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Abstract 
The ongoing and evolving threat from Islamist and far-right extremism, as well as the 
challenges associated with returnee foreign fighters, means that reporting of radicalisation 
and extremism is a counterterrorism priority. Surprisingly, the research on incentives and 
obstacles for reporting is limited — i.e. focused on communication campaigns such as ‘See 
it. Say it. Sorted’, and the threshold for reporting in targeted communities. Thus, this 
research aims to contribute distinctively to the literature.  
This interdisciplinary comparative case study examines the role and limitations of 
counterterrorism community engagement (CTCE) in the reporting of radicalisation and 
extremism in West Yorkshire (UK) and East Jutland (Denmark). Specifically, this thesis 
explores (1) delivery of CTCE in these regions; (2) the effect of CTCE on reporting 
behaviour; (3) the motivations of and barriers to reporting for professionals and families; 
and (4) the extent to which data from this study and theories in the fields of criminology, 
political science, behavioural science and psychology collectively explain the relationship 
between CTCE and reporting. Semi-structured interviews and secondary data were 
collected between 2017 and 2019 to understand if and how the formal reporting of 
radicalisation and extremism could be encouraged and improved through CTCE. 
Consequently, the thesis uses, develops and contributes to the existing Transformative 
Research Design model and Yin’s notion of case studies, which are discussed in detail. 
Comparative assessment of practice and experience of this cross-national study are 
presented. CTCE was delivered through a multi-agency approach in a multi-layered 
fashion, at times, targeted, focusing on different audiences. The prominent difference was 
that East Jutland worked closely with families, which was vital to prevention. The results 
suggest CTCE can positively affect reporting, especially from families and close associates 
(East Jutland saw 63% average annual increase); and once limited there appeared to be a 
negative relationship. The thesis argues the positive relationship is due to practitioners 
connecting with those engaged on a personal level, as well as the support available to 
reporters. There were similarities and differences in motivation and barriers to reporting 
between professionals and families, notably trigger points. The data from professional 
reporters revealed factors that influenced the quality of reports. Mid- to long-term 
recommendations are proposed. Integrated models of reporting behaviour and CTCE are 
introduced. The implications and limitations of the study, as well as the future research, 
are discussed.  
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Chapter 1 
In The Beginning: An Introduction 
1.1 Introducing the Thesis 
“Twisted minds can be straightened with teamwork, with the government and 
family.” (Abase 2019) 
The above comment was made by Hussen Abase, the father of Amira Abase, in response to 
Shamima Begum requesting to return to the UK. Shamima, Amira, and their friend Kadiza 
became known as the Bethnal Green Trio when they left home at the age of 15 to join ISIS 
in February 2015. This incident and the public media focus that surrounded it raised a 
number of important questions. Is it possible to prevent radicalisation and extremism 
through a partnership between the authorities and families? High quality intelligence 
(which requires timely, appropriate, reliable, accurate, and comprehensive information) 
can be significant in the prevention of radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism, especially 
in some cases where failing to prevent harmful behaviours could result in costly acts of 
violence. One source of intelligence is the formal reporting of concerns, through which, 
commonly, the aim is to stop the escalation of risk that may result in certain acts — 
namely the prevention of a future event (or series of events). Families are therefore 
ideally placed to know or suspect, based on changes in behaviour and early warning signs. 
With growing concerns about returning foreign fighters and recent terrorist incidents, 
reporting of radicalisation and extremism is a counterterrorism (CT) priority, particularly 
reports from relatives and close associates. However, data from the Home Office reveals 
that only a few relatives and close associates report concerns of radicalisation and 
extremism to the authorities (Home Office 2018c).  
Across the North Sea, the Danish city of Aarhus experienced the return of foreign fighters. 
Practitioners working in the prevention of radicalisation and extremism at community 
level started to get telephone calls from parents of at-risk individuals, and the foreign 
fighters themselves. In 2012, approximately 34 people left Aarhus for Syria, 18 of whom 
returned and reached out to practitioners at the Info-House, as did hundreds of other 
vulnerable individuals. The work of Info-House resulted in very few people leaving Aarhus 
for Syria (Rosin 2016). Why was this happening? What were the practitioners doing to 
encourage not only parents to report their children but also to encourage the vulnerable 
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individuals themselves to come forward? What is known about the experiences and views 
of those who reported radicalisation and extremism, particularly relatives?  
Surprisingly, little is known about the motivations and obstacles (push and pull factors) of 
cooperative behaviour (i.e. reporting) and citizen participation, in relation to 
radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism. This thesis is a collaborative ESRC project, 
funded primarily to compare the prevention of radicalisation and extremism in Denmark 
(East Jutland) and the UK (West Yorkshire). It seeks to contribute to this gap by exploring 
the relationship between community-based engagement and the reporting of 
radicalisation and extremism, which, it will be argued, lacks an informed body of research 
to complement policy and practice.  
From a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary lens (see Chapter 4), this thesis integrates 
the literature of several relevant disciplines — criminology, political science, behavioural 
science and psychology — to explore reporting behaviour, as well as the importance of 
counterterrorism community engagement (CTCE) in the reporting of radicalisation and 
extremism. The thesis uses reporting behaviour as a proxy measure for the 
(in)effectiveness of CTCE (see Section 1.3). The thesis hypothesises a relationship 
between CTCE and reporting behaviour, and that through connecting with the individual 
at a personal level, the psychological needs of reporting are met, which result in an 
increased number of reports, especially from relatives and close associates. Moreover, it 
hypothesises that there is a difference in how CTCE is delivered in East Jutland and West 
Yorkshire, and that this difference has an influence on reporting behaviour.   
The thesis synthesises a range of relevant theories focused on cooperative behaviour and 
decision-making from separate disciplinary approaches to construct a conceptual and 
analytical framework, for the use of CTCE in the prevention of radicalisation and 
extremism, and as a tool to assess its impact on reporting behaviour. These theories were 
selected based on their relevance to, and ability to explain, predict, and understand the 
processes of, the decision to report, and the relationship (if any) between reporting 
behaviour and CTCE. Therefore, the theories from behavioural science, including 
psychology, are especially useful to this thesis, as they allow for consideration of internal 
and external factors that shape behaviour, as well as relationships. Moreover, theories 
from criminology and political science provide valuable insight for understanding police-
public relationships, as well as public responses to CT, related strategies and challenges 
that authorities face in encouraging public cooperation, especially in a CT context.  
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It is important to note that while CT strategies are interesting concepts and in need of 
further examination (there are several general reviews of these strategies e.g. 
Hemmingsen 2015; Radicalization Awareness Network 2018; Joint Committee on Human 
Rights 2018 each, to some extent reflecting on work being done at the community level), 
due to the pace of development and breadth of this research, this thesis will not be 
analysing the CT strategies of the UK and Denmark as a whole, as this is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. Rather, the study focuses on one particular aspect of CT strategies: namely 
community-based engagement: an exploration of one of the cogs (Community 
Engagement) in this machine (CT strategy) that is used, among other means, for 
prevention purposes. More specifically, the thesis is interested in exploring the impact of 
CTCE on reporting behaviour.  
The thesis aims to explore: (1) the method and style in which CTCE is delivered in East 
Jutland and West Yorkshire; (2) the effect of CTCE on reporting behaviour; (3) the 
motivators and barriers that influence reporting of radicalisation/extremism by 
professionals and families; and (4) the extent to which the above-mentioned collective 
interdisciplinary literature and data from this thesis can establish drivers and predictors 
of reporting behaviour in a CT context, as well as explain any relationship between CTCE 
and reporting.  
Thus, the following review presents an overview of the evolution of CTCE as a preventive 
strategy and the contributing factors of citizen participation and reporting behaviour, in 
addition to a comparative analysis of CTCE and reporting of radicalisation and extremism 
in East Jutland and West Yorkshire, as well as the impact of CTCE on reporting in these 
regions.  
The current chapter first outlines the meaning of key terms used in this thesis. Next, it sets 
out the field of inquiry and draws up the boundaries of the context and the landscape of 
the thesis, focusing on the effect of CTCE on the reporting of radicalisation and extremism. 
This is followed by a discussion of the gaps in the literature that this thesis will address, 
highlighting originality. Subsequently, the research aims, questions and approach are 
stated. The chapter concludes by outlining the structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Introducing the Key Terminologies 
Before describing the problems and gaps this thesis seeks to address, it is important to 
explain and define some of the key concepts, specifically ‘pre-criminal space’ and ‘CE’, at 
the outset, for the purpose of clarifying definitions and hence the scope of the thesis.  
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It is not the aim (or within the scope) of this thesis to explore pre-criminal space as a 
phenomenon or its evolution and use in CT or crime prevention. The aim of this section is 
to introduce the term to the reader. Chapter 2 of the thesis explores the preventive turn 
and evolution in policing, and its relevance to this thesis. Pre-criminal space is a term that 
is used frequently in CT and crime prevention, and it lacks a  definition (Heath-Kelly 2017, 
p.280; Ashworth & Zedner 2014; Zedner 2007). The notion itself “consists of three terms: 
‘pre’ meaning before, ‘criminal’ as a person who has committed a crime or repeated 
crimes, and ‘space’ as a continuous physical area” (Goldberg et al. 2017, p.210; Ashworth 
& Zedner 2014; Zedner 2007). However, ‘space’ can also refer to time or context. Thus, 
‘pre’ modifies the person (i.e. criminal) and the ‘space’, as there is a suggestion of a trigger 
or threshold that needs to be met for the modification of the person. Therefore, the 
urgency for action in a given context is implied through the notion of time.  
Although there is no definition for the term, it is suggested that pre-criminal space can be 
linked to crime prevention measures of the mid-twentieth century that predicted the 
probability of future offending through the use of data and calculative rationality of risk 
on prior criminal conduct, school leavers, and economic deprivation (McCulloch & Wilson 
2015, p.9). These predictive measures, especially in CT, have been criticised by many since 
it brings ‘community’ into a pre-criminal space and underassessment of terrorism risk, as 
they might be viewed with suspicion (Heath-Kelly 2017, p.283). This is also referred to as 
‘targeted communities’, as a certain community is believed to be associated with the risk 
factors of terrorism and extremism. The notion of risk factors and types of prevention are 
discussed in Chapter 2, criticism of ‘targeted communities’ are examined in Chapters 2 
and 3. 
Although controversies exist around the tools or methods use to predict criminal 
behaviour, the pre-criminal space is all about seeking to ensure that a crime is prevented. 
Therefore, it is looking for environmental and individual factors that are believed to shape 
a specific crime. This notion of social and environmental factors is one that crime 
prevention approaches and theories have started to adopt, leading to a preventive turn in 
policing (discussed in Chapter 2). One form of pre-crime prevention strategy is CE, which 
refers to the development and maintenance of the relationship between communities and 
public bodies (e.g. police, councils, health providers etc). The term CTCE is used 
consistently throughout the thesis to designate a form of CT strategy that indicates a mode 
of delivery that is hybrid, consisting of elements and aims of both CT and CE in varying 
combinations and mixes within the prevention of radicalisation and extremism. Its 
evolution and application are discussed in Chapters 2 and 5.  
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Myhill (2012, p.19) explains that CE has different meanings for everyone and defines CE as 
“the process of enabling the participation of citizens and communities in policing at their 
chosen level, ranging from providing information and reassurance to empowering them to 
identify and implement solutions to local problems and influence strategic priorities and 
decisions.”As a ‘soft’ policing strategy (i.e. one that is not punitive), CE is regarded as 
preventive and proactive policing strategy (Docobo 2005; Sherman 2006), rather than one 
with the intent of punitive action. Thus, the emphasis is upon a more persuasive mode of 
social control, with the agenda that is not usually typical of policing areas (Innes 2005). As 
such, CE commonly operates in the pre-criminal space. It is based on the notion that crime 
prevention can be made possible through citizen empowerment (Stevens 2001). Although 
CE as a concept is well-established in the literature concerning public policy (Mccabe et al. 
2006, p.8), the meaning differs for different users of the term, and different contexts 
within the literature. Thus, there is no fixed definition,  as a result of CE being a 
complicated term: ‘community’ and ‘engagement’ are themselves problematic notions 
(Myhill 2012, p.15). 
For the purpose of this research, the thesis will define community as a group of 
individuals that share commonalities such as ethnicity, religion, location, values, norms, 
and other forms of identity. These social ties are important for the sense of identity and 
social roles (Ritzer 2007). Communities can be small (micro level) (e.g. a neighbourhood) 
or large (macro-level) (e.g. national and international community) (James 2006). Research 
has identified that factors constitute a ‘sense of community’: membership, influence, 
integration and fulfilment of needs, and shared emotional connection (McMillan & Chavis 
1986). An individual may have multiple community memberships at any one time (e.g. 
culture, gender, profession, sports team membership, etc.). This membership is fluid, as 
the individual may move in and out of communities over time (Myhill 2012, p.15). Social 
Identity Theory (SIT) provides a psychological explanation for such memberships, as 
belonging to groups shape our identities and relationships (Tajfel & Turner 1979).  
Thus, through group memberships, individuals establish their normative beliefs, attitudes, 
and behaviours (Billig & Tajfel 1973; Hogg et al. 1995). This sense of membership and 
association highlights that there is a psychological underpinning to whom, what or where 
(and at times when) one associates oneself with. To belong or to avoid is a psychological 
and behavioural process. Consequently, for this thesis, ‘community’ in CE is a 
psychological notion, the underpinnings of which need addressing in order to guide 
human behaviour. 
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‘Engage’ means to ‘occupy or attract someone’s attention or interest’, to ‘involve someone’ 
or to ‘participate or become involved’, to ‘establish a meaningful contact or connection’, 
and to ‘pledge or enter into a contract to do something’. Therefore, engagement involves 
or refers to a psychological state, which induces ‘commitment’ or ‘motivation’ (Schaufeli 
2013). Vocabulary around engagement in the literature also expands to concepts such as 
‘participation’, ‘consultation’, ‘outreach’, and ‘partnership’. Considering this, this thesis 
views the term ‘engage’ in the same light as Shaufeli (2013). As such, this thesis argues 
that effective CE (and CTCE) is dependent on psychological processes, as the willingness 
to cooperate like other forms of behaviour is reliant on the psychological needs that must 
be met, thus making the strategy effective and prevention possible. 
1.3 The Problem 
In their report, which looked at community thresholds for reporting potential violent 
extremism and terrorism, Thomas et al. argued that “an overwhelming majority of 
respondents wanted to report [concerns of radicalisation and extremism] to their local 
police, not counter-terrorism specialists” (Thomas et al. 2017, p.7). They may be right 
about to whom people prefer to report their concerns of violent extremism, but they could 
also be dismissing the possibility that this preference is context-dependent, which is 
influenced by various factors. Moreover, Thomas et al. provided participants with 
hypothetical scenarios and in some sense there is an assumption that people will do as 
they say. However, what someone says they would do in a hypothetical situation may not 
match what they actually do in real life. The literature on human decision-making 
illustrates that humans are not rational, even in instances where there is self-interest 
(Kahneman & Tversky 1979).  
Thomas et al. continue to explain that “as the preventative arm of counter-terrorism 
policy and operating in the pre-crime space, it is a moot point as to whether Prevent at the 
local level should welcome or be equipped to receive local expressions of concern about 
possible violent extremist activity or recruitment” (Thomas et al. 2017, p.38). Although 
there are controversies around Prevent, as presented earlier in Denmark the CT 
practitioners at the Info-House had managed to persuade families and vulnerable people 
to report to them and seek assistance. Therefore, this begs the question of context. For this 
thesis, context refers to the delivery of CTCE, relationships, internal and external factors, 
and access to information (i.e. awareness of the help available). Moreover, Thomas et al. 
argue that although young adults expressed a willingness to consider talking to teachers 
or lecturers about their concerns of radicalisation/extremism, “all respondents were 
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dubious about sharing concerns with GPs/Health staff, whom they saw as inappropriate 
or lacking subject matter knowledge about these issues” (Thomas et al. 2017, p.81). As for 
approaching local government, Thomas et al. suggested that their respondents were 
uncertain about the practicalities of doing so. Although people may have limited options in 
terms of to whom they report, the research by Thomas et al. suggests they have a 
preference. Whom one approaches with concerns of extremism is influenced by context, a 
person’s concept of self and relationships with others, which, in turn, are shaped by 
perception. Reporting is a behaviour. A key factor that guides behaviour is perception: an 
individual’s interpretation and mental representation of the world, which is argued to be 
based on their past experiences and theories (e.g. social norms and stereotypes) about 
one’s environment (Medin 1989). In other words, perception is the brain’s way of 
interpreting ambiguity with the most likely explanation possible (Berns 2010). It is 
through the perception of one’s environment that one can understand and identify who 
one is, as well as making sense of others based on the reasons for their actions (Rangel & 
Keller 2011). Not only does perception contour one’s sense of identity, but also the 
identity of others, which subsequently shapes how one feels about a group (e.g. 
legitimacy) and behaviour towards the said group.  
Thomas et al. (2017) do not explore the context dependency in reporting behaviour, 
especially when discussing preferred choices. However, in the above quotation, they do 
capture the consequence and complexity of relationships and perceptions that guide this 
reporting behaviour. In their research, they suggest that, should the reporters wish to 
escalate their concerns by approaching local police, they would rather do so in person to 
engage in discussion and ensure their concerns are taken seriously. Therefore, this 
suggests that the reporter has needs they wish to address when reporting, including the 
expectation that their concerns elicit action. This thesis seeks to expand on Thomas et al.’s 
(2017) research by exploring the role of CTCE in reporting radicalisation and extremism, 
as well as its importance. Therefore, the thesis also seeks to challenge and push the 
margins of the above statement by exploring the impact of CTCE on reporting. It is 
important to address this problem, as CTCE is about engaging with people, and knowing 
the underlying psychological factors that shape behaviour can assist in informing better 
CTCE practices. As such, behavioural insight can guide effective prevention of 
radicalisation and extremism through CTCE.  
Additionally, Thomas et al. (2017) go further suggesting that to report concerns of violent 
extremism, ‘intimate reporters’ — a term used to describe those close to the vulnerable 
individual such as family, friends and community insiders — need to overcome certain 
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barriers, triggers, and thresholds before making the grave decision to report their 
concerns to the police. This thought process will often include attempting to dissuade the 
vulnerable individual, as well as seeking counsel and guidance from family members, 
friends, trusted lecturers/teachers, and community leaders. These barriers, triggers, and 
thresholds suggest a personal element linked to emotions, relationships and needs, which 
shape the context for the reporter. As explained earlier, perceptions of self and others 
influence behaviour, based on the stereotypes (see Chapter 3) associated with an adopted 
identity (e.g. a mother protecting her child is a stereotype of the mother-child 
relationship). Thus, this thesis argues that identity can shape and influence the decision to 
report, as it is through this medium that perceptions are formed and used as lens to 
interpret the surrounding world. Therefore, this research seeks to explore the threshold 
of reporting through the process of decision making. By understanding reasoning behind 
the decision to report, the thesis can explore what role identity plays in the decision to 
report, and why it is important in the application of CTCE. Again, this is vital to gaining 
behavioural insight into how reporting behaviour is shaped in order to tailor the CTCE 
and reporting process to be more effective in encouraging reporting of radicalisation and 
extremism.  
Furthermore, the UK government research shows (see Figure 1) that the vast majority of 
initial formal radicalisation and extremism reports (89%) come from professionals 
(primarily education services, providing 33% of the reports), with very few intimate 
reporters (3%). Moreover, only a small fraction of these reports receive Channel support 
or make it to intervention programmes or meet their thresholds. As presented in Figure 1, 
those discussed at Channel indicates that those reports have met the required threshold 
— i.e. identified risk associated with radicalisation, extremism, or terrorism. Whilst those 
who received Channel support only refer to those who accepted to voluntarily join the 
programme. There are others who refuse to take part in Channel even if they have met the 
risk assessment threshold. Consequently, this thesis seeks to explore the impact of CTCE 
on reports — especially those from relatives and close associates. It argues that if CTCE is 
delivered effectively (i.e. if it connects with one’s sense of identity), this may result in an 
increased number of reports from this cohort. It is important to address this problem, as 
relatives and close associates are usually best placed to spot the early signs of 
radicalisation or extremism. The earlier the intervention is introduced, the earlier risk 
management can be put in place. 
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 Although it is fair to argue that not all those reported should necessarily receive 
intervention support from programmes such as Channel, as risk assessments evaluate the 
vulnerability, severity, and the validity of reports. Nevertheless, the high volume of 
reports from professionals with only a small number needing to receive the non-
compulsory intervention service, may suggest a problem of evidential quality in these 
reports. Therefore, the thesis explores the factors that influence and the reasoning behind 
professional reporters’ decisions to raise concerns as well as the role and importance of 
CTCE in improving such reports. This is important for identifying barriers and problems in 
the service that are damaging the effectiveness (e.g. the volume of reports putting a strain 
on the resources and quality of service provided).  
The problem becomes clear: how can authorities, through CTCE, encourage people to 
report their concerns while ensuring good quality reports, as well as encouraging reports 
from relatives or close associates? See Chapters 7, 8, and Appendix O. This thesis argues 
that if CTCE is implemented in a way that connects with the individual on a personal level 
(identity), then reporting can be increased, especially from intimate reporters. In addition, 
if CTCE is need-focused, it can improve the quality of reports. 
Figure 1: Reports of radicalisation and extremism based on the Home Office data 2017/2018. 
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Another problem is the notion of prevention. How can prevention or its effectiveness be 
measured? How can the (in)effectiveness of CTCE be identified? In cases where direct 
measurement of an outcome is unavailable and/or unobservable due to lack of data, but 
the desired outcome is known, a proxy measure is commonly used. A proxy is an indirect 
measurement of a strong correlation that indicates a relationship with the outcome (i.e. 
prevention). For the purpose of this thesis, reporting behaviour is considered a proxy 
measure, as it has an indirect relationship with prevention, since an intention of sharing 
information is to stop a situation from escalating.  
1.4 Bridging The Gap 
Despite the recognition that public cooperation is vital to CT, this is an under-researched 
area. Most research in the CTCE context has focused on gathering intelligence (Innes 
2006) and improving police cooperation and legitimacy (Dunn et al. 2016; Briggs 2010). 
This research differs to that of Dunn et al. (2016) in measuring the impact of CE in a CT 
context, as this thesis does not directly measure attitudes to and trust in police, especially 
the within ‘Muslim’ community, nor does it measure the level of community members’ 
awareness of CT initiatives. Instead, this thesis focuses on reporting behaviour (i.e. 
reasons and barriers to reporting) and the impact CTCE might have on it, as it illustrates 
the possible intent to prevent alleged criminal activity or behaviour. Therefore, this thesis 
contributes to knowledge by exploring CTCE and cooperation from a different angle — i.e. 
from the perspective of reporters and frontline practitioners. The niche lies in the former 
group, as they have reported concerns of radicalisation and extremism — a cohort that 
thus far (at least this thesis did not identify such literature) have not been explored for 
many reasons including access to participants due to security and sensitivity of the topic. 
Similarly, the literature on reporting behaviour, particularly in CT context, was limited. 
Research on other crime reporting behaviour (e.g. sexual assault) is focused on victims 
reporting crime rather than looking at various sources of reports. Moreover, in the context 
of current terrorism and extremism (notably post 9/11) literature on reporting of 
radicalisation and extremism is scarce, with research focusing on two different aims: a) 
communication strategies that encourage reporting of suspicious behaviour such as the 
‘See It, Say It. Sorted’ campaign (Parker et al. 2017; Pearce et al. 2019); and b) thresholds 
of reporting, which looks at community respondents (Thomas et al. 2017).  
The latter is where the current study can be situated. However, it differs from Thomas et 
al. (2017), as it explores the reasoning behind the decision to report 
radicalisation/extremism, as well as looking at the impact of CTCE on reporting 
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behaviour. Moreover, unlike Thomas et al. (2017), this thesis does not focus on particular 
‘communities’ (e.g. ‘Muslim’ or ‘marginalised White British’). Rather it is concerned with 
those who have actually reported concerns of radicalisation and extremism. This is 
important, as people outside a specific community —e.g. ‘Muslim’— also report such 
concerns. It would also be interesting to see if there was a difference in how this process 
(i.e. the decision to report) differed for professional reporters (e.g. teachers) to that of 
relatives and close associates. This will provide behavioural insight and create an 
opportunity for practitioners to understand why people come forward, and based on that 
they can encourage and improve reporting of radicalisation, which ultimately can lead to 
prevention. 
Additionally, the gaps in the literature suggest that the research on decision-making in 
criminology thus far has primarily been dominated by behavioural economics, such as the 
use of rational choice theory in crime prevention research (Cornish & Clarke 1986). The 
psychology literature on preventive reasoned action and behavioural change seems to be 
dominated by health behaviour research (Montano & Kasprzyk 2015; McAfee et al. 2019). 
Similarly, behavioural economics explores the notion of reasoned action and decision-
making from the consumer perspective (Hui et al. 2009; Varki & Colgate 2001). Although 
advances have been made in these fields in understanding behaviour and decision-
making, there remains a question as to the reasons and the need for reporting 
radicalisation and extremism, and how this decision-making process is shaped. More 
importantly, what role does CTCE play in influencing this reporting behaviour or 
addressing the needs of reporters? The work described in the following chapters attempts 
to understand how each of these fields can inform a better understanding of behaviour 
and decision-making — in the context of reporting of radicalisation and extremism — 
through fusion and integration of the available theories.  
Therefore, this thesis seeks to contribute to existing knowledge by addressing these gaps 
through the application of behavioural insight to CT policing, and reporting of 
radicalisation/extremism. This is significant because this research can be used to better 
inform policy and practice, as well as the existing literature in relevant disciplines. As a 
result, this contribution is multifaceted. The core, original contribution of the thesis is in 
its findings, which deepen understanding of why people in different contexts report 
concerns about radicalisation/extremism, and how CTCE is relevant, and translate this 
into recommendations in terms of strengthening CTCE.  
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Additionally, there are secondary contributions. First, the thesis takes an interdisciplinary 
and multidisciplinary approach (see Chapter 4): it looks at the prevention of radicalisation 
and extremism (a key focus for criminology and political science) through the lens of 
behavioural science (a discipline that is informed by theories of psychology, cognitive 
science, anthropology, and economics). This is significant because the research takes a 
multi-layered approach in understanding CTCE and reporting radicalisation and 
extremism, as well as the relationship that may exist between them. As such, through the 
application of behavioural insights, a new perspective is provided to understand these 
phenomena. Therefore, the result of this research can provide an evidence-based 
approach to a style of CTCE that may encourage and improve reporting of 
radicalisation/extremism, which ultimately may result in prevention.  
Second, this research seeks to contribute to the further development of existing 
psychological models. One of the models advanced is the Integrated Behavioural Model 
(IBM) (Montano & Kasprzyk 2015). The thesis seeks to add additional psychological 
factors to IBM, which influence behaviour — in particular, reporting of radicalisation and 
extremism — by exploring the literature on criminology, psychology, and behavioural 
economics. The significance of this contribution is that this research can further advance 
psychological theories and understanding of reasoned action, in addition to criminology 
theories of reporting behaviour and citizen participation. Consequently, the contribution 
made by this thesis  can be significant, as it not only incorporates existing models and 
theories for better insight, which is infrequently done, but also advances existing theories 
by applying a behavioural dimension. This is discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.  
Third, the methodological approach that this thesis utilises is a multi-method design, with 
an added comparative dimension, which has a focus upon delivering policy and practice 
impact. Therefore, the thesis has to some extent adapted the Transformative Research 
Design (TRD) (Mertens 2005; Mertens 2012), to afford a different approach and starting 
point — the reporters and those concerned about radicalisation and extremism — to 
encourage social justice and change (i.e. policy and practice that reflects the needs for 
reporting of radicalisation and extremis,). This is also done through learning from 
comparative study of practices and experiences in two sites (West Yorkshire, UK and East 
Jutland, Denmark). 
Stigma associated with radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism can create an unclear, 
alienated, fearful, and vulnerable environment that elicits inequality in accessing support 
and empowerment. Unlike other forms of crime (e.g. rape, murder, assault etc.), 
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radicalisation and extremism are vague concepts for non-specialists; it is a grey zone, a 
knife-edge that leaves the concerned individual (reporter) in the dark — experiencing 
doubt, uncertainty and not knowing what to look for. For example, these hunters in the 
dark do not know if someone’s conservative religious beliefs or racist world view may be 
associated with radicalisation or extremism, as not every person with such ideologies has 
been radicalised or is an extremist since these ideologies may not lead to criminality. They 
do not know what signs  to look for or the accumulation of what events could be a cause 
for concern. This is the information that CT professionals posses, as they work with such 
cases on daily basis, particularly when it is in a pre-criminal space. 
Although there is stigma associated with other forms of crime, there is still a sense of 
victimhood associated with those who are harmed. However, in cases of radicalisation and 
extremism, victimhood is usually associated with those who are harmed by acts of 
terrorism or extremism. The stigma not only brings about shame and alienates the 
concerned individual, but they are also not recognised as a victim, especially families who 
are worried about a loved one being radicalised or at risk of extremism. These families 
(not to mention the vulnerable individual) are victims of crimes such as grooming, and in 
some cases human trafficking. In some cases, they may be viewed as part of the problem. 
Therefore, the help offered to this group is not as available or evident in comparison to 
that offered to victims of other forms of crime.  
In this sense, reporters and those concerned about radicalisation and extremism are 
marginalised. Therefore, this thesis is informed and guided by TRD, as the design focuses 
on such marginalised groups. Its “philosophical worldview focuses on the needs of groups 
and individuals in our society that may be marginalised or disenfranchised” (Creswell 
2014, p.10). Hence, by keeping the focus on the needs of this group, this thesis aims to 
create change in CTCE practice that benefits this cohort. The data from the multi-method 
design of this research design can be used to introduce change, allow tailoring of CTCE 
practice with the needs of reporters in mind alongside prevention. A service should be 
influenced and informed by the people it is designed to serve. Therefore, the significance 
of this methodological contribution is twofold: (a) to illustrate the flexibility of TRD by 
amending it without sacrificing social justice in order to meet the needs of this research 
and; (b) to ensure the impact of research (see Chapter 4). Additionally, the thesis seeks to 
advance some arguments on the use of multiple case studies and research questions. In its 
design, the thesis adapts (in small ways) Robert Yin’s notion of case studies, which makes 
the use of case studies in research more diverse by suggesting exploratory questions can 
also be explanatory (see Chapter 4).  
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Further, this research seeks to contribute to the field of CT policing and cooperative 
behaviour research by providing data from reporters. The significance of this is the 
demonstration of the relationship between academia and CT policing, in particular getting 
access to data deemed impossible by some in academia. This is not to say access is not 
challenging. However, it opens doors for future collaborations and research. Additionally, 
focusing on delivering change that benefits the reporters is more likely to encourage their 
participation in further research. This is a significant step in CT research, as access to 
participants is usually limited. Finally, this research seeks to inform CT literature and is 
distinctive in that it adopts a comparative approach to the policies and practices in East 
Jutland (Denmark) and West Yorkshire (UK) that impact reporting of radicalisation and 
extremism. This broad audit of processes has not been studied previously in the context of 
CT and CE, through the lens of behavioural insight. The aim is to learn about best practice 
and its appropriate application to other geographical regions.  
Comparative studies highlight what has not been effective and why. As part of this 
comparison, it is possible to explore how policies are resisted in practice or changed to 
achieve the end result. Identification of these barriers and problems provides insight for 
future policy and practice, a significant output that is evidence-based and may be cost-
effective in the long run. This comparison provides an English language insight into the CE 
practices in East Jutland, as most of the literature is presented in Danish. Consequently, 
this research seeks to address these gaps empirically (through the use of qualitative and 
some secondary statistical data to challenge or support assumptions) and interpretively 
(meaning attached to behaviour) by exploring the CE strategies and practices in East 
Jutland and West Yorkshire. Also, it explores the reporters’ reasons for reporting 
radicalisation/extremism to inform the reporting behaviour model. The thesis seeks to 
identify the needs of both reporters and practitioners to inform practice and policy with 
reporters’ needs in mind.  
1.4.1 Behavioural Insights as a Policy and Practice Tool  
This section is about introducing the importance and benefits of using behavioural 
insights as a policy and practice tool. It is not an assessment of the effectiveness or impact 
of behavioural insights on policy or practice. The use of behavioural science in policy and 
practice is a new concept, but a vital one in the evidence-based era. Consequently, the aim 
of this section is to illustrate how the data from this thesis can be used to better inform 
policy and practice through behavioural insight.  
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Behavioural insights or behavioural science — informed by a growing body of social and 
cognitive psychology, as well as behavioural economics — assists with understanding and 
predicting behaviour. The approach stems from questioning the assumption of 
‘rationality’ in decision-making. The methods of behavioural insights are derived from 
psychology, which involves identifying patterns of behaviour in an empirical format. As a 
result, behavioural science bridges the natural sciences (how the brain works) and social 
sciences (how people work together) in order to provide insight into how behaviour is 
shaped. Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis focus in detail on these natural and social sciences 
in the context of reporting behaviour and public cooperation to gain an holistic 
understanding of factors that shape reporting behaviour.  
Behaviour can be a key element for successful policy initiative, as policy-making can gain 
greatly from understanding people’s behaviour and how it is shaped. The application of 
behavioural insights to policies is possible whenever there is a behavioural element 
present (Bavel et al. 2013, p.6). More importantly, people are at the heart of social issues, 
and to address these problems there is a need to understand what drives these behaviours 
or decisions. Behaviour is a by-product of our environment, influenced by internal and 
external factors that guide personal biases (also referred to as heuristics — mental 
shortcuts). As such, in behavioural science, the complexity of human beings becomes the 
fundamental unit in understanding the problem more holistically, as behaviour is not 
black-and-white. This insight in return can help with better-informed policies that can 
meet the desired outcomes; and behavioural science is increasingly being used across 
public services — as well as private — for this purpose (Bavel et al. 2013, pp.6–10; 
Halpern et al. 2004, p.31; Halpern 2015, p.217). Thus, policy and practice are evidence-
based.  
When policies are introduced without taking into consideration the behavioural evidence, 
there is a gap between the law and actual behaviour, due to lack of understanding of how 
behaviour works. There is a naive assumption that people will automatically support 
desired behaviour regardless of other factors in play. It assumes that people will 
‘rationally’ consider the cost, which will outweigh other pressures and concerns. 
Unsurprisingly, such uneducated assumptions do not elicit the desired effect and lead to 
policy implementation failure or ineffectiveness. For example, there was strong opposition 
from some educational services — particularly universities — to introduction of the 
Prevent Duty. It was argued that the Prevent Duty limited freedom of thought and 
expression in an educational setting for fear of being considered an ‘extremist’. Moreover, 
the Duty assumed that these practitioners know the signs of radicalisation/extremism and 
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that the reports made would be supported by sufficient evidence and intelligence, and that 
the relationships and processes in place encouraged such cooperative behaviour. 
Consequently, there was a lack of support for the Prevent Duty and some academics 
refused to view prevention of radicalisation/extremism as a safeguarding issue.   
There are instances where such intervention has worked, and that can be seen when the 
desired behaviour is understood better, and the inhibitors are in place. Behavioural 
change and behavioural influence is possible with a surprisingly light touch, as long as one 
knows what that touch ought to be. If the intention is to affect behaviour, then one needs 
to make it easy, attractive, socially acceptable, and timely (Service et al. 2014, pp.4–5), but 
in order to do that one needs to understand the behaviour itself. For example, a national 
two-week weapon surrender in 2014 resulted in over 6,000 weapons being handed in 
directly to the police (BBC, 2017). This campaign urged people to anonymously surrender 
unwanted or illegal weapons at designated police stations across the UK without facing 
prosecution. Of course the campaign was communicated across the nation (and the 
effectiveness of its communication perhaps can be studied elsewhere), but the campaign 
was effective because it understood the barriers that would stop an individual from 
handing in a weapon. By removing the fear of prosecution and identifying safe discarding 
zones, as well as creating a social environment led by the example of others, the police 
successfully managed to remove lethal weapons from  society — the desired outcome. 
It is important to note that although behavioural insights can be beneficial, it should not 
be expected to solve problems that it is not intended to address, but rather used as a 
complementary tool. Therefore, behavioural science, like any other field, has its 
limitations. For example, in the case of the Prevent Duty, it is not for behavioural science 
to say whether safeguarding of vulnerable individuals should be the duty of practitioners 
from education services. However, it can shed light on how such policies can be effective 
in eliciting cooperation from this group. This also raises another question about the use of 
behavioural science: if human behaviour is irrational, then how can behaviour be 
explained or predicted? There are many attempts in scientific literature to provide 
explanations, considering many factors (see Chapters 2 and 3). However, there is no 
homogeneous model of behaviour that encompasses all theories, which can then be used 
to predict behaviour. Behaviour is context-dependant, and any attempt at explaining 
behaviour is reliant on the dynamics of a particular context (not to mention the medium 
used to interpret that context), which requires specific empirical observations. Therefore, 
the insight from one particular context cannot be used in a different context to elicit the 
same desired response, although the insight can be used broadly, if applicable, to provide 
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a foundation for understanding factors that may be at play in a given context.  This can be 
argued to be a positive element of behavioural science that encourages behavioural 
observation in isolation but also holistically through recognition of the multifaceted 
nature of context and behaviour, which intertwine and interact with one another. Thus, 
promote reality checks in researching social phenomena that requires understanding of 
behaviour, which is essential for evidence-based policies and practices.  
This thesis seeks to provide evidence-based insights into reporting behaviour in a given 
context to create an opportunity for implanting change. This thesis primarily focuses on 
reporting behaviour in a CT context and how this behaviour is shaped. It considers the 
needs of reporters and how they can be met through CTCE. It identifies similarities and 
differences in threat perception and reporting behaviour of reporters that are family 
members and those that are professionals e.g. teachers. Thus, the thesis tries to 
understand why people report, their thought processes, the context they were in, and the 
relationship CTCE has in shaping reporting behaviour. This is with the intention to bring 
forth the needs of reporters. The cohort that CT needs to promote and achieve prevention 
is the same cohort that is marginalised with excessive expectations and limited support, to 
encourage and improve reporting of radicalisation and extremism. Consequently, the 
thesis aims to encourage change in CTCE policy and practice that benefits this cohort and 
meet the axiological expectations of TRD.  
1.5 Positioning the Research: Research Question, Objectives, and 
Approach 
The thesis is a theoretically informed empirical study. The analytical and conceptual 
framework developed to explore the impact of CTCE on reporting behaviour is drawn 
from different disciplines. These are synthesised to permit and promote the analysis of the 
relationship between CTCE and reporting behaviour, as part of wider prevention 
strategies in a CT context. From a preliminary reading of these literature and disciplinary 
traditions, an overarching research question was derived: What is the relationship 
between CTCE and the reporting of radicalisation and extremism, and why does this 
relationship exist? 
To answer this question, the following specific research questions (which were also 
presented in brief in Section 1.1) will be addressed through collection and analysis of 
primary and secondary data: 
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1. What is CTCE in the broader context of prevention, and how do the police 
and their partner agencies (e.g. local authorities) explain its use and delivery in 
East Jutland and West Yorkshire?  
2. How effective is CTCE in encouraging people to report concerns of 
radicalisation/extremism, and what are the reasons for this? 
3. What are the reasons and barriers for people reporting or not reporting 
radicalisation/extremism, and how can CTCE address these needs? 
4. How, if at all, can the existing literature and current data explain the 
existence of any relationship between CTCE and reporting behaviour? 
5. What lessons can be learnt from East Jutland and West Yorkshire in 
shaping CTCE practices that encourage and improve reporting of radicalisation 
and extremism? 
As mentioned earlier, this research uses TRD and case studies to address the above 
questions. For this study, the end-user perspective is important in shaping the service, 
which is based on their needs. Hence, TRD is best-suited to this project, as it encourages 
transformation for social justice purposes. Chapter 4 discusses this in relation to 
epistemology, ontology, and axiology.  
As for the case study, the research took place in East Jutland (mostly Aarhus) and West 
Yorkshire (mostly Leeds, Wakefield, and Kirklees). These two locations were selected as 
case studies for this research for several reasons: (a) both police organisations use CE for 
CT, and have relatively similar approaches to the prevention of radicalisation/extremism, 
as well as CE; (b) prior to the start of this research the Aarhus Model in East Jutland had 
made headlines for preventing foreign fighters leaving Denmark and rehabilitating them 
back into society; (c) the Prevent strategy experienced a highly negative public image and 
backlash from some sections of the public, including organisations such as universities; 
and finally (d) considering the similarities of the CT approach adopted by the two regions, 
their different receptions indicated that there might be a difference in application and 
delivery of CE. Therefore, different experiences of CTCE might provide insights as to how 
different approaches may have different impacts, and to inform better practice. 
Statistics and other relevant documents were collected from both sites. Twenty-six semi-
structured interviews were conducted with the local authority (LA), police CE and CTCE 
practitioners, reporters, as well as three case studies of relative reporters. It was difficult 
to encourage direct participation of relative reporters due to the stigma attached to 
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terrorism. The data was collected between June 2017 and August 2018.  The methodology 
of this research is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
1.6 Structure of the Thesis  
The thesis consists of eight chapters, including the introduction. Each chapter aims to 
address the research questions set above. The next two chapters review different aspects 
of the relevant literature and provide the context of the thesis for the reader in 
understanding CTCE and citizen participation (i.e. reporting), upon which the thesis 
builds. The aim is to set the scene for the development of a theoretical framework to 
contextualise the empirical work. Chapter 2 seeks to answer the first part of Question One 
by conceptualising CTCE and its importance in prevention. This is to illustrate the 
evolution of CTCE, and the importance in using communities and partnerships in CT. Thus, 
it provides the ‘why’ for the use of CTCE as a preventive tool. Chapter 3 seeks to present 
the underlying (more importantly psychological) factors that influence cooperative and 
reporting behaviour, which is crucial to this thesis as it explores the ‘how’ of behaviour 
formation and decision-making. It draws upon literature from different disciplines to set 
the foundation, primarily for Question Four of the thesis — i.e. the use of existing 
literature to explain any relationship between CTCE and reporting behaviour. It also 
partly addresses Question Three, as it provides background knowledge of how 
cooperative behaviour is shaped and the contributing factors of citizen participation and 
reporting behaviour.  
Chapter 4 delineates and explains the methodology of this study and provides a rationale 
for the research approach adopted, arguing that TRD and case studies were most suitable 
approach to answer the research questions. Chapters 5 through 7 present the empirical 
research findings and their analysis. They seek directly to address the research questions 
through the presentation, interpretation, and discussion of the data collected. Chapter 5 
addresses the second part of Question One by describing CTCE practices in each site. It 
expands by answering Question Five by comparing and analysing both CTCE strategies. As 
such, Chapter 5 has three core parts: CTCE practices in East Jutland, CTCE practices in 
West Yorkshire, and comparative analysis. Thus, it lays the foundation for learning from 
each strategy and contributes to the later discussions in Chapters 7 and 8 about the 
effectiveness of CTCE and reasons why. 
Chapter 6 explores the experience of reporters, addressing Question Three while laying 
the ground for Questions Two and Four. The chapter focuses on the experiences of 
reporters who come from professional backgrounds (e.g. teacher), and those that of 
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relatives or close associates. As such, this chapter provides insight into the reasoning for 
and the experience of reporting. It focuses on the reasons and the barriers of reporting 
and connects them back to literature presented in Chapter 2, as well as identify areas of 
recommendations for Chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 7 draws upon previous chapters, as well 
as the empirical data, to address the overarching question — i.e. the role of CTCE in 
reporting behaviour and the importance of this relationship. Consequently, the chapter 
addresses Question Two, Four, and Five and develops a theoretical framework used to 
explain the relationship between CTCE and reporting behaviour, which are mostly 
informed by Chapters 5 and 6. The final chapter concludes the analysis and considers the 
implications of the study for policy and practice. It makes recommendations for CTCE 
practices — outlined in medium- and long-term suggestions — in order to improve and 
encourage reporting of radicalisation and extremism, as well as considering the future 
direction of research in this field. 
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Chapter 2 
 
On The Origins of Counterterrorism Community 
Engagement 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the evolution of CE and CTCE through the 
literature on policing, crime prevention, and political science. It explores the evolution in 
crime perception and how it developed preventative approaches. Consequently, this 
chapter addresses the first part of Question One, which is to conceptualise CTCE and its 
importance in preventive policing. This is important to the aim of this thesis as it 
highlights the role of CTCE in prevention and the logic behind the use of communities and 
partnerships in CT. 
Policing terrorism is a local and regional response to a national and global threat. To 
tackle the problem of terrorism, governments have three broad responses: the military, 
criminal justice, and the community response (Staniforth 2014, p.84). Policing terrorism 
falls under the community response, with the influence of criminal justice as guidance in 
identifying crimes committed. The police play an integral role in countering terrorism and 
extremism (Stuart 2015, p.4). In a CT context, policing organisations have the most to lose, 
both in terms of community relations and public reliance on the police (Pickering et al. 
2008, p.25). A major challenge the authorities involved in CT is engaging or working with 
families, considering that the police are known to arrest those in the community involved 
in criminality. This also applies to specific communities that come from oppressive 
countries where police and the like are viewed as the oppressive hand. Given that the 
police are very often well connected to other networks (such as education services, social 
services, mental health services, intelligence services, and communities), they are, 
therefore, key players in engaging and networking with communities — although this is 
by no means straightforward or taken for granted, as the long history of community 
policing (CP) show. Thus, the police have the advantage of obtaining community 
intelligence through trusted relationships within communities (Innes 2006), with which 
to prevent crimes such as terrorism and extremism. 
There is a philosophical consensus that policing is most successful when it is community-
oriented, as through policing with consent and inclusion, policing can have a greater reach 
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and depth (Skogan 2006b; Sarre 1996). Policing through consent is equally relevant to CT 
(Briggs 2010). There is a broad acknowledgement that prevention of radicalisation and 
extremism, as well as CT, relies upon communities for intelligence, as well as 
interventions (Radicalization Awareness Network 2018, p.9). According to some, there is 
a need for grass-roots work in policing, CE and community cohesion (Blackwood et al. 
2016). There has been an international debate on whether CE should be used or 
integrated within the sphere of CT. Sceptics are concerned with securitisation and 
militarisation of the police and social issues such as community cohesion, as well as 
widening the trust gap between the police and the public  (Pantazis & Pemberton 2009; 
Thomas 2014; O’toole et al. 2016).  
Considering the argument that there are various underlying factors that shape crime and 
criminal behaviour — not to mention radicalisation and extremism — it would be illogical 
to disregard the fact that these issues are interconnected and overlapping. There is 
evidence to support the success of using CE in CT, as direct contact with the community — 
especially the ‘Muslim community’ — and close relationships increased trust and 
awareness (Dunn et al. 2016). It is also argued by research comparing both state and NGO 
CTCE practices that lack of insight, contact, interaction with communities can backfire and 
prevent effective efforts to stop extremism and terrorism (Radicalization Awareness 
Network 2018, p.9). 
To present an insight into evolution of CE and CTCE, this chapter situates this thesis 
within the broader policing and CT literature, by primarily focusing on the use of CE as a 
CT strategy. It examines the nature and progress of CE in the context of crime prevention 
and how change in perception of crime influenced the birth of this strategy. This is 
followed by exploration in the emergence of multi-agency partnership in preventive work 
and once again its link to perception of crime. The chapter then reveals the evolution of 
CTCE and factors that inform and shapes its practice and use. Here, the aim is to illustrate 
how policy and at times theories form the practice of contemporary preventive policing 
through the perception and comprehension of crime. In turn, a foundation is laid for the 
reasoning behind the use of CTCE in prevention. Finally, the chapter presents literature 
and arguments around the impact of CE on prevention and the implications of applying it 
to a CT context. 
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2.2 The Rationale for Community Engagement in Counterterrorism 
2.2.1 Preventive Policing: The Rise of Community Engagement and Multi-Agency 
Partnership 
Crime prevention differs in meaning for different people, but most often the term refers to 
efforts to prevent crime or criminality. One such effort is CE. In recent years CE has 
increasingly developed a high profile in policing and wider government policy (Myhill 
2012; Skogan 2004; Sherman 2006), especially in the CT context (Staniforth et al. 2010). 
This is due to CE being recognised as preventive policing, which has a proactive rather 
than a reactive approach to crime control. It is argued that crime control “has its roots in a 
new collective experience of crime and insecurity, an experience which is itself structured 
by the distinctive social, economic and cultural arrangements of late twentieth-century 
capitalism”(Garland 2000, p.347). In Section 2.2.2 the thesis discusses how this collective 
experience of terrorism and insecurity has resulted in harmonised preventive action at 
international level. Crime control and crime prevention share a common goal, but crime 
prevention differs from crime control in that it typically operates outside the confines of 
the formal justice system i.e. pre-criminal space (see Section 1.2) (Welsh & Farrington 
2010). In this respect, alongside the institutions of police, courts, and correctional 
facilities, prevention is regarded as the fourth pillar of crime reduction (Waller 2006).  
In its simplest form, crime prevention is introduced via three different, connected 
approaches: punitive corrective and protective. The punitive arm of crime prevention is 
concerned with the law and applied through criminal justice system. The corrective 
approach focuses on providing mentoring, counselling, employment and education 
support in order to rehabilitate the individual back into society.  The protective element is 
the proactive arm of prevention and is usually delivered through CE, Neighbourhood 
Watch, public education etc. to ensure the three elements of crime (desire, ability, and 
opportunity) are distributed, hence working as a deterrent. Moreover, there are three 
types of prevention: primary, which focuses on individual- and family-level factors that 
are deemed to be correlated with criminality; secondary prevention, which focuses on at-
risk individuals/groups or potential opportunities that may foster criminality; and finally 
tertiary prevention, which takes place once a crime has been committed to reduce re-
offending and re-victimisation (the implementation of tertiary measures can be seen after 
terrorist attacks, for example). The CT strategies studied in this thesis take all three 
approaches and types, as shown in Chapter 5. 
This classification of perception was further expanded through a second dimension: the 
target group of crime prevention strategies (Van Dijk & De Waard 1991), which was 
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influenced by the Routine Activity Theory (Cohen & Felson 1979). The key contribution of 
this two-dimensional typology was that crime prevention efforts must consider the victim 
or potential victim alongside the offender and place. Additionally, four major prevention 
strategies were introduced to distinguish between efforts (Tonry & Farrington 1995): 
Developmental Prevention (early interventions aimed to prevent criminal activity in 
individuals, especially those at risk) (Farrington & Welsh 2007); Situational Prevention 
(interventions designed to reduce opportunities for offending) (Cornish & Clarke 2003); 
Criminal Justice Prevention (traditional interventions, deterrents, incarceration, and 
rehabilitation operated by law enforcement and criminal justice system agencies) 
(Blumstein et al. 1978); and Community Prevention (interventions focused on changing 
social conditions e.g. families, social norms etc.) (Hope 1995). It is worth noting that 
community prevention tends to overlap with Situational and Developmental Prevention, 
and although the latter two can be delivered in a community setting, they do not address 
community processes and thus are not regarded as community approaches (Bennet 
1998).  
Although the emergence of CE and preventive policing was not smooth, this thesis will 
focus on some major milestones assisted in shaping this strategy, which are relevant to 
this thesis. At the heart of preventive policing sit Utilitarian philosophical discussions by 
the likes of Marquis Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham who argued that it is better to 
prevent crimes than to punish them, which is the chief aim of every good system of 
legislation (Marin 1981, pp.18–19). 
Preventive policing initially emerged in 1798, pre-dating the Metropolitan Police — the 
‘new’ police linked to the Peelian principle — in the form of the Marine Police Force (also 
known as the Thames River Police, with Patrick Colquhoun being instrumental in its 
establishment). It was formed to counter theft of cargo by having a continual presence on 
the riverfront to act as a deterrent, and disrupt crime in progress through intervention 
(Harris 2004). Other supporters of preventive policing argued that prevention is better 
than punishment and more cost-effective for a criminal justice system that is 
overburdened by the prosecution of crimes (Chadwick 1829). This led to the formation of 
policing by consent (Peelian policing), and prevention became the primary aim of the ‘new 
police’ to keep social order and control. The aim of prevention was described in the 
mission of the new police in 1829 in Sir Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne’s direction to 
the police, which subsequently informed what became known as the Peelian principles 
(Schafer 2013). As a result, prevention was twofold; a) for the state to ensure crime did 
not pay, given the consequences; and, b) for citizens to adopt behaviours such as rational 
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thinking to prevent them from criminality (Crawford & Evans 2017, p.789). However, it 
was primarily the role of the police to ensure detection, arrest and prosecution of 
criminals, with little attention being paid to the social environment in which the crime 
took place (Crawford & Evans 2017, p.789). 
Fast forward, it was not until the 1940s that the concept of Situational Crime began to gain 
a platform. It was argued that crime was a consequence of either historical behaviour or 
situational/environmental factors (Sutherland, 1947). However, the concept of 
‘situational’ factors was abandoned until the 1970s, when it regained interest due to rising 
crime rates, causing practitioners and policy-makers to look elsewhere for new policing 
style (Home Office 1977).  Consequently, the focus was on the context in which the crime 
took place (physical and social settings in addition to societal arrangements), instead of 
the perpetrator (Clarke, 1983). Clarke’s argument was based on the assumption that 
situational opportunities ‘host’ crime. This changed the arguments around criminal 
agency, and examination of criminal behaviour started to slowly take a more holistic 
approach to understand crime and criminality. Critiques of the Situational Crime 
Prevention argue that crime can be displaced rather prevented, as this approach does not 
address offenders’ criminal disposition (Wortley 2010). This means that the approach 
does not promote social reform or rehabilitation; instead, the aim is to tackle the 
immediate crime. Others argue that Situational Crime Prevention diverts attention from 
the underlying causes of crime, and is a ‘conservative’ approach to crime control with a 
tendency to blame victims (Clarke & Bowers 2017).  
Central to the Situational Crime Prevention Theory were the theories of rational choice (as 
the offender needs to weigh the risk and benefits of committing the crime), the routine 
activity (a likely offender, a suitable target, and absence of control), and the Theory of 
Crime Pattern (the interaction between the activity space of an offender and victim gives 
rise to crime) (Felson 1994; Clarke & Felson 2004; Clarke & Cornish 1985; Felson et al. 
1998; Cohen & Felson 1979).  These theories started to look at crime differently, meaning 
perception of crime changed from being focused only on the individual (e.g. an immoral 
act, committed by an innately bad person) to a more holistic view of various factors that 
can create an environment for criminality. The change in crime perception suggested that 
crime has causal and underlying factors known as risk factors (psychological and 
environmental conditions), which can be mitigated (Luthar 2003). These risk factors are 
multifaceted (see Figure 2), ranging from circumstances that influence the lives of 
individuals and families as they grow up to local environments, and the situations and 
opportunities that facilitate victimisation and offending (United Nations Office on Drugs 
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and Crime 2010). Risk factor perception is a reflection of Developmental, Situational, and 
Community prevention strategies. Developmental Prevention efforts in recent years have 
targeted early risk factors related to offending. These risk factors are regarded as prior 
factors that enhance the vulnerability to, and the frequency, duration and persistence of 
offending (Kazdin et al. 1997).  
Risk-focus prevention was introduced to  criminology from public health, and the idea is 
to identity key risk factors for offending and implement prevention methods (Welsh & 
Farrington 2010, p.7). However, some problems are associated with risk-focused 
prevention, for example, which risk factors are causes and which are markers or 
correlated with causes (Farrington 2000); or how mediators between risk factors and 
outcomes are established (Baron & Kenny 1986). In principle, through the identification of 
the factors associated with various types of crime, preventive strategies and programmes 
may be developed — such interventions are targeted. This approach acknowledges that 
crime is an holistic problem, multifaceted and that preventing crime is not just the role of 
the criminal justice system. Instead, it needs a solution that reflects the nature of the 
phenomenon itself. 
 
Figure 2: Factors influencing the risks of crime and violence (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
2010, p.10). 
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This change in perception of crime and criminality created a preventive turn in policing 
that focused on problem-solving and tackling the root cause of crime to prevent it. This led 
to calls for public cooperation, and the concept of partnership with local agencies and 
communities became the key of new crime prevention, firmly asserted in the 1980s and 
later in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 advocating a partnership approach (Garland 
1996; Crawford & Evans 2017, p.800).  The Crime and Disorder Act reinsert community 
into policing through the process of a local audit of crime, as well as determining local 
priorities and involving hard-to-reach groups in addressing crime (Hughes et al. 2002), 
encouraging an inter-agency and multi-agency approach to crime prevention. The idea 
was to identify ‘link personnel’ within the different organisations whose professional 
expertise was relevant to crime prevention (Crawford 1999, p.119). As such, this multi-
agency partnership resulted in putting everybody’s role into perspective, which entails a 
division of labour in which different organisations and actors contribute different things 
that add collective value to prevention (Crawford 1999, p.119).  
This, in turn, gave rise to ‘responsibilisation’ strategy in the new mode of governing crime, 
wherein the central government sought crime prevention “not in direct fashion through 
state agencies (police, courts, prisons, social work, etc.) but instead by acting indirectly, 
seeking to activate action on the part of non-state agencies and organisations” (Garland 
1996, p.452; Crawford & Evans 2017). This approach, developed by the UK government, 
used key phrases such as ‘partnership’, ‘multi-agency approach’, ‘activating communities’ 
and ‘active citizenship’ to devolve responsibility for crime prevention onto agencies and 
individuals outside the state (Garland 1996, p.452). The state uses various techniques 
including policies (e.g. the Prevent Duty) to encourage action on the part of non-state 
parties, either by stimulating new forms of behaviour (e.g. reporting of radicalisation or 
extremism by education and health services) or by stopping established habits (e.g. 
getting retailers to reduce retail crime by threatening to shift the cost of prosecution onto 
retailers) (Riley & Mayhew 1980, p.15).  
The first step in ‘responsibilisation’ is to identify parties that have the ability to reduce 
opportunities associated with a given crime (e.g. terrorism), and to assess if these parties 
have a responsibility in place already, and if so, whether it needs to be enforced (Hough et 
al. 1980, p.16). The rationale and recurring message of this approach is that crime is not 
just the responsibility or a matter for the police or the state alone (Garland 1996, p.453), 
but rather a problem for all, given its roots in social issues outside the ambit of police 
action, supporting the notion of partnership (Edwards 2005, p.313). For example, fear of 
crime affects trade in shopping centres, which improved security and joint practices can 
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help with. Consequently, crime prevention is “part of the routine day to day practice and 
culture of all agencies and individuals” (Home Office 1993, p.16). Therefore, it is believed 
that partnership (coordinated, concentrated effort of individuals and organisations 
affected by and concerned with the problems)  is needed in reducing crime and disorder 
(Skogan 2004, p.6). 
It should be noted that ‘responsibilisation’ does not ‘off-load’ the state’s responsibility for 
controlling and preventing crime. Rather it is a new mode of governing crime, in which 
exclusive reliance on the state (or criminal justice) is reduced to an attempt to elicit non-
state crime prevention effort (Garland 1996, p.454). In this light, “publicity campaigns are 
used to raise public consciousness, interpolate the citizen as a potential victim, create a 
sense of duty, connect the population to crime control agencies, and help change the 
thinking and practices of those involved” (Garland 2001, p.125). This is an approach that 
the UK government took during the 1980s and 1990s Troubles. Adverts encouraged 
reporting of extremism among family members and close associates of those involved in 
such activity. According to a BBC documentary, this resulted in a 729% increase of 
legitimate reports overall (BBC 2018). Garland (2001, 137) argues that this is a 
criminology of the self, which routinises crime through fear and promotion of preventive 
action. However, there are practical problems involved in responsibilisation, which create 
obstacles for multi-agency working. These include resistance, diverse interests in crime 
control, resources, practices, information sharing barriers and so on (see section 2.2.4 in 
relation to CTCE). Responsibilisation is still a new concept and it is likely to develop 
further in years to come.   
This focus on non-state participation in crime prevention solidified with more policing 
strategies such as Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) or CP, also referred to as CE. The POP 
strategy focused on the identification, analysis, and solution of specific crimes (Goldstein 
1979). As such, a ‘problem’ was not considered a single incident, but rather a cluster of 
similar, related or recurring incidents (Goldstein 1990). The concept of POP focused on 
tailor-made policing that fitted the needs of the local problems. Hence, POP requires 
detailed crime analysis, appropriate prevention strategies based on crime analysis, a 
partnership between agencies and residents/targeted population, implementation of 
strategies, and the evaluation of the effects (Crawford 1998, p.163; Ekblom 1988). POP 
recognised that much criminal activity could be prevented by establishing and 
maintaining a working partnership between police and the community (Miller 2006, 
p.17). Therefore, POP is a proactive approach, as it aims to address specific problems 
through an emphasis on broad roles for the public in identifying, prioritising and solving 
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problems to prevent future crimes. However, there are criticisms that application of POP, 
like Situational Crime Prevention, can result in crime displacement, as crime may be 
reduced in the targeted area only, shifting to other jurisdictions. Some critiques suggest it 
is only logical to evaluate the effectiveness of POP by determining the extent to which 
crime and disorder has been reduced (Weisburd et al. 2010). It is argued that POP “should 
be measured not on the results of each application but rather on the degree to which its 
process and principles improve the prospects for more effective policing, particularly as 
compared with alternative policing approaches” (Scott 2010, p.137). Others argue that 
POP can sometimes over-simplify a problem and its significance (Tilley 2010).  Many 
argue that POP in practice bears little to no resemblance to its original concept (Eck 2000; 
Clarke 1998).  
Like POP, CE, has community at its heart. The main driving force behind CE was a sense 
that policing had become detached from the community it is supposed to serve — in 
particular the disadvantaged and alienated sections of the community (Skogan 2004), 
relying on a cooperative community to ensure prevention of crime (Murray, 2005, p.348). 
The next sections will focus on application of CE in CT.  
2.2.2 Evolution of Counterterrorism Community Engagement 
Countries across the world have experienced terrorist attacks from groups such as ISIL 
and Al-Qaeda, with approximately 380 attacks in 2017 alone being committed by ISIL 
(Story Maps 2017).  The impact of terrorism varies over the globe, with some countries 
being affected more than others (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016). Every country 
has its distinct history of terrorism; however, the events of 9/11 on American soil were a 
catalyst for global collaboration and reform of CT policing (Deflem 2010). This is due to 
terrorist attacks across the world starting to take on a new form i.e. multiple countries 
being under attack by the same terrorist groups. These attacks made clear the strategic 
dimension of terrorism, and changed the notion of terrorism from a ‘national’ to an 
‘international’ threat (Zimmermann & Wenger 2007). As such, the need for international 
cooperation to counter terrorism became evident. 
More specifically, the European Union (EU) became the harmonising body for its member 
states due to concern at international terrorism, and the fact that only six out of fifteen EU 
member states had separate incrimination for terrorist acts as part of their criminal law; 
the other states prosecuted terrorist acts as common offences (Dumitriu 2002). The UK 
was one of the six countries, and due to its history of dealing with terrorism it was a lot 
more advanced. The EU used this advancement in informing CT legislation at the time to 
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harmonise CT across the EU. As a result, anti-terror legislation such as the Framework 
Decision (Council of the European Union 2008; Council of the European Union 2002)1 and 
EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism were introduced (Walker & Lennon 2015). The 
latter became a monitoring instrument for member states that identified the measures, 
the responsible body, and the deadline to adhere to (Murphy 2012).  
Additionally, both the Madrid bombings and the 7/7 London attacks raised concern at 
home-grown terrorists, which highlighted the complex web of radicalisation. At a 
European level radicalisation and extremism was viewed as issues that were embedded in 
communities, as those that recruited vulnerable individuals were integrated within their 
communities — i.e. being a local level issue for the authorities to address. Grievances used 
by terrorist and extremist groups to recruit and radicalise vulnerable individuals were 
believed to be risk factors centred on socio-economic issues (LaFree & Dugan 2004; 
Koshrokhavar 2005). These, like any crime-facilitating risk factors, were believed to be 
key vulnerabilities that made individual receptive (Christmann 2012). This is in line with 
the Community Regeneration Theory, which suggests that socioeconomic factors lead to 
delinquency (Taub et al. 1984; Bennet 1998). It was also recognised that these risk factors 
might differ based on geographical location and culture. To identify such differences, 
authorities needed to engage with the community that they served — as such, policing 
terrorism became community oriented through the use of community-based prevention 
strategies that addressed local issues, which facilitated radicalisation and extremism. 
Therefore, there was a need for the prevention of terrorism to connect with and empower 
the communities with the resources and information that they needed to be resilient to 
radicalisation/extremism. It is argued that governments can build community resilience 
in the face of violence through “supporting existing community initiatives and building a 
sound economic base for the communities there” (Briggs et al. 2006, p.64). This is in line 
with Community Empowerment Theory, although it also overlaps with community 
regeneration theory. Community Empowerment Theory is concerned with sharing the 
power of decision-making and management activities with residents in the social 
conditions believed to sustain crime in the neighbourhood (Welsh & Hoshi 2006). This 
will be further discussed in Chapter 3, which is focused on contributors to cooperation. 
Briggs (2010, p.972-973) argues that there are four ways in which communities 
contribute towards effective CT: a) as an important source of information and intelligence; 
                                                          
1
 This is a type of EU legislation that does not require the involvement of the European Parliament and is 
only passed and activated when there is a unanimous vote by all members of the Council (in this case, 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council). It is the member states’ own responsibility to incorporate the 
provisions in this Framework into their domestic legislation (Lowe 2015).   
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b) communities are good at recognising warning signs and diverting vulnerable 
individuals; c) communities can tackle grievances that may lead to violent crime (e.g. 
poverty, education, racism, segregation, discrimination, etc.); and d) the Police and 
Security Service cannot act without the consent of the communities they are there to 
protect. Without their consent there will be pushback that could influence the 
effectiveness of prevention. The Community Intelligence-Based Model also supports the 
argument that terrorism can be prevented and deterred through community intelligence 
feeding into CP (Innes 2006, p.222). Additionally, by engaging with communities, a 
problem-oriented approach is adopted to address issues associated with 
radicalisation/extremism. Hence, working with communities became a key foundation in 
tackling terrorism and extremism, and local responses to an international threat.  
From a CT perspective, this was vital, as it started to outline the EU’s Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy to harmonise the member states’ approach to CT at local, regional, national, and 
international levels. This led to the EU calling for CE and a cooperative approach, not just 
between states but also various agencies, to encourage a partnership approach to 
countering terrorism and extremism (Council of the European Union 2005). There was an 
emphasis on municipal initiatives that stemmed from the realisation that a multi-agency 
partnership and collaboration with communities were best placed to detect and prevent 
radicalisation and extremism (Council of the European Union 2014, p.5). Therefore, 
prevention of radicalisation and extremism was no longer just the job of policing and 
security agencies, but also other authorities and bodies that operated within the 
framework of safeguarding vulnerabilities. This is in line with the responsibilisation 
theory discussed earlier, devolving responsibility onto non-state parties and encouraging 
action. As a result, the prospects of success were believed to be greater (Rabasa et al. 
2010).  
This community response was one of three broad responses to terrorism; the other two 
were military and criminal justice responses (Staniforth 2014, p.84). This community-
level response was an alternative approach that considered the causes of terrorism, and 
the inherent risk of criminalisation and suppression that informed traditional CT policing 
(Pickering et al. 2008, p.25). Therefore, CTCE was a soft approach to the prevention of 
radicalisation and extremism (Aly & Green 2010). The notion of ‘soft’ policing refers to 
“the non-coercive aspects of police-led social control encompassing the provision of a 
visible presence of authority, persuasion, negotiation and community interaction” (Innes 
2005, p.157). Hence, it focused more on the persuasive mode of social control rather than 
enactment. A ‘soft’ CT approach aims to prevent and reverse the process of radicalisation, 
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“usually by providing a stable support network, probing their [the vulnerable individual at 
risk of radicalisation/extremism] original reasons for radicalising, and divorcing them 
from their extreme beliefs and social contacts” (Stern 2010, p.108). It also tries to provide 
the public with relevant information for safeguarding. 
It is also argued that CT can work better when there is an integration of CP into CT 
apparatus, which can assist in building trust between minorities and the police to enhance 
the flow of community intelligence (Innes 2006, p.224; Dunn et al. 2016). As such, this 
approach requires high visibility-reassurance policing, as well as expanded community-
contact through engagement that can assist in building trust in addition to understanding 
the difference in communities, individuals, and community tensions. This CTCE utilises 
and expands on existing community interfaces to increase the flow of community 
intelligence, as well as putting in place preventive strategies that address risk factors 
associated with terrorism (Lowe & Innes 2008). By directly interacting with the 
community, law enforcement can identify and engage with citizens as partners in 
addressing community grievances that may lead to extremism (International Association 
of Chiefs of Police 2014). As such, it is argued that communities, if supported and guided, 
may be able to prevent radicalisation/extremism (Briggs et al. 2006, p.15). 
Post-9/11 events have led international institutions such as the EU, to harmonise the fight 
against terrorism, not only at an international level but also local, regional, and national. 
As a result, more attention was paid to socio-economic risk factors and their impact on 
radicalisation and extremism, and ways in which CE could be used by multiple agencies 
for prevention purposes. This, highlights the complex nature of radicalisation and 
extremism, and why addressing some socio-economical issues may overlap with security 
issues — and crime prevention in general. More importantly, prevention of radicalisation 
and extremism needed to be tailored to the needs of communities, geographical locations, 
and risk factors; resulting in active engagement with the general public, organisations, 
authorities, vulnerable individuals and their families.  
2.2.3 Impact of Community Engagement on Prevention 
Just like POP it is only logical to ask about CE’s success in prevention, and whether it is the 
right response to crime prevention, especially in a CT context. These question, although 
legitimate, are complex due to the diversity in the application of CE, local context and 
culture, type of crime, and the rage of outcomes concerned (e.g. better police-public 
relationships), as well as a limited number of robust evaluations (Bullock 2014, p.111). 
Nonetheless, there are some studies that can be used to draw insight (Rosenbaum & 
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Lurigio 1994; Mackenzie & Henry 2009; Myhill 2012). While there is evidence to suggest 
the use of CE has reduced the fear of crime, improved problem-solving, and enhanced 
perceptions of and relationships with the police, evidence for its impact on crime 
reduction is limited. This could be due to what method is used to measure the impact on 
prevention or how prevention is viewed, as the term is very complex and difficult to 
evaluate. There is a need to establish the ‘input’ before an intervention is introduced — 
e.g. how many people could/would have been radicalised if an intervention was not 
introduced? Establishing such input is vague and difficult.  
Considering this challenge, there is still evidence that suggests CE is effective in crime 
prevention (Skogan & Steiner 2004), including in a CT context (Dunn et al. 2016). It is 
argued that CE can be effective when a variety of different strategies is adopted to 
encourage citizen participation in comparison to relying on one method of engagement 
(Mackenzie & Henry 2009, p.5). This is not to say that there is strong evidence to suggest 
CE has a major impact on ‘social capacity’ — i.e. individual willingness to intervene or 
increased voluntary activity. Some argue that CE is thought to be effective and easy to 
implement when communities are organised to some degree (Walker 1999, p.190). 
Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest positive changes in crime, anti-social behaviour, 
feelings of safety, and public confidence in police (Tuffin et al. 2006), although the long-
term impact of CE is still in need of further research (Quinton & Morris 2008).  
As evident, an evaluation of CE and its impact on prevention is difficult to achieve. It is 
argued that some of this difficulty may be due to the flexibility in design and 
implementation of CE, which is guided by specific needs of the local communities and 
crime; thus a more locally-focused research design may be better in evaluating the impact 
(Mason 2009; Bullock 2014, p.112).  
2.2.4 Implications of Application of Counterterrorism Community Engagement 
The thinking behind the use of CE in CT policing is that communities can assist in 
preventing or mitigating radicalisation and/or extremism (Tahiri & Grossman 2013). 
Although the terrorist threats come from a small minority, nevertheless these individuals 
are integrated within communities (Briggs 2010). One major criticism of CTCE strategy 
revolves around a political issue regarding selection: which segments of the community 
are to be contacted and consulted (Murray 2005; Skogan 2004)? However, the notion of 
communities is complex (see Chapter 1). The controversy mainly surrounds the idea of a 
‘suspect community’, a notion that repeats in history, creating mistrust. 
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The notion of ‘suspect community’ was first mentioned by Hillyard in the analysis of the 
impact of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 1974 to 1989 on Irish communities. The 
concept is explained, as a process of threat identification and signs of abnormality: 
“A person who is drawn into the criminal justice system under the PTA is not 
a suspect in the normal sense of the word. In other words, they are not 
believed to be involved in or guilty of some illegal act […] people are suspect 
primarily because they are Irish and once they are in the police station they 
are often labelled an Irish suspect, presumably as part of some classification 
system. In practice, they are being held because they belong to a suspect 
community.” (Hillyard 1993, p.7) 
Hence, it has been argued that racial profiling, which is used in CT strategies to identify 
individuals based on their religion, ethnicity, and culture, encourages victimisation of 
communities (Awan & Blakemore 2013). As such, these stereotypes can leak into the 
public domain, which can be a risk to community cohesion as it leads to the social 
exclusion of communities. In turn, communities are stigmatised, which consequently can 
result in difficulties for the police to build relationships or collect intelligence. For 
example, Robert Lambert (former undercover policeman) in an interview highlights the 
experiences of the Irish community in the 1980s in London: 
“In the 1980s, some police raids on London Irish families began to cause 
alienation from the police because they gave the impression that the police 
regarded Irish Catholic communities in London with suspicion. This was 
often caused by operational counter-terrorism activity that was insufficiently 
focused on terrorist targets [...] Also, bear in mind how much confidence in 
the police was damaged as a result of the miscarriages of justice cases 
involving the Guildford Four and Birmingham Six. This was similar to the 
problem Lord Scarman identified after the Brixton riots in 1981, when 
London’s black community felt unfairly targeted by police, felt under 
collective suspicion.” (Jackson 2008, p.294) 
Since the post 9/11 ‘war on terror’, some parts of the ‘Muslim communities’ feel targeted 
by CT strategies (Pantazis & Pemberton 2009). In the case of ‘suspect communities’, in the 
current years, Muslims are associated and labelled as a terrorist (Spalek & Lambert 2007; 
Powell 2011). For example,  study of the experiences of Kurdish Londoners visited by MI5 
in 2010-2011 found that the processes and practices in place criminalised Kurds as the 
collective subjects of security policing, or ‘suspect  community’(Sentas 2016). Despite the 
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significant resources being invested in prevention of terrorism programmes at the 
community level, there has been backlash from parts of the society as it is argued that 
such strategies and policies tend to marginalise and alienate some sections of the 
community (Kundnani 2009). Scholars argue that many ‘Muslim communities’ have been 
subjected to and scrutinised by national and international government CT policies; thus, 
the ‘Muslim community’ is no longer just a ‘community suspect’ but an ‘international 
suspect’ (Awan and Blakemore, 2013). Therefore, these scholars claim or imply that state 
practices have a direct influence on Muslims (i.e. how they are perceived and how they 
perceive themselves) (Ragazzi, 2016). It is worth noting that others have found that 
mainstream ‘Muslim community’ views of the police have remained stable, relatively 
positive and consistent since Prevent implemented (Innes et al. 2011, p.9). They found 
that in comparison to young men in the general population and in other ethnic minorities, 
the negative attitude of young Muslim men had only slightly increased. Other research 
have found that although there were signs of alienation, most British Muslims were 
satisfied with and trusted CT policies, the government and the police in addition to 
presenting a high level of willingness to take action against terrorism (Shanaah 2019). 
Similarly, studies of other countries argued that there was a cause for concern in the 
implementation of such CT strategies and their impact on specific communities. For 
example, one study focusing on the Danish radicalisation prevention argued that “the 
developing practice regime of radicalisation prevention revolves around logics of 
‘repressive liberalism,’ which holds that radical identities can be prevented by shaping 
and disciplining adolescents with illiberal and undemocratic beliefs into liberal 
democratic citizens”(Lindekilde 2012, p.122). As such, such practices aim to influence the 
individual’s free will not through power but through incentives, information, 
empowerment, and challenging interventions. The study found that the Muslims from a 
targeted milieu were sceptic about the effectiveness of such measures.  
Studies focusing on the UK Muslim communities identified that many local communities 
have serious concerns and grievances about government and police efforts in CT (Lakhani 
2012, p.190). These grievances revolve around three issues: funding that focused on 
community cohesion rather than CT; preventative approach; and allegations of spying 
upon ‘suspect community’. Briggs (2010, p.973) argues that these real and/or perceived 
grievances need to be addressed for CE to be effective: 
36 
 
“The government is to gain the confidence of Muslim communities; it must 
work hard to maintain the moral high ground and show it is committed to 
tackling the injustices faced by Muslims both here and abroad”. 
This argument echoes the reasoning introduced by the Broken Window Theory, which 
argues for an indirect causal link between crime and disorder, which needs a ‘zero 
tolerance’ policy that encouraged the police and other agencies to aggressively pursue 
minor infractions to deter greater crimes (Serewicz, 2009). In this case, when CE can 
address insecurities that threaten social identities, the police may be in a better position 
to have the cooperation of the public in countering terrorism. By addressing these 
grievances through community engagement, radicalisation and extremism can be 
prevented in the long run, as terrorist messages that resonate among those who might be 
swayed to terrorism are muted (Briggs 2010). However, the notion of a ‘suspect 
community’ is not supported by all scholars. Walker (2012) suggests that the adoption of 
a ‘suspect community’ should be treated with great caution. The concept of the ‘Muslim 
community’ in itself is a broad and vague term; hence it cannot be defined as a single 
cohesive ‘community’ since Muslims come from diverse ethnic, cultural, social and 
economic standings, and even differs in terms of religious beliefs (Walker 2012). This 
supports the psychological theory of Social Identity and Categorisation (see Chapter 3). 
To regard the ‘Muslim community’ as a homogenous group, disregards of other identities: 
heritage, nationality, ethnicity, race, class, gender, geography, immigration generation, 
political views, and religious practices (Briggs et al. 2006, p.60). Therefore, there is a 
problem with using ‘the community’ in this way, especially in CT policies since it 
disregards ‘super-diversity’, as ‘community’ is usually regarded as referring to racial 
groups (Rowe 2004, p.147). It is argued that “the majority of ‘white communities’ are 
fairly good at grasping how minority communities differ from the majority, but not nearly 
so good at understanding how they differ from one another” (Briggs et al. 2006, p.60). 
Additionally, Greer argues that the thesis by Pantazis and Pemberton (2009) is built upon 
a “series of analytical, methodological, conceptual, logical, empirical, evidential and 
interpretive errors” (Greer 2010, p.1171). Greer points out that there is no hard evidence 
for any official policy or sanctioned practice in that direction.  
For Pantazis and Pemberton, the notion of a ‘suspect community’ addresses people’s 
experiences of the law. As such, they argue in response to Greer that CT policy and 
practices affect social identities and produce a distorted sense of community. In their 
suspicion pyramid, at the top of the pyramid lies formal suspects, controlled through 
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surveillance. In the middle, stop and search powers are used for informal suspects; and at 
the bottom, the ‘entire Muslim community’ is targeted by media, political and civil society 
discourse (Pantazis & Pemberton 2011). Awan & Blakemore (2013) also suggest that CT 
policy put community cohesion at risk, as it leads to the social exclusion of communities 
and, as a result, makes it difficult for the police to gather evidence and build trust. For 
example, a study on the effects of CT policing on cooperation illustrated that procedural 
justice is a direct cause for American Muslims to cooperate; while legitimacy shapes 
cooperation indirectly (Tyler et al. 2010), discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
Other studies found that defining the ‘Prevent space’ within the police organisation had a 
negative implication for public relations, which is worsened by a lack of understanding 
how it is positioned between Pursue CT policing and community policing (Innes et al. 
2011, p.18). It is argued that the “lack of standardisation of implementing CT practices and 
policy across the UK’s institutional bodies reflects on community groups’ inability to work 
coherently with said bodies”(Silverman 2017, p.1097). Moreover, although communities 
are seen as of value to CT, there is also a recognition that the current approach is 
incapacitating to community organisations and institutions. As such it is argued that 
community-level work can be strengthened by real CE that works towards building 
ongoing and permanent relationships, which involves inclusion in decision making at local 
level, rather than a reactive and top-down response (Silverman 2017, p.1101). It is 
suggested that there is not enough transparency around CT strategies; increased 
transparency of such strategies and their delivery can help in reducing the fear that closed 
doors can incite (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice 2012). Silverman (2017, 
p.1097) further suggest that the positive aspects of CT strategies need to be highlighted in 
order to change perceptions and increase transparency around such policies to encourage 
dialogue and reduce barriers to engagement.  
Further on the distinction between Prevent and Pursue some criticism arises from the fact 
that some Prevent interventions have resulted in constructing the opportunity for 
interdiction and disruption, which is related to Pursue. Pursue operate in the criminal 
space, whilst Prevent is concerned with pre-criminal space. Prevent focuses on counter 
radicalisation, de-radicalisation, and managing community cohesion/tension. As such the 
work is predominantly at community level. Studies have found that some of these 
community level engagements have resulted in community-led disruptions (Innes et al. 
2017, pp.271–273). It was identified that when the police could not Pursue extremist 
groups and their activities through prosecution, since some activities although highly 
undesirable they were not illegal, they used local communities to help disrupt such 
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activities. Such collectivised community-led disruptions usually involve tactics such as 
pressure, alienation, and setting up organisation and community councils to ensure a clear 
consensus that these groups are not welcomed in the community. These activities are 
informal social control by the local community that disrupt the unwanted activities 
identified by the police but the community takes ownership in addressing it. Such 
collectivised approach is supported by the police. Consequently, such examples highlight 
that it is “important in capturing some of the complexities and nuances associated with 
the practical delivery of Prevent interventions ‘on the ground’ these days” (Innes et al. 
2017, p.272). Additionally, Innes et al (2017, p.273) identified that the police were also in 
support of diversionary activities set up by communities (e.g. football event) in support of 
pre-emptive crime risk reduction efforts, which is argued to be a crime prevention activity 
that is routinely applied (Bjørgo 2015). 
The CE activities also result in gathering intelligence, which can then be used to Pursue 
extremist groups and activities, as well as Prevent interventions. For example, a police 
Inspector explained how the intelligence gained from community in relation to ‘person of 
interest’ resulted in the individual being informally warned that they may be subject to 
police surveillance and possibly more assertive interventions if they continued their 
activities (Innes et al. 2017, pp.268–269). Such disruption tactics are favoured by Prevent 
officers for managing behaviours that may be indirectly increasing threat but are not in 
violation of the law. However, the fear remains that such Prevent interventions only move 
the problem from one area to another, and it may be only a short-term local ‘fix’. It is also 
argued that Pursue operations “frequently shape and influence the context in which 
Prevent is delivered”, which can have negative consequences for the community (e.g. 
community gets bombarded by negative media coverage once a person is found to be up 
to no good) (Innes et al. 2017, p.274). 
Moreover, this issue of policy and practice in addressing violent Islamic extremism is 
found to be similar across Europe, where “authorities perceive such extremism is a 
problem of the incorporation of Islam and/or the integration of the Muslim population in 
European societies” (Vermeulen & Bovenkerk 2012, p.185). It is argued that in order to 
achieve these policy goals, engagement strategies are used (Vidino 2010). Such 
engagement is believed to come with new policy dilemmas, one of which is 
representativeness. It is argued that “when authorities want to engage with Islamic 
population through religious organisations they want these organisations to represent the 
community”, albeit the knowledge that these communities are not coherent (Vermeulen & 
Bovenkerk 2012, p.188). Other dilemmas are defining the enemy and identifying suitable 
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partners for engagement, as well as identifying to what extent authorities provide 
extremist organisations a public platform by engaging with them. Those countries with 
value-based approach seek out organisations that have similar values to those of 
mainstream Western society for engagement purposes, whilst those wit means-based 
approach tend to be willing to engage with non-violent extremism organisations, as this 
engagement could be effective in fighting violent extremism (Vermeulen & Bovenkerk 
2012, p.189). The value-based approach does not provide public platforms, whilst the 
means approach countries need to find a balancing act for providing such public platforms 
for engagement. Chapter 5 presents how UK and Denmark are operating within the value-
based and means-based spectrum,  
Some comparative studies also argued that lack of evolution in such CT strategies was a 
problem. For example, a comparative study between America and UK CT strategy argued 
that American CT policy needs to learn from the UK’s approach, as the latter had evolved 
its strategy through “several publicly debated version into an all-inclusive philosophy that 
incorporates soft-power resources from the whole of government to augment hard-power 
practices of counterterrorism” (Stewart 2017, p.68). However, to truly understand the 
implication of CT strategies better evaluation designs and frameworks are needed, as a 
comparative study of CT strategies found there to limits to the extent to which evaluation 
practice has advanced and grown evenly across all areas of CT (Bellasio et al. 2018, p.76). 
In their study, Bellasio et al (2018, p.76) argue that some of these evaluation, by design, 
undermine the ability to come to robust conclusions about an initiative’s impact. 
2.2.5 Implications of The Role of Law in Practice 
As noted previously policies can have both implications in practice. There is a wide 
literature on criticism of such policies and their impact on individuals and institutional 
behaviours. For example, in the case of the UK’s Prevent Duty, it is argued that “the 
Prevent Duty has both accentuated the limitations of the Prevent strategies, while at the 
same time also creating new problems” (Barrett 2016, p.1). Such problems include the 
creation of further alienation of minority groups or being in conflict with other policies. In 
one case, it is argued that only 8% of pupils leaving school in Tower Hamlet had  5 A-C’s at 
GCSE in 1990 (Barrett 2016, pp.11–12). As a result the Tower Hamlet council took action 
under the Public Sector Equality Duty (which requires public authorities to eliminate race 
and religion discrimination and promote equality) to seek to improve this situation by 
working with children who did not have English as a first language and to work with local 
mosques due to the area’s large Muslim population. In contrast, Prevent requires 
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authorities to be vigilant and identify risks in order to take appropriate measures for 
prevention. This can be problematic for public authorities as it leads them having a dual 
identity. Thus it is argued that improving poor attendance as well as being viewed through 
the equality lens can now also be viewed by Tower Hamlets’ Council “through a 
radicalisation lens and see it as evidence of failed integration, alienation, marginalisation 
and rejection (all signs of radicalisation) and take steps to counter-radicalise” (Barrett 
2016, p.12).  
Furthermore, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 is argued to offer a response 
to radicalisation and extremism which is lower than that which justifies arrest and 
prosecution, but simultaneously seeks interventions falling short of deprivation of liberty 
(Blackbourn & Walker 2016, p.870). For example, it is argued that free speech in higher 
and further education is on the wane, while the Prevent Duty will increase the tendency 
toward risk aversion, this is due to the government repeatedly highlighting the fact that 
30% of convicted terrorists in the UK had attended universities (Blackbourn & Walker 
2016, p.864). Additionally, it is argued that while the seizure of travel documents was 
introduced to stop individuals from travelling to conflict zones, the Temporary Exclusion 
Orders were designed to keep foreign terrorist fighters in exile (Blackbourn & Walker 
2016, pp.843–856). Such policies are argued to disproportionately affect the Muslim 
community and limiting the freedom of choice for the individual in question, as well as 
voluntary return to the country. A contrary viewpoint is that this is not a loss of liberty, 
and many anguished parents have expressed support for such interventions. 
Others have argued that the definition of extremism needs to be carefully drafted, as it can 
limit the right for activism, which is crucial to liberal democracy as it encourages healthy 
debate, even though activism may hold radical views in oppose to the mainstream 
opinions (Lowe 2017). This notion of clarity on definitions is further explored by others 
who argue that Prevent and Counter Extremism policies suffer from destabilisation in two 
ways: first, each policy lacks internal stability, which is acquired through solid agenda-
setting, policy formulation, and decision making; and second issue arises from the 
inability of certain concepts like extremism, terrorism and radicalisation to be fully or 
precisely defined, as such they leave uncertain borders and make the interaction between 
these two policies instable (Walker 2018). The criticism of such policies and their 
influence on liberal democratic societies also include the conscription of the public into CT 
work. It is argued that legal duties introduced through CT policies conscript citizens into 
CT efforts, these duties appear in domestic legislation, such as financial reporting 
measures or even wider duties not to withhold information (Walker 2010).  
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2.3 Discussion 
This chapter demonstrated the evolution of CE and CTCE through literature focusing on 
policing and crime prevention, as well as political science. It argued that although crime 
prevention is not new, its application has become more targeted and refined over time 
due to a greater understanding of crime and criminal behaviour. Prevention is now better 
understood, as it aims to deal with root cause problems that may lead to criminal 
behaviour. It is about understanding crime more holistically and finding appropriate 
solutions for its prevention. This change in how crime is viewed led to new insight into 
what prevention meant and needed to consist of, but also created a softer approach to 
policing.  
Prevention is about disturbing the crime formula (desire, ability, and opportunity). 
Community-based prevention can assist in addressing the needs of the residents and local 
issues, which could facilitate infestation of crime but also tackle some of the risk factors 
that may be local or regional issue. It is as a result of a positive public-police relationship 
that information-sharing and discussion about residents’ concerns and priorities become 
easier. Civic engagement is usually used to enhance community safety. Research suggests 
that overall CE has potential benefits on crime reduction (although this result varies in 
terms of different crimes) and public cooperation. 
Prevention is no longer just the responsibility of the police but various organisations 
within the community (e.g. schools, health providers, social services, etc.) in addition to 
the general public. Community is now at the heart of prevention, as it enables using its 
resources (i.e. residents) to tackle crime collectively and holistically. As such, prevention 
and its provision are a co-production — “the process through which inputs used to 
provide a good or service are contributed by individuals who are not ‘in’ the same 
organisation” (Ostrom 1996, p.1073). In other words, the direct and joint involvement of 
both private citizens and public agents in the delivery of prevention services is vital (Joshi 
and Moore, 2004).  
Although there are positives to the use of multi-agency partnership in crime prevention, 
Crawford (1999, p.298) suggests that there are some dangers involved, due to inherent 
diffusion of responsibility, which is the result of increasingly shifting and blurred 
boundaries between the state and other intra-organisational networks involved in crime 
prevention (the public, the private, the voluntary sector). Edwards (2005, p.314) also 
argues that apportioning accountability in a multi-agency approach can be difficult, 
because, if a project fails, various arms involved will seek to shift responsibility. Others 
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suggest that multi-agency partnership in crime prevention implies that crime is a local 
problem, which is to be managed locally — not necessarily prevented or reduced — for 
people to feel better and more in control (Hughes et al. 2002, p.71).  
This chapter also demonstrated how community-based partnership approaches to 
prevention are vital for preventing terrorism. More importantly, it presented how policies 
at European level started to shape the fight against terrorism at the local level. As 
explained earlier, CE is a localised and targeted approach to a global security risk: 
terrorism. This stems from one particular concern, which is the risk posed by domestic 
radicalisation and extremism (Cherney & Hartley 2016). Without active engagement and 
earned consent, it may be challenging for the police to acquire public cooperation, which 
in turn may have detrimental consequences for countering terrorism. This way, the police-
community relationship extends beyond CT agenda and is community oriented to 
promote prevention. Community orientated policing addresses the needs and issues of the 
community to prevent future crimes, including terrorism and extremism, through early 
and proactive interventions. As such, CE can assist with building a positive relationship 
between the police and the public, where information is shared, and resources are 
accessible to empower the community to prevent crime. 
Often, CE is dealt with as if it is separate from general CT work (Briggs et al. 2006, p.25).  
Briggs and colleagues (2006, p.25) argue the CE is somehow perceived to be a job for 
‘community and diversity’ staff, while CT remains the ‘real action’ of the covert police and 
intelligence services. To think that CT and CE should be separate can only hold back 
countering terrorism. It is valid that the aim and practice of intelligence services differ to 
those of the police, but it would be foolish to disregard the overlap in their work, and the 
events of 7/7 in 2005 made that very clear (if one was to disregard the Troubles in the 
1970s and 1980s). The idea that security does not involve a community approach due to 
its covert nature is redundant. This is not to say that the use of CE in CT has not been 
challenging and problematic. In fact, the use of CE in the context of CT has experienced 
some controversies, primarily surrounding the notion of a ‘suspect community’; where it 
is thought that the policing agencies use racial profiling to target specific parts of the 
community when tackling terrorism (e.g. the ‘Irish’ and the ‘Muslim communities’). 
Despite the notion of a ‘suspect community’ being a well-worn concept in the literature, 
this chapter explored areas of concerns and limitations around the concept of the ‘Muslim 
community’. This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter while exploring the issue 
of legitimacy as a factor contributing to cooperation. The next chapter will explore 
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contributing factors that influence public cooperation, and delve into interdisciplinary 
theories that shape these arguments, with CTCE in mind. 
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Chapter 3 
 
A Mind in Motion: The Contributors to Citizen 
Participation and Reporting Behaviour 
3.1 Introduction 
Thus far, the thesis explored the origins and evolution of CE and CTCE, which highlighted 
how the change in perception of crime and prevention has led to working with 
communities. This chapter will focus on the importance of citizen participation and the 
contributors that shape this behaviour, in particular reporting, to set the foundations for 
Questions Two to Five (the effect of CTCE on reporting, reasons and barriers for reporting, 
and lessons to be learnt), primarily Question Four (the relationship between CTCE and 
reporting). This is because this thesis is using reporting behaviour as a proxy measure, 
which allows indirect observation between CTCE and prevention, as by sharing 
intelligence there is a possible intent to stop a situation from escalating. This chapter 
begins by presenting an understanding of the contributors to citizen participation by 
exploring criminology literature. Next, the chapter highlights various psychological 
contributors to citizen participation and reporting behaviour — or more specifically, how 
behaviour is shaped.  
The purpose of exploring public cooperation through these specific bodies of literature is 
to present how the decision to cooperate is influenced by personal and social factors. This 
chapter argues that identity sits at the core of these factors, as identity is used as a 
medium to guide individual behaviour through attitudes, values, respect, relationships, 
the perceptions of others, and senses of agency and responsibility. As a result, the costs 
and benefits of reporting are formed through the lens of identity and manipulation of 
perception. The theories on these principles can assist in addressing the overarching 
thesis question, as they can explore and identify contributing factors that may impact 
reporting behaviour, and how CTCE can positively influence these factors. 
3.2 Understanding the Contributors to Citizen Participation 
It is generally agreed that citizen participation is essential to a healthy democracy (Bullock 
2014, p.25). It is argued that participation can develop and sustain democracy, and that 
participation in associational life creates social capital (Putnam 1995; Putnam 2000), 
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defined as “features of social organisation such as networks, norms, and social trust that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995, p.67). It is 
believed that disconnection from social capital and associational life can have negative 
consequences for civic engagement and trust (Putnam 1995, p.77). 
Effective policing and crime prevention require public cooperation (see Chapter 2), 
without it prevention can be challenging. The public can assist the police by being their 
‘eyes and ears’, working in partnership, sharing information, and reporting crimes 
promptly when they occur, as well as representing their community by serving on 
advisory boards (Skogan 2004). Therefore, ongoing public support and voluntary 
cooperation are required for successful policing (Murphy et al. 2008, p.136). However, it 
has been questioned whether civil society is capable of sustaining participation (Blaug & 
Schwarzmantel 2000), especially concerning crime control (Bullock 2014, p.43). 
It is thought that citizens who are concerned about the fear of crime and social disorder in 
their neighbourhoods, are motivated to protect their neighbourhood from the spiral of 
deterioration with the support of their local police (Zhao et al. 2002). Therefore, it can be 
argued that in the context of crime, CE has an advantage: crime is very important to 
people, and it has a clear impact on the communal quality of life, and as such, people may 
be more keen on being involved to tackle crime (Duffy et al. 2008). In a review of crime 
and communities in Britain, it was identified that 36% of the public believe that they and 
the local community had a responsibility to take action on crime prevention in their 
communities (Casey 2008, p.72), while only 16% said they could assist in fighting crimes 
such as anti-social behaviour, Duffy et al. (2008, p.65) also reported that although a large 
proportion of people are willing to help, they would not get actively involved when it came 
to it. This suggests that greater emphasis on maintaining a range of levels of engagement 
is needed to actively involve citizens (Duffy et al. 2008, p.65). To unlock this potential 
army of volunteers and maintain levels of engagement, a better understanding of the 
barriers that currently stand in the way of stronger public involvement is needed (Casey 
2008, p.75). 
3.2.1 Awareness 
It is believed that sophisticated advertising can increase awareness among citizens and 
encourage participation. For example, Skogan and Steiner (2004, p.6) found that 
awareness of participation opportunities had increased among citizens by 80% post 
campaign. Similarly, another study found increased in awareness, as a result of campaigns 
— 40% of citizens in the pilot areas reported that they had heard of the public meetings, 
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in comparison to 22% in control sites (Tuffin et al. 2006, p.73). However, it should be 
noted that high levels of awareness do not guarantee participation (Bullock 2014, p.112). 
For example, Tuffin et al. (2006) found large differences between sites, ranging from 12-
32% of resident participation in meetings. Similarly, another study discovered that 
although aggressive campaigning had increased awareness, participation in meetings was 
around 12- 14% (Skogan et al. 2000). 
3.2.2 Crime Rate 
Research reveals mixed results in terms of drivers of citizen participation in crime 
prevention. Although some studies show that crime and disorder may motivate citizen 
participation (Lavrakas & Herz 1982; Skogan 1989; Pattavina et al. 2006), others found 
the opposite. For example, some studies have found that high crime rates can weaken 
trust between the residents by creating suspicion, thus hindering a collective response to 
the implementation of crime prevention interventions (Hourihan 1987; Rosenbaum 1987; 
Laycock & Tilley 1995). The argument is high crime rates stimulate a collective response 
to crime prevention (Skogan 1989, p.439). Pattavina et al. (2006, p.228) argue that citizen 
participation is evident in high-crime areas, and when the residents felt part of the 
community and believed the police were invested in getting to know residents. In areas 
with low to moderate crime rates participation was more complex, fuelled by differences 
based on home ownership and whether they had been victims of crime before.  
Moreover, Skogan (1989) outlines that in areas of high and low crime rate, residents may 
deter from participation, as they might find the intervention inappropriate for the crime, 
but in areas of average crime rates resident may be more motivated to participate. Hence, 
there is a ‘curvilinear’ relationship between crime rates and citizen participation in crime 
prevention. It has also been suggested that the perception of crime problems is of 
importance and can have a positive impact on citizen participation (Frank et al. 1996). 
Therefore, concerns about crime give reasons and incentives for participation (Skogan & 
Steiner 2004, p.ii; Bullock 2014, p.115).  
3.2.3 A Question of Social Class and Inequality 
There is evidence to suggest that social class and inequality have an impact on citizen 
participation. Research shows that areas that are characterised by low income, citizens 
with limited formal education, and where state institutions fail to serve their citizens tend 
to attain the highest rate of participation (Skogan & Steiner 2004). It is argued this could 
be linked to the crime rate in the area, as low-crime areas have less incentive to 
participate in an organised collective response to prevent crime (Skogan 1989). Another 
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explanation is that middle-class areas may have the resources to protect themselves by 
investing in private security or resolving problems informally (Bullock 2014). Similar 
observations revealed that participation in community crime prevention was not 
prevalent in the wealthiest, low-crime areas (Pattavina et al. 2006). However, research on 
neighbourhood watches has identified a negative relationship between neighbourhood 
watch membership and deprived or disadvantaged areas (Yarwood & Edwards 1995; 
Husain 1988; Hope 1988; Shernock 1986). This indicates that in these disadvantaged 
areas, there are both reduced opportunities for participation and less intention for 
residents to be involved when the opportunities are available (Hope 1995). Nevertheless, 
Skogan (1989) argues that while there may be more opportunities for participation in 
wealthier neighbourhoods, the effect of disadvantage is diminished because people from 
wealthier areas have fewer reasons to participate. What needs to be considered here is the 
resources available to wealthier areas. Having fewer reasons for participation does not 
indicate that opportunities are limited. In cases where wealthier areas get more financial 
investment, this has an impact on what is available to the residents, while poorer areas 
will not get the same level of opportunity — for example, the number of police officers 
allocated to each area.  
On the subject of inequality Skogan (1995) found that engagement in US was more visible 
in predominantly white areas in comparison to the black or hispanic beats, leading 
citizens residing in the white areas to be more likely to participate in CP. This was 
believed to be the result of (a) the white population taking advantage of the resources that 
programme brought to their community; and (b) the officers having the freedom to invest 
in populations and areas where they felt efforts were most likely to be welcomed and 
effective. Other studies found that officers tended to engage with those already known to 
the police for having an interest in organised collaboration — i.e. the ‘good citizens’ (Parks 
et al. 1999). Due to these contradictory findings, it is important to consider 
neighbourhood disadvantage as a contributor in conjunction with citizen participation.  
3.2.4 Age, Gender, Race, and Education 
Individual characteristics are thought to have some influence on citizen participation. For 
example, age is considered to have positive associations with participation and level of 
awareness of such community-level activities (e.g. older people are more likely to 
collaborate) (Skogan & Steiner 2004; Bullock & Sindall 2014). Additionally, gender is also 
to be a contributing factor to citizen participation. However, the results are mixed. For 
instance, studies have found that participation of men and women is about equal (Skogan 
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& Steiner 2004; Kitchen et al. 2006; Pattavina et al. 2006) while others found that men 
were more likely to participate, even though women are more aware of the activities in 
their local policing teams (Bullock & Sindall 2014). Studies have found that race is another 
factor that has an impact on citizen participation. There is evidence to suggest that Black 
and Minority Ethnic (BAME) communities are more likely to engage and participate in CP 
in comparison to white citizens (Lavrakas & Herz 1982; Skogan 1989; Frank et al. 1996; 
Pattavina et al. 2006). However, these results have also been mixed. For example, Skogan 
and Steiner (2004) illustrated that citizen participation was highest in African-Americans 
areas, although they did not see the same results in non-English-speaking beats. Similarly, 
Bullock and Sindall (2014) revealed that white citizens were no more likely to participate 
than BAME citizens. Finally, the level of education was a facilitator for citizen participation 
in volunteer activities (Wilson 2000) and civic consultation (Kitchen et al. 2006), those 
with a college qualification were more likely to be aware of, and participate in, CP (Skogan 
1995; Frank et al. 1996; Skogan & Steiner 2004). 
3.2.5 Legitimacy: That’s the Sound of da Police! 
Central to the discussion of the rationale for citizen participation sits the notion of 
legitimacy. In Chapter 2, this is presented how application of CTCE and CT strategies has 
impacted legitimacy. Police legitimacy and lawfulness are paramount to any democratic 
policing model (Rogers 2016). It is argued that the legitimacy of legal, political, and social 
structures is important for their long-term survival (Bullock 2014, p.43). Here, legitimacy 
is defined as those not in power granting the right to hold and be in power to those in a 
commanding position (Coicaud 2013, p.40), “through which power and obedience are 
justified, transforming the latter into the consent of the governed” (Coicaud 2013, p.40). It 
was previously thought that compliance with the law It was previously thought that 
compliance with the law ‘good citizens’ (Tyler 1990). It has been argued that people grant 
legitimacy to institutions (like the police) because they represent particular normative 
and ethical frameworks, rather than cooperating through good behaviour (Beetham 
1991). The notion of legitimacy derived from an observation that through authoritative 
power relations alone, compliance cannot be guaranteed (Weber 1968; Murphy et al. 
2008). Legitimacy takes on the notion that “human beings are norm-users, whose 
interactions with each other depend on mutually recognisable patterns that can be 
articulated in terms of right versus wrong conduct, or of what one ought to do in a certain 
setting” (MacCormick 2007, p.20). This is in line with the social psychology of societal 
norms. Social norms are informal rules within the society that guide behaviour and 
maintain order, as well as organising groups (Huang & Wu 1994).  
49 
 
It is argued that legitimacy is not simply instrumental; rather, it reflects a social value 
orientation towards authority and insinuations — a normative, moral, or ethical feeling of 
responsibility (Sunshine & Tyler 2003, p.514). Durkheim's pioneering work (Durkheim 
1961; Durkheim 1984) on social solidarity suggests that the communities evaluate the 
agents of criminal and penal law (e.g. police) based on whether they and their actions 
represent the community's moral values. As such, people are happy to belong to and be 
respected by groups whose authorities follow fair procedures (Sunshine & Tyler 2003). In 
other words, the practice of authority by these authorities communicates to communities 
the normative group values. In the literature, legitimacy centres on evaluative 
assessments of police services. Beetham (1991, 2013) has been significant in driving a 
contemporary understanding of the application of legitimacy to criminal justice. Beetham 
argued that in order understand legitimacy; it is vital to study the foundation upon which 
legitimacy claims are based on and their credibility to relevant actors within a particular 
social and historical context (Beetham 2013, p.19). In other words, “every application of 
law or action in the name of the law . . . must stand up to a test of rightness” (Tamanaha 
2001, p.241).  As such, Beetham notes that power can be considered legitimate as long as 
it is exercised within the established rules and delivered by those who are accepted as the 
rightful source of authority. Thus, legitimacy is considered to be a factor that can promote 
public support and cooperation (Murphy et al. 2008) by providing a moral basis for 
compliance and/or cooperation. It has been demonstrated that public perception of 
fairness (especially that of the justice system) shapes police legitimacy and can influence 
cooperation (Tyler 1990). Tyler’s (1990) findings suggest that procedural justice (the idea 
of fairness and respectful treatment that follows the rules) is very important for public 
cooperation. It is argued that this sense of moral authority is central, and a necessity for a 
legitimate authority (Beetham 1991).  
Police legitimacy has been described as the right to rule, and the recognition by the ruled 
of that right — i.e. the state gives the police the right to rule, but the public also needs to 
recognise this right for legitimacy to exist (Rogers 2016). Studies have demonstrated that 
legitimacy changes the basis on which people decide to consent and cooperate with legal 
authorities (Tyler & Huo 2002; Tyler 2001). For example, Tyler (1990) found a significant 
relationship between compliance with the law, and attitudes and behaviours towards 
these agencies (legitimacy). This study was replicated in another city, and similarly it was 
found that legitimacy had a strong impact on citizen’s reaction to the police, with the 
perception of fairness being the precursor of legitimacy (Sunshine & Tyler 2003). More 
importantly, cooperation with the police was more likely when police were viewed as 
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legitimate (Sunshine & Tyler 2003; Hough et al. 2010). It is evident that people are less 
inclined to cooperate when they have had experiences of disrespectful behaviour from the 
police (Paternoster et al. 1997; Tyler & Smith 1998; Tyler 1997; Tyler 1990). As such, it is 
argued that disrespect may also result in resistance, therefore making it more challenging 
for authorities to fulfil their responsibilities (White et al. 1994). 
Hough et al. (2010) reported that the experience of procedural fairness induced feeling of 
trust, which resulted in perceived legitimacy. This is because treatment of citizens 
communicates information about their status, and so when the police treat the citizens 
with fairness there is a statement of power and equality, which is used by citizens to align 
themselves with the police and perceive them as legitimate (Hough et al. 2010, p.206). In 
contrast, if the treatment of the police is deemed unfair, both legitimacy and compliance 
are influenced negatively, resulting in citizens becoming cynical about the justice system, 
which in turn may lead them to believe certain norms are not personally binding (Hough 
et al. 2010, p.207). This concept, which underlines relationships, is vital for procedural 
justice (Lind & Tyler 1988). People care about how they are treated by police agencies and 
other authorities (procedural justice) because those experiences affirm whether they are 
valued or not. Cooperative behaviour may be influenced by how the police and procedural 
justice are perceived (Bradford 2014). It is argued that confidence and legitimacy 
encourage people to cooperate with the criminal justice system, which can enable the 
more effective functioning of criminal justice (Jackson et al. 2009).  
It is thought that particular sections of the population have significantly lower levels of 
confidence in the police (Allen et al. 2006). In a British Crime Survey, it was identified that 
British Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, in comparison to all other ethnic groups, had lower 
levels of confidence in the police and were more likely to perceive themselves as a victim 
of a racially-motivated crime (Clancy et al. 2001). The Independent Police Complaints 
Commission (IPCC) reported that a section of society that were ‘highly disengaged’ from 
the police, majority consisting of young males from ethnic minority and less affluent 
backgrounds, perceived all police officers with great suspicion and distrust (Inglis & 
Shepherd 2007, p.12). A more recent report showed that although the confidence of the 
BAME groups had risen in many areas, they remained lower in confidence than the 
general public across a range of issues: making complaints, trust in fairness, fear of 
negative consequences of complaining, and so on (Ipsos Mori 2016). The 2007 report 
identified that since 7/7 and 9/11, ‘Asian’ and Muslim participants felt increasingly 
targeted by the police (Inglis & Shepherd 2007). Young Muslims (16-24-year-olds) are 
reluctant to report terrorist-related issues to the police due to distrust and fear of 
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consequences, as the police might assume them to be involved in the activity (Blick et al. 
2006)2. Although other research show the contrary (Innes et al. 2011; Shanaah 2019) (see 
Section 2.2.4) this does not indicate there are no barriers to such level of cooperation as 
verified by Thomas et al. (2017). 
Research has shown that a sense of identification with the state or social group has a 
bearing on how effective procedural can be. It is less effective in cases where people 
identify less strongly with the dominant groups/authorities representing them (Huo 
2003). Central to this argument is the notion that the more the individual identifies with 
their sub-group and its culture, customs, and values, the less likely they are to identify 
with key social institutions in mainstream society or regard their operations as being in 
their own interest (Lind & Tyler 1988). For example, one study found that cooperation in 
CT was more likely when Muslims who identified more with British society viewed the 
police as legitimate (Huq et al. 2011). Similar results were found in a study exploring the 
relationship between willingness to cooperate in CT and self-identification with Australia 
in Arab-speaking citizens (Cherney & Murphy 2013). Therefore, the police can be used as 
a vehicle for individuals to understand their past and their future, as well as expressed 
collective identities (Loader & Mulcahy 2003; Bradford 2014) — in Chapter 7 some 
examples are presented in relation to CTCE. Conclusively, perception plays a key role in 
shaping legitimacy and cooperative behaviour (see Section 3.3.1). When the police are 
viewed as dangerous, the citizens are reluctant to take the personal risks involved in 
safeguarding the social order of the community (Silver & Miller 2004). It is suggested that 
police illegitimacy and untrustworthiness makes the community more likely to “view their 
neighbourhood as collectively efficacious”(Sargeant 2015, p.3). This is in line with the 
study presented by Bottoms (2006), who demonstrated that police illegitimacy and 
ineffectiveness leads to negative control signals3, which leads to community withdrawal.  
Whereas citizens’ willingness to engage and intervene is encouraged by positive control 
signals (Bottoms 2006). Without cooperation, there is no public intelligence. It is this lack 
of voluntary intelligence that has been argued to further prompt the emphasis on overt 
‘low’ CP in an attempt to miraculously solve the issue of police legitimacy and community 
relations (Thiel 2009, p.38; Innes 2006). It is thought that people are more satisfied with 
procedures when their participation is valued, and their views are recognised by the 
                                                          
2
 Fear of reprisals from terrorist, too, hindered the young Muslims from approaching the police. 
However, they did say that the activity would be reported to a trusted Imam. 
3
 A ‘control signal’ is defined as ‘an act of social control that communicates an attempt to regulate 
disorderly and deviant behaviour’ (Innes 2004, p. 556; Sargeant, 2015). Therefore, negative control 
signal indicates lack of control and positive signal indicates control (Sargeant, 2015). 
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authorities (Skogan & Frydll 2004) (Chapters 5-7 provide examples of this in CTCE). It is 
this level of consideration by decision-makers (i.e. the public) that induces comfort for 
participants. This in turn suggests that there is neutrality, as objective indicators are used 
for decision-making rather than personal views, which enhances the perceived fairness 
(Skogan & Frydll 2004). Additionally, being treated with respect and dignity suggests to 
the people that their rights are acknowledged. Therefore, if people feel that the authorities 
care about their rights, they will view the procedure as fair and trustworthy. Research 
suggests that individual encounters with police officers can enhance and/or damage 
police legitimacy (Skogan & Frydll 2004; Murphy et al. 2008). It has been found that police 
officers’ actions and behaviours, rather than the general legitimacy of the policing 
institution, influence people’s views and attitudes towards police legitimacy (Tyler & 
Darley 2000). Also, whether encounters are initiated by the police or the public, show 
mixed results in terms of police legitimacy (McCluskey 2003; Tyler 1990).  
Other research found that individuals who had no contact with the police rated them on 
average more highly than those who did have such contact (FitzGerald et al. 2002; Allen et 
al. 2006; Skogan 2006a). As such, personal experience seems to reduce an individual’s 
confidence in the police and although several studies have suggested that the police can 
do little to enhance public confidence, it is during these personal contacts with citizens 
that damage can be done if not careful (Skogan 2006a). In contrast, numerous studies 
argue that confidence in the police can be improved through outweighing negative 
experiences with positive ones (Bradford et al. 2009; Myhill & Bradford 2012). Although it 
is vital to ensure the service provided meets the needs of the public, using public 
confidence as a performance indicator can be problematic, as it may not be a true 
reflection of actual performance. However, it is suggested that negative encounters with 
the police have a greater impact on levels of satisfaction than positive ones (Lloyd & 
Foster 2009). This is because negative encounters weigh more than the positive 
experience (Skogan 2005). People’s view of their experiences is emotionally driven, and 
therefore may lack objectivity. This is in line with psychological findings that remembered 
experiences dominates actual moment-based experience i.e. evaluation of the total 
experience of an episode can be dominated by the recollection of a specific part of the 
experience, regardless of the full experience (Kahneman 2000). For example, one might 
enjoy dining in a specific restaurant, but upon recalling that they waited an hour for a 
table, which was unpleasant, that recollection may override any pleasant experiences.  
Another psychological theory that explains such subjectivity is the affected heuristic, 
which uses emotions (sadness, fear, pleasure, etc.) to influence decision-making (Finucane 
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et al. 2000; Zajonc 1980). It is a decision-making shortcut, which associates positive or 
negative feelings to risks linked a stimulus (e.g. the police) — as such risks and benefits 
are placed on a sensory thread and judgements are altered (Finucane et al. 2000; Zajonc 
1980). Therefore, public confidence and public perception of police legitimacy is not a 
solid indicator of performance; however, the literature does suggest that these 
perceptions can influence citizen participation and cooperation. Participation is vital, as it 
enables citizens to share and communicate their views with authorities, which can 
influence the process of decision-making (Tyler 2004). As such, policing by consent may 
encourage public cooperation.  
3.2.6 Snitches Get Stitches 
Other literature that circles around the notion of public-police cooperation has highlighted 
that the culture of ‘snitching’ (telling on someone’s criminal activity and cooperating with 
the police) has implications for community-based crime prevention (Clampet-Lundquist 
et al. 2015, p.265). This is because ‘stop snitching’ encourages or pressures the whole 
community to keep quiet, not to trust law enforcements or engage and cooperate with 
them. Although snitching was already viewed negatively within some communities and 
cultures, Clampet-Lundquist et al (2015, p.265-266) argue that the War on Drugs in 
America may have influenced the push for people to ‘stop snitching’. Some scholars argue 
that the ‘stop snitching’ movement is rooted in the “the manifestation of distrust created 
by continual use of police deception during search and seizure encounters” (Masten 2009, 
p.704). Moreover, it is argued that practices like ‘stop and search has created an 
environment for distrust in some neighbourhoods (Clampet-Lundquist et al. 2015, p.267) 
As a result of War  on Drugs, the American prisons witnessed an increase of 546% in drug 
offences between 1985 and 2000 (Mauer 2006), and by 2011 nearly half of the 
incarcerations were on drug charges (Carson & Sabol 2013). Consequent changes in the 
criminal justice system that created a leniency in prosecution of such crimes if defendants 
were of ‘substantial assistance’ (Brown 2007), which led the increased use of informants 
in criminal cases and subsequently saw a host of other negative outcomes at community 
level (Natapoff 2004; Clampet-Lundquist et al. 2015, p.267). In consequence, cooperation 
with authorities was deemed acceptable if the accused could receive less severe 
punishment. It is argued that the use of informants has resulted in criminal justice system 
being viewed as unfair and distrusting (Natapoff 2009, p.136). Moreover, it is argued that 
the disproportionate impact of War on Drugs policies on low-income, high-crime 
disadvantaged neighbourhood is not felt equally by other places in America (Petteruti & 
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Walsh 2008; Goffman 2009), resulting in shaping everyday routines of the affected 
communities through the sense of being wanted and under surveillance (Goffman 2014).   
Others have argued that in socially isolated communities there is a ‘code of the street’ that 
discourages the use of law and authorities in favour of a more immediate and localised 
dispute, as such settling matters in a way (including violence) that exerts informal control, 
garners respect, and maintains reputations (Hannerz 1969). The ‘stop snitching’ 
phenomenon, other than being seen as cultural norm (Cohen 1997), is also thought to be a 
“collective attempt to resist the overpolicing–underpolicing paradox and mass 
incarceration” (Rios 2011, p.60). This distrust in formal authorities to resolve conflict was 
also seen in teens. This erosion of trust, as presented in this Chapter, is a theme that 
impacts procedural justice. Clampet-Lundquist et al. (2015, p. 281-283) argues that 
contrary to popular belief, cooperation with the authorities is not always prohibited in 
high-crime neighbourhood; instead individuals use variety of personal rules to assess 
when to cooperate. With exception of talking about drugs to the police (as this was seen as 
a means to earn income), the respondents reported that they were able to call the police 
for rape, domestic violence, gun violence, or harm to young children (Clampet-Lundquist 
et al. 2015, p.279). The study also found that experience of police within these 
disadvantaged communities shapes their legal cynicism, which influence the decision not 
to cooperate. 
3.3 Considering the Psychology of Reporting Behaviour  
3.3.1 Why do Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values Matter? 
When considering reporting behaviour, perceptions of the police and others are factors in 
reporting decision-making (this is further illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7). People’s 
internal attitudes and values are, too, motivational influencers of behaviour (Tyler & 
Blader 2000, p.51). It is thought that attitudes may be useful in predicting people’s 
behaviours. Therefore, there is the assumption that if attitudes are altered, this enables 
altering behaviour. Internal attitudes and values are argued to be important elements in 
voluntary cooperation through discretionary behaviour (Tyler & Blader 2000, p.53). 
Attitudes are an evaluative judgement of a given entity, defined as “a psychological 
tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or 
disfavour” (Eagly & Chaiken 1993, p.1). Simply, reporting of an attitude involves deciding 
on liking or disliking a particular entity, be it an issue, person, or an object (Maio & 
Haddock 2014, p.4). As a result of this perspective, conceptual models of the attitude were 
generated; one of the most influential models has been the multi-component model 
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(Rosenberg & Hovland 1960). According to this perspective, attitudes are a three-
component evaluation of an entity: cognitive (the person’s knowledge or belief about the 
entity), affective (person’s feelings about the entity), and behavioural (action taken based 
on other two components). For example, “the police are racist” (cognitive); “I am scared of 
the police” (effective); therefore, “I will stay away from the police” (behaviour). As a result 
of their synergetic relation, when an individual holds positive beliefs about an entity (e.g. 
the police), they will typically have positive affective and behavioural associations with 
that entity (Maio & Haddock 2014, p.38). However, the degrees to which people’s 
attitudes are based on effective or cognitive components differ, suggesting there is an 
element of individuality to consider. In one set of studies on attitude and behaviours, it 
was discovered that some people based their attitudes on the favourability of their beliefs 
(thinkers) rather than of their feelings (feelers), while other feelers had their attitudes 
heavily driven by their feelings rather than their beliefs (Huskinson & Haddock 2004).  
Attitudes serve a function, one that parallels the utility of stereotypes (Smith et al. 1956). 
They are a frame of reference that helps in organising and structuring of one’s 
environment (Katz 1960). According to Smith et al. (1956), attitudes server three primary 
functions: object-appraisal, social-adjustment, and externalisation. The first refers to the 
ability to collate and summarise all the negative and positive attributions associated with 
an entity in our social world. These attitudes can help people decide to approach things 
that are beneficial for them and to avoid harm (Maio et al. 2004). This is very relevant to 
the cost-benefit analysis of reporting concerns. Social-adjustment, on the other hand, can 
assist with identifying with people whom one associates with and like while avoiding 
people whom one dislikes and disassociates with. Both social identity and categorisation 
theory can be linked to social–adjustment (see Section 3.3.3). Through association with 
groups and self-categorisation, inter and intragroup relationships are formed (Kelman 
1961; Kelman 1958). For instance, one’s relationship with others may be mediated by 
one’s attitude toward the death penalty because the issue symbolises what that attitude is 
perceived to express about the self (Tyler & Weber 1982). 
Another function is externalisation, which serves as a self-defence mechanism against 
internal conflicts. This means that attitudes can assist in distancing the self from 
threatening entities by projecting one’s unacceptable impulses onto them (Shavitt & 
Nelson 2002). This can generate prejudices (Katz et al. 1956). Consequently, it is through 
these attitudes that the individual may express their self-concept and central values, as 
such attitudes serve as a value-expressive function entity (Maio & Haddock 2014, p.44). 
Values are people’s general ideas, which are used as guiding principles for appropriate 
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behaviour in addition to being overarching goals that people strive to obtain (Maio & 
Olson 1998). Obedience and cooperation are motivated by personal values (Skogan & 
Frydll 2004). Should these values agree with the law, participation and cooperation will 
be voluntarily extended regardless of legitimacy. Conversely, compliance can be 
undermined by contrary values  (Murphy et al. 2008, p.137; Tyler & Darley 2000). 
However, some studies have found that attitudes do not always guide behaviour. For 
example, a review of forty studies examining the relationship between attitudes and 
behaviour found that attitudes were relatively poor predictors of behaviour (Wicker 
1969). This lead to psychologists asking when does attitude predict behaviour, which 
resulted in the more optimistic conclusion that attitudes do predict behaviour, but in some 
conditions more than others (Maio & Haddock 2014, p.68). 
The Stereotype Content Model (SCM), a social psychology theory, can provide a reasoning 
foundation as to how legitimacy can influence cooperation. The SCM model argues that 
judgements are made based on two dimensions: warmth (perceived competition) and 
competence (perceived status) (Cuddy et al. 2008). Therefore, a combination of 
characteristics that fall on these two dimensions can have emotional and behavioural 
consequences that can influence decision-making. The theory posits that the stereotypes 
held about other social groups (e.g. the police) elicit specifically-associated emotions, 
which predict distinct behaviours: active, passive, facilitate, and harmful. The Behaviours 
from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes (BIAS) map (Figure 3) demonstrates how the 
warmth dimension can predict active behaviour, and the competence dimension can 
result in passive behaviours (Cuddy et al. 2008). For instance, when discussing police 
legitimacy, it is possible that in an event where the police lack legitimacy, they are rated 
low on warmth and high in competence, this may elicit negative emotions and 
uncooperative behaviour (Cuddy et al. 2007). 
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It is argued that on the dimensions of warmth-by-competence, the stigmatised group will 
be negatively stereotyped in the majority of cultures (Fiske 1998). Furthermore, various 
social groups tend to be associated with different threats and emotions (Cottrell & 
Neuberg 2005).  Studies using warmth-competency have identified that in Western 
societies Muslims are stereotyped as cold and incompetent (Asbrock 2010). Others have 
illustrated how both Muslims and Muslim-Americans are perceived as violent and 
untrustworthy. Given that a Muslim person might see how they are perceived, they are 
less likely to cooperate with the group (e.g. the police) that they feel is targeting them, 
whether this targeting is imagined or real. It is argued that if there is a belief that the 
police offer such groups little in the way of protection, this in turn influences cooperative 
behaviour from that group in addition to them being reluctant to approach the police for 
support (Thiel 2009, p.38). 
Based on the literature presented here, it is fair to say that personal attitudes and values 
shape and predict behaviour. It is suggested that if there is a requirement and need for 
discretionary cooperative behaviour, CTCE must be concerned with developing and 
sustaining a climate that promotes favourable attitudes and strong values (Tyler & Blader 
2000, p.65). Tyler and Blader (2000, p.66) found that people engage in extra-role or pro-
social behaviours when they hold positive attitudes about a group. For example, in a study 
of crime reporting behaviour, it was found that a positive attitude towards the police 
predicted the victims’ decision to report sexual assault and robbery (Boateng 2016). Other 
studies have, too, found that individuals who have favourable attitudes of the police will 
Figure 3: BIAS map – the X and Y axis layout the competence and warmth stereotypes, respectively. Blue 
arrows represent emotions, whilst the red arrows demonstrate behavioural tendencies (Cuddy, Fiske and 
Glick, 2007, p. 634) 
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be more likely to report a crime to the police in comparison to those that hold less 
favourable attitudes (Rosenbaum 2005; Anderson 2000; Watkins 2005).  
3.3.2 Investment: What’s In It for Me? 
The decision to cooperate and report involves a cost-benefit analysis. In exploring various 
factors that may influence cooperative behaviour, scholars have identified that people 
make choices based on risk and benefit (Tyler & Fagan 2009). This perspective is 
underpinned by notions of deterrence sanctions (e.g. fines or custodial sentences) or 
social control (Murphy et al. 2008, p.137; Nagin 1998), although the effectiveness of 
deterrent strategies is argued to be an insufficient basis for an effective system of social 
regulation due to deterrent effects being modest and the certainty of punishment being 
low (Skogan & Frydll 2004, p.296). It is suggested that cooperative behaviour can be 
divided into two forms: discretionary and mandatory  (Tyler & Blader 2000). Engaging in 
a behaviour that is dictated or required by rules or norms is recognised as mandated 
cooperation. In contrast, when the behaviour is not directly required by rules or norms, 
this is considered to be a discretionary behaviour. Although the mandated behaviour is 
required, it is nevertheless a cooperative behaviour, as there is an element of freedom that 
the individual possesses in deciding how to behave. 
Efforts have been made to attempt to understand why some individuals choose to report a 
crime while others do not. It is suggested that victims’ decision to report crime is 
dependent upon their assessment of the cost and benefit associated with reporting 
(Bowles et al. 2009). This assumption stems from rational choice theory, suggesting that 
the decision to report criminal incidents is a complex process of evaluating the likely cost 
and benefit of the action (Kaukinen 2002; Felson et al. 2002). The theory stipulates that 
crime is reported by the victim if they find the benefit of reporting greater than the 
associated costs (Tarling & Morris 2010). Conversely, if the cost of reporting is deemed 
high, then the victim will be discouraged from taking such action (Kaukinen 2002). In an 
effort to explain the reasoning behind an individual’s choice to report a crime, a two-
dimensional theoretical framework was presented. First, it distinguishes ‘situational’ from 
‘contextual’ determinants that influence reporting decision; second, it differentiates 
‘rational’ reporting decisions from those that are ‘normative’(Goudriaan et al. 2006; 
Schnebly 2008, p.225). Situational or micro-level factors “refer to the immediate crime 
scene or the face to face interaction between the victim and the offender”, which may 
influence reporting to the police (Goudriaan 2006, p.147). These may include injuries to 
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the victim, the physical location of the incident and the state of the offender, e.g. armed 
(Schnebly 2008, p.225).  
While contextual elements are largely geographically defined and include any social 
aspects of the location in which a crime occurs outside the immediate face-to-face 
situation (Goudriaan 2006, p.147), these often represents community-level 
characteristics. These may include the community’s relationship with the police, levels of 
collective efficacy and social cohesion, or residents’ willingness to assist each other in 
maintaining order (Schnebly 2008, p.225). The collective efficacy theory explains that 
social control is only achieved when residents trust one another and are willing to 
intervene and cooperate together (Sampson 2012). Collective efficacy constitutes of 
informal social control and social cohesion (Armstrong et al. 2015). Informal social control 
operates in two ways: willingness to intervene as a form of prevention and the ability to 
extract resources and respond to cuts in public spending (Armstrong et al. 2015; Sampson 
et al. 1997). Informal control is very much dependent on social cohesion — in 
communities where there is mutual trust and respect, residents are more likely to exercise 
social control (Armstrong et al. 2015). Fear created in the minds of residents will 
consequently result in individuals withdrawing from the community, weakening social 
control; this subsequently has a cyclical effect on disorder and crime: disorder causes 
crime, which produces more fear and disorder (Kelling & Wilson 1982). This approach, 
too, aims to form a psychological connection between the residents and the police. This 
may be in the shape of the legitimacy of the police or empowerment of the residents. This 
theory is in line with the Systemic Model of Community Attachment, a social psychological 
model. According to this model, societal ties have determinates (e.g. social participation, 
community sentiment, kinship, friendship, and associational ties) (Kasarda & Janowitz 
1974). These societal ties enable the community to put into practice social control 
(Sampson et al. 1997; Sampson & Groves 1989; Sherman et al. 1994). 
According to Goudriaan et al. (2006), the rational model of reporting behaviour is a cost-
benefit calculation. It is argued that the victim is more likely to report a crime if the 
benefits of reporting outweigh the costs; therefore, it is a transactional behaviour. For 
example, an injured victim reasons that by reporting the crime to the police, the chance of 
future/additional injury by the offender is reduced (Singer 1988). In contrast, normative 
responses represent the norms that coexist in the social context — the societal and/or 
cultural standards that guide an individual’s decision of reporting a crime. For example, 
“Crimes should be reported to the police,” “this is not a case for the police,” or “I should 
deal with this myself” (Goudriaan 2006, p.148). These cost-benefit calculations and 
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normative responses may differ with the situation (e.g., the seriousness of the crime) and 
also with the context (e.g. the country) (Greenberg & Ruback 1992; Ruback et al. 1999; 
Goudriaan et al. 2006). Therefore, Goudriaan and colleagues (2006) conclude that the 
decision to report to the police is influenced by the rational and normative considerations, 
which vary in any given situation or context. These arguments are similar to the theories 
of reasoned action and planned behaviour (Figure 4).  
The theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen 1975) argues that behaviour is the result 
of intention, which is a function of an attitudinal component a normative component. An 
attitudinal component refers to how favourable an outcome is perceived to be by the 
individual; while normative suggest what others think the behaviour should be. Many 
previous studies focusing on the relationship between attitude and behaviour were 
concerned with the attitude towards the object. However, what Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) 
did was to distinguish between the attitude toward the object (e.g. police or cancer) and 
the attitude toward the behaviour (e.g. reporting or getting a mammogram). It was 
Figure 4: Theory of Reasoned Action and Theory of Planned Behavior.* 
*Note: Upper light area shows the Theory of Reasoned Action; entire figure shows the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (Montano & Kasprzyk 2015, p.70). 
61 
 
concluded that the attitude towards behaviour was a better predictor of behaviour. They 
have illustrated the importance of a degree of “correspondence between measures of 
attitude, norm, perceived control, intention, and behaviour in terms of action (for 
example, go get), target (for example, a mammogram), context (for example, at the breast 
screening centre), and time (for example, in the next twelve months)” (Montano & 
Kasprzyk 2015, p.69). Thus, a change in any one factor may result in different behaviour. 
The theory of planned behaviour is an integration of the theory of reasoned action and is 
one of the most frequently applied and tested theories in behavioural research. The theory 
suggests that there are three types of beliefs concerning the outcome of the behaviour, 
which influence the intentions to perform a particular behaviour: “beliefs about the 
probable positive or negative consequences of performing the behaviour (attitudes), 
beliefs about the expectations of others with regards to performing the behaviour 
(subjective norms), and beliefs about the ease of accomplishing the behaviour (perceived 
behavioural control)” (Viki et al. 2006, p.288).  
The theory of reasoned action and planned behaviour suggest that every action has a 
reaction, and there is a value attached to it. Based on these values and consequences, the 
behaviour is planned and reasoned. Behaviour is argued to be skewed when negative 
emotional beliefs have a stronger impact on intentions than positive non-emotional beliefs 
(Maio & Haddock 2014, p.93). Therefore, when these beliefs are collectively assessed or 
considered, it is argued that the behavioural beliefs elicit attitudes towards the behaviour, 
while normative beliefs produce subjective norms concerning the behaviour and control 
beliefs result in perceived behavioural control (Bamberg et al. 2003). As such, the person’s 
intention to perform a particular behaviour is influenced by attitude, subjective norms 
and perceived behavioural control (Ajzen & Fishbein 2005). Hence, holding positive 
beliefs on all of the three factors can increase the likelihood to intend to perform the 
behaviour in question (Viki et al. 2006). As a result, behaviour can be argued to be the 
outcome of the evaluation of ‘likelihoods’ and what one associates those likelihoods with, 
therefore creating an avenue to guide decisions in situations of uncertainty (Passer & 
Smith 2007). Through integration, the theory of planned behaviour distinguishes 
“between personal and social antecedents of intention in the attitude and subjective norm 
constructs and elements from social cognitive theory with perceived behavioural control 
closely aligned with self-efficacy”(Hagger & Chatzisarantis 2014, p.63). However, the 
theory of planned behaviour lacks insight into the belief-based antecedent of intention. 
Consequently, recent reach has adopted self-determination theory (SDT) to provide a 
foundation for source of belief in the theory of planned behaviour, as the motivational 
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orientation in SDT leads the individuals to form beliefs based on the planned behaviour 
theory’s components — attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control  
(Hagger & Chatzisarantis 2009). The SDT is a need-based organismic motivation theory 
that distinguishes between autonomous motivation and controlled motivation. Instead of 
viewing motivation as a unitary concept that can be increased and decreased,  SDT 
explores different types of motivation (Deci & Ryan 1985). Autonomous motivation is 
guided by interest, enjoyment, and value; therefore, there is a sense of personal choice and 
autonomy. Autonomously motivated behaviour does not depend on external 
reinforcement and is more likely to persist on own merit.  
In contrast, controlled motivated behaviour is guided by external pressure, obligation, and 
demand. The behaviour that is guided by control motivation can only last as long as the 
controlled contingencies are presented; once the incentive is removed, the behaviour will 
cease. Research has found that motivation is greater when the individual is autonomously 
motivated in comparison to controlled motivation. From a prevention perspective, 
autonomous motivation may be vital in promoting concern reporting and cooperative 
behaviour that aim to prevent radicalisation and extremism. The second distinction is the 
argument that all humans have a set of basic psychological needs. The SDT argues that 
these basic needs are: competence (feeling confident and effective in relation to the 
task/behaviour), relatedness (feel cared for by others, able to care for others, and feeling a 
sense of belonging, especially in/with groups that are important to one), and autonomy (a 
desire to be the causal agent in one’s choices). Autonomy has already been discussed, but 
now it is recognised as a need, which must be satisfied for optimal performance. If this 
need is not satisfied, then there are negative psychological consequences. 
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There are two types of autonomous motivation: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic 
motivation is self-desire, an internal cause that is self-determined and perceived to 
increase competence (Ryan & Deci 2000a). Extrinsic motivation comes from external 
influencers; it leads to a separable consequence (Ryan & Deci 2000b). It is usually the 
extrinsic motivation that is used to encourage outcomes that a person would not get from 
an intrinsic motivation — common extrinsic motivations are rewards or punishments. 
However, it is found that extrinsic motivations can also be intrinsic when the individual 
identifies and values the external influencer. Consequently, when the external influencer 
is integrated so that it is viewed as part of oneself, the outcome will be very positive (Ryan 
& Deci 2000a, p.62). The premise of SDT is important for this thesis as it argues that the 
decision-maker needs to feel as if they are the maker of their own behaviour, and they 
Figure 5: Integrated Behaviour Model (Montano & Kasprzyk 2015, p.77) 
64 
 
actively seek to satisfy this need for autonomy (Deci & Ryan 2000). Additionally, the IBM4 
(Figure 5) combines the theory of reasoned action and planned behaviour to provide a 
theoretical framework with which to understand behaviour and identify specific beliefs to 
target. At the heart of the model is the intention; however, it is argued that four other 
components affect behaviour.  
The first is knowledge, as the individual needs knowledge and skill to carry out the 
required behaviour. Second are the environmental constraints, which make the 
behavioural performance difficult or impossible (Triandis 1980). Third, behaviour ought 
to be salient to the person (Becker 1974). Finally, it is argued that intention is less 
important if the behaviour is habitual (Triandis 1980). According to the model, 
behavioural intention is guided by three components: attitude toward the behaviour; 
perceived norm; and personal agency (Montano & Kasprzyk 2015, p.79). Personal agency 
in the model consists of self-efficacy and perceived control. Perceived control is 
considered as the amount of control or agency one has over behaviour, determined by 
one’s perception of how various elements make the behaviour easy or difficult to perform. 
In contrast, self-efficacy is “one’s degree of confidence in the ability to perform the 
behaviour in the face of various obstacles or challenges” (Montano & Kasprzyk 2015, 
p.79). While the model does not specify, these factors are linked to SDT’s intrinsic 
motivation and autonomy, as well as competency. 
3.3.3 The Role of Identity 
Identity defines people and their relationships with others.  There is a need to explore 
how the concept of identity can influence cooperation. Recognising how people define, 
resist or adapt their identities is important in understanding how they engage with their 
fellow citizens, and with the government (Gilchrist et al. 2010). Identities are fluid, 
complex and multiple, evolved and expressed in response to shifting needs at an 
individual level or group level (Rangel & Keller 2011). This, in turn, can create a sense of 
belonging. Both identity and the associated relationships may reflect, at any particular 
moment, a sense of family, community, loyalty, historical division or wider structural 
                                                          
4
 The IBM argues, that it is important when applying the model to conduct interviews with the 
population that is “being studied to elicit information about the behavioural, normative, efficacy, and 
control beliefs for that behaviour and population” (Montano & Kasprzyk 2015, p.81). Once such 
information is obtained, IBM can be designed for that particular behaviour. Although theories of 
reasoned action and planned behaviour, as well as IBM, are sometimes criticised as ‘Western’ and 
inapplicable to other cultures (Airhihenbuwa & Obregon 2000), the elicitation process enables the 
model to be applicable to all cultures (Montano & Kasprzyk 2015, p.81). The model suggests other 
communication and behaviour change theories to guide strategies to change those target beliefs and 
behaviour. 
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inequalities (Gilchrist et al. 2010).  This is vital for community engagement, especially in 
the context of CT, as it needs to address the complexities involved in policing such 
multifaceted phenomena. 
Two key psychological theories focused on identity are the SIT and Self-categorisation 
Theory (SCT). Recently, the notion of social identity is being rediscovered in criminology 
and how it can influence the issue of legitimacy. Bradford (2014) suggests that Social 
Identity may explain the causal link in the processes of perception, legitimacy, trust, 
cooperation and compliance with the law agencies. These theories argue that individuals 
can develop two principal identities: personal identity (self-defined in idiosyncratic 
personal relationships and traits) and social identity (self-definition based on group 
membership) (Tajfel & Turner 1979). As such, the concept of self is related the normative 
beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours associated with social group membership (Billig & Tajfel 
1973; Hogg et al. 1995). These prototypes, married with membership values, are referred 
to as ‘social identities’ (Tajfel 1978). Thus, social identity is simultaneously individual and 
social. SIT explains that social identity is shaped by group membership and intergroup 
relations, which are dependent on three components: a) self-categorisation, b) social 
comparison and c)self-definition in terms of in-group defining properties (e.g. prototypes 
associated with being a woman) (Hogg 2006; Turner 2010; Tajfel & Turner 1979). SCT 
builds upon SIT through the expansion of the first component: self-categorisation. It 
explains that the process of self-categorisation shapes social identity and group and 
intergroup behaviours. These intersect between identities, which leads to flexibility and 
collection in our identities (e.g. being John equates to being male, a dad, a sports fan etc.), 
which combine and modify each other in the process (Gilchrist et al., 2010). Depending on 
the situation and the individual, certain identities are less negotiable. This in turn affects 
how that person, and those around them, act and react to challenges (Gilchrist et al. 2010).  
To promote positive self-distinctiveness, these social identities are used for comparison 
between groups (Abrams & Hogg 1990). As a result, stereotyping and stigmatisation are 
inevitable for such categorisations to occur (Lapinski & Mastro 2000). Stigmatisation is 
used to maintain, and justify the hierarchical social system through the use of values in a 
given culture to discriminate against others (Kramer & Jost 2002; Jost & Banaji 2004; 
Hinshaw 2009). Therefore, it rationalises the existence of social order (Kunda & Oleson 
1995; Hoffman & Hurst 1990). As such, stigma is behaviour that aims to discredit and 
exclude an individual or group (Major & Eccleston 2004; Major & O’Brien 2005; Goffman 
1963). Groups and/or individuals are more likely to be stigmatised when certain 
characteristics or attributions are devalued in the societal context (Crocker et al. 1998). 
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This in turn influences positive collective behaviours such as integration, cooperation, and 
cohesion. 
Both social identity and SCT are important functions that shape the portion of our identity, 
which projects an image that develops out of the groups one belongs to. Therefore, it is 
argued that one’s self-evaluation is linked to how the status of the group one associate 
with is perceived. Identity theory also provides the basis for a link between the self-
identity and intended behaviour. The theory suggests that the self is not a distinct 
psychological entity, but a social construct (Terry et al. 1993). As such, each social role5 
that is adopted brings with it distinct components of self (Stryker 1987; Stryker 1968). 
Therefore, the self becomes a collection of identities that reflect the roles a person 
occupies in the social structure (Terry et al. 1999). Subsequently, these role identities 
imply action (Callero 1985). Thus, the behaviour is an indicator of a person’s role as a 
member (Terry et al. 1999; Callero 1985). 
These theories (identity theory, planned behaviour, and reasoned action) have many 
similarities to SIT and its extension to self-categorisation (Tajfel & Turner 1986; Terry et 
al. 1999; Turner 2010). Like identity theory, SIT recognises that the self is socially defined, 
which mediates the relationship between self and the wider social groups. However, they 
do differ: identity theory is focused on role identities (identities which may be to some 
extent universal, such as motherhood), while social identity is concerned with identities 
that emanate from group memberships (identities inclusive to a specific group, such as 
British nationality). Moreover, social identity focuses on intergroup perceptions and 
behaviours and intragroup influence, which can impact the intent of membership (Terry 
et al. 1999). Nonetheless, they both construct a ‘definition’ for who the self is. Terry et al. 
(1999) argue that identity theory provides a clear justification that self-identity is a 
predictor of intention, given that intention is a key predictor in both theories of reasoned 
action and planned behaviour. This notion is supported by studies that explored the 
relationship between intent, identity, and particular behaviours e.g. voting (Granberg & 
Holmberg 1990), staying in school (Biddle et al. 1987), donating blood (Charng et al. 
1988) and consuming of organic food (Sparks & Shepherd 1992).  
As illustrated, identity can influence social ties based on categorisation and stigmatisation. 
In a study exploring social cohesion implications in relation to the discourse of suspect 
community on the everyday lives of the Irish and Muslim communities evidence suggested 
that it was enough to be identified as or assumed to be, Irish or Muslim in order to be 
                                                          
5
 Role here refers to a set of expectations as to what is deemed appropriate. 
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treated as ‘suspect’ (Hickman et al. 2011). Therefore, this stigma results in communities 
feeling that they are ‘othered’, which can result in reactive behaviours and attitudes that 
impact the individual’s social identity (Esses et al. 2001; Cottrell & Neuberg 2005; Aviram 
& Rosenfeld 2002). This suggests that there is a possibility for the development and 
implementation of community-focused approaches to be problematic if not delivered 
effectively, as trust in the police and the community can be shaken (Spalek 2012). Without 
trust community intelligence-gathering would be very difficult.  Some scholars  (Innes et 
al. 2007) have discussed how low trust in the police can result in a lack of willingness 
from the public in passing community intelligence to the police for effective national 
security (Demos 2007). Thus, the breakdown of this vital relationship can have serious 
consequences for the information flow that may enable CT (Hillyard 2004; Hillyard 1993). 
Another element that identity induces is sense of respect. Respect is described as “a basic 
form of social evaluation that emerges in group interactions and that it plays an important 
role in shaping not only social engagement in group life but also the self-esteem and 
physical well-being of the individual” (Huo & Binning 2008, p.1582). A lay person 
perceives respect as a variety of attitudes ranging from deference to social rules to the 
distribution of power in groups and concern for others (Langdon 2007, p.469). Like many 
psychological phenomena, respect is hard to define with distinct criteria, as it is unclear if 
respect should be regarded as an emotion, attitude, or behaviour (Hedinger 2000). 
Furthermore, when comparing people of different nationalities, there are broad 
differences in what is considered respectful behaviour (Sung 2004). Langdon (2007, 
p.470) identified four recurring themes across the psychological literature of respect: (a) 
social power, (b) social rules, (c) caring, and (d) equality and accepting differences.  
There is an argument that respects represents power and status. Therefore there is an 
element of obedience to authority (Ingersoll-Dayton & Saengtienchai 1999; Piaget 1932). 
Furthermore, social norms, as explained previously, set out rules that indicate appropriate 
behaviour required of an individual in a social context. As such, normative social rules are 
used to define respect; for example being treated politely and with dignity (Tyler & Lind 
1992; Heuer et al. 1999) or being friendly and considerate (Simon & Stürmer 2003). In a 
study with no pre-established definition, respect was measured through prototypes of 
caring and loving (Frei & Shaver 2002) while others found several behavioural definitions, 
which indicated that respect is found in acceptance and equality (Jones 2002) and is given 
to all beings (Sennett 2004; Lawrence-Lightfoot 2000). Research has shown that respect 
has an impact on our behaviour and attitude. For example, communicating respect has 
been found to motivate cooperative behaviour, which illustrates the importance of 
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perceived and received respect in deciding to cooperate or not (de Cremer 2002). Other 
research has illustrated a negative correlation between perceived respect and bullying 
(Langdon 2007, p.473; Langdon & Preble 2003) or a negative correlation between respect 
and violent behaviour (Leary et al. 2005). Social psychologists have demonstrated that 
when respect is manipulated, it affects emotions, such as shame and pride (Spears et al. 
2005; Ellemers et al. 2004). Respect has also been linked to procedural and social justice 
(De Cremer & Tyler 2005).  
It is evident from these different lines of thinking about respect that they have a shared 
understanding that what is at stake is people’s relationships to groups and that it matters 
to people because it satisfies two core motives of social life — striving for status and the 
need to belong (Huo & Binning 2008, p.1571). As a result, the Dual-Pathway Model of 
Respect (Figure 6) relies on these two core motives as organising principles and two 
evaluative pathways (liking and status evaluation) “through which respect feedback from 
the group shapes attitudes and behaviours that affect the welfare of the collective (social 
engagement) and of the individual (self-esteem and health)” (Huo & Binning 2008, 
p.1572).   
The social engagement aspect of this model argues that people’s perception of to what 
extent they are respected can be a predictor of when and why people choose to engage 
with each other (Huo & Binning 2008, p.1574). For example, studies have found that 
feeling respected by authorities was linked to compliance, commitment, and engaging in 
Figure 6: Dual-Pathway Model of Respect (Huo and Binning, 2008, p.1572) 
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extra-role behaviour (Tyler et al. 1996). Other studies have found that perceived respect 
from the community predicts higher levels of self-reported civic engagement, such as 
attending neighbourhood meetings (Boeckmann & Tyler 2002). Key to the current 
research, two studies found that when one feels that others respect one's ethnic subgroup 
in the broader community, it can predict support for political institutions and student 
participation in school engagement (Huo et al. 2010; Huo 2006). This is important 
because, as previously mentioned, the current climate of CT has hurt some Muslims, which 
can impact their level of social engagement if they feel that their social identity (ethnicity 
or religion) is not respected.  
Given the evidence presented in the literature, the present study suggests that the notion 
of identity and its sub-elements (i.e. respect) are key to understanding crime-reporting 
behaviour, especially in the context of CT, because individuals live in communities and 
have a collection of identities and roles, which imply what actions they should take in a 
given context.  
3.3.4 Responsibility 
Two other factors to note when discussing attitudes and values as regards cooperative 
behaviour are accountability and responsibility. Both accountability and responsibility 
suggest there is an element of liability. The main difference between the two is that while 
responsibility can be shared, accountability cannot. Accountability, too, can influence 
cooperative behaviour. To hold residents/community members accountable, two 
conditions are needed: a) residents need to acquire the same level of knowledge (and in 
some cases, skill) as service providers; and b) locally appropriate structures need to be 
taken into account (Mistry 2007). As such, effective crime prevention needs community-
based policing to engage the public in ways that enhance and enable cooperative 
behaviour, especially in the context of CT. Additionally, studies have shown that 
responsibility can also have an impact on how an individual behaves. For example, 
interpersonal relationships can increase the feeling of responsibility in cases of 
emergency; particularly if there is a special bond or commitment to the victim (Moriarty 
1975; Geer & Jarmecky 1973), or if the victim is dependent on the individual (Berkowitz 
1978). Other studies have found that how responsible a person feels for the environment 
is a promising predictor of that person’s ecological behaviour (Kaiser & Shimoda 1999).  
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3.4 Discussion  
What is known about citizen participation and behaviour, particularly reporting 
behaviour? It is known that identity is used as a medium to make sense of the world 
around us. Identity is not a singular entity; rather, it is multifaceted and complex. Each 
social identity or role that one adopts comes with various stereotypes and stigmas, which 
shape and guide our relationships/group memberships, beliefs, attitudes, values, and 
sense of respect and responsibility. Also, the literature highlights that legitimacy is one of 
the key factors that influence citizen participation and cooperation. This is in line with 
psychological theories focused on inter-group relationships. Based on the identities that 
one associates with, the perception of whom one ought to cooperate with is guided 
through attitudes, beliefs, and values that are shaped by stereotypes. As the BIAS map 
illustrated, stereotypes help to categorise whom one associates with more and whom one 
feels most threatened by. It is based on such categorisations that one’s behaviour and 
relationships with others is guided. Therefore, if one perceives the police to be of threat, 
according to the BIAS model, one is less likely to approach them.  
Additionally, the literature suggests that a sense of respect can also influence how and 
when an individual may decide to engage with others. This, too, can also be explained 
through a sense of identity and application of BIAS, and how it impacts behaviour. It is 
also known that the decisions one makes are based on the evaluation of what benefits or 
may hurt us. How one perceives these costs and benefits is again dependant on the notion 
of identity. It is as a result of this evaluation that one forms the intention to respond to a 
situation and subsequently act upon it. The literature on behaviour illustrates that 
intention is the key to performing the behaviour. It is also evident that one’s intention is 
formed through motivations, which are either internal or external — both of which are 
again shaped by individual’s interpretation of context through one’s sense of identity. The 
concept of identity is vital to behaviour outcome, as it guides one’s perception and 
interprets one’s existence in the world. 
The current chapter presented the contributing factors for citizen participation and 
behaviour. The theories presented here suggest that there are ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors that 
influence the decision to cooperate. Behaviour is complex and interconnected. Activating 
action from non-state agencies requires connecting at an individual level — a 
psychological state, which may encourage cooperation. Therefore, this thesis argues that 
to achieve public cooperation, psychological needs (e.g. recognition of fear, responsibility, 
agency, and social membership) have to be addressed through engagement. From a 
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prevention perspective, and the purpose of this research, understanding contributors to 
citizen participation and behaviour is vital to prevention. This is because, to encourage 
cooperation, it is critical to know what the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors are. This is vital to CTCE 
strategy, as presented in Chapters 1 and 2. The findings from this literature review will 
assist this thesis in informing a CTCE model that is behaviour-conscious, especially in the 
context of cooperation and reporting.   
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Chapter 4 
 
Research, Social Change, and The Space In 
Between: A Reconstructed Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, it explains, justifies, and reflects on the 
methodological and design approach underpinning the assumptions and reasoning for 
this study. Second, it applies the methodological literature to the thesis reasoning and 
assumptions, as well as the planning and the implementation of the research. Third, it 
challenges some of the broader methodological theories and provides to guide future 
research. It is through these three processes that the researcher can be reflective and 
identify the purpose of the research, as well as its strength and limitations based on the 
methodology adopted (see Chapter 8). 
The chapter begins with the introduction of the study’s aims and research questions; this 
is followed by the ontological and epistemological scaffolding of the thesis. Next, it 
explains the reasoning for the adoption of a primarily qualitative strategy and justification 
of using multiple case studies; this also covers reasons for selecting East Jutland and West 
Yorkshire as case studies. The processes of access, data collection, conducting interviews, 
and participation sampling are discussed in detail. The following section covers the 
rationale for methods of data analysis. It also highlights the management of ethical 
considerations. Finally, the chapter discusses research dissemination and the pathway to 
impact, as well as providing concluding observations in which original contributions to 
methodological literature are presented. Throughout, the chapter highlights how this 
research has made contributions to methods.  
4.2 Research Aim, Questions and Summary of Data Collected 
As set out in Chapter 1, this research aims to explore the use of CTCE by two police forces 
(East Jutland and West Yorkshire) and how this relates to reporting of 
radicalisation/extremism. Thus, the overarching question this research aims to answer is 
what is the relationship between CTCE and the reporting of radicalisation and 
extremism? Based on prior knowledge (discussed in Section 4.3) of behaviour and the 
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psychological processes that shape it, as well as the difference in reception of CT 
strategies in these two locations, it was hypothesised that CTCE could influence the 
internal and external variables of reporting behaviour or citizen participation if it was 
delivered in a particular way suggesting a relationship between CTCE and reporting of 
radicalisation/extremism. The null hypothesis implies no relationship between CTCE and 
reporting because CTCE cannot influence reporting behaviour. To test this hypothesis and 
to answer the overarching question of the thesis, the following questions were used to 
guide the research: 
1. What is CTCE in the broader context of prevention, and how do the police and 
their partner agencies (e.g. local authorities) explain its use and delivery in 
East Jutland and West Yorkshire?  
2. How effective is CTCE in encouraging people to report concerns of 
radicalisation/extremism, and what are the reasons for this? 
3. What are the reasons and barriers for people reporting or not reporting 
radicalisation/extremism, and how can CTCE address these needs? 
4. How, if at all, can the existing literature and the current explain the existence 
of any relationship between CTCE and reporting behaviour? 
5. What lessons can be learnt from East Jutland and West Yorkshire in shaping 
CTCE practices that encourage and improve reporting of 
radicalisation/extremism? 
The above questions highlight two key elements that guide the research design and 
methodology of this research: reporting and CTCE strategies. The first factor suggests that 
there is a need to understand reporting behaviour, and therefore it is vital to take the end-
user perspective, which means taking the reporters and practitioners’ platform as the 
starting point to inform how to encourage and improve this behaviour through CTCE. As 
there is a need for transformation, TRD was chosen to help guide the focus on reporters 
and their needs (see Section 4.4). The second factor, CTCE, requires an understanding of 
the strategy, and to explore its relationship with reporting behaviour and citizen 
participation, a comparative analysis can be insightful.  As a result, case studies are used 
to identify significant similarities and differences that could inform effective practices in 
relation to reporting radicalisation and extremism. The study took place in East Jutland 
and West Yorkshire, in collaboration with the East Jutland Police and West Yorkshire 
Police (see Section 4.5.1). The decision to research in this manner was guided by a variety 
of assumptions, which are explained in the following sections.  
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4.3 Epistemology and Ontology  
This section outlines the epistemology and ontology that informed the research design of 
this thesis, guiding the reader through theoretical framework and contribution to 
knowledge. For researchers, epistemology is an important tool that provides reasoning 
and justification for the theory of knowledge. The theory of knowledge for this thesis is 
grounded in a priori knowledge in psychology — specifically, in cognitive and social 
psychology — and behavioural economics. This knowledge provided the understanding 
that there is a link between identity and behavioural economics. These two disciplines 
provide insight into human behaviour that is independent of experience. This suggests 
that there is a process in place that explains reasoned action (i.e. reporting behaviour), a 
multifaceted process that results from the marriage and interaction of various personal, 
social, and contextual elements. 
As explained in Chapter 1 and Section 4.2, the a priori knowledge that shaped this theory 
was that, theoretically, the Aarhus Model and the Prevent strategy are similar, in that their 
work is in the pre-criminal stage and focuses on rehabilitation of the vulnerable individual 
through a voluntary process. However, the former had received positive feedback from 
the international audience while Prevent experienced negative backlash. Additionally, the 
Aarhus Model had allegedly decreased the number of foreign fighters leaving for conflict 
zones, and had managed to attract the returnees to directly contact the Info-House (where 
the model was operated from). These reports were made either by the returnees 
themselves or their relatives. This raised a question about how the Aarhus Model, or Info-
House, engaged with the public to encourage a cooperative relationship, especially from 
those affected (i.e. vulnerable individuals and their relatives). Were they delivering this 
engagement differently to the delivery in the UK? My prior experience of auditing 
organisational practices and processes indicated that there were potential bottlenecks 
that needed further examination. Moreover, my background in psychology and insight in 
behavioural economics also suggested that reasoning is shaped by various internal and 
external factors such as identity and cost-benefit analysis of action. However, empirical 
knowledge was needed to explore the relationship between CE and reporting behaviour, 
to challenge or support the assumptions made based on prior knowledge.  
Ontology is also vital to answering and understanding fundamental questions related to 
theory. It is about looking at a question through an holistic and multi-layered lens to 
identify other factors that influence the formation and existence of a possible answer. 
Therefore, through ontology, researchers are required to acknowledge the existence of 
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these factors, exploring the relationships between them to provide a better-informed 
answer. It is through the inclusion of these factors that creation, reproduction, and 
modification of the structures and systems that exists within society are made possible,  
thus providing a framework (Giddens 1984). This is crucial to problem-solving in a social 
context, for example, as various elements feed into the given context. Additionally, 
through ontology, one can distinguish and categorise the embedded factors, as well as 
identify their relational hierarchy.  
This is relevant to this thesis, as CE, CT, CTCE, reporting, prevention, radicalisation, and 
extremism are complex and interconnected phenomena and thus, in need of an holistic 
approach for understanding and problem-solving. It is by understanding the interaction of 
factors that influence these phenomena that scholars can modify, reproduce, and create 
structures and systems to promote the prevention of radicalisation and extremism 
through CTCE. In this thesis, it is evident that reporting and CE are two objects within a 
social context, and they each have various trajectories. At the forefront of CE, there is an 
individual interaction premise that deserves scrutiny: what kind of interaction is it? What 
does that interaction mean for the parties involved? How does the interaction influence 
these parties? What is the need or aim of the interaction? And so forth. From a reporting 
aspect, this thesis is more focused on the individual and the internal processes that shape 
behaviour through interactions of internal and external factors. The research asks what 
the elements and processes that guide specific behaviour are. Consequently, this research 
is about exploring the interaction and relationships of objects that affect reporting 
behaviour through the medium of CE. Therefore, this research, through the application of 
ontology, is using an holistic and multi-layered lens to gain behavioural insight of 
reporting radicalisation/extremism. 
Ontology enables comprehension of truth fluidity, which is associated with an object in 
different domains. For example, in the theological domain, the creation of the world is 
viewed differently to the view taken by some scientists. Therefore, this fluidity is about 
the exploration of reality from a more holistic angle. This thesis is exploring how CE is 
understood and viewed by practitioners and reporters. Also, the thesis is exploring how 
reporting is viewed by these parties. Essentially the thesis is also concerned with how the 
risk of a given situation and/or reporting is viewed not only by reporters but also 
practitioners. Without consideration of such questions, factors, and relationships, the 
research lacks a solid theoretical foundation. Understanding these ontological questions 
and the relationship between CE and reporting of radicalisation/extremism requires an 
understanding of how CE is delivered. To do that it is necessary that practitioners, senior 
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leaders, as well as managers, are interviewed because these individuals have first-hand 
knowledge of the practice, importance, impact, and value of CE. These practitioners who 
inform, interpret, implement, and apply CE policies, as well CT policies, can offer unique 
and valid insight into the factors that form CTCE practice and its impact on reporting 
behaviours, and ultimately prevention. Therefore, interviews with this group provide 
expert insight into a phenomenon that they are intimately familiar with (Beyers et al. 
2014; Froschauer & Lueger 2009). 
Research on CTCE is limited. Here it is explored through CT practices and policies, rather 
looking through the application of CE. Additionally, the CE literature has not delved deep 
into the link between CE styles of practice and prevention, and most of the studies around 
CE are dominated by American practice. More importantly, research has not yet explored 
the relationship between CE and reporting of radicalisation/extremism. As a result, the 
first-hand experience of these experts is under-researched and is in need of discussion, as 
the concept of CT, prevention, and CTCE, more specifically around raising awareness, has 
become increasingly popular in policy and practice.  
By understanding the practice and CE structure, the thesis can see how formal rules tend 
to shape practitioner behaviour —  for example, in the police (Dixon 1997) — such as 
changes in recording requirements that may also result in behavioural modification 
(Collier 2001). However, it is important to consider both informal and formal rules in 
place, to comprehend how these norms shape practice and practitioners’ behaviour in 
addition to the reporters, as it is believed that informal factors such as situational 
incentives also guide practice (Workman-Stark 2017; Waddington 1999). As explained in 
Chapter 1, the meaning of CE varies from user to user. Since the approach is a ‘soft’ form of 
policing (i.e. not punitive), there is a need to explore what this means in practice for 
practitioners, senior leaders, as well as managers, and its interpretation into action to 
assess practices in place (Fielding 2006a). As a result of this mixed interpretation, there is 
ambiguity and possibly confusion among practitioners and policy-makers as to the best 
possible form of CE practice. Therefore, there is a need for a methodological approach that 
examines perceptions, feelings, and lived experiences (Guest et al. 2012). Thus, this 
research can reflect on attitudes and values, situation factors, and organisations 
structures that contextualise the work of these practitioners.  
Similarly, reporters of radicalisation/extremism are a cohort that is yet to be explored. 
Their experience of reporting, CTCE or CE can be very helpful in getting an insight into 
their world view. Although there have been some recent studies into thresholds of 
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reporting (Thomas et al. 2017), there is still a lack of first-hand experience. Thomas et al. 
predominantly focus on a limited group (i.e. young Muslims and marginalised white 
British) and ask these groups hypothetical questions around whether they would report 
someone close to them if they had concerns of radicalisation/extremism. This is not to 
argue that their research has no value, but rather to point out the simple fact that their 
study did not focus on first-hand experiences of reporters. Also, there is a need to inquire 
what was meant by ‘reporting’ in the context of CT, to be able to identify what is being 
influenced, and also who was considered a reporter (e.g. professional, relatives, and the 
general public)? However, the thesis does not argue that interview with experts and 
reporters necessarily uncover the ‘truth’ about the relationship between CE and reporting. 
The data may be skewed or incomplete, due to gaps in knowledge, the mood of the 
participant (Berg 2009), fear of repercussion (Sapsford 2007), inaccuracy or bias, the 
relationship between the researcher and the researched, participants being untruthful 
about their reasoning or practices, or simply that the researcher might have asked the 
questions differently (Cresswell 2007). Through this integrated approach, an holistic lens 
enables the researcher to understand how practitioners (and reporters) experience and 
comprehend the structure, as well as create meaning and make decisions (McConville et 
al. 1991). It is through answering such questions and approaching them holistically that 
this study was able to connect practices informed by both organisational structures and 
personal interpretations, to the experiences and actions of those who engage with it. 
Therefore, the research can connect the social, personal, and historical dimensions of the 
given context (Mills 2000). Subsequently, this research’s original contribution to 
knowledge (the application of behavioural insight to CT policing, and reporting of 
radicalisation/extremism) is, in essence, an ontological question. By answering the 
questions presented in this section, the thesis can address matters that are linked to other 
and wider disciplines and knowledge.  
4.3.1 Policy Transfer 
Decision-makers in CT are increasingly interested in the age-old wisdom of cross-national 
experiences, which has encouraged ‘policy transfer’ and ‘lesson-drawing’ from other 
nations facing similar problems. In order to develop a policy that addresses a particular 
policy issue/problem, jurisdictions, international organisations, agencies, and alike 
initiate policy transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh 2012, p.340). As such, policy transfer is about 
importation of ideas from abroad, and this transfer can assist in understanding the 
movement of political ideas and policies (Newburn & Jones 2007, p.1). Hence policy 
transfer is an ontological and epistemological phenomenon. This process of learning is a 
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comparative one, it is about comparing and contrasting the ways in which a country 
responds to, in this instance, terrorism, extremism, and radicalisation with those practiced 
elsewhere. As explored in Chapter 2, the EU used policy transfer to learn from countries 
like the UK and enforced these policies on EU member states to ensure appropriate 
actions were taken in countering terrorism at global, national, regional, and local levels. 
The EU also encouraged this knowledge transfer and learning between member states, 
ensuring evidence-based practices and policies.  
Therefore, policy transfer and comparison require understanding and interpreting what 
those in other places are actually trying to do (Nelken 2009, p.291). This is where this 
thesis aims to provide insight into CTCE practices and interpreting their impact on 
prevention, with the intention of identifying effective CTCE practices but also of providing 
an interpretation of terms such as CTCE. Through policy transfer and comparison it is 
possible to re-evaluate ontological and epistemological assumptions, meaning that there is 
the possibility to recognise that radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism may be viewed 
differently by others, and to influence the response to these phenomena at national, 
regional and local level. Consequently, ethnocentric assumptions are challenged. As such 
policy transfer and lesson-drawing are not about copying what others do but to learn 
under what circumstances and to what extent programmes effective elsewhere may also 
work here (Rose 2005, p.1). This learning process is not just about what works but also 
failures, which can be far less costly politically and financially. This thesis utilises a multi-
method design, with the interest in delivering policy and practice impact. The next section 
will discuss in more detail about other methodological strategies used in this thesis to 
encourage policy transfer and lesson-drawings through comparative study of West 
Yorkshire and East Jutland CTCE practices and policies, as well as the adaptation of TRD to 
inform the focus on reporters and their needs.   
4.4 Methodological Strategy 
This section explains the methodology used in this research and presents the limitations 
and challenges faced. As explained in Chapter 1 and based on the ontology and 
epistemology of this thesis, a multi-method design with a comparative dimension was 
deemed suitable. The justification for the adaptation of TRD will be expressed in this 
section, but first, it is important to establish what TRD is. This ‘transformative paradigm’ 
is a human-centred framework that seeks to ‘transform’ mechanisms in place, through an 
interdisciplinary process, to form socially progressive ends. Therefore, there is an element 
of concern around issues of inequality and injustice in society (Mertens 2014, p.212). 
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Specifically, this paradigm focuses on “the existence of unequal power relationships 
(which leads to tensions within and between communities) and the strengths of 
communities when their rights are respected (presented as a strong alternative for the 
‘deficit perspective’ of researchers and evaluators who only focus on problems)” (Baur 
2010, p.276).6 As such, the transformative paradigm provides a framework for the 
examination of assumptions surrounding issues of power, social injustice, and embedded 
complexities that construct a social context or norm. 
The TRD surfaced during the 1980s and 1990s in response to issues within research: a) 
dissatisfaction with the existing and dominant research paradigms and practices; and b) 
“the white, able-bodied male perspective” had formed much of the sociological and 
psychological theory which lay behind the dominant paradigms, not to mention that these 
theories were “based on the on the study of male subjects” (Mertens 2005, p.17). This also 
applies to other fields such as criminology and political science. As such, TRD believes that 
the “agendas of agents of interest need to be inquired into, to introduce an action agenda 
that may change the lives of the participants, and the institutions in which individuals 
work or live” (Creswell 2003, pp.9–10). Also, most research restates the status quo due to 
the nature of the funding and grant models, which can result in reaffirming existing 
inequalities. Moreover, most research starts from the basis of the researchers’ need rather 
than the needs of the end-user. Therefore, TRD encourages the researcher to move out of 
their sphere and into the researched context. Consequently, TRD starts from the 
perspective of the end-user. In this thesis, there are two groups of end-user s: a) receivers 
of CTCE, who are encouraged to use the pre-criminal services, including the reporting 
service; and b) practitioners who deliver CE, because their voices are usually unheard due 
to the organisational hierarchy. They are knowledgeable about the needs of the public 
through their engagement. The framework produces results that are useful to 
stakeholders: reporters (professional, relatives, and the general public), practitioners, and 
policy-makers.  
By adapting this approach as guidance and using it in conjunction with comparative study 
in addition to the focus on policy transfer and practice, the research takes into 
consideration axiology (the theory of value), which is often overlooked. Therefore, 
axiology incorporates ethics for the research and the researcher. From the TRD 
perspective, through the focus on social justice, the researcher is held accountable for how 
research is conducted — accountability means ensuring researchers are not restating the 
                                                          
6
 Communities here does not only refer to geographical or cultural entities but also various other in-
groups and out-groups such as authorities, professions and so on. 
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status quo. For example, notions that right wing-extremism is carried out by ‘white 
marginalised middle-aged men’; or that Islamist extremism is carried out by Muslims with 
specific characteristics such as orthodox clothing or brown skin; or the Muslim 
community have a specific representative within the community that they go to. These 
examples highlight the biases associated with specific groups and how they shape our way 
of thinking. Right-wing extremism has wider group memberships that include other 
ethnic groups as well as genders. The ‘Muslim community’ is not one homogenous group; 
it has various factions and trajectories that come from a diverse range of cultures and 
ethnicities, which collide with each other. Therefore, when describing the ‘Muslim 
community’, to whom do we refer to? Is this more an issue of racism and/or lack of 
knowledge of ethnicity and cultures? Believing that ethnic groups such as ‘Muslims’ have a 
leader or representative in the community restates the colonial and tribal view of ethnic 
minorities (Easby 2016). When discussing issues of radicalisation, extremism or 
terrorism, a report by MI5’s Behavioural Science Unit stressed that there is no single 
profile for this group of people, based on several hundred in-depth case studies (Travis 
2008). The people from this group come from various social and economic backgrounds, 
ethnicities and religions.  
If research predominantly focuses on the ‘Muslim community’ or the ‘marginalised White 
British’ group to understand a phenomenon, that research is fundamentally unethical and 
skewed, as well as reinforcing the status quo and biases that oppress and stigmatise such 
groups. Such research is not helping to improve social inequality or injustice, but rather 
maintain it, which results in questionable research axiology. If one desires change, one 
cannot follow the same exhausted routes. Thus, TRD challenges the epistemology, 
ontology, and axiology of research, and assists with the removal of restrictions on the 
lived experiences of the end-user. This is because critical paradigms such as TRD focus on 
“empowering and removing oppressive structure[s] around research subjects” (Kivunja & 
Kuyini 2017, p.38). Accordingly, this thesis aims to remove this oppressive and limiting 
structure by not focusing on a faction of the community or reporters; rather it observes 
reporters as a whole entity (i.e. demographically diverse), and practitioners are not 
limited to only the police. The research asked for the involvement of those practitioners 
that deliver CE, especially in the CT context. Otherwise this research, too, would have 
reaffirmed the existing biases, and failed to approach the question holistically.  
Subsequently, through using the social justice design and methodology such as TRD, the 
researcher is accountable for how the research outcomes are used and returned to end-
users. These strategies question and reflect on the space between the researcher and the 
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researched, as well as questioning the very foundation of the research. Consequently, it 
holds the epistemological, ontological and axiological foundation of the research tightly. 
This thesis aims to develop better practices and policies (see Policy Brief in Appendix O). 
The current research’s pathway to impact has so far been involved in drafting policy 
papers for practitioners and policy-makers, providing them with suggestions on how to 
improve and encourage reporting through introducing a new style of CE and reporting 
process that is faithful to the needs of future reporters. 
The characteristics of TRD can be summarised as a social justice methodology that is an 
interventionist strategy, which operates within the parameters of knowledge by 
interacting with all disciplines. The argument for TRD is that social research cannot be 
comprehensive without social justice methodologies. Such research needs to apply social 
sciences, both empirical and theoretical. Through this strategy, the personal and 
contextual factors that impact and influence the end-user, which result in the creation of 
inequalities, can be explored.  
From an ontological perspective, reporters are fundamental to the understanding of 
reporting reasoning, as they allow us to understand the personal and contextual factors 
associated with reporting radicalisation/extremism. This is also in line with TRD because 
this thesis is drawing upon TRD by taking the end-user’s perspective in conjunction with 
data from comparative analysis to transform the service to impact them positively i.e. 
provide them with what they need to be at ease in raising their concerns of 
radicalisation/extremism. This ensures that a key contribution is delivering policy and 
practice impact..  
Therefore, a multi-method approach supports the ontological and epistemological 
argument for the theory of knowledge, as it provides an holistic perspective, recognising 
that when examining any phenomena, a multi-faceted perspective (multidisciplinary and 
interdisciplinary) is necessary. This research recognises that ‘cause’ and effect’ are the 
result of a collection of embedded factors that contribute to phenomena, which all needs 
to be addressed. As such, by using TRD as guidance, an interdisciplinary theoretical-based 
framework is used to deal with the determinants surrounding the problem at hand, 
subsequently widening the methodological imagination. Moreover, the ontological 
questions also welcome a comparative approach to exploring these relationships in 
different environments (i.e. East Jutland and West Yorkshire). Through comparative 
analysis, the thesis can explore what works and what does not in a given context, as well 
as identifying other existential factors that could influence the relationship between CE 
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and reporting behaviour. More importantly, through comparing and evaluating the reader 
has the opportunity to draw their own conclusions. 
4.5 Research Design 
This section explains and justifies the research design for this thesis. It begins by 
explaining why a multiple case study approach was taken. This is then followed by 
justifications for using a qualitative approach through semi-structured interviews. Next, 
the chapter discusses access to participants and data before outlining sampling and 
interview scheduling. 
4.5.1 Justification and Application of Comparative Case Studies 
A case study is commonly used for organisational research (Leonard-Barton 1990; 
Crompton & Jones 1988). A case study is described as “a strategy for doing research, 
which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context using multiple sources of evidence” (Robson 1993, p.146). This 
thesis explores a contemporary phenomenon using historical events to make sense of 
real-life contexts (the needs and barriers of reporting in a CT context and the influence of 
CE on these variables). Therefore, this thesis argues that the definition of the case study 
should also describe and reflect the ontological aspects of ‘contemporary phenomena’, as 
they are the by-product of historical events. Yin (2009, p.18) adds to this definition by 
suggesting that case studies are an in-depth (Berg 2009) investigation, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are unclear. This then allows for the 
exploration of many more variables of interest (Thomas 2011; Yin 2014). This is in line 
with the ontological and epistemological aspect of this thesis, which argues for a more 
holistic approach to research. Case studies are seen best suited to research that 
investigates through ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Yin 2003; Stake 2005). Therefore, case 
studies can be exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory (Yin 2009, pp.5–9). In fact in 
areas where case study is used for exploratory reasons is because not enough is known 
about the area i.e. one cannot design a questionnaire unless one knows what questions to 
ask, or design an experiment unless one holds some insight into how the participants are 
going to respond within the bounds of experimental manipulations.  
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Thus, case studies are open techniques that welcome, but are not limited to, exploration. 
As a result, case studies can be descriptive and explanatory, as the researcher begins to 
understand the ‘how’ and the ‘why’. For example, case studies can show why people do 
certain things, how they explain their behaviour, and what are the proceeding activities 
that lead the individual to behave in a certain way. Consequently, these observations 
provide an explanation of the process and the outcome. Therefore, Yin (2009, p.6) argues 
against case studies being only a preliminary research method and stresses that some 
famous case studies have provided causal explanations through explanatory and 
descriptive case studies (Allison & Zelikow 1999). As a result, ‘how’ and ‘why’ answers 
might take the form of simple causal models, as well as illustrating the complexity of 
people’s reasoning and feelings. Additionally, it is believed that the case study relies on 
multiple sources of evidence and the triangulation of data to provide insight into 
phenomena (Yin 2009, p.102).  
There are three conditions that can assist with identifying three types of methods suitable 
for a case study: “a) type of research question posed, b) the extent of control an 
investigator has over actual behavioural events, and c) the degree of focus on 
contemporary, as opposed to historical” (see Figure 7) (Yin 2009, p.8). ‘What’ research 
questions are considered by Yin to be exploratory, while the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are 
more explanatory. Considering this thesis, the ‘why’ and ‘how’ are asked through 
Questions Two (how effective is CTCE in encouraging reporting behaviour?) and four 
(how current data and existing literature explains existence of any relationship between 
Figure 7: Yins’s Relevant Situations for Different Research Methods (Yin 2009, p. 8) 
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CTCE and reporting behaviour?), as well as parts of Questions One (how do the police and 
partners explain use and delivery of CTCE?) and Three (how can CTCE address the needs 
of reporters?), as well the second part of the overarching question, which asks why a 
relationships (if any) would exist within CTCE and reporting behaviour. Questions Three 
(what are the reasons and barriers for reporting and not reporting?) and Five (what 
lessons can be learnt?), as well as parts of Questions One (what is CTCE?), Two (what are 
the reasons for CTCE being effective?), and Three (what are the reasons and barriers for 
reporting and not reporting?) are considered ‘what’ queries. This thesis argues that these 
questions are of exploratory and explanatory.  
Question Two is querying the existence of a relationship between CTCE and reporting as 
well as why there is such a relationship. Therefore, this thesis argues that although 
interviews were used to ‘explore’ if practitioners believed such relationships existed, 
supportive comparative annual reporting statistics were also obtained to ‘explain’ this 
relationship or a relationship. This is not to say that research was able to measure or 
explain the strength of the relationship, but rather that it exists because of the increase in 
reports after engagement with communities and relatives, in particular in East Jutland. 
Consequently, through the use of multiple sources of evidence, the research question is 
both exploratory and explanatory. Similarly, Question Three seeks to identify the needs in, 
and barriers to reporting, thus providing an ‘explanation’ for what could be hindering 
reporting or reducing its quality; what it is that reporters need to come forward; and how 
these issues can be addressed. Finally, Question Five, through comparison, aims to identify 
practices that can inform a CTCE strategy, which can encourage reporting of radicalisation 
and extremism. Therefore, through comparative analysis, the research ‘explores’ in order 
to identify these factors, while using them to ‘explain’ their importance in relation to 
citizen participation and reporting behaviour. As a result, this thesis disputes that ‘what’ 
questions can only be exploratory, and makes an original contribution to knowledge by 
proposing these small adjustments to Yin’s theory of case study.  
Additionally, it is suggested that a theoretical proposition is needed for case studies, as 
they can assist in defining relevance and in testing or developing that theory (Yin 2009, 
p.35). As mentioned in Section 4.3, there were some prior knowledge that guided the 
formation of the research hypothesis, which shaped the theory for this thesis and was 
used as template to compare with the empirical results i.e. if CTCE is delivered in a 
particular way, then there is a possible relationship between CTCE and reporting of 
radicalisation/extremism. Alongside the fact that this research is seeking organisational 
and behavioural insight, a case study was deemed appropriate. This is because not much 
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is known about the relationship between CTCE and reporting of radicalisation/extremism; 
how CTCE is delivered in East Jutland and West Yorkshire; or the reporters’ experience of 
reporting. Thus, the thesis started with a theoretical proposition, which was investigated 
through the ‘how’, ‘what’, and ‘why’ research questions.  
Consequently, a multiple case study design was adopted as a form of qualitative research, 
and allows for identification of likenesses and differences between similar phenomena, 
organisations, practices, and contexts (Dion 1998). Further, according to Yin (2009, p.38), 
under this mode, analytic generalisation is possible, as it can use a previously developed 
theoretical proposition and test it against empirical data. Therefore, it is argued that the 
evidence from multiple cases can be regarded as compelling, resulting in the study being 
considered more robust (Herriott & Firestone 1983). Also, multiple cases studies follow a 
‘replication’ design testing the same theory, similar to that of multiple experiments, which 
Yin (2009, p.53-54) argues challenges the mistaken analogy of the past where multiple 
cases were considered “to be similar to the multiple respondents in a survey (or to the 
multiple subjects within an experiment)” i.e. a sampling design. However, it is important 
to note that the validity of generalisation of the developed theory can be enhanced with an 
increased number of cases and/or replications. For example, a multiple case study looking 
at the experiences of academics and research groups, and why their advice appears not to 
have helped municipalities tackle urban challenges (Szanton 1981). Szanton cleverly uses 
multiple case studies to argue forcefully that a) failure to implement was not only inherent 
to academia but also research groups; b) universities had successfully helped other 
sectors and businesses other than the city government; and c) those who had managed to 
help city governments were focused on implementation and not just the creation of new 
ideas. It was concluded that city governments had a particular need for receiving advice 
but also putting such advice into practice. This is a great example of theoretical replication 
and analytic generalisation through use of multiple case studies.  
On the utility of comparative analysis, such studies attempt to reach conclusions beyond 
single cases studies whilst setting boundaries for analysis based on structural, cultural, 
political, territorial, functional, or temporal qualities systems (Esser & Vliegenthart 2017, 
p.3). Comparative studies perform several important functions; specifically they enhance 
the understanding of one’s own society through contrasting familiar routines and 
structures against those of other systems. Esser & Vliegenthart (2017, p.2) argue that, 
through this process, insight is gained on systems, cultures, and patterns of thinking and 
acting, creating awareness and opportunities to test diverse theories, thereby contributing 
to the development of universally applicable theory (generalisation). Comparison studies 
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also prevent over-generalisations by challenging claims that maybe based on scholars’ 
own experiences. Comparative studies provide the opportunity to gain access to a wide 
range of alternative solutions that can reveal new ways of addressing similar problems at 
home.  
This research compares East Jutland’s and West Yorkshire’s CTCE and its impact on 
reporting. One justification is that the Aarhus model has a somewhat different reputation 
in terms of CE to that of the UK, and so the comparison generates insights in terms of how 
different approaches may result in different outcomes. In the aftermath of 9/11 attacks on 
America, the EU attempted to harmonise the collective efforts in CT amongst its member 
nations (see Chapter 2), however, differences in approach still remained. Although the CT 
practices of UK and Denmark appear to be similar, when faced with similar threats they do 
have differences, such as CTCE, which is predominantly a local CT response, and this 
thesis aims to explore it. The two countries, apart from being an EU member and facing 
threats from Islamist terrorism, have broadly comparable police, intelligence, policy and 
practices (see Chapter 5). Such comparative studies are able to build insight into the role 
of culture, norms, and institutions shaping CT responses (Foley 2013, p.9).  
Similar to other countries studied comparatively for their CT approach, there is a shared 
perception in how policymakers in the UK and Denmark see themselves as one of the 
designated Islamist terrorism targets (Crenshaw 2001; Katzenstein 2003; Foley 2013, 
p.2). While terrorism has led these countries to converge in some respects (e.g. emphasis 
on preventive CT), they do continue to display significant differences in their responses 
and practices, such as rehabilitation of returnee foreign fighters, engagement with 
families, and certain policies that influence prevention (see Chapter 5). Thus, comparative 
studies can provide insight into such differences and possibly explore the reasons. As 
such, comparative studies also provide explanatory opportunity that takes into 
consideration how context can shape phenomena in different settings (Esser & 
Vliegenthart 2017, p.3). This recognition that contextual conditions can have causal 
significance is one of many reasons why comparative research can be valuable, as it 
extends beyond the mere descriptive comparison (Mancini & Hallin 2012).  
Moreover, the decision to select these two sites was made because they differed in the 
range of measures: geographical location (which is important in a connected CT world, 
especially within the EU, which enforced CT policy that is then interpreted into national 
practices), organisational practices, different public response to CT strategy, and 
differences in outcome. Therefore, as the research hypothesised that there was a 
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difference between these two entities, theoretical replication was deemed possible 
through multiple case studies. Additionally, this research also explores reporter 
experiences in these two locations. Therefore, this is a multiple case study consisting of 
embedded cases (Yin 2009, p.59). Through the investigation of these two entities, the 
researcher has been able to connect CT CE practices to reporting behaviour. Moreover, 
through a multiple case study and the set hypothesis, the researcher was able to focus on 
specific areas, such as the notion of identity and how it is incorporated into practice. 
By using a comparative approach, the research can explore differences and similarities in 
definitions and practice in both entities. Thus, it is able to reveal unique aspects of a CE, as 
a form of CT policing that would be virtually impossible to detect otherwise (Mills et al. 
2006, p.621). Since 9/11 and recent terrorist attacks in Europe, the EU has encouraged 
member states to learn about each other’s CT strategies to have a more coherent approach 
towards the prevention of terrorism. Such comparisons have received much attention 
(Roach 2011; Butt & Tuck 2014; The Cordoba Foundation 2012; Riezen & Roex 2009). It 
has been suggested that comparing fairly similar countries may prove useful, practically to 
inform regionally-based policy (Hantrais 1999). Consequently, this thesis may be an 
addition to the field of CT policing and assist in the formation of such concepts in East 
Jutland and West Yorkshire. 
4.5.2 The Justification of Qualitative Methods: Interviews 
Transformative and multiple case study researchers are able to use qualitative and 
quantitative data collection and analysis methods. However, it is believed that a mixed 
method approach provides TRD with a structure that may result in “more complete and 
full portraits of our social world through the use of multiple perspectives and lenses”, 
which allows for “greater diversity of values, stances and positions” (Somekh & Lewin 
2005, p.275). While TRD can use quantitative methods, it cannot be meaningful enough on 
its own in interpreting social dilemmas. Therefore, it is recommended to use quantitative 
methods and analysis in conjunction with qualitative methods. At the very least, TRD 
needs to be qualitative to provide an understanding of the social phenomenon of study.  
This research takes a qualitative approach to generate rich, contextual and natural data 
(Patton 2015) because social and psychological phenomena need freedom of expression. 
Additionally, it is suitable for the application of TRD and multiple case study research. 
Qualitative research is a non-statistical (Strauss & Corbin 1990) form of social enquiry 
focused on people’s interpretation of their experiences and the world in which they live; it 
aims to understand social realities at the levels of individual, groups, and cultures. Such an 
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approach is used to understand behaviour, perceptions, and feelings in a given context 
that cannot be free from time and place. The basis of the qualitative research lies in this 
interpretation of social reality, which is in line with the epistemology, ontology, and 
axiology of this research (see Section 4.3 and 4.4).  
Although experimental processes or fixed questionnaires allow for some evaluation, they 
are considered to be limiting. Rather than restricting expression to questionnaires and 
Likert scales, this thesis wishes to enable the participants to present their world view 
more freely through the semi-structured interviews, which allow for a subject to be 
introduced and create flexibility within the interview context that provides some power to 
the participant to introduce new topics or add relevant information. Other research on 
reporting of radicalisation/extremism have also used interviews to understand how and 
what people believe, think and act (Thomas et al. 2017).  
Interviews are defined as a conversation initiated by the interviewer “for the specific 
purpose of obtaining research-relevant information and focused on content specified 
research objectives of systematic description, prediction or explanation” (Cohen & Manion 
1989, p.307). These conversations provide the opportunity to explore concepts or ideas in 
a given context. There are varieties of formats that interviews take, including structured, 
unstructured, and semi-structured. Semi-structured interviews are flexible; thus allow 
obtaining rich and illuminating data by conducting them in a face-to-face manner where 
the interviewer can respond to the non-visual cues as well as elaborate or modify their 
questions, without straying too far from the topic of study (Robson 1993, p.229). In a 
semi-structured interview, open questions are explored, and the interviewer has the 
privilege to modify the order in which questions are asked, change the wording, ask 
additional questions or leave out questions as deemed appropriate. Similarly, the 
interviewee can be more expressive. 
Finally, it is argued that for an in-depth analysis of the data, interviews should be recorded 
(Lofland et al. 2006), as one cannot rely on the recollection of conversations (Sacks 
1992b). Furthermore, recordings can be replayed and transcriptions improved, which 
allows for the conversations to be studied again and again (Sacks 1992a, p.622). This also 
enables the researcher to be more present and responsive during the interview, which is 
vital when sensitive issues are discussed. The field notes may be used to assist the 
researcher in reflecting upon any issues or vital factors that may have impacted upon the 
way the interview was conducted. 
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4.5.3 Obtaining Access 
The researcher’s supervisors had an existing relationship with the West Yorkshire Police, 
and a former colleague had an affiliation with the East Jutland Police. Contact was made 
with both forces, which resulted in meeting with West Yorkshire Police and Crime 
Commissioner Mark Burns-Williamson and West Yorkshire Police representatives 
(Wright 2015), as well as with East Jutland Police Commissioner Helle Kyndesen and Info-
House representatives. During those conversations, the collaborating partners agreed to 
provide access to the researcher. This access was dependant on the security clearance of 
the researcher. Unlike the experience of some researchers working with the police 
(Fielding 2006b; Lynn & Lea 2012), the current researcher did not experience suspicion 
while accessing or collecting data. In fact, the Danish collaborators consistently stated that 
they “trusted” the researcher. Due to high police staff turnover in West Yorkshire, access 
had to be renegotiated a few times. There were concerns around having access to 
reporters, as this was a sensitive group that did not want to be identified. It was agreed 
that the identities of reporters would be protected and they were not going to be pursued 
or pressured to take part in this study, as doing so would be unethical, as well as 
jeopardising the relationship between the police and the reporters. 
The researcher had limited control in the recruitment of any given participant. The Police 
and the Counterterrorism Unit (CTU) in both regions were in charge of recruitment. The 
researcher had initially asked to have access to 15 reporters, which was met by concerns 
that it would be extremely difficult to encourage this group to take part. However, it was 
promised that they would provide the researcher with as many reporters as they could 
recruit for the research. Additionally, the researcher asked for approximately six police 
officers involved in CE to be interviewed, as well as three senior staff (e.g. management). 
This was a particular issue for East Jutland, as they did not have this many officers in those 
roles. Therefore, it was agreed that access to as many willing participants who were 
involved in the delivery of CE would be granted. The researcher stressed that a sample of 
12 (this included at least two reporters) was needed to provide meaningful data.  
Accessing reporters was very challenging, as mentioned earlier. East Jutland had provided 
access to three reporters, two professionals and one relative. After several agreed 
interview dates and failed meetings, it became evident to the researcher that one of the 
professional reporters was hesitant to take part. This individual never expressed concern 
about being involved in the research, they showed eagerness to book further meetings 
and to help with the research, but then simply either cancelled meetings or failed to 
attend them. It was believed that pursuing this individual was unethical, given that the 
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individual was a professional reporter and might have felt pressure from their senior to be 
involved in research (Miller & Boulton 2007). Therefore, continued cancellations of 
meetings were interpreted, as unwillingness to participate and the individual was not 
contacted again. 
Similarly, in West Yorkshire, the CTU found it difficult to recruit relative reporters but had 
more success with professional reporters, although this could be because a few were 
involved with Prevent in some way. It was agreed that the CTU could provide access to 
reports of cases where relatives had made the report; however, the researcher was not 
allowed to look at the system in which they were recorded. The CTU representative read 
out the reports and discussed it in detail with the researcher. This was done without 
identifying anyone involved in the cases.  
4.5.4 Collecting Data and Conducting Interviews  
The data was collected through digitally-recorded semi-structured interviews, undertaken 
from June 2017 to June 2019. Access from East Jutland was granted first, and West 
Yorkshire data collection started in December 2017. The majority of the interviews were 
conducted in person, and only a few were completed over the telephone (as requested by 
participants). The purpose of the research and the right to withdraw or refuse to answer 
questions were explained to the participants at the outset. They were informed that 
participation in the study was entirely voluntary. All participants were provided with an 
information sheet about the study and consent forms. In cases where it was not possible 
to obtain a physical signed copy of consent form, verbal consent was sought from 
participants. This mainly applied to the phone interviews, as the participant had not 
submitted the consent form before the interview. Interviews were digitally recorded and 
lasted between 30 minutes to 2 hours, with average interview duration of approximately 
1.5 hours. 
All interviews began with short demographic questions and a brief job description if they 
were practitioners. This was followed by the semi-structured interview questions, which 
were designed on the basis that respondents within different organisations or roles would 
provide information from different perspectives (see Appendix A), as would reporters 
(see Appendix B). For practitioners, this included a series of questions based on the key 
themes of the study, such as: what was their understanding of CE and dialogue, how did 
they practise it, how did they build relationships with the community, how did they 
believe the community perceived them, from their experience why did people report 
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individuals at risk, what did they think about current reporting processes and their 
effectiveness, and so forth.  
The reporters were questioned about the reasons behind reporting and their experience 
of CE. They were asked, without exposing the individual reported, describe the context of 
the report, what led them to report, how they perceived the police, what was their 
relationship with the police, how was their experience of making the report, whether they 
experienced stigma and prejudice, and whether they had any support prior to, during, and 
post reporting. The questions were designed in a way that allowed the interviewees to 
explore a phenomenon and limit the possibility of acquiescence bias (Watson 1992).  At 
the end of all interviews, all participants were given the opportunity to add anything 
further that they thought was important and what they felt needed more improvement to 
encourage and improve quality reporting. 
It is argued that for an in-depth analysis of the data, interviews should be recorded 
(Lofland et al. 2006), as one cannot rely on our recollection of conversations (Sacks 
1992b). Furthermore, recordings can be replayed and transcriptions improved, which 
allows for the conversations to be studied again and again (Sacks 1992a, p.622). This also 
enables the researcher to be more present and responsive during the interview, which is 
vital when sensitive issues are discussed. The field notes may be used to assist the 
researcher in reflecting upon any issues or vital factors that may have impacted upon the 
way the interview was conducted.  
Both collaborative partners were happy to provide the researcher with the information 
needed, as long as it was within the security clearance and legal boundaries. The 
researcher had asked for comparative years that illustrate reports coming from 
professionals, relatives/friends, and the general public. Additionally, the researcher asked 
for explanations for any variances. This set of data was requested, as explained, to 
illustrate the change in reporting of radicalisation/extremism and provide a tool 
explaining the relationship between CE and reporting behaviour. This was primarily to 
address research Question Two: How effective is CTCE in encouraging people to report 
concerns of radicalisation/extremism, and what are the reasons for this? 
4.5.5 Sampling 
Case studies 
The East Jutland Police force covers Randers, Norddjurs, Syddjurs, Favrskov, Aarhus, 
Odder and Samsø municipalities, with four policing divisions. Aarhus is the largest city in 
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the district. Each municipality has a LA referred to as a Kommune or municipality. The 
district is the second largest in Denmark and has a physical area of 3.505 km2, with 
approximately 580,000 inhabitants. Each police district in Denmark serves around 
500,000 citizens and has 8,000-900 staff, except Copenhagen and Bornholm which have 
more inhabitants. The West Yorkshire Police force is the fourth-largest force in England 
and Wales, with over 5000 officers. This police force is responsible for the West Yorkshire 
region, which consists of five policing districts and LA (Leeds, Bradford, Wakefield, 
Kirklees, and Calderdale). Leeds is the largest city in the district. There are eight policing 
divisions in five policing districts. The physical area, of some 2000 km2, has approximately 
2.2 million inhabitants.  
These two locations, as explained in Chapter 1, were selected as case studies for this 
research for several reasons. First, this was a collaborative ESRC project, which was 
funded to primarily compare the prevention of radicalisation/ extremism in East Jutland 
and West Yorkshire.  Next, both regions use CE for CT, and their approach to the 
prevention of radicalisation/extremism is somewhat similar. Additionally, the Aarhus 
Model, a rehabilitative and preventing strategy had made headlines for its success in 
stopping the recruitment of foreign fighters. On the other hand, the Prevent strategy had a 
toxic image, as a result of negative public reaction from some factions of the public. The 
similarities of the approach and different experiences suggested that there might be a 
difference in the application and delivery of CE. Therefore, these two regions were critical 
cases for this study. 
The East Jutland interviews were conducted first, primarily because access was granted 
first. Twenty-seven semi-structured interviews were conducted with practitioners who 
had personal experience of CE, eleven of whom were Municipality/LA representatives, 
and ten were police, and reporters (two family reporter and four professionals), as well as 
three case studies of relative reporters, as reporters were reluctant to participate directly. 
These reporters, who were primarily relative reporters, understandably wanted to leave 
the horrific incident behind and were fearful of being identified. Due to ethical reasons, 
they were not pursued further and instead the CTU provided details of their reports and 
discussed the reports in detail with the researcher. 
Participants 
The study is mainly concerned with the experiences of those who deliver CTCE and those 
who report radicalisation and extremism. Therefore, recruitment focused primarily on 
these groups. There is little guidance on sample size for qualitative thematic research 
93 
 
(Onwuegbuzie & Leech 2007; Emmel 2013; Guest et al. 2006). The suggestions vary 
greatly from 6 to over 400 and are dependent on the type of data and the type of project 
(Fugard & Potts 2015; Braun & Clarke 2013). Given the sensitive nature of the research 
and availability of participants, the East Jutland West Yorkshire Police allocated 
individuals for the interviews. The only requirement for facilitator participation was to 
have reported radicalisation/extremism and to have delivered or been involved in CE. 
This was so that they could provide insight into this experience, as well as being able to 
recollect the events or experiences in detail (Foddy 2001). It was requested from each 
force that a minimum of twelve participants were needed from each country for 
meaningful research, considering the length of time available to complete the PhD. This 
number was chosen because it is believed that a sample of twelve participants is sufficient 
for exploring perceptions and experiences of a subject (Guest et al. 2006). This meant that 
at least a total of 24 participants were needed to accumulate meaningful data. This is in 
line with the suggestion that 20-30 participants may be sufficient for a study (Baker & 
Edwards 2012). However, Baker and Edwards (2012) also advice that 50 participants are 
needed for interview-based research. This thesis argues that, given the limitations of 
access and the sensitivity of the subject studied, 20-30 participants is sufficient for 
exploration of this phenomenon. The researcher was able to obtain access to 27 
participants for semi-structured interviews (see Table 1).  
 East Jutland West Yorkshire Total 
Police Practitioners 4 6 10 
Local Authority/Municipality Practitioners 7 4 11 
Professional Reporters 1 3 4 
Relative Reporters  1 1* 2 
Total 13 14 27 
Table 1: The number of participants by role and organisation. 
*This number consists of one reporter that was based outside of West Yorkshire (UKR1).  
In West Yorkshire, it became difficult to recruit families or relatives who had reported 
their concerns due to wanting to leave the traumatic events behind them. Therefore, when 
a family reporter from the UK made contact via Twitter and was willing to take part in this 
research, their participation was deemed valuable and accepted. Additionally, due to this 
lack of participation in West Yorkshire, access was given to three recent case studies. 
Although the level of exploration is not the same as an interview, nevertheless such cases 
studies, allow interpretation of the data to inform decision-making theories (Carroll & 
Johnson 1990). 
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4.6 Data Analysis 
This section describes how the data was organised, coded and analysed through a 
thematic framework. The thematic framework is a method of analysing qualitative data 
and reporting pattern (themes) within the data (Guest et al. 2012). Through thematic 
analysis, themes are identified across the data set, which can assist in understanding the 
description of a phenomenon (Daly et al. 1997). This method uses a systematic staged 
approach, also known as phases, moving from familiarisation with data to coding, 
summarising, and interpretation of data in the final report (Braun & Clarke 2006, p.5). The 
analysis in such a context involves constant moving back and forth between the entire 
data set, coded extracts, and the produced data (Braun & Clarke 2006, p.5). Unlike 
statistical analysis, writing is an essential part of thematic analysis in that it is not 
something that takes place at the end; rather, it is practised at the beginning with jotting 
down ideas and potential coding schemes. Coding is deemed to be an integral part of 
thematic analysis, as it recognises vital moments in the data and encodes it before 
interpretation (Boyatzis 1998). This then leads to the identification of emerging themes 
relevant to the research questions (Saldaña 2013).  
Recorded interviews were listened to twice to ensure accurate of transcription, and to 
allow the researcher to become familiar with the data (Ritchie & Spencer 2002). Excel was 
used to code and categorise the data, which helped to identify relationships within the 
data (Cresswell 2007). Some codes and themes were specifically selected to identify data, 
which were related to the theoretical proposition of the thesis. This also supported the 
argument that social research, as well as case studies, can both build and test theories (Yin 
2009, p.39; Thomas 2011).  
Thematic analysis is a flexible and useful research tool, which “potentially provides rich 
and detailed, yet the complex account of data” (Braun & Clarke 2006, p.5). Using thematic 
analysis can assist with providing links between themes and aims of the study, to guide 
and develop analytical claims. It is argued that themes can only have full significance when 
they are linked to form a coordinated picture (Bazeley 2009, p.6). It is for this reason that 
it is a useful approach when exploring new or under-researched areas and is particularly 
relevant to CT policing and reporting behaviour. As such, all interviews for this thesis 
were analysed using a thematic approach and were synoptically coded. Additionally, notes 
were taken during the interviews and during transcription, which was used to inform 
analysis (Liamputtong 2009).There was also a triangulation of the statistical data 
obtained and the interview data in relation to effect of CTCE on reporting behaviour. The 
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practitioners were asked if they believed CTCE had an effect on reporting behaviour and 
how they explained this impact. The responses were overwhelmingly positive. Therefore, 
statistical data was used to illustrate if there was an increase in reports. As mentioned, 
East Jutland and West Yorkshire are not like-for-like comparisons. However, the design of 
interview questions and a similar sample of participants have allowed for a comparative 
analysis of CTCE practice and reporter experience, and to some application of some 
policies.   
4.7 Ethical Considerations 
This thesis underwent comprehensive ethical scrutiny at the University of Leeds to ensure 
the research was within its guidelines taking into consideration safety; methods to 
maintain confidentiality, privacy, and anonymity; consent; participants' right to 
withdrawal; respect; and data security. As a result, this thesis submitted to the ethics 
board draft research context, consent forms, information sheets, and a safe data storage 
proposal. This was a dual process, as access to the requested reporter participants meant 
additional ethical scrutiny. First approval was gained for interviewing practitioners 
involved in CTCE. Second approval was sought for interviewing the reporters, and a third 
approval was sought for extending the recruitment outside West Yorkshire to 
accommodate the reporter who made contact on Twitter. This section will address two 
main non-prohibitive ethical considerations for this research, which were necessary to 
protect the participants. 
4.7.1 Confidentiality and Anonymity 
The research engendered a legal and ethical obligation towards participants, as well as the 
collection and storage of the data. Given the sensitivity of the subject and wishes of the 
participants, confidentiality and anonymity were of paramount importance for this 
research. Consequently, the thesis has used codes (Table 2) to mitigate and/or eliminate 
the risk of identification through specific quotes or locations that might be tied to a 
participant by ensuring that the details of their role, their specific location, name, and in 
some cases gender were not shared within the thesis.  
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East Jutland Code West Yorkshire Code 
Senior Municipality Representative SMU1 Channel Representative CH1 
Senior Municipality Representative SMU2 Youth Service Representative YS1 
Info-House Police Representative IHP1 Senior Police Representative SP1 
Info-House Police Representative IHP2 Senior Police Representative SP2 
Senior Youth Service Representative SYS1 Police Representative P1 
Senior Police Representative SP5 Police Representative P2 
Info-House Municipality Representative IHM1 Police Representative P3 
Youth Service Representative YS2 Local Authority Representative LA1 
Mentor MT1 Local Authority Representative LA2 
Case Worker CW1 Professional Reporter WYR1 
Professional Reporter EJR1 Professional Reporter WYR2 
Relative Reporter EJR2 Professional Reporter WYR3 
  Relative Reporter UKR1 
Table 2: The breakdown of participants by broad role description, seniority, organisation, and code. 
Table 2 illustrates how identification has been prevented through not sharing details of 
their roles or the departments, participants belong to. Additionally, some participants 
asked not to reveal their specific location. Thus, the thesis has avoided revealing such 
information for all participants. However, the difference in views between the senior staff 
and frontline practitioners was believed to be significant and needed to be presented. 
Therefore, when the participant was senior staff, it has been made clear. Also, with 
reporters, no demographic or background details are provided — they are categorised 
into relative (i.e. family/close associate) and professional reporters only. Additionally, no 
identifiable personal information was shared about the vulnerable individuals reported. It 
is important to note that numbers allocated to participants do not reflect the order of the 
interviews. Moreover, personal pronouns have been altered in quotations, and some 
informative quotations have not been shared in a thesis on the basis that they might 
identify the individual. 
The process by which participants were recruited meant that the recruiters at the CTU 
and some managers knew who had been interviewed. The interview schedules, some 
organised by the CTU and some by myself, meant that some of the colleagues who worked 
together were also aware of who participated in the research. This highlights a big 
challenge to anonymity when researching organisations, and the research being 
dependant on another party for recruitment of participants. The digital statistical data 
obtained were anonymised. It was ensured this data was safe to share if it was not 
previously published, by confirming it with participants. At the earliest opportunity, all 
data (digital stats, digital recording, and transcriptions) was stored securely on the 
university server and held there after that. These files are accessible through a single 
password. The consent forms, which were the only form of identification of the reporters, 
were kept in secure storage only accessible by me. The data will be only kept for two years 
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after completion of the PhD, to allow time for publication of research findings; thereafter, 
it will be disposed of. 
4.7.2 Consent 
As mentioned earlier, consent was sought from participants prior to data collection. They 
were given the opportunity to withdraw from the research at that moment or at a later 
stage. It was explained to the participants that they could reach out to my supervisors and 
me at any time to share their concerns about the research. Therefore, the contact details 
for all parties were shared. The information sheet and the consent form (see Appendix C) 
explained to the participant the purpose of the research and the interviews, as well as 
what was required from them. Before recording the interviews, the aims of the research 
and the rights of the participants were explained (the same information as presented in 
the information sheet and consent form), and participants were asked if they were happy 
for the researcher to start recording. Once the recording commenced, the participants 
were notified that the recording had started.  
As discussed in section 4.5.3, given that the researcher did not have much control over the 
recruitment of participants, this might have influenced the participants and their consent. 
This is because when senior staff/management are involved in recruitment, there is a 
power dynamic (Miller & Boulton 2007). For example, as mentioned in Section 4.5.3, one 
reporter consistently cancelled interview appointments or did not show up, but at the 
same time was conveying that they were eager to help with the research. This behaviour 
indicated that the participant might have been reluctant to participate and therefore had 
not really consented to participation. As a result, it was decided that it was unethical to 
pursue this participant any further.  
4.8 Summary 
This chapter outlined, explained, and justified the underpinning assumptions of the 
research, as well as the decisions on designing and conducting the research. It started by 
presenting the research aims and questions. This was followed by setting a strong 
research foundation by highlighting the epistemological and ontological arguments of the 
theoretical framework. The theory of knowledge was shaped by prior knowledge 
(psychology, behavioural economics, and organisational audit) and empirical findings. The 
latter was used to challenge or support the assumptions made based on the priori 
knowledge. Additionally, this chapter discussed the holistic approach taken by this study, 
by addressing the ontological factors, and how they reproduce and modify the structures 
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and systems that exist within the context. The discussion focused on the notions of truth 
fluidity and how one object could be viewed differently by different domains. This was 
applied to the understanding and experiences of CE, reporting, and risk of a given 
situation. As a result of this holistic approach, a more comprehensive framework for 
problem-solving has been developed. Consequently, it was concluded that to be able to 
identify a relationship between CTCE and reporting of radicalisation, there was a need to 
interview those who were involved in CE and those who had reported 
radicalisation/extremism. Therefore, through an holistic and multi-layered lens, this 
research gained behavioural insight into reporting radicalisation/extremism, as well as 
the interaction between CE and reporting.  
The chapter also presented strong arguments from an axiological point of view to 
illustrate the current study’s accountability to the end-user and the use of the data set, by 
focusing on social justice. It was argued that TRD provides flexibility as an application, as 
long as the foundations of the methodology are intact — i.e. creating social justice and 
considering the end-user’s perspective. Therefore, by using TRD to inform and guide this 
study in conjunction with the comparative dimensions of this research, the thesis is able 
to focus more on delivering policy and practice transfer, whereby an original contribution 
to knowledge is made.  
Next, the chapter discussed the reasoning for using multiple case studies thorough 
theories presented by academics such as Robert Yin. It was argued that although Yin’s 
categorisation of relevant situations for different research methods, based on research 
questions focusing on ‘what’, ‘why’, and ‘how’, is valuable, it is nevertheless somewhat 
incomplete. This is because Yin suggests that ‘what’ questions are exploratory, while ‘why 
and how’ questions are explanatory. This thesis, however, argues that not all ‘what’ 
questions are merely exploratory if they are used in conjunction with multiple sources of 
data and the aim of finding a solution for the problem at hand by considering the factors 
identified through the ‘what’ questions. This adjustment to Yin’s theory of case study, it is 
argued, provides an original contribution to knowledge. Moreover, the chapter highlighted 
the limitations of this thesis and how some of these were addressed. More importantly, it 
was argued that although generalisation might be deemed as a limitation of the research, 
in fact, it is not necessarily so when it comes to analytical generalisation. This is because 
by having a theoretical proposition, the thesis was able to test and challenge that theory 
by replication through multiple case studies. Likewise, it was argued that small sample 
size, when considering case studies, is not potentially a costly limitation when exploring 
decision-making (Carroll & Johnson 1990).  
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The chapter covered the processes of data analysis, challenges of access, ethical 
considerations, and data management. The aim was to present to the reader with the 
steps this thesis had taken to minimise any risk of the identification of participants. 
Therefore, issues of anonymity were discussed in detail. Nevertheless, this research has 
managed to collect high quality and informative data, as the following chapters will 
demonstrate. The data illustrates how some policies influence CE practice and reporting 
behaviour. More importantly, the data enables inferences to be made that refer to the 
relationship between CE and reporting behaviour, as well as how reporting can be 
encouraged and improved through the application of the CE model presented in this 
research.  
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Chapter 5 
 
A Tale of Two Strategies: Counterterrorism 
Community Engagement in Practice 
5.1 Introduction 
The remaining chapters present and discuss the empirical findings, and seek to address 
the study’s research questions. They explore the role of CTCE and its impact on reporting 
radicalisation and extremism through practices of CTCE, as well as the experiences of 
reporters of radicalisation and extremism. The aim of this chapter is to compare the CTCE 
strategies practised in East Jutland and West Yorkshire in order to learn something new 
about the strategies that can help inform CTCE practice. This is not an analysis of who 
does CTCE best; rather, it is an assessment of good practice, which can inform better CTCE 
practice in relation to improved reporting behaviour. This chapter aims to answer the 
second part of research Question One: 
What is CTCE in the broader context of prevention, and how do the police and 
their partner agencies (e.g. LA) explain its use and delivery in East Jutland and 
West Yorkshire?  
Additionally, the comparative analysis presented in this section is used to inform research 
Question Five, rather than answering it directly: 
What lessons can be learnt from East Jutland and West Yorkshire in shaping 
CTCE practices that encourage and improve reporting of radicalisation and 
extremism? 
This comparison is also used in Chapter 7 to identify barriers and problems in the services 
— i.e. a process in a chain of processes that, due to its limited capacity, reduces the 
capacity of the entire strategy. This chapter situates this thesis within broader CT 
strategies, CT policing, and partnership literature. Each area is studied in relation to how 
these patterns shape CTCE practice and its implementation. As a result, the current 
chapter focuses on presenting the background of the introduction of CTCE in East Jutland 
and West Yorkshire. This is followed by a description of CTCE practices in these two 
regions, informed by the data collected. Next, the definition of CE is explored by 
presenting interview data from practitioners and how they view CE to ensure that both 
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East Jutland and West Yorkshire practitioners have the same understanding of CE 
(otherwise, the research is not using the same ‘unit’ for exploration). Thereafter, the 
chapter provides a comparative analysis of the two CTCE strategies by exploring the 
similarities and differences between their CTCE practices. 
It is important to note that although the CT and preventive strategies, such as the Aarhus 
Model and Prevent, are interesting concepts and in need of further examination, this 
thesis does not study these strategies as a whole. Rather, one particular aspect of these 
strategies is explored (i.e. CTCE). This is because the core aim of this research is to 
understand the impact of CTCE on reporting of radicalisation and extremism, and 
ultimately prevention. Therefore, this thesis is not an analysis of the Aarhus Model, 
Prevent, the Exit Programme or Channel, but instead an exploration of one the cogs (CE) 
in the broader CT machinery. Consequently, this study should be examined and 
understood on the basis of the application of CTCE for prevention through reporting 
concerns, and its impact on reporting behaviour. 
The reader is reminded that the CTCE practices of these two regions do not represent how 
CTCE is implemented across Denmark or the UK. Hence, these cases should be viewed as 
examples of how CTCE may be practised. Furthermore, this comparative analysis is about 
learning from practices that are received better or have a more positive effect on 
reporting behaviour, as well as identifying problematic factors, to provide a better 
understanding of effective CTCE practices.  
Finally, it is important to mention that although there has been some comparative analysis 
of strategies, this research is from a different angle. For example, this thesis is different 
from that of Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) (2018), as it provides a review of 
how CTCE is delivered in the UK and Denmark. However, when exploring engagement, 
RAN (2018) did not provide insight into state-driven CTCE through the Prevent strategy, 
but rather looked at other organisations (e.g. NGOs) or projects within the UK that aimed 
to engage with communities. Their analysis of the Aarhus Model, although insightful, did 
not go in depth. In contrast, this thesis provides a more in-depth overview of CTCE using 
the Aarhus Model in East Jutland, as well as a comparison of these two practices. Also, this 
thesis had similar findings to that of Hemmingsen’s (2015) detailed overview of the 
Aarhus Model and their approach to the prevention of radicalisation and extremism; 
however, this research focused more on engagement and advanced evaluation of the 
strategy through insight into how the CTCE operates within the Aarhus Model, by 
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providing the Aarhus Engagement Model. Thus, detailed comparison of CTCE strategies 
and practices is an area in which this thesis makes an original contribution.  
5.2 East Jutland  
5.2.1 Counterterrorism Strategy Background  
As a response to terrorist attacks post 9/11, a number of terror suspects being arrested in 
Odense in 2006, and a policy change within the EU, a pilot initiative called De-
radicalisation – Targeted Intervention (aka the Aarhus Model), was launched by 
Denmark’s second-largest city, Aarhus, in 2007 (later anchored in 2011). It is argued that 
the Aarhus model was developed with the aim of targeting the phenomenon of foreign 
terrorist fighters through deradicalisation and inclusion, rather than criminal prosecution 
and repression (Brie re & Weyembergh 2018)This pilot strategy took inspiration from the 
Dutch project Wij Amsterdammers (‘We Amsterdammers’), which focused on investing in 
‘social capital’ and avoiding social expulsion of part of the population (e.g. BAME) in order 
to combat radicalisation and polarisation.  
The aim of the Aarhus Model is to identify vulnerable individuals at risk of radicalisation 
or extremism. It worked with SSP cooperation (school, social authorities, and police) in 
the prevention and intervention of radicalisation and extremism. In addition to 
municipalities, educational services, social services and health services are increasingly 
responsible for spotting signs of concern. The Aarhus Model is a local component of a 
comprehensive national CT approach, not a new strategy. In fact, it is based on a thirty-
year-old crime prevention philosophy and approach that the city has used: that is, to take 
a multi-agency approach and engage with communities and individuals to prevent crime 
and risky behaviour. However, the theoretical grounding for the Aarhus Model is ‘Life 
Psychology’, which has three core assumptions: 1) everybody aspires to a good-enough 
life; 2) having a good-enough grip on life means coping sufficiently successfully with the 
tasks life offers, which depends on having the necessary skills to handle them; and 3) 
every human being regardless of gender, cultural background, abilities and disabilities, life 
history as well as social situation is confronted with exactly the same fundamental life 
tasks (Bertelsen 2015, p.246).  
General crime prevention strategies in East Jutland focus on stopping individuals from 
committing or getting involved in criminal activities by recognising that the process of 
prevention is not a single-handed approach and also the need for application of Life 
Psychology. Counter-radicalisation and extremism is no different, and working in multi-
agency partnerships and incorporating activities into an existing structure is at the core of 
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the East Jutland approach. As such, the Aarhus Model is anchored in two agendas: 
protection of the state and society from any terrorist attacks; and the responsibility of the 
welfare state to protect the individual from self-harming (Hemmingsen 2015, p.15). 
The pilot project established by the East Jutland Police and the municipality of Aarhus 
started on the basis that radicalisation is “a process that leads to a person increasingly 
accepting the use of violent and other unlawful means of achieving certain political or 
religious goals” (Aarhus.dk 2016). This meant recognising the process of radicalisation as 
a pre-criminal stage, as well as knowing how and when to intervene in order to prevent 
radicalisation and extremism. The efforts of the Aarhus Model included the Info-House 
assessing concerns, planning, and coordinating the prevention of radicalisation; 
counselling and advising professionals about radicalisation; providing information about 
radicalisation to the public; specialised mentoring for the prevention of or intervention in 
radicalisation; counselling, advice and exit programmes for individuals considering 
travelling to or returning from conflict zones; outreach to local communities and other 
actors in contact with such individuals; counselling and advice for the parents of 
radicalised young people and facilitating networks between them; and dialogue-based 
workshops for primary and secondary schools about radicalisation (Hemmingsen 2015, 
p.31). As of 2014, this strategy was adopted nationally (Hemmingsen 2015, p.18). 
5.2.2 Counterterrorism Community Engagement in Practice  
East Jutland’s prevention strategy falls into two types of activities: outreach, and exit and 
intervention. The former focuses on engaging with vulnerable individuals/groups that are 
not currently in any kind of trouble, and individuals/groups that are in contact with those 
in trouble or deemed to be at risk (Hemmingsen 2015, p.24); while exit and intervention 
are for individuals/groups that are already in trouble or deemed to be at risk. There are 
approximately 22 members of police staff that carry out crime prevention, with 1.5 staff 
working on a fulltime basis in Aarhus. East Jutland’s prevention strategy is divided into 
three hierarchical levels: general (at the bottom), specific and targeted (Figure 8). As such, 
the level of engagement varies across this model and it is delivered through a multiagency 
approach. The General Level or green zone is about engaging with the general public. This 
level is concerned with raising awareness in order to build resilience to prevent 
radicalisation and extremism. The engagement delivered at this stage is about building 
relationships and closing the gap between the authorities and the communities in addition 
to keeping the public informed. Most of the work at this level crosses over with general 
social development projects, such as community cohesion and empowerment or dealing 
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with social issues, but they also include Info-House workshop sessions for young people 
(aged 15 and over), where they are informed about radicalisation, extremism, and 
terrorism, as well as the relevant legal issues (i.e. what constitutes a crime). In these 
workshops, students are encouraged to engage in a dialogue about current issues and 
what they consider to be acts of terrorism or extremism and why.  Most importantly, they 
also address issues of discrimination: the workshop is entitled Prevention of 
Radicalisation and Discrimination (Aarhus Kommune 2016). 
The workshops and awareness briefings are evidence-based. The awareness briefings are 
presentations on radicalisation, what can be done about it and providing contact 
information for risk assessment. The workshop consists of two 45-minute interactive 
sessions about radicalisation, everyday democracy, and how to deal with bias. The 
workshop is informed by works of Preben Bertelsen (Psychology) (Bertelsen 2015), John 
Horgan (Psychology), Lasse Lindekilde (Political Science), Arie Kruglansky (Psychology), 
Tore Bjorgø (Social Anthropology). The work of Adam Bermingham et al. (2009) is used to 
raise awareness about online vulnerability to radicalisation. Two instructors from the 
Info-House deliver these workshops and awareness briefings (in schools, at least one 
permanent teacher is also present to ensure the class is under control). The workshop's 
overall method is a combination of communication, dialogue and exercises. The workshop 
contains four parts: introduction to the content and core concepts; knowledge of political 
Figure 8: Aarhus Engagement Model.  
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and religious radicalisation, as well as extremism, terrorism and law; group work, in 
which where the students’ attitudes, roles and positioning are brought into play in 
relation to discrimination, digital behaviour, freedom of speech, prejudice and 
communities; and finally the students' reflection on the workshop. Therefore, the 
dialogues at these workshops provide young people with critical thinking skills that 
enable them to distinguish between facts and prejudice and/or misunderstandings. 
Equally, it allows participants to comprehend how radicalisation and extremism influence 
the wider community, as well as those that can be affected through discrimination and 
stigmatisation, which could possibly feed the cycle of radicalisation. The awareness 
briefings and the workshops are free. The awareness briefings are offered to first-line 
practitioners, and community agents and the workshops are available to educational 
institutions. This is primarily an Aarhus effort, and not implemented at the national level.  
It is important to note that there is no legal obligation for those involved in safeguarding 
or civil service to receive such training or awareness. However, there is a law that 
obligates all citizens, especially public servants to report concerns about the welfare of 
minors (17 years or younger) (see Appendix N).7 The reason for not providing the 
workshop and the awareness briefing to across all frontline practitioners is twofold. First, 
after the launch of the Aarhus pilot in 2007, practitioners invested greatly in CTCE and 
awareness briefings. As a result, in 2008 they had decided that in Aarhus there was a 
widespread awareness due to the briefings, but were faced with a limited taskforce with 
the expertise to do a risk assessment and specialised intervention. Second, it was decided 
that training all frontline personnel in radicalisation and extremism was disproportional 
to the size of the target group and not economically sound.  
Other engagement at the General Level includes having dialogue and sharing information 
with families and the public about risk factors, such as ownership of certain flags or 
planning to travel to conflict zones. Respectful and assertive dialogue is used actively and 
religiously to address concerns, share information, and build relationships, as well as 
encourage cohesion by addressing social issues such as prejudice. As such, dialogue is the 
heart of East Jutland’s CTCE. Engagement within SSP also takes place at this level, where 
professionals discuss current social concerns at monthly meetings. These concerns could 
be anything from keeping the children entertained after school to gang crime, 
                                                          
7
 The Social Service Act (No. 573 of 2005) §154 and §153 highlights safeguarding obligations. §154 is the 
general obligation for all citizens to notify the municipality if they become aware of minors whose 
wellbeing is threatened, while, §153 highlights a special obligation for public servants who will have to 
report on unborn children as well. There is no obligation to report anyone over the age of 18, although 
one could. 
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radicalisation and extremism. As evident, the CTCE at this level is not only concerned with 
radicalisation and extremism but also broader social issues such as cohesion and 
interrogation, as well as general crime-related issues. 
At the Specific Level (yellow zone), engagement is more specific, and targeted at the 
individuals or groups at risk of radicalisation and/extremism, who have been identified 
through risk assessments carried out by the people working at the Info-House. It is at this 
stage that each case is handled individually, with tailored engagement and support. 
Therefore, the engagement at this level can be categorised in three types: a) individuals; 
b) relatives; and c) group(s) (e.g. mosques with Jihadi fighters). At this level it is about risk 
management, ensuring that safeguarding mechanisms, support and guidance are 
provided. Engagement at this level is focused on the individual and their immediate social 
surroundings in order to facilitate capacity-building for the individual and those in their 
immediate social surroundings. The tailored engagement approach requires a focus on 
identity, which becomes the driving force for addressing issues the vulnerable individual 
might have. As such, the individual may receive support from mentors, employment and 
education coaching, and access to other social and welfare services. The support given to 
relatives consists of a Parent Network, coaching on how to manage risk, as well as access 
to relevant resources and partners.  
Engagement at the Specific Level also includes reaching out and entering into dialogue 
with communities that are deemed at risk of radicalisation and extremism. For example, at 
one point there were a large number of Somali foreign fighters leaving for conflict zones. 
The Info-House reached out to these communities and engaged in dialogue, which enabled 
them to build relationships and empower them to assist with the prevention of 
radicalisation and extremism. They worked with Somali parents, who requested a Somali 
Centre that would allow them to keep their children and community engaged and 
connected, whilst being more active in supervision of their children.  
The Targeted Level (red zone) is aimed at those involved in criminal acts or at risk of 
being involved in such behaviour. The intensity of engagement at this level is heightened, 
and interventions such as the Exit Programme are introduced, which focuses on 
rehabilitating the individual. Engagement with the immediate social surrounding of the 
individual is essential to the prevention and rehabilitation of the individual. Targeted 
Level engagement is very similar to that of the Specific Level, but more intense. Again, the 
efforts at this stage are tailored to the needs of the individual identified through risk 
assessment and working with both the individual and the relatives. At this level, the 
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engagement is strongly focused on building powerful, trusting relationships with the 
individual and their relatives, through dialogue and active empowerment. For example, 
there have been cases where the returnees or those involved in such criminal behaviour 
were prosecuted and incarcerated. Some of these individuals had a family of their own 
with small children, and spending time with them was not possible given the prison 
environment. The practitioners at the Info-House arranged for families and imprisoned 
returnees to have lunch at the Info-House so that they could spend quality time together. 
This kind of approach has enabled the practitioners to be trusted by both the relatives and 
the individual, and it has resulted in many positive outcomes. Through such action and 
level of engagement, the practitioner's goodwill and good intentions for the vulnerable 
individual and their families is made clear, creating warmth toward the practitioners and 
reducing fear.  
As evident the key features of the CTCE approach by the Aarhus Model are inclusion, 
dialogue, working closely with relatives, support for relatives, and tailor-made approach.  
Therefore, the approach is very much identity-oriented, and actively seek to connect at a 
psychological level.  
5.2.3 Info-House & Multi-Agency Partnership  
Central to the Danish CT approach is the Info-House, a framework for local cooperation 
between the police and the municipal social service administrations and providers. It is a 
centre concerned with extremism and radicalisation, open to all. Therefore, the general 
public, practitioners, and vulnerable individuals can reach out to Info-House and share 
their concern, as well as accessing support. Info-House assesses the concern to identify if 
it is warranted. Once the concerns have been confirmed through assessment, the Info-
House decides what actions need to be taken and by whom — this may include mentors, 
coaches, teachers, relatives etc. The response is therefore multi-agency and encourages 
sharing and accessing a wealth of information. This information-sharing is part of §115 of 
the Danish Administration of  Justice Act (see Appendix N) (Hemmingsen 2015, p.28). 
Thus, the Info-House works as a connecting hub or centre that brings together all other 
networks (e.g. SSP, PSP, and KSP), professionals, and civil society, municipality, and 
intelligence services.  
As a result, CTCE engagement at all levels is multi-agency. A multi-agency approach to 
prevention is not new, and it is based on three decades of cooperation between schools, 
social services and the police (SSP) sharing information and identifying future risks, as 
well as introducing preventive measures for early interventions. The formation of SSP in 
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the 1970s aimed to prevent young people engaging in crime. In 2009, an additional 
network was created that encouraged cooperation between the police, social services, and 
mental health services (PSP) to prevent individuals with mental health issues engaging in 
criminal activity. A year later, a formation of the police, social services and the prison and 
probation services (KSP) was launched to stop individuals released from prison re-
engaging in criminal behaviour (Hemmingsen 2015, p.18). Collaboration between these 
networks and Info-House has facilitated information-sharing between different 
authorities.  
5.3 West Yorkshire  
5.3.1 Counterterrorism Strategy Background  
The UK, like many other countries in the developed world, did not have a sophisticated or 
coherent cross-departmental strategy to counter international terrorism prior to 9/11 
(Staniforth 2014, p.84). In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, UK introduced CONTEST, a 
national CT strategy in 2003. CONTEST is a risk reduction framework with four strands; 
Pursue (reduce terrorist capability); Protect (reduce national vulnerability); Prepare 
(reduce the impact of terrorist attacks); and Prevent (reduce individual intention to get 
involved in terrorism, extremism, and radicalisation). The Prevent strand of CONTEST is 
most relevant strand for this thesis.  
Figure 9: Shows the link between Prevent and Pursue objectives (Home Office, 2018, p. 29) 
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Prevent is delivered through a number of different central government departments, with 
multi-layered police responses, and NGOs (Spalek et al. 2008). Since its inception, 
CONTEST has been reviewed and updated several times, with the latest being 2018.  Both 
Prevent and Pursue focus on addressing and reducing the threat of terrorism. Although 
they overlap, they are not the same, but this similarity has resulted in some confusion and 
in the 2018 review of CONTEST, attempts were made to distinguish between the two 
more clearly (Figure 9). The 2018 framework (Home Office 2018a, p.31) highlights that 
safeguarding and support of vulnerable people are at the heart of Prevent. The objectives 
of Prevent are to a) tackle the causes of radicalisation and respond to the ideological 
challenge of terrorism; b) safeguard and support those most at risk of radicalisation 
through early intervention, identifying them and offering support; and c) enable those 
who have already engaged in terrorism to disengage and rehabilitate (Home Office 2018a, 
p.31). The third objective was new to Prevent.  
This refreshed CT strategy introduces the Desistance and Disengagement Programme 
(DDP), which focuses on providing support to those that are already engaged in terrorism 
and extremism. The programme is provided to those who are subject to court-approved 
conditions i.e. offenders on probation licence related to terrorism, as well as those on 
Terrorism Prevention Investigation Measures, or those who are subject to Temporary 
Exclusion Orders. It also supports the returnees from conflict zones in Syria or Iraq. 
Prevent works at the pre-criminal stage by stopping vulnerable individuals from being 
drawn into radicalisation, which could lead them to support or commit  extremism or 
terrorism. It also extends its support to those already involved in terrorism and 
extremism through rehabilitation and disengagement in order to prevent them from 
committing further crimes. The framework explains that although there is no single factor 
or profile that causes someone to become involved in terrorism, there are several factors 
that can converge to create conditions under which radicalisation can be more likely, such 
as an individual’s background, personal circumstances, previous criminal activity, initial 
influences (people, ideas, or experiences) and ideological receptiveness (Home Office 
2018a, p.32). Therefore, Prevent aims to address such factors when trying to stop people 
being drawn into radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism. 
The 2005 London bombings highlighted the importance of community and brought a 
community-based approach back to the centre, as community approach for the UK was 
not new (Briggs 2010, p.14). The UK used the community-based approach in Northern 
Ireland, but it was assumed to be a redundant response in the aftermath of 9/11, as the 
threat was thought to be an international, foreign and highly coordinated threat (Briggs 
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2010, p.14).  In fact, community-oriented CT policing strategies evolved in Northern 
Ireland in order to work more effectively with Republican groups and paramilitary 
Loyalist groups (White & McEvoy 2012). It was the experiences in Northern Ireland that 
showed CE is the cornerstone of effective CT. ‘Hardware’ is useless without ‘software’ 
(Briggs et al. 2006, p.17). 
In the 1970s and 1980s there was a militaristic approach of suppression and 
criminalisation to tackle the Troubles in Ireland, which resulted in a negative 
consequences for police-community relations (Pickering et al. 2008, p.26). Policing a 
divided society was very difficult, as both Protestants and Roman Catholics had their own 
views on the institutions of the state (i.e. legitimate or illegitimate) (Weitzer 1987). In 
addition, both Republicans and Irish nationalists accused the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
(RUC) of being a discriminatory and one-sided, since the RUC was heavily Protestant and 
aggressive. The RUC was later reformed and renamed the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland (PSNI) with the philosophy ‘policing with the community’, distilled into five 
distinct categories: accountability, empowerment, problem solving, partnership, and 
service delivery (Topping 2008, p.380). As such, the PSNI took a proactive approach to 
policing instead of a reactive approach, although in “many areas of the Province policing 
largely mirrors the reactive style of policing characteristic of the Troubles” (Topping 
2008, p.391).  
The lessons from Northern Ireland and the events of the 2005 London bombings brought 
back community-based CT. Briggs (2010) argues that the government responses to both 
9/11 and 7/7 matched the crime: a big, bold, and international response to 9/11; and a 
more localized and community-led approach for the London bombings. Soon after the 
attacks in London, the government acknowledged the need to work in partnership with 
communities to prevent terrorism. The Prime Minister held a meeting with ‘Muslim 
leaders’ (Chapter 4 discussed why such terms are problematic) and the Home Office in 
order to launch its Preventing Extremism Together initiative (Briggs et al. 2006, p.14) and 
prevention began to be delivered by the police, LA, community organisations, health and 
education services, and other groups.  
As part of working with communities and promoting integration and cohesion, the 
government released the Integrated Communities Strategy in March 20188. The Green 
Paper sets out an ambitious programme of actions to build strong integrated communities 
                                                          
8
 Online at: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/integrated-communities-strategy-green-
paper 
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based on shared rights, responsibilities and opportunities. Communities are the 
cornerstone of Prevent, enabling CONTEST to address radicalisation and extremism at a 
local level. Prevent’s work is similar to programmes designed to safeguard vulnerable 
individuals from gangs, drug abuse, and physical and sexual abuse (Home Office, 2018a, 
p.31). Thus, operating in a pre-criminal space with the intention of protecting vulnerable 
individuals, it requires a similar multi-agency approach to prevention and safeguarding. 
The government introduced the Prevent Duty under the Counter-Terrorism and Security 
Act 2015, for specific authorities (LA, education services, health sector, prison and 
probation, and the police) to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being 
drawn into terrorism. Section 36 of the Act requires LA and other partners to support 
people who are at risk of being drawn into terrorism prior to them committing an offence. 
This prevention process is known as Channel and sits within Prevent. It uses a multi-
agency approach to identify those at risk, assess the nature and extent of that risk, and 
develop a tailored support plan for the individual. Channel panels are responsible for 
managing the safeguarding risk to both children and adults and, as such, there is a need to 
establish processes that complying with the Children Act 1989 and Working Together to 
Safeguard Children 20159.  
It is under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 that LA are required to establish 
a multi-agency Channel panel and meet regularly. The Statutory Channel Guidance10 
guides Channel panels on their role, the delivery of Channel, why people may be 
vulnerable, and the support that can be provided to safeguard those at risk. The emphasis 
is on Channel’s core aim of safeguarding individuals at risk of radicalisation/extremism 
and de-securitising the process. The Home Office proposed changes to Channel, 
transferring responsibilities for some elements from the police to local government, 
sitting more closely with LA’s wider safeguarding responsibilities (Safer and Stronger 
Communities Board 2018, p.2). This is known as the Dovetail Pilot (Office for Security and 
Counter-Terrorism 2017). In late 2016 a 12-month trial was piloted in Brighton, Croydon, 
Haringey, Kent, Kirklees, Lancashire, Luton, Oldham and Swansea, with the intention of 
adopting Dovetail across the country from the end of 2017/18.  
The elements of the model required the police to continue being a key partner and assess 
referrals (risk of terrorism; the individual is not currently under police investigation; and 
                                                          
9
 Online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/419595/Working_Tog
et 
her_to_Safeguard_Children.pdf  P19.27 
10
 Online at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-guidance 
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that referrals are not malicious, misguided or misinformed). LAs were responsible for 
gathering information about referred individuals, assessing individuals’ level of risk, 
commissioning support for individuals from approved intervention providers, reviewing 
progress/risk over time, as well as administering panels and updating databases. 
Following the evaluation of the pilots, the Home Office proposed the model’s rollout (Safer 
and Stronger Communities Board 2018, p.3). Other responsibilities include those of ‘the 
most appropriate person’, who may be a LA employee (e.g. caseworker, teacher, probation 
officer) making initial visits to the individual referred, and if need be securing consent to 
proceed with a Channel referral. This is an important move for Prevent because it places 
LA at the centre of prevention. Thus, Prevent is taking a social platform rather than a 
policing one to guide safeguarding against radicalisation/extremism. After all, Prevent’s 
role is to tackle the causes and risk factors that can lead an individual becoming 
radicalised, support those at risk through early intervention, and rehabilitate those who 
have already engaged with terrorism. The 2018 CONTEST revision emphasises this multi-
agency approach to prevention, which influences practices of CE. 
5.3.2 Counterterrorism Community Engagement in Practice  
In West Yorkshire, there are approximately 16 Police Officers, Prevent officers, and 
Prevent Support Officers that work fulltime on prevention, with five being located in 
Leeds, the largest city in the region. The Home Office recognises LA areas across the UK on 
the basis on risk as either Priority (Tier 1 and 2) or non-Priority (Tier 3) areas.  Tier 3 or 
non-priority areas receive no specific funding for Prevent activities. This is the case for 
some of the areas within West Yorkshire. The allocation of Prevent Officers is based on 
tiers. Tier 1 is considered top priority, there are less of those in the country but there is a 
lot more funding for those- for the LA and the police - which attracts more staff to cover 
that extra workload. Tier two in West Yorkshire has approximately five Prevent Officers; 
some of those might be Prevent Support Officers, which is a civilian role. They have a 
similar role to support the Prevent Officers but they are not warranted officers, therefore 
they cannot complete all the tasks that a warrant officer would do. A tier 3 in West 
Yorkshire might have one Prevent Officer.  
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Figure 10: West Yorkshire Model of Engagement 
 
The engagement is centred on three core aims: tackle causes of radicalisation, early 
intervention, and rehabilitation (Figure 10). The first two of the aims operate in a pre-
criminal stage; it is about ensuring the individual does not commit a crime. Engagement 
on tackling causes of radicalisation is community-based engagement, which includes 
efforts to address social issues that converge to create the conditions under which 
radicalisation can occur. The CE delivered at this level aims to address those individual 
factors more broadly at the community level, which may require targeted engagements 
with various parts of the community in order to build resilience. Therefore, at this level, 
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the target audience is the general public and engagement can take the form of community 
events that focus on promoting cultural insight or organised sports events. This kind of 
engagement is focused on addressing socio-economic issues that might make community 
members feel disengaged, detached, segregated, and marginalised at a local and national 
level, rather just focusing on Prevent related issues. Prevent-related engagements were 
delivered in conjunction with raising awareness about other risks such as anti-social 
behaviour, speeding, littering, and so on. Engagement at this level is centred on inclusivity, 
cohesion, and integration. The practitioners focus on building trusting relationships and 
engaging in dialogue, as well as empowering the communities. As evident, engagement at 
this level is not necessarily CT related. In fact, practitioners deal with some mundane tasks 
such as parking in order to build those vital relationships between the community and 
authorities. 
The delivery of engagement is all about making it relevant to the end-user and finding the 
right medium through which to communicate key messages. In the context of CT, key 
messages were communicated through engagement with education services, mosques, 
churches, social media, community-based events, open days, community centres and 
organisations, and community cohesion events, ensuring people feel that their voices are 
heard; their needs are addressed; and that they have access to support that encourages 
integration within the community. At this level, the practitioners raise awareness, both 
online and offline, of Prevent, radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism. The LA and the 
local police use their social media platforms to raise awareness of local issues and local 
community events.  
This is multi-layered engagement that starts with general outreach dealing with daily 
issues, followed by dealing with specific issues impacting one community more than the 
other, issues that are not observed by the public or are ignored. At the top of sits more 
specific engagement focused on crimes that need to be addressed at the national level 
such as CT, modern day slavery, female genital mutilation (FGM), child sexual exploitation, 
etc. For the purposes of this thesis, CT related engagement is placed at the top of the 
pyramid. It is at this level that training is provided to those employees who are based in 
any of the listed ‘specified authorities’: LA; schools and registered childcare providers; 
higher education; the health sector; prisons and the probationary services (including 
under-18 secure environments); and the Police. However, this training is also available to 
those in a position to safeguard, such as religious institutions. Table 3 presents a list of 
training available to frontline practitioners and those in safeguarding roles.   
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Training Description 
Introduction to Prevent 
e-Learning package 
An introduction to the risks of radicalisation and the role that 
professionals and practitioners can play in supporting those at risk. 
Prevent e-Learning 
training 
An introduction to the Prevent duty and how it aims to safeguard 
vulnerable people from being radicalised to supporting terrorism or 
becoming terrorists themselves. 
Workshop to Raise 
Awareness of Prevent 
(WRAP) 
A workshop DVD that explains Prevent, the radicalisation process, how 
to identify at-risk students, how to raise concerns and what an 
appropriate response looks like. Local Prevent partners may be able to 
help organise a personalised WRAP training workshop if requested. 
Channel General 
Awareness training 
An online course that explains the Channel programme and how 
Prevent works to provide a proportionate response in supporting 
vulnerable people who have not committed a crime. 
Counter-Extremism: 
Narratives and 
Conversations  
An interactive video resource which lays out the principles applying to 
all forms of extremism. It helps with counter-extremist narratives and 
helps facilitate discussion on respect, tolerance, shared values and 
community cohesion. 
Prevent for Further 
Education and Training 
Guidance, sample risk assessments, policies and procedures for people 
working in colleges and universities, along with resources and links to 
videos and other relevant websites. 
Table 3: Types of CT training available to frontline practitioners and those in the position of 
safeguarding. 
Early intervention engagement is targeted at those at risk of radicalisation/extremism, as 
identified through risk assessment and intelligence. Such engagement is targeted and 
tailor-made for the individual at risk, provided through Channel. Once a referral is 
received by a representative from local partnerships that delivers Channel and Prevent, 
they will carry out an assessment using Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF)11 of 
the referral based on the three Ms (Malicious, Misguided, or Misinformed) to ensure there 
is enough evidence supporting the case. This is similar to the process flow diagram 
provided by the Home Office (Figure 11). 
                                                          
11
 VAF assesses whether individuals need to be supported and safeguarded against being targeted by 
terrorists and radicalisers. The framework complements the local practitioners’ professional judgement. 
The framework covers 22 factors that may cause someone to: engage with a terrorist group, cause or 
ideology, develop the intent to cause harm and/or, develop the capability to cause harm. 
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Once the referral is made, it is then forwarded to CTU, which have five days to assess the 
intelligence and risks associated to the case, and to decide whether the referral will go to 
Channel or not (this is also known as five days de-confliction). Both the CTU and local 
partnership representatives might liaise with the referrer, the vulnerable adult/child, 
their relatives (if necessary), social care, probation, housing, mental health services, and 
any other relevant agencies in order to gain more information. This is a snowballing style 
of questioning that looks at unearthing the thinking process behind the report to ensure 
that there is supporting evidence for such concerns. If the referral is deemed a case for 
safeguarding against radicalisation/extremism, the CTU will pass it to the Channel panel, a 
multi-agency partnership chaired by the LA, to provide tailor-made support to the 
vulnerable individual. This is a voluntary initiative that provides many types of support, 
addressing educational, vocational, mental health, and other vulnerabilities. Ideological 
mentoring is common. Therefore, the programme focuses on the individual’s identity and 
needs in order to empower and promote their progress within a cohesive society. Those 
who do not meet the requirements for Channel, are no longer a concern, or drop out of the 
programme, may be offered alternative forms of support by the LA or other providers 
(Home Office 2017, p.6). The rehabilitation level was introduced after the data collection 
for this thesis. Unfortunately, the thesis cannot provide material on this level of 
engagement, but the assumption is that a similar service to Channel is provided to those 
Figure 11: Prevent Process Flow Diagram (Home Office 2017, p.6) 
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who have committed terrorist and extremist-related crimes, with the intention to de-
radicalise and rehabilitate these individuals. 
5.3.3 Gold-Silver-Bronze Commands & Multi-Agency Partnership  
Central to the engagement framework is a multi-agency (e.g. Police, Counter Terrorism 
Unit, Education Services, Mental Health, Social Services, etc.) structure known as the Gold–
Silver–Bronze command12 (Figure 12), which oversees the implementation of the 
government’s CT strategy and guidelines. They decide how and what engagement is 
delivered. 
The command structure is applied to the resolution of both spontaneous incidents and 
planned operations. There are two sets of Gold–Silver–Bronze command groups: the 
CONTEST group and the Prevent group. The former is more focused on the 
implementation of all strands of CT strategy (not just Prevent). It does, however, have 
several aims in relation to preventing extremism. The CONTEST group aims to address a 
lack of uniformity across the boroughs; provide for greater oversight of how money is 
being spent; make sure that all partners understand the nature of the threat; and improve 
transparency (Police and Crime Committee 2015, p.29). The Prevent group differs from 
the CONTEST group in that it only focuses on the implementation of Prevent and its 
guidelines. It is in place to bring together government and other agencies that are working 
on Prevent. This board provides a space in which to share good practice and discuss risks. 
It also works as a medium for senior officials to feed information about Prevent back to 
their local borough. Both command groups follow the same structure and meet on a 
frequent basis. The Gold board meets on a quarterly basis, whilst the Silver and Bronze 
meet every eight weeks, although their meetings may be more frequent should 
circumstances require. 
                                                          
12
 The Gold-Silver-Bronze command structure is nationally recognised, accepted and used by the police, 
other emergency services and partner agencies to establish a hierarchical structure for command to 
control incidents of emergency and disaster. Whilst this framework was designed for emergencies, it 
has been successfully utilised for pre-planned operations. The command structure was introduced after 
Broadwater Farm riot in October 1985, which led to the murder of a police constable. The investigations 
highlighted that the usual rank-based command system was inappropriate for sudden events, as it was 
not clear who was actually in charge of the operation that fateful night. It was realised that three 
essential roles (gold, silver, and bronze) were required for these situations to highlight strategic, tactical 
and operational responsibilities and accountabilities. The framework allows processes to be established 
that facilitate the flow of information, and ensures that decisions are communicated effectively and 
documented as part of an audit trail (College of Policing, 2013a). 
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At the top of the hierarchy sits the Gold group, a strategic steering board that is 
responsible for oversight of delivering the Prevent objectives and action plan, based on 
the current and emerging terrorism risk for their district. The Gold commanders assume 
and retain overall command for the operation or incident, as well as being in control of 
their organisational resources for the operation. They oversee the parameters the Silver 
and the Bronze commanders have to follow. Although the Gold command does not make 
tactical decisions, they are held accountable for ensuring that any tactics deployed are 
proportionate to the risks identified, meet the objectives of the strategy, and are legally 
compliant (College of Policing 2013). At the Gold level, chief executives and the like from 
various organisations and authorities meet to discuss threats and vulnerabilities at 
district and national level, and try to implement standard practices at the very senior 
level. By setting these priorities, the Gold Group requests Action Plans from Silver group, 
asking what is being delivered in order to meet those priorities, providing evidence of 
impact and so forth. 
The Silver group manages the command and coordinates tactical responses in line with 
the strategies set by the Gold group. Their main objective is to identify and manage 
terrorism risks to the district and the individual(s) through risk assessment and control 
measures set by the Prevent Action Plan. The Action Plan is developed and implemented 
through this multi-agency medium, which sets out clear, realistic and effective 
deliverables (owned by and delivered through the partnership) that address the issues 
raised in the Counter-Terrorism Local Profiles (CTLPs)  and reduce the risk of 
Figure 12: Gold-Silver-Bronze Command Structure 
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radicalisation in the district. It is through these Action Plans that performance is 
measured, assessed and actions going forward are agreed. 
The Bronze command is the delivery and operational group and is usually the level that 
deals with referrals. It undertakes, coordinates, and monitors Prevent-related operational 
strategies and tactics set by the Gold and Silver groups. The delivery of tasks is in 
accordance with the priorities set by the Silver command, and the Bronze group take the 
operational decisions necessary to accomplish those tactical plans. At the Bronze level, 
training is frequently discussed, what is delivered, what needs to be delivered, and 
shortage of training. The Action Plans set by the Silver group are passed to the Bronze 
group and each division has an Action Plan e.g. the Neighbourhood Team has an Action 
Plan, as well as Prevent and Channel. The Bronze groups distribute these Action Plans to 
their partners and request feedback: e.g. what has been done in their area in relation to 
this objective. Once the Bronze group has all the feedback, they identify any gaps in the 
action plan. Any objective from the Action Plan not met will be rolled over onto the next 
upcoming Action Plan, as they get reviewed and updated frequently.  
Although this might not be the case for every region, it is likely that all the partners sitting 
at the Bronze level will be on the Channel Panel. Hence, there will normally be a 
representative from the LA who chairs the Channel Panel. The Bronze Prevent Group, 
where the Channel Panel sits, discuss any live cases on Channel, support for individuals on 
a case-by-case basis, their progress, or bring new cases to the panel. For example, one of 
the objectives on the Action Plan might be to identify and assess threats. The Action Plan 
has set questions that partners need to answer. These may include ‘have any of your 
community/working environment came across any stickers with group logos like National 
Action, National Front, or any of these groups?’; ‘have you picked up any of these stickers 
and where have these stickers been located?’ Therefore, the Gold-Silver-Bronze 
committee act as a harmonising mechanism that encourages the application of CONTEST 
and the Prevent strategy within different partner agencies. Additionally, it encourages 
multi-agency partnership in relation to CT at different levels of the organisational 
hierarchy. At these meetings, the committee is able to inform partners about current 
issues at national and local level, and identify appropriate interventions. All groups 
discuss the threat update and what has happened since the last meeting: internationally, 
nationally and specific in for West Yorkshire. This gives the partners an up-to-date view of 
the picture, and where they need to concentrate. Therefore, this can be a top-down 
approach to prevention. Once the information is gathered, the intelligence is fed back into 
the system by the Bronze team.  
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It is this structure that drives those operational relationships. It is necessary to have 
different areas of understanding and responsibility. Hence, this framework provides 
engagement at three major levels in organisations creating top-down and bottom-up 
information-sharing. The command structure operates top-bottom; however, through a 
bottom-up approach, it gains insight to amend strategies and tactics.  
5.4 Comparative Analysis  
5.4.1 Birds of A Feather: Defining Community Engagement 
From the interviews, it was clear that although CE was referred to as outreach in East 
Jutland, nonetheless it had similar meaning for practitioners in West Yorkshire. Consistent 
with the definition presented in Chapter 1, both West Yorkshire and East Jutland 
practitioners viewed CE as a versatile and dynamic tool that facilitated interaction, 
involvement and exchange between the authorities and the community, as well as 
individuals. Practitioners agreed CE enabled building relationships, trust, identify 
problems, reach out to hard-to-reach groups, encouraged partnership, as well as 
informing and educating the community but more importantly help with prevention and 
safeguarding. It was also identified that dialogue was a major cog in CE and important for 
its effectiveness: “We have to talk to people and [...] Dialogue is very important for us and 
our work.” (SP5) Although respondents from both regions expressed the importance of 
the dialogic element of CE, the East Jutland practitioner emphasised dialogue to a much 
greater extent in comparison to their counterparts in West Yorkshire, in some ways 
mirroring the CTCE strategy applied in each region (see Table 4). This is not to say that 
dialogue was not as important for West Yorkshire in CE; rather, East Jutland views 
emphasised more the importance of dialogue as a bridge-building tool and greatly 
invested in it, whereas, for West Yorkshire community was central to CE and greater 
emphasis was placed here.  
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Table 4: Overview of CTCE in East Jutland and West Yorkshire 
 East Jutland West Yorkshire 
Description Three levels of engagement:  general, 
specific, & targeted. The intensity of 
engagement & target audience varies 
at each level. 
Engagement is organised around three 
core aims: tackle causes of 
radicalisation, early intervention, & 
rehabilitation. The intensity of 
engagement & target audience varies 
at each level. 
Approach 1. Community engagement & building 
relationships  
2. Dialogue.  
3. Empowerment.  
4. Work with families & support them.  
5. Extend engagement beyond the 
vulnerable individual.  
6. Inclusion 
7. Induce a sense of responsibility 
8. Raise awareness 
9. Info-House 
1. Community engagement & building 
relationships  
2. Dialogue.  
3. Empowerment. 
4. Raise awareness 
5. Counter-narrative campaigns 
Target Audience 1. First responders or practitioners 
2. Local Community 
Organisations/NGOs 
3. Youth/pupils/students 
4. Parents 
5. At risk individuals 
1. First responders or practitioners 
2. Local Community 
Organisations/NGOs 
3. Youth/pupils/students 
4.At risk individuals 
Central Infrastructure Info-House works as a central hub, 
where information and specialists are 
made available to the general public, 
practitioners, and vulnerable 
individuals. Additionally, it brings 
together partner agencies in a physical 
space and harmonises the work of 
prevention.  
The Gold-Silver-Bronze committees 
work as a harmonising hand in the 
application of CONTEST and Prevent 
strategy in different organisations. It is 
a multiagency board, and enforces the 
appropriate practice at different levels 
of the hierarchy: strategic (senior 
managers and directors), tactical 
(managers), and operational (frontline 
staff).  
Deliverables 1. Workshop: formalized 2 X 45 min. 
interactive lessons about radicalisation, 
everyday democracy and how to deal 
with bias. The workshop is informed by 
research in fields of psychology, social 
anthropology, and political science.  
2. Awareness briefings: presentation 
about radicalisation, what can be done 
about it and contact-information for 
risk assessment. The workshop is what 
most resembles WRAP in concept, 
while the awareness briefings most 
resemble WRAP in content.  
1. Introduction to Prevent e-Learning 
package 
2. Workshop to Raise Awareness of 
Prevent (WRAP) 
3. Channel General Awareness training 
4. Counter-Extremism: Narratives and 
Conversations (London Grid for 
Learning) 
5. Prevent for Further Education and 
Training 
6. Prevent e-Learning training 
This thesis failed to find information on 
how these training programmes were 
designed (See Table 3). 
Pre-criminal stage 
prevention 
The Info-House provides early 
intervention support to the individual 
based on the risk assessment. These 
may include mental health, education, 
career, relations etc.  Participation is 
voluntary. They also work very closely 
with relatives and provide them with 
guidance and support, e.g. Parent 
Network.   
Channel provides early intervention 
support & aims to safeguard the 
vulnerable individual based on risk 
assessment. These may include mental 
health, education, career, relations etc. 
Participation is voluntary. 
Disengagement and 
Deradicalisaiton 
Engagement 
Exit Programme - participation is 
voluntary 
Desistance and Disengagement 
Programme (DDP) — compulsory 
participation  
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Moreover, CE was viewed by both as tailored and specific to the needs of individuals and 
communities, providing freedom in the level of participation whilst empowering 
individuals and communities in order to encourage their participation: 
“CE is specific to the communities in which we serve, it is not generic. One 
model doesn’t fit all. It is about understanding the community, in terms of the 
demographic, the geography of the areas, the tensions, looking at the politics. 
It's all about having a real deep understanding, in terms of what our 
community wants, needs, and what level of engagement they seek. [...] It is 
not just us that determines how we are going to engage our community, but 
also it is about empowering our communities. [...] We shouldn’t just decide 
what we think works best. We should have meaningful conversations and 
have some really difficult conversations, as well.” (SP1) 
Similar to West Yorkshire, East Jutland practitioners agreed that CE was a tool that 
allowed both practitioners and communities, or individuals, to identify their own 
limitations in finding solutions to problems: 
“CE allows us to encourage the community to work together and to get 
involved. Together with the community we talk about what they can do and 
identify problems, but they can also come back to us and say ‘can you do 
Multi-Agency Info-House, East Jutland Police, Aarhus 
Municipality, SSP, KSP, PSP. PET only 
gets involved in some cases with the 
Targeted Engagement. For example, if 
the individual was planning to leave for 
a conflict zone, PET might hold a 
conversation with them about the 
consequences.  
LA,  schools and registered childcare 
providers, further education, higher 
education, the health sector including 
mental health, prisons & probation, the 
police, and youth services. 
MI5 is not involved in the engagement 
at any level, although they may be 
involved in the investigation. 
Number of days to 
process a referral  
No official timeline, however, the 
practitioners aim to conclude within 
two weeks. 
Five days. 
Who assesses the 
risk? 
The prevention police at the Info-
House assess the risk 
The Counter Terrorism Unit, however, 
the assessment can be challenged by 
the Channel panel. In some cases 
where the case does not meet the 
Channel threshold, they are still 
discussed for safeguarding. 
National approach No Yes, it is tailored based on regional 
needs. 
Number of police 
officers working on 
prevention 
Approximately 22 police staffs that 
carry out crime prevention, with 1.5 
staff working on a full-time basis in 
Aarhus, the largest city in East Jutland. 
Approximately 16 police staff working 
in prevention with five being located in 
Leeds, the largest city in the region, on 
a full-time basis. 
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something to help us solve this problem?’ [...] It’s about talking to the 
community and getting them involved.” (SYS1)  
Additionally, CE was viewed as a partnership that enabled a better problem-solving 
approach, as practitioners recognised that each partner could bring forth a different set of 
skills and resources. More importantly, it enabled the partners to share information, 
which assisted with prevention. It was believed that, with the appropriate level of 
intelligence and judgements, actions can be more calculated to address problems 
appropriately. As such CE was viewed as more effective when delivered through a multi-
agency approach, as problems and prevention were believed to be multifaceted, and in 
need of an holistic approach (in line with Chapter 2 and existing CT strategies). Most 
importantly CE was viewed as a vital strategy that, if not delivered, could result in the gap 
between the public and authorities widening. Therefore, the use of dialogue through CE 
could help to build a closer community and identify a common goal: 
“CE is crucial. If we don’t do it, if we don’t concentrate on it, it will very soon 
end in ‘us and them’. It is a question of bringing people together instead of 
dividing them, and this is a legitimate problem. How do you bring people 
together instead of dividing them? The answer is language, talking, most 
importantly making sure that you are talking about the same thing.” (MU1) 
Moreover, the West Yorkshire practitioners like East Jutland explained CE to be multi-
layered that was guided by the needs of the individuals and communities: 
“CE from my perspective is multi-layered [...] and has to be based upon the 
needs of those individuals and the community groups.” (SP2) 
These findings illustrate that East Jutland and West Yorkshire viewed CE in the same light. 
The similarity between how the practitioners defined, understood, and expressed CE 
provides a relatively clear indication of the aim of CE and what the practitioners hoped to 
achieve by implementing it. However, as the next section will present, there are 
similarities and differences in the way in which CE is practised in these regions. It was 
important to first establish that CE was defined in a similar way before such a comparison 
in practice was made. This creates a baseline line of what CE should be and how 
practitioners translate this into practice.  
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5.4.2 Similarities 
Engagement in East Jutland and West Yorkshire is multi-layered and the intensity and the 
target audience varies at each level. Both styles of CTCE engage with the general public, 
those specifically vulnerable, and those who have already been involved in extremism.  As 
part of their engagement, both East Jutland and West Yorkshire focus on empowerment, 
use of dialogue, and building relationships. Additionally, the use of training and 
workshops is evident in both entities as a form of engagement to raise awareness about 
radicalisation and extremism. They both take a multi-agency approach to the prevention 
of radicalisation and extremism, and have infrastructure in place that encourages this 
multiagency approach. For example, the Info-House works as a physical hub that brings 
together different partner agencies to work towards preventing radicalisation and 
extremism. Also, networks like SSP, PSP, and KSP also enforce multiagency practice. In 
West Yorkshire, the Gold-Silver-Bronze commands work as a harmonising infrastructure 
in implementing CONTEST and the Prevent strategy.  
The pre-criminal stage interventions and engagement in East Jutland and West Yorkshire 
are similar, as they both assess the risk to and needs of the individual and provide tailor-
made engagement and intervention. The participation of the vulnerable is completely 
voluntary at this stage. The targeted engagement is focused on rehabilitating those who 
have been involved in extremism and are put through the Exit programme. Similar to the 
previous level, engagement with relatives and parents is sought when possible. The Exit 
programme engagement is comparable to that of the UK’s DDP, which this thesis does not 
have information on. Both West Yorkshire and East Jutland focus on connecting with 
individual identity, although the Info-House practitioners seem to have a better 
understanding and grasp of the importance of using a psychological approach. 
Nevertheless, the two strategies invest in connecting with identities in order to build 
relationships. For example, a Youth Service representative in East Jutland explained: 
“We have to sew a seed. You have to be very normal about a lot of things. You 
have to find a way in. You try to find one identity that you can match with 
them so that you can build a relationship. Especially at the start; because 
with each person you need to have something in common to have a 
connection with them. It’s like these youngsters can get a mirror and see 
themselves in you in some way. This method works.”(YS2) 
The practitioner clearly highlights that building relationships is a process that needs 
specific skills. It requires the individual to be aware of the target audience and various 
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commonalities that can be used as a gateway to building relationships. It is important to 
strike a balance between being ‘normal’ and the ability to ‘mirror’, as it is about being 
genuine and using similarities to connect. Similarly, in West Yorkshire, others reported 
how they utilised identity and self- categorisation in building relationships. One way this 
was achieved was by sharing personal experiences that people could relate to in order to 
build commonalities, such as being a parent. By finding common ground through personal 
experiences, barriers were broken and rapport was built. For instance, it was explained by 
a CT Police Officer that some of the people they engage with are supporters of far-right 
ideologies. They come from white, rough, ex-miner areas. Engaging with these individuals 
is risky and challenging and consequently, practitioners try to engage with this group 
using humour or personal experience — sharing with them that their own family member 
was also a miner, for example — in order to connect with these individuals13. Moreover, 
practitioners in both East Jutland and West Yorkshire explained that connecting with 
individuals also involved appearance. Practitioners realised that how formal they looked 
could have an influence on building relationships, especially at the beginning. For 
examples police officers mention that when attending community meetings they would 
avoid wearing their uniform to encourage engagement. They wanted people to feel 
comfortable approaching them to talk before the officer revealed that they worked for the 
police force.14 They explained that migrant communities did not have a good experience or 
perception of police forces. Generally, it was felt that being mindful of the target audience 
included thinking about how to present oneself: 
                                                          
13
 “I’ve worked with right wing guys who were covered in tattoos, National Front stickers on their 
forehead [...] who came from a really White, rough, council estate with lots of poverty. [...] You knock 
on doors sometimes, and people have weapons for intense. There is knives on walls and flags, and 
you’re thinking ‘my God what am I doing here?!’ [...] I have to approach them from a different angle, try 
to be funny and make humour. [...] You try to look for something that you’ve got in common. Like on my 
grandparents were miners for instance, and they might be a miner and worked down the pit for years. 
Straight away [...] you can talk to each other because of that similarity in life.  [...] So I bring in some of 
my own personal experience to build those relationships. I have a son who is 18 and I often use that as 
an example because sometimes you go in and you are a) a police officer, b) you’re a CT officer. They are 
really defensive of their child. They almost think you’re there to judge their parenting skills. To put them 
at ease I often say ‘you know, I’ve been in your shoes’, and I give an example of something that has 
gone wrong with my children, bad judgements [...] and try to get them at ease and talking.”  (P2) 
14
 “We did have a problem with engagement around the uniform, is uniform a good thing or a bad 
thing? and where to play it? Depending on where we were going we had to change 3-4 times a day 
some times, because if you went in community centres sometimes you want to be identified as a police 
officer so that people could come to you and speak to you about different things. But if you go to the 
African communities with your uniform, they are out of the backdoor. So sometimes we go without 
uniform and talk to people. Once we’ve had a conversation with them we say ‘oh by the way I’m a 
police officer’ [...] By then you have broken the ice and spoke to them a little bit [...] and eventually you 
get to talk to them and you get to know all the coffee shops and places people go and meet.” (P2) 
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“For example, if I am meeting with a Muslim family and I know that the father 
is very religious then I would think about what to wear when I meet him. Or 
if I am hanging out with the youngsters then I wear jeans and sneakers. I 
think about my look and appearance.” (CW1) 
It is important to note that these practitioners are not required to change their clothes, 
but rather behave in this manner because they believe it helps them to connect with 
individuals much better.  
Practitioners also engaged with people to investigate referrals. It was explained that the 
style in conversation, from appearance to the tone of voice, had an impact on the 
relationship: 
“I’ve got a soft voice, and I don’t like to go in uniform. Sometimes it is taking 
your tie off, a bit more easy on the eye when you are not so formal. Make 
them relax, get them a drink, make them comfortable and then you can start 
talking.” (P2) 
Another similarity in connecting with an individual’s identity that was seen in both West 
Yorkshire and East Jutland was that people delivering the CE needed to represent the 
structure of their communities i.e. the team needed to demographically represent the 
communities that they served. This was mainly seen in youth service and LA; the police 
practitioners did not mention this. It was believed that having practitioners from the same 
or similar background could speed the process of building close relationships. This was 
not to say that those from a different background were not capable of building a good, 
solid relationship, rather it might take a longer time for them to do so.15 It was often 
believed that colleagues from cultures and specific communities could provide insider 
insight to that culture and the best ways to interact with a said community due to 
sensitivities within those cultures and groups that would otherwise be unknown to the 
practitioners. It was argued that such insight could tailor the engagement in order to 
connect with identities, rather create barriers by causing offence: 
                                                          
15
 “I think that it is very important for the youth workers to represent the actual community and their 
neighbourhood that they live in. This could be a positive thing for CE. Also, it helps the public build 
relationships with the municipality and the police. I think that the speed of how we can get a close 
contact would be a lot faster when we [...] use someone from their own background than using a young 
blonde Danish girl, for example, to build a relationship. I am sure the young blonde Danish practitioner 
could do the task; however, it could take a long time before the family actually accept and understand 
her. So it speeds up the process by having ethnic minority youth workers. Having all these ethnic 
minority youth workers can represent the general Danish community, not just Caucasian but also the 
multicultural Danish community, where we have all the immigrants in as well as the Caucasian Danish. It 
is good to have an organisation that mirrors the society.”(SYS1) 
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“First of all you have to be aware who you are working with and sensitivities 
within those communities. Obviously, we have Asian employees, Polish 
employees, and so on. We ask them for assistance how would you 
communicate? What would you feel would be more appropriate or 
beneficial? So we have a lot of input from our own staff, and our community 
contacts.” (LA2) 
Moreover, both entities used dialogue to build relationships, address concerns, and 
identify problems. However, again Info-House practitioners were more aware of the 
power of dialogue and it was a key component of their engagement approach. Whilst in 
West Yorkshire, the dialogue was used more in line with counter-narrative and 
challenging extremist ideologies, in addition to building relationships. Nevertheless, the 
dialogue was seen as vital to engagement by both parties. Both CTCE approaches were 
relationship-oriented and focused on building long term trusting relationships with 
communities and individuals. They both focused on empowerment and supporting the 
communities they served. In fact, some of this support had no connection to CT-related 
issues (e.g. parking or family-related issues), but these platforms were used to gain trust 
and build bridges.  
The CE was problem-oriented in West Yorkshire and East Jutland, and through the 
identification of problems, the engagement was tailored, whether at the individual or 
community level. For example, the Info-Hose reached out to the Somali communities who 
argued that they needed a community centre for children and families entertained. 
Similarly, West Yorkshire had the same request from Kurdish and Syrian communities. By 
providing the community centres, the police practitioners were able to build strong 
relationships with them but also ensure prevention. Another example is when there was a 
fear of youth delinquency, and therefore a desire for a space for young people: 
“There is a large construction work taking place in the area and the 
contractors, communities, and the police were very worried about what the 
young people would get up to. Would they spoil the machines? Or steal them? 
So I thought if we are to have control over the young people, I have to get a 
football field. Now I have the most beautiful football field in Aarhus, thanks to 
the Mayor, to keep the young people busy.” (MU1) 
Finally, the data revealed that transparency is vital to a trusting relationship and 
prevention. Both West Yorkshire and East Jutland illustrated transparency in practice; 
however, it should be noted that the police in West Yorkshire were more transparent than 
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the LA. For example, due to fear of scaring people from attending awareness training, 
some LA would not openly advertise prior to the training session that they were also 
going to cover Prevent whilst talking about FGM and human slavery.  
5.4.3 Differences 
One key difference between the CTCE approaches is that the Info-House practitioners 
work closely with relatives of vulnerable individuals, including returnee foreign-born 
fighters. From the interviews, it became clear that the Info-House used their previous 
experience of working with parents in order to prevent young people from being involved 
in delinquency.16 It was clear that practitioners recognised that families were helpless in 
protecting their loved ones from radicalisation and extremism. These families did not 
receive support from other agencies or politicians such as the Intelligence Service or 
ministers, thus were left frustrated and powerless. The Info-House practitioners 
understood this void in services and started working closely with relatives. These families 
were desperate for help: 
“I would meet with families and discuss the issues. They felt relieved because 
the authorities couldn’t help them but at least there was someone like me 
who would meet with them, who would listen to them, who knew something 
about these things [radicalisation and extremism], who could advise them on 
this stuff because of his experience. I would tell them ‘you are unhappy, this 
is a bad situation for you but you are not alone, we have others who are 
experiencing the same thing’; and somehow they feel like they have come to 
the right place.” (IHP2) 
The practitioners repeatedly mentioned the importance of inclusion — especially families, 
empowerment and inducing a sense of responsibility when it comes to prevention of 
                                                          
16
 “With radicalisation we started working with families when foreign fighters started leaving. Not every 
parent came to the police but others did. The parents were very frustrated, scared, and very angry. The 
problem was that their kids were 18-19 years old and did not need parental authorisation for travel, and 
at the time it wasn’t illegal for people to travel to conflict zones. [...] So the parents were helpless, they 
couldn’t do anything. They went to the foreign ministry and the Intelligence Service, they couldn’t help 
them. So it had to be us, and we had some previous experience working with the parents for prevention 
purposes. For example, we had a girl gang problem that didn’t do crime but if left, in the long run, they 
would have. So the method was to involve the parents and tell them what was going on and in that way 
you involve the family to do the crime prevention with you. Together with the school we invited the 
parents because the school was worried and we were worried. Both the school and I presented our 
concerns and what was going on. The parents knew that the girls were going out with some girls but 
they never knew what was going on. By having that meeting we alerted them and they took action. 
They started to make contact with each other, calling each other. It took one hour of our time, which 
enabled us to mobilise the parents to take care of the situation, to take care of their kids; and somehow 
the problem disappeared.”(IHP2) 
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radicalisation and extremism. Therefore, recognising the family could assist with the 
prevention of radicalisation and extremism rather being thought of as hindering, risky, or 
just a source of intelligence. Another example involved the Info-House, as part of the Exit 
Programme, working with the widow of a high-ranked Jihadist and her sons, as part of 
their Exit programme. The widow had a hard time leaving the Jihadist environment and 
the Info-House had helped her. As a result of this intervention and close working 
relationship, the ex-Jihadi widow reported her own son who was trying to leave for Syria 
and join his elder brother who was fighting for Daesh: 
“His mother phoned me and said ‘I think my son is trying to deceive me. I 
think there is something going on and he is on his way to Syria’.  Of course, I 
had to inform the Intelligence Services and he was arrested with another guy 
in Turkey trying to get into Islamic State. While they were in prison, I told her 
that ‘we will still try to help you, we will not leave you with this. We can help 
your son to have a good life once he is released from prison.’ [...] For her this 
was a much easier decision because she said ‘yes, my son is in prison but he 
is alive, I can visit him in comparison to him going to Islamic State and I 
never see him again or end up dead.’ So for her, this was acceptable given the 
circumstances.” (IHP2) 
In fact, the Info-House practitioners not only worked with families in general, but they 
also worked closely with families of returnees, as well as extremist families in order to 
ensure the possibility of prevention. Although practitioners mentioned that some cases 
were harder than others, and working with families was not possible in all cases, 
nevertheless the Info-House does not shy away from working with such challenging cases.  
As part of supporting families and including them in the prevention work, the Info-House, 
created the Parent Network, which was designed for the use of parents and relatives of 
those who were radicalised or involved in extremism. Practitioners explained how the 
Parent Network had helped practitioners to gain the trust and support of the families, and 
in addition, had a positive impact on families directly reporting their concerns about their 
loved ones to the Info-house: 
“Working with Parent Network helped us to build trust and this led to me 
getting a huge amount of information because those families knew what was 
going on in Syria. They wanted to inform me because they saw that we are in 
the same boat now, they trusted me and we were working together against 
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the extremists and terrorists.  The information helped us to predict and 
prepare for when someone hopefully came back home.” (IHP2) 
Unfortunately, in West Yorkshire, aftercare and support for reporters and specifically for 
relatives was non-existent. There are no workshops or networks designed specifically for 
relatives for further guidance and support. Working together with relatives was mainly 
for the purposes of intelligence-gathering. However, one senior police officer explained 
that although there is no formal structure in place to provide such support to families, 
there are bespoke approaches for some individual cases: 
“I don’t know if we have a formal structure like the Parent Network delivered 
by the Info-House. We have individuals that are trained, as what we call 
Community Contact Officers. They will maintain contact with that family and 
provide support, a bit like the Family Liaison Officer.17 In individual cases, we 
would put families together to provide support to each other, but again it is 
very much a bespoke case and approach.  [...] We have a number of projects 
that have got lots of experience dealing with radicalisation, and families have 
been involved in those projects and would have met other people who had 
been previously radicalised. (SP2)” 
The interview also highlighted reasons for not being able to provide a formal Parent 
Network similar to the one delivered by the Info-House. It was explained that such 
networks could potentially be an environment where radicalisation is further spread. 
Moreover, it was argued because not many families from West Yorkshire travelled to 
conflict zones, there was no need to set up support within the region for relatives of those 
who were involved in radicalisation, extremism or terrorism.18 Moreover, it was agreed 
that the style of communication was key to connecting with the individual. It became 
                                                          
17
 Family Liaison Officers (FLOs) are specially trained to provide a two-way flow of information between 
families and the investigation teams. FLOs are usually assigned in any situation where a point of contact 
between the family and the police is deemed essential. Since 1999, the UK Police has assigned FLOs to 
assist families who have lost relatives in terrorist attacks or major disasters. They help support the 
family through the police investigation, answer questions and gather important information about the 
person who has died. They also keep the family updated on the progress of the investigation. 
18
 “Our concern, I suppose, is that it is something that you’ve got to manage very carefully because 
you're potentially putting two radicalised families together who are going to bounce off each other, and 
actually reinforce each other’s radical views in some respect. So it’s that balancing act, the support and 
the benefit of that. [...] In reality, we might have had one family where somebody travels from a 
particular city. Obviously the Syria issue particular impacts the Muslim communities. Muslim 
communities are quite geographically based and are quite self-supporting if you like. The support that’s 
been provided to people tends to be very local within their own community. But because we haven’t 
had mass number of families travel from Bradford or Dewsbury or Leeds there hasn’t been, I suppose, 
the sense of there being a need to setup something in the city where people could come together to 
talk about those issues.” (SP2) 
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evident that the Info-House practitioners consciously tried, to be compassionate and 
empathetic. For example, being close to the individual, touching their hand in comfort or 
showing empathy through language and tone of voice was thought to be of value when 
connecting with reporters, especially the relative reporters (in line with the warmth-
competency theory discussed in Chapter 3): 
 “I was alone with the parents, just them and me in the room, and we were 
very close [...] It is about things like being near each other, sitting opposite 
them with open body language and welcoming [...] and maybe touching their 
hands to comfort them. It is about being close to each other and having that 
contact. They need to feel it [compassion, empathy, and authenticity]. We had 
to be close.” (IPH2) 
West Yorkshire practitioners also explained that they were sympathetic. However, during 
the interviews practitioners did not use specific language or examples like the Info-House 
practitioners. In contrast to West Yorkshire, the Info-House focused more on the 
individual and their immediate surrounding when it came to engagement, taking a more 
inclusive and comprehensive approach to prevention by ensuring the individual’s 
environment was ‘healthy’. Thus, it could be argued that their CTCE was ‘heavier’ at the 
specific and targeted level, whereas, the West Yorkshire CTCE was focused on engaging 
directly with communities and faith institutions, as well as NGOs that represented specific 
communities.  
As a result of this individual focus, the Info-House practitioners explained that it was vital 
to know the individual and the elements of their identity, which could help build a 
relationship in order to help both prevention and the individual progress. For example, in 
one particular case, the vulnerable individual who had been receiving help from the Info-
House was a father to a toddler, which the practitioners used to connect with him and 
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induce a sense of responsibility.19 Additionally, West Yorkshire does not have a physical 
hub centre like the Info-House in Aarhus, which is open to the general public, 
practitioners, and vulnerable individuals to discuss any concerns they may have about 
radicalisation or extremism. Both West Yorkshire and East Jutland practitioners held 
partnership meetings on a regular basis to discuss at-risk cases or current rising risks. 
However, this thesis identified that West Yorkshire’s ‘regular meetings’ in fact did not take 
place all the time. Instead, meetings were sometimes held based on the need at the time; 
hence at times, such meetings were postponed to a later date meaning that there were 
longer gaps in between each meeting. This involved all levels of the Gold, Silver, Bronze 
group.  
In contrast to West Yorkshire, East Jutland has not invested or employed publicly 
available counter-narrative campaigns engaging in extremist or terrorist narratives. 
Instead, dialogue is a solid foundation for engaging in difficult conversations, and East 
Jutland has not shied away from controversies. For example, in collaboration with Strong 
Cities in 2015, the Info-House set up a conference on prevention of radicalisation and 
extremism. At this event, they had invited Imams from a controversial mosque in order to 
encourage dialogue. Additionally, Info-House actively sought media platforms to raise 
awareness about Info-House and what they did, and why. 
Finally, unlike the UK’s Prevent strategy and the Channel programme, the Info-House and 
their approach to prevention are not practised across Denmark. Info-House was a pilot 
study, which is being considered for national roll out. 
  
                                                          
19
 “You have to find where their pressure points are. [...] I know these pressure points and I use them. 
For example, we had a Jihadist [...] he had a family, a 3 years old son. [Before he went to gaol] I got in 
trouble with him, because when he became a father I knew he was planning to travel to Syria, and so I 
wrote a social report. The social services presented this report to him by mistake. So he called me one 
day through another person, not threaten me but he said you better be careful. [...] So I reached out to 
him, and said ‘don’t misunderstand this. I can understand why you are angry; my reason for this is that 
I’m not worried about you, because you can do whatever you like. But my only reason is there is child, 
and we have to take care of this. We have to take care of your wife and your kid. My hope for you is 
that you can bring up your kid and family in a secure and safe manner. This is my dream and this is why I 
did this’. He accepted it [...] Anyway he went to gaol and his son was turning three-year-old, so I 
arranged a meeting for them in prison. His son was running around and looking at him, [...] you could 
see that they were very close before. [...] He and his wife were nearly not talking to each other. So when 
I was alone with him I told him that it really hurts me to see his son running around and doesn’t 
understand why his father is in this room. His personality is being shaped right now. I told him, 
‘somehow I could see your story being told again. You spoke to me about how your father beat you and 
your mother, and left you. This is happening again now. You have to see this’. You know, I could see that 
was his pressure point and I w as using it because that vulnerability is the result of caring and 
compassion.” (IHP2) 
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5.5 Discussion  
This chapter explored how CTCE was defined and practised in East Jutland and West 
Yorkshire, in order to gain a better understanding of CTCE and use this insight to inform 
better practice with the intention to improve and encourage reporting behaviour. This led 
to an exploration of the shape and details of each CTCE strategy. The chapter highlighted 
how 9/11 was a catalyst for each country to take a more comprehensive approach to 
develop CT strategies: Denmark introduced the Action Plan and the UK, CONTEST, which 
includes Prevent. More importantly, events in Europe such as the 7/7 London terrorist 
attacks that gave rise to concerns about home-grown terrorists and forced these countries 
to look at CT from a community lens. This is because it was believed these individuals 
were embedded within their communities, therefore communities were best placed to 
spot the signs.  
This chapter revealed that although these events instigated the need for CTCE strategies, 
each country took a different approach to introduce them. In contrast to the UK, Denmark 
had pilot CTCE projects, one of which was in East Jutland. Unlike Denmark, Prevent in the 
UK is a national strategy, while the Aarhus Model in East Jutland is not practised across 
the country.  
In both East Jutland and West Yorkshire, the data revealed that practitioners had a clear 
understanding of CE, and their definitions of CE was very similar to one another. This was 
a positive sign, as it illustrated that this thesis could compare these practices a lot more 
confidently, as it provided a clear baseline. The practices in these regions illustrated that 
CTCE is multi-layered and targeted, and needs dictate the intensity and type of 
engagement needed. The data revealed that CTCE needs to be multi-agency, as different 
partners can provide different resources, insights, and value in addressing the prevention 
of radicalisation and extremism. Therefore, partnership was seen to an influential factor 
to effective CTCE and was not limited to just working with other agencies. 
The notion of partnership also links to community empowerment theory, which is 
concerned with sharing the power of decision-making and management activities with 
residents on those social conditions believed to sustain crime (Welsh & Hoshi 2006). As 
such, it is suggested that residents are more likely to be satisfied and take more interest, 
as well as responsibility for their residential area (Bennet 1998). This is because 
empowerment represents recognition of individual identity and concerns. This, in turn, 
induces a psychological state where the empowered resident views cooperation more 
positively and actively seeks it out. Such preventive methods can take shape in various 
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programmes that empower the community, for example after school recreation 
programmes (Welsh & Hoshi 2006). It is argued that citizens can play an active role in 
delivering a quality service, as the way agencies interact with the public can elicit 
cooperative behaviour and/or enhanced results that can improve the overall quality of the 
service (Ostrom 1996; Joshi & Moore 2004). This is because people are willing to share 
accountability and support a movement when it is in line with their personal values 
(Skogan & Frydll 2004). This is in line with the community empowerment theory 
presented in Chapter 2.  
Myhill and Quinton (2011) argue that public support is very much conditional rather than 
universal, and it is highly dependent on expectations of the role of police as well as how 
police are deemed to act. They found that the most important factor motivating people to 
cooperate with police and not break the law was the legitimacy of the police. The key 
aspects of legitimacy were found to be trust and shared values, which were fostered by 
the perception of police fairness, rather than police effectiveness (Myhill & Quinton 2011). 
Moreover, the inclusion of communities also creates a sense of agency and responsibility. 
The ability of community members to create a sense of agency and assuming ownership 
for the state of their community is regarded as Collective Efficacy (Sampson et al. 1997), 
as discussed in Chapter 2. 
One of the key factors that the data revealed when exploring CTCE was that there are 
psychological elements to CTCE. The practitioners revealed how they tried connecting 
with the individual or group identity in order to build trusting relationships. Both entities 
understood that identity was multi-layered, that it was not just focused on personality but 
also appearances, tone of voice, and style of communication. This supports the identity 
theories presented earlier in Chapter 3, and how they influence intergroup relationships 
and perception through stereotypes associated with different social identities that help 
with categorisation. These stereotyped categories drive and guide one’s decision to 
interact with or to avoid the out-group.  
This self-identification also enabled practitioners to have shared goals with the target 
audience and express compassion for the position these individuals were in (see footnote 
19). By connecting to the individual through shared goal (e.g.. the well being of his child), 
the practitioner is showing respect for the individual as a father and wants to support him 
to be a good parent. The practitioner further confirmed this notion by making it possible 
for the individual to have a private meeting with his family, creating an environment of 
trust, to ensure long term prevention. This approach is in line with warmth-competency 
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research presented in Chapter 3, as the individual’s behaviour is more positive if they are 
not threatened. Thus, by connecting to identity, not only it was possible to share 
compassion but also to identify avenues through which to create a sense of responsibility, 
which is vital in prevention as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. By connecting the past to the 
present, the practitioner helped the individual to discover what kind of father he wants to 
be: one that mirrors his dad, an absent father, or an active one that helps to shape his son’s 
personality. Another example is when the West Yorkshire Police representative connected 
with the individual through self-association with miners (see footnote 13). Identifying as a 
miner brings about the association of pain, hurt, trouble, struggle, poverty, betrayal and 
sense of abandonment that these communities felt when the UK government closed coal 
mines in the 1980s. Therefore, the officer is no longer an outsider but a possible in-group 
that has shared an experience with these individuals. This is how the notion of social 
identity and categorisation theory, as well as warmth-competence,  helps to understand 
the psychological processes of this action. 
The importance here is that these practitioners are aware of how important it is to 
connect with the individual’s identity in order to become an in-group in building 
relationships. The keyword presented throughout the interviews is the ability to be a 
‘mirror’ for the individual. Using a simple fact of daily life consciously is a novel social 
practice that is applied to CTCE. This is not to say that all practitioners practised this. In 
fact, there were comments on the type of person needed to deliver CTCE for this reason 
(see Chapter 7). This connection to identity is not unusual: one does this on a daily basis, 
whether it is in one’s professional or social life. However, for engagement this process 
needs to be more of a strategy, rather than a ‘nice’ skill to have. Therefore, this thesis 
argues that identity is central to building relationships. Thus the practitioners delivering 
engagement need to have the knowledge and skill for building relationships, as well as 
being able to spot the cues for self-identification. The literature has shown that one is 
more positive towards the in-group (the group oneself associates or belong to) than the 
out-group (Billig & Tajfel 1973; Tajfel 1978; Tajfel 2010; Tajfel 1969; Tajfel & Turner 
1986). As such, it is important to recognise how being representative of a particular 
identity can influence relationships and behaviours. As mentioned in Chapter 3, studies 
have found that SIT can influence cooperative behaviour in policing (Bradford 2014). This 
thesis also supports this notion.  
Here, it should be noted that there seemed to be a difference in the expression of 
compassion. The Info-House practitioners seemed to be able to give better and more 
examples, whilst the West Yorkshire practitioners did not illustrate with as much 
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emphasis. This is not to say they were not compassionate; rather it may have not been 
expressed as clearly or frequently (see Chapter 6). Another key difference between East 
Jutland and West Yorkshire is that East Jutland works very closely with families for the 
purpose of prevention. The East Jutland practitioners illustrated how parents want to 
keep their children safe, therefore it is important to recognise that need for support and 
act upon it. Prevention is about being proactive, and the officers recognised that by going 
beyond the person of interest prevention can be made possible. This is in line with the 
literature on CE (see Chapters 1 and 2) that the citizen can decide the level of 
participation. The level of support and engagement provided to these families makes the 
difference in the effectiveness of prevention strategies. When there is a recognition that 
these families are vulnerable and in need of help, a new platform is taken to prevent 
radicalisation and extremism. The stigma attached to radicalisation, extremism and 
terrorism usually isolates these individuals, and the lack of information makes the 
problem even more alien. To have someone who is willing to provide a helping hand 
creates a sense of trust, and this is exactly what the Info-House practitioners experienced 
with the Parent Network.  
This level of support and inclusion was not evident in West Yorkshire. In fact, there 
seemed to be a gap in practitioner’s knowledge about the type of help available to families 
who have had a member of their family involved in radicalisation/extremism. If there is 
support out there for these families, the practitioners are not aware of it (although, it was 
reported by West Yorkshire practitioners that families may be offered a contact or liaison 
officer). The fact that it is not mandatory to provide such support is to all families is 
problematic. Also, in order to identify if these roles are sufficient in supporting the 
families, it is vital to explore them further. Unfortunately, this thesis did not have access to 
such data. It is important to note that the Parent Network was not a compulsory service, 
but rather an initiative that the Info-House designed to address some of the emotional 
needs of these families. . Appropriate emotional support can increase cooperation with the 
police, as experienced by Info-House where they have received increased reports from 
family members (in line with the warmth-competency theory discussed in Chapter 3). 
This strategy is no longer in place for reasons that will be discussed in Chapter 7.  
As illustrated in Section 5.4.3, there were concerns from a senior police representative in 
West Yorkshire about what it would mean to provide a similar service like the Parent 
Network to these families (see footnote 18). This research believes such views are 
problematic, as presented in Chapter 6 through UKR1’s experience.  
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First, there is an assumption that all families that had one or more of their members 
involved in radicalisation/extremism/terrorism tend to also be radicalised; therefore, 
families are seen as a problem. This view is a prejudice these families face, and it does not 
assist with the prevention of radicalisation or extremism. However, there is an element of 
truth in that there is a possibility that these environments could be exploited by those 
who have unhealthy intentions. This has not been the case for the Info-House and their 
Parent Network, because it is supervised by practitioners at the Info-House. Second, the 
officer believes there should be a higher number of families affected by 
radicalisation/extremism/terrorism in order for such support to be made available. The 
aim of prevention is to ensure the elimination of the risk associated with 
radicalisation/extremism in the first place. If such services were available to people and 
families, where they could freely seek support and guidance without having to fear legal 
consequences, then there could be an argument that prevention is in place. Also, such 
services not only can help in the initial prevention but also to maintain it, as evident from 
the practices of the Info-House. This way support is provided to families empowers them 
in knowing how to continue preventing their loved one from being involved in criminality. 
This also applies to those cases of de-radicalisation, making sure the individual is 
disengaged from further involvement. Third, the above comment illustrated passing the 
buck in providing these families with support. In reality, there is a lack of understanding 
of minority communities. The officer asserts that minorities, like the Muslim communities, 
are self-supporting, but this was not the case for the relative reporter in East Jutland, who 
was looked at negatively and accused of wanting attention and being a sell-out. Of course, 
this is not a reflection of all communities; however, to suggest that these communities 
take care of themselves is not completely true either. By perceiving minorities as groups 
with tribal mentality is a colonial view that completely disregards the impact of 
globalisation, individual and cultural integration, and adoption of new identities. It 
diminishes the idea that these minority communities, for example, the Somali Muslim 
community, are complex with intra-group differences let alone different to other minority 
groups, e.g. Lebanese Muslims. 
It was also evident from the data collected that dialogue was needed in order to build 
relationships, as well as identifying and addressing problems. For East Jutland 
practitioners, the dialogue was central to their work. Dialogue is an important, practical, 
everyday tool, which is accessible to everyone (Yankelovich 2001, p.15). Nonetheless, 
there is little scholarly research on how dialogue is used in police work and the effects it 
may have on the favoured outcome. The thesis in the coming sections and chapters 
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explores the use of dialogue in CTCE and its psychological importance for encouraging and 
improving reporting. Thus, this is an area where this thesis makes an original contribution 
to knowledge. Dialogue is a process of successful relationship building through 
respectable discussion directed towards the exploration of a particular subject or problem 
— recognising how everyone involved is affected (Yankelovich 2001, p.15). Therefore, a 
dialogue is not about you or me, rather about you and me. Yankelovich argues that 
dialogue is a highly specialised form of discussion that imposes a rigorous discipline on 
the participants. As such, when dialogue is done skilfully it can have extraordinary results: 
longstanding stereotypes dissolved, mistrusts overcome, mutual understanding achieved, 
visions shaped and grounded in shared purpose, bringing together people who were 
previously at odds with each other, new common ground discovered, new perspectives 
and insights gained new levels of creativity stimulated, and bonds of community 
strengthened (Yankelovich, 2001, p.16). From a policing perspective, dialogue is thought 
to enable the police to listen to the community and more accurately determine the needs 
of citizens (Trojanowicz & Carter 1988, p.8). It is through dialogue that the police can get 
closer to the community and learn that the public has a different — and more accurate —
measure by which to assess officer competence and police satisfaction (Trojanowicz & 
Carter 1988, p.9). Through community consultation, the police can identify public 
priorities, provide the public with information on policing activities, and develop 
partnerships with the public. Therefore, dialogue creates an atmosphere in which status 
and power differences are minimised, where listening is encouraged, and opportunities 
are created to make assumptions explicit (Yankelovich 2001, p.102). Consequently, 
engagement and inclusion of communities create a genuine belief in  equal partnership 
with the community (Murray 2005).  
This study also found that East Jutland did not use counter-narrative campaigns or 
advertisements. Instead they engaged in dialogue to address complex issues like 
radicalisation and extremism. It is argued that the logic for this may be that the campaigns 
might be risky due to addressing problems on the general level (Hemmingsen 2015, p.25). 
The data also illustrated that West Yorkshire’s engagement, in theory, is both bottom-up 
(proactive) and top-down (reactive), but in reality, engagement is more reactive (see 
Chapter 7). The Info-House also has a reactive approach to engagement for similar 
reasons; however, their strategy is top-down. The individual at risk is used to guide the 
engagement with their surroundings and community. Therefore, engagements with 
communities are targeted in both entities. There is a risk that not everyone in the 
geographical parameters within East Jutland and West Yorkshire will receive engagement, 
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thus leaving sections of the community vulnerable to radicalisation and extremism, as 
well as failing to identify the emergence of new threats — e.g. new trajectory groups or 
ideologies that enforce violence. 
Also, it should be noted that CTCE in East Jutland were more individual-focused whereas 
West Yorkshire was more community-focused on their engagement. This may be due to 
the Prevent strategy the individual engagement is separated from that of the community 
as the result of Channel and DDP. As such, community activities were more predominant 
in this research, as participation from practitioners who were involved in DDP or Channel 
was close to none in this research,20 whereas, the Info-House delivers engagement to both 
individuals and community (however, they work more closely with the vulnerable 
individuals and their families). This thesis argues that the municipality does more work on 
CE, not necessarily CTCE, that addresses community cohesion, crime issues, 
empowerment etc, and use those relationships in communities to connect with Info-House 
CTCE if needed. For example, in cases of connecting with hard-to-reach communities.  
This study found that CTCE overlaps with none-CT-related CE, and sometimes are linked 
to issues such as social cohesion. Therefore, not all CTCE delivered was actually CT-
related, but rather part of broader efforts at building relationships and addressing 
community problems (for example, keeping youth busy to prevent them from committing 
crimes (Newton 2001). This research also found that although both West Yorkshire and 
East Jutland were required to meet on a frequent basis (e.g. the Gold-Silver-Bronze 
command, and the SSP, PSP, KSP meetings), West Yorkshire failed to do so. This is in line 
with the finding of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC)  who reported that nine 
Channel panel meetings took place between June 2016 and September 2017 discussing 
the Parson Green attacker — an active Channel case — but none were held between 
January 2017 and June 2017 (Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament 2018, 
p.96). This thesis has failed to find an equivalent national audit of Info-House meetings or 
with the SSP, PSP, and KSP. This thesis recommends Channel panels and Prevent to meet 
on a monthly basis to discuss new and ongoing cases. This meeting is vital to information 
flow between the partners and various levels of command. 
Considering the literature on CE and CCTE, as well as behaviour and cooperation, in 
addition to the data from this research, the following definition for CE in policing and CT is 
suggested with focus on prevention by adapting Myhill’s (2012, p.19) definition of CE: 
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 There was only one Channel representative.  
140 
 
A multi-layered, inclusive, tailored and specific multi-agency strategy, 
which involves a psychological process that requires connecting with 
the individual’s and/or group’s identity through the use of dialogue 
and stimulation of the sense of responsibility to encourage citizen 
participation in identifying and solving problems at their chosen 
level. This may range from providing information and reassurance to 
empowering them to identify and implement solutions to local 
problems and influence priorities and decisions strategic.  
This chapter aimed to discussed how CTCE is practised in East Jutland and West 
Yorkshire, and has presented a clear picture of what may be considered best practice in 
order to inform a more holistic CTCE strategy. The following chapter will explore the 
reporters’ experience of reporting and use that insight to further advance the current 
understanding of CTCE practice and reporting behaviour. 
  
141 
 
Chapter 6 
 
Hunters in The Dark: Reporting Radicalisation 
and Extremism 
6.1 Introduction 
To understand the impact of CTCE on reporting behaviour, there are two components, 
CTCE and reporting. The previous chapter explored how CTCE is delivered and various 
strategies used in order to encourage public cooperation. This chapter explores the 
reporters’ perspective and analyses the motivations, feelings, and experiences of 
reporters (professional, as well as relatives and close associates) with the aim to answer 
the first part of Question Three (i.e. reasons for and barriers to reporting). This chapter 
discusses how and to what extent different factors influence the decision to report by 
establishing reporters’ experience of reporting. This chapter is not intended as a 
comparative analysis of East Jutland and West Yorkshire; however, when appropriate 
differences will be highlighted. The current chapter has four core sections. The first 
section explores the reasons for reporting, followed by barriers to reporting. The third 
section examines the difference between professional reporters and close 
associates/relatives, particularly the way they report and perceive threat. The fourth 
section explores the reporters’ experience of reporting in an attempt to identify factors 
that can contribute to the decision to report, and ultimately set the ground for Chapter 7 
where recommendations for service improvement are presented. 
6.2 Reasons for Reporting 
One of the questions asked of participants was why they reported. The data from both 
practitioners and reporters (professional and relatives) offered various rationales. The 
data is discussed under a number of sub-headings based on the themes that emerged from 
the interviews.  
6.2.1 Threat, Uncertainty, and Fear of Consequences 
The interviews highlighted prior to reporting, the reporters viewed the given situation 
(i.e. the vulnerable individual) in similar ways. They all recognised there was a threat that 
needed addressing, but felt uncertain. For example, foster parents of a teenage boy 
reported their concerns because one night, during dinner, the subject stated to his foster 
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parents that he was planning to become a suicide bomber, and wanted to blow up the 
house. He also said that he did not like people from Pakistan because they were racist.21 
Though the foster parents had not seen the teenager present any other extremism- related 
behaviours, they felt need for professionals to take a closer look. Similarly, a student who 
was becoming isolated from his peers was reported to the authorities based on concerns 
that he might attempt to travel to Syria: 
“It was reported by other students who followed the individual on Facebook 
that he had stated he ‘can’t wait to go Jihad, and leave this land of Kafars.’ [...] 
We didn’t know at that time if he really did want to go. It was later that his 
friends had left then we realised he was also at risk of leaving.” (WYR1) 
Another reporter explained that a report about one of their tenants was made because of 
the type of language this individual had used, the tone of conversation and the speed at 
which the conversation changed from raising a concern about some Asian men using as 
building as mosque to being extreme and inflammatory.22 This concern was enhanced by 
the fact that the reporter did not have much information on this particular tenant: 
“The gentleman in question was a tenant of ours. [...] He was reported to be 
quite elusive. Not really engaging with other residents. People who lived 
around him described him in their words as ‘odd’, ‘sometimes quite extreme 
in his views’, and probably had ‘tendencies in the past to act erratically’. [...] 
We reported him because of the language that was used, the tone of the 
conversation, and how quickly the conversation deteriorated into something 
quite personalised and inflammatory. [...] We didn’t know this guy, if he was 
known to the police and other agencies [...] or if he had been involved in 
criminal behaviours before? If he had any mental health issues, where 
perhaps medication was an issue, or his personal circumstances, family 
breakdown etc.” (WYR2) 
In another case, the reporter (EJR1) explained that the pupil reported had shown various 
causes for concern.23 The student came from a troubled family with divorced parents, was 
spending time with drug dealers and suddenly his group of friends changed to all Muslims. 
He started spending a lot more time at the mosque, to play video games and have food. He 
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converted to Islam, and started to recite prayers in Arabic in school, as well as watching 
beheading videos.  
What these cases demonstrate is that the trigger point for threats perception is layered. It 
is a sequence and combination of events, information or even lack of information that 
create the notion of threat. It can be represented like a layered cake, each event adding a 
layer of concern, which accumulates to form the threat; the final trigger point is the cherry 
on top of the cake that encourages the need for action (see Figure 13). In each case the 
reporters explained it was not one isolated factor that led them to report, although the 
‘cherry’ is the focal point. For the foster parents, the problematic behaviour of the teenage 
boy was a cause for concern that (the first layer), topped with the challenging relationship 
they have with him (second layer) and his comment about wanting to become a terrorist 
and blow up the house. Would this comment mean much to the reporters without 
previous context? The recent terrorist attacks in addition to the background of the 
teenager as an Afghan refugee24 is argued to be of contributing factors. Therefore, the 
comments made at dinner table are just the cherry on top of the cake. Likewise, for WYR1 
the initial concern was comments being made on Facebook, along with other factors as 
explained in Appendix D. The ‘cherry on top’ for the reporter was the confirmation that 
the student’s friends had left for Jihad. This certainly confirmed the threat perception for 
the reporter. Similar pattern can be seen with WYR2. Although the comments made by the 
tenant were extreme, in isolation they might not have been sufficient for reporting a case 
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 Afghanistan has been and still is exposed to Taliban and Al Qaeda. 
Figure 13: Threat perception for reporters. 
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of radicalisation or extremism. It could arguably be a case for racism. However, the tone 
and the speed in which the conversation escalated added another layer of concern. This 
concern was further developed by learning some characteristics about the tenant’s 
personality from other residents. However, lack of information such as criminal or mental 
health history was the ‘cherry on top’ for the reporter. Finally, in the case of EJR1, it is 
possible to get a better picture of this layering of concerns that shape the perception of 
threat. At the very foundation sits the concerns that the student comes from a troubled 
background, which is then escalated by being in contact with negative influencers. Change 
of friends, conversion to Islam, and spending long periods of time at the mosque further 
provides cause for concern given the experience of having young people radicalised at a 
local mosque. The trigger point or the ‘cherry on top’ was when the student started to 
recite prayers in Arabic in school, as well as watching beheading videos.  
In all cases, there is a level of uncertainty while trying to make sense of the situation. Not 
knowing enough information that could assist with calculating the cost or consequences of 
events also shapes how a threat is perceived and skews the sense of control. This indicates 
a need for confirmation or disapproval of what is being experienced or perceived. As a 
result of uncertainty, people tend to use biases (confirmation bias theory) and patterns as 
evidence to confirm their beliefs, and use those as heuristics to make a decision 
(Kahneman & Tversky 1974). Fear of consequences is another key factor that influences 
threat perception. The practitioners who dealt with such reports believed that people who 
reported their concerns of radicalisation/extremism were fearful of what the vulnerable 
individual might be capable of, which could have server consequences: 
 “[The fear is] that these individuals might commit an offence and go forward 
[...] I think the risks are often physical harm to themselves or other people. 
[...] They [reporters] genuinely think of the harm that this person could do to 
themselves or to other people. [...] Ultimately it’s because they [the 
vulnerable individuals] hold the potential threat or risk.” (CH1) 
Another practitioner observed: 
“When they have a genuine concern [...] about an individual and what that 
individual is capable of doing; worrying that something detrimental was 
going to happen to that individual or that individual was going to create 
something that wasn’t good for other people. And I think people get to the 
point of thinking that they need to report it.” (LA1) 
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Similarly, a reporter explained: 
“I think the sense of implications did have a heavier weight on my decision to 
report. The risk of not reporting it was that his views would have been 
genuine, and might have wanted to seek retribution in some way. He had 
strong opinions, and not only to why the Asian men were there.” (WYR2) 
Such comments highlight the recognition of the need for safeguarding and appropriate 
intervention by relevant agencies such as the police. For example, from WYR2’s 
comments, it is evident that the reporter felt powerless due to lack of knowledge about the 
subject and felt they could not judge the level of risk this individual posed. As the reporter 
explains, the belief was that the police had sufficient capabilities to deal with the situation 
appropriately. This need for intervention by relevant agencies suggests the reporter feels 
that they are not in a position of power to prevent and safeguard the individual.  
Punishment was another consequence that was feared by professional reporters (e.g. 
teachers). For example, in case of WYR1, the risk of not reporting the individual was 
inadequate safeguarding, consequently failing the Prevent Duty because the appropriate 
actions were not taken. This in turn would have result in a bad Ofsted report: 
“The risk of not reporting was that firstly we wouldn’t have protected the 
individual. Secondly, we would have failed our Duty. To not report something 
like that you are clearly not fulfilling the Prevent Duty. [...] I think we were all 
really worried about failing to meet the Duty because the sanctions in 
education for not meeting the Duty are very serious. So we were frightened 
to death about what we should and shouldn’t be doing. [...] Because, they 
have made it essential to have a good Ofsted around Prevent and 
Safeguarding. [...] It didn’t occur to me not to report it. [...] I think it is better 
to be safe than sorry. [...] The benefits were that we would hopefully clarify 
the situation; that we would mitigate or remove any risk to that individual 
and the cost didn’t really come in to it.” (WYR1) 
The risks of not reporting were high, and because of that it became a case of ‘better safe 
than sorry’. The reporter clearly highlights how costly it can be for education services if 
they fail to put appropriate safeguarding in place to protect the vulnerable individual. A 
poor or failed Oftsed outcome can ruin a school’s reputation. As such this can weigh on the 
decision to report (see in Chapter 7). The above comment also suggests that people do not 
want to be responsible for making the wrong decision. This also feeds into the notion of 
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responsibility and accountability, which will be discussed in Section 6.2.2. The notion of 
‘better safe than sorry’ continued to echo in the interviews with the professional 
reporters, and it seemed to be a push factor to report their concerns: 
“I didn’t want to take the risk that this was just an erratic behaviour that had 
no substance to be of genuine concern. I felt the need to pass it on, [...] as it 
was not a normal behaviour. [...] I suppose it was all about passing on the 
information, and my trust that the police would do the right thing with that 
information. ” (WYR2) 
The fear of consequences can influence the cost and benefit of reporting and/or not 
reporting, which as a result contributes to reporting behaviour, as it shapes threat level. 
Similarly, another reporter explained that the experiences of the school principal had an 
impact on how the threat of the situation was perceived: 
“The principal at the time was very nervous that this student would, within a 
short time, be at risk of joining an extremist group [...] because she had a 
previous experience with another student, whom she had taught from grade 
two, [...] that travelled to Syria and joined ISIS. The principal remembered his 
parents, and how a local Aarhus boy ended up being killed down there. She 
has had a closer experience of extremism; I had not experienced such things 
before.” (EJR1) 
As explained earlier, context and historical experience or back-story matters in threat 
perception. Experiences provide knowledge, and one learns through experience. 
Experiences also assist in shaping heuristics (mental shortcuts), which provide a quick 
answer to a similar problem. Moreover, though experiences more stereotypes and biases 
are formed. One can also use the experiences of others to learn from and adopt them as 
one’s own. The above comment illustrates how previous experience of the principal 
shaped consequences and threat perception, but also how the reporter adopted this 
experience as his own since the comment is emotionally charged — the reporter is using 
terms or examples that he can associate with. For example, teaching a student for a long 
time, or knowing the devastation that it can have on a family that you have known for a 
long period. Moreover, fear of consequences was not just associated with the vulnerable 
individual but also the role of the reporter. For example, EJR1 explained how he feared 
that his close relationship with the student might cloud his judgement of the threat: 
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“I had to be careful of my relationship with the student so that it didn’t 
influence my judgement about him being at risk of being radicalised. Other 
teachers who didn’t have the same close relationship or knowledge about the 
pupil, like I had, were very worried and I can see why they were feeling that 
way. I didn’t want to be the person to put a blanket over the signs. I had to be 
careful not to neglect others point of view, because I wasn’t sure either. I 
mean how can you be? [...] Their point of view should have just as much 
attention [...] and because I had a senior position at the school, that gave me 
some sort of power [...] and I didn’t want my power to dominate.” (EJR1) 
The reporter was very aware of his position not just as a senior member of staff but also 
as someone who had an emotional connection with the student. During the interview EJR1 
was very empathetic towards this particular student in a professional context. Therefore, 
it is very important to being conscious of the consequences of these factors and how they 
can have an impact on analysis of the situation that can shape threat perception. Thus, 
perception of consequences and threats can be multifaceted. 
These examples illustrate threat perception prior to reporting. In these cases, the 
reporters had managed to report early enough to allow intervention. But what happens in 
cases where the reporter is late reporting — i.e. the vulnerable individual has either left 
for conflict zone or has committed a crime? Does the same thought process hold? In two 
cases the reporters raised the alarm after they had discovered the vulnerable individuals 
had left for conflict zones — both of whom were relatives of the vulnerable individuals. 
Both reporters, EJR2 and UKR1,25 explained that although they had noticed differences in 
behaviour, religious practices, attitudes and beliefs, and interest in learning new skills — 
such as learning Arabic — it was not until they had discovered the vulnerable individuals 
were missing that they started to get really worried.  
Although the formation of the threat perception is similar to those who report earlier, 
those who report later do notice subtle gradual changes that occur over a long period of 
time and in some aspects they are uncomfortable with such changes and challenge it, but 
perhaps not actively or aggressively as they are not sure if these vulnerable individuals 
are actually being radicalised. However, what seems to happen is that their concerns are 
muted by a sudden positive change in behaviour of the vulnerable individual, as if 
everything is back to ‘normal’. Another factor that causes a delay in reporting their 
concern is that, in cases of relatives and close associates, there is emotional charge and 
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perception of control. They believe they can control the situation, and to some aspect the 
sudden positive change in the vulnerable person’s behaviour can be interpreted to the 
situation being under control: 
“A year before she left, this guy who she knew from school asked my brother 
if he could marry her. My brother said no, she is too young. But I was like if 
they love each other then it is okay, they can still continue with their 
education. I could see she was going and I didn’t want her to go. I was trying 
to hold on to her, I thought maybe if she has one kid then maybe she will stay. 
[...] Before my sister went she was all okay [...] the night before she left we, 
including our friends, were up watching YouTube videos till early hours in 
the morning. We had such a great time. She was cuddling next to me, had her 
head on my shoulder. [...] We were just having a really good time. [...] The 
next day after she went missing, I realised she had gone [to Syria].”(EJR2) 
Similarly, another reporter explained 
“The changes weren’t consecutive [...] they took place over the course of a 
year and a half. [...] I confronted the changes in him, I found it difficult in the 
family life [...] but at the same time I was being his mother. [...] Particularly 
about six months before he left, [...] he had actually gone back to his normal 
self. He was joining in family celebrations. He was much [more like the] 
happy, fun, loving boy that he was before. And that is why it was like a bolt 
out of blue when he left. [...] What he did was to turn our eyes away from 
possibly thinking he may be going there [Syria].” (UKR1) 
The reporters perceived that they had control through challenging or finding ways to 
distract the vulnerable individual (e.g. getting married and having a family). Similarly, 
they both experienced a distracting positive change in behaviour. To take the cake 
analogy, these reporters follow the same layering of threat perception; however, there is 
an extra layer of false hope due to misinformation/deception — thus miscalculating the 
threat level (see Figure 14).  As such the lack of control is the ‘cherry on top’ — i.e. the 
trigger point. 
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This section provided an insight into how reporters perceived threats, and how the factors 
involved shaped their decision to report. Perception of threat has a layered thought 
process and the end result (action) is dependent on other layers. This section highlighted 
the three core elements that shaped the reasoning for reporting: threat perception, 
uncertainty, and fear of consequences. The following sections will present other 
contributing factors to reporting behaviour. 
6.2.2 Responsibility and Accountability 
A sense of responsibility and accountability play a big part in reporting concerns of 
radicalisation/extremism. The reporters felt a great sense of obligation. For professional 
reporters the obligation was personal and legal: 
“I had a sense of obligation [...] as in the Duty. [...] I definitely recognised it 
[obligation] as a legal duty in that way [...] but I think the real moral 
obligation for me was to make sure that he was safe and supported. 
Somebody who is presenting those kinds of views, you want to make sure 
they're alright really. So I think it was that [safeguarding] first then obviously 
the Duty. [...] Later on, based on what we learnt, we thought ‘thank goodness 
we had done everything right.’ Because, if hadn’t done that someone would 
have, surely, said ‘if you knew this, then why didn’t you say something?’” 
(WYR1) 
Likewise, another reporter explained: 
Figure 14: Threat perception for late reporters. 
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“I felt a sense of obligation, again a purely a professional obligation. [...]As a 
senior member of staff I felt that something wasn’t right, potentially, the local 
community could be at risk from that individual. [...] We had to share that 
intelligence, to make sure the police knew what we knew. [...] If something 
very significant did happen, and I or my organisation didn’t move the 
conversation on or didn’t report it then I think clearly that has great risks. [...] 
If I didn’t have this sense of professional obligation I would still have made 
the report, purely doing it out of personal values, personal sense of what is 
right and wrong.” (WYR2) 
These views on sense of obligation were strongly echoed and espoused by other 
reporters: 
“I felt a sense of obligation because if I didn’t report and something 
happened, [...] for me, as someone who works in education, [...] I could be 
putting people at risk. So it’s also a moral obligation as well as being part of 
my work.” (WYR3) 
The sense of obligation is somewhat guided or influenced by fear of consequences — 
especially in cases of uncertainty. However, the sense of responsibility and accountability 
enforces liability, and the actions need to be justifiable. Therefore, there is a sense of 
control and duty to deliver, which makes one answerable for managing risks. Failure to do 
so suggests that the concern was not dealt with appropriately, and this may imply lack of 
control. Similarly, in the case of the foster carers reporting a teenage boy,26 they have a 
legal duty to safeguard the individual from harm. Although they may have a family role to 
play, they can also be considered professionals. Therefore, the reason for their decision 
and comfort in reporting may also be due to the fact they have a legal obligation, and 
possibly the emotional connection may be dynamic. Nonetheless, they operate in a family 
environment; therefore they cannot be considered a professional fully. 
For close associate and relative reporters, the sense of responsibility was associated with 
their role (e.g. mother, sibling etc) and judgement by others: 
“To be honest I was thinking that if I don’t do anything my mum would blame 
me because my sister used to live with me. So I thought now I have to be 
upfront and go to the police because it was my responsibility to take care of 
her, be her eyes. Because I knew my mum would say ‘it is your fault!’, and she 
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did actually. [...] I am glad that I did report it. [...]I thought I was the only one 
that could bring her back when I talked to her but I couldn’t. I didn’t think my 
mum could convince her to come back because my sister had more of a close 
relationship with me than she did with her mum. [...] My sister would tell me 
everything, not my mum. I was like her mum, you know.” (EJR2) 
The above comments highlights the level of responsibility the reporter felt towards her 
sister. In fact, the intensity of this feeling suggest accountability more often rather than 
responsibility (responsibility can be shared, whilst accountability cannot). Her 
relationship with her sister was very close, and she was her carer, as they lived together. 
The reporter indicates that she had a mother’s role. As discussed in Chapter 3 the sense of 
responsibility and accountability suggest that there is an element of liability. Roles and 
stereotypes that one adopts as part of one’s identity shapes one’s attitudes and behaviour. 
For the reporter, she had taken the role of a carer and protector, factors she associates 
with motherhood, which lead to sense of accountability. This is linked to identity theories; 
how individuals tend to take on the stereotypes that come with a role, and subsequently 
identities shape behaviour. As such it was important for her to continue with that 
protective role. Again the reporter mentions that she felt she was the only that could bring 
her sister back. Another factor that heightens the sense of responsibility is the fear of 
being blamed for failing to prevent her sister from leaving (i.e. fearing consequences). This 
fear, as the reporter explains, induced her to report to show that she had not neglected her 
duties (i.e. fear of being blamed). 
6.2.3 Agency and Control 
A sense of agency and control also shaped the reasoning for reporting. For example, for 
EJR1, given that the school principal in a management position, the interview suggested 
that the reporter may have felt less control or power in this circumstance about deciding 
to include the student and his parents in the discussions. It is clear that the reporter would 
have reported the student whilst still keeping in line with the traditions and general 
practice. As explored earlier, EJR2, who reporter her sister, explained during the interview 
that although it was very hard for her to report her sister, she felt that the police had 
higher powers and she felt powerless: 
“Actually, it was very hard for me to report her but I wanted her back, you 
know. I thought I could get her back through the police. [...] For me the police 
were the powers of the powers. If I couldn’t reach her then the police could, 
that is what I told myself. It was hard. [...] When I finally spoke to her, she 
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found out I reported her and she was mad. [...] Then she said, ‘I know I hurt 
you and my mum but I will come back one day Inshallah’. I told her ‘No! No! I 
know Inshallah but you have to come back today and we’ll come and get you 
from anywhere’.” (EJR2) 
The reporter felt powerless to influence her sister’s decision to come back home. Not 
knowing the whereabouts of her sister added to this sense of powerlessness. She felt as 
though the police would have the authority and the ability to locate her and bring her back 
home. For the reporter, the risk of being disliked by her sister was trivial in comparison to 
losing her. The reporter clearly states how her sister viewed her negatively once she was 
aware of the report. This indicates internal conflict in the decision-making process. The 
reporter clearly refers to this tension by saying that the decision to report was very hard 
for her. The reporter comes from a religious background, and it was interesting to note in 
her comments that she felt Inshallah (God willing or if God wills) was not sufficient. Within 
her comments there is a suggestion that she felt the police were more able to make this 
reunion happen. She felt that by cooperating with the police she will have some answers, 
for example sharing the video call details with the police in order to understand her 
sister’s whereabouts. The reporter further explains that through reporting she would have 
access to information and support, as well as a sense of control by taking action: 
“When you report, you can have information. If I didn’t report I wouldn’t 
have had any of the information I have now. I wouldn’t meet any people, 
those good people I met during my hard times. [...] Reporting gave me 
comfort, that I did something. I couldn’t just sit there and wait for her to 
show up one day. I was scared that she would be raped, [...] that she will be 
alone there with no one to protect her. I was scared of everything. [...] It 
would have hurt me to think that I could have done something. [...] That is 
why I did it. [...] But now I can say I’ve done it, you know. I tried to do 
everything in my power.” (EJR2) 
The comment highlights the need for some form of control over the situation. Lack of 
agency and control create a sense of desperation, with limited options. This is in line with 
the practitioners’ belief that relatives tend to make a report based on feeling powerless 
and not having any other options (see Section 6.4). Additionally, knowing that one has not 
much control over the situation encourages possibly raising the alarm earlier and 
cooperating more. For example, in two case studies provided by the West Yorkshire CTU, 
it was evident that families who were already in a position (having their son under mental 
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health care) that dictated their level of power and influence over their sons, which 
encouraged them to raise their concerns early on.27 Also the relatives were already in a 
state of high alert, because the subjects were psychologically unstable. Their parents were 
clearly aware that they could not sufficiently safeguard the individual on their own and 
needed external powers, as well as assistance (see Figure 14).  
6.2.4 Knowing About Similar Cases and Available Help 
One of the reasons for reporting was knowledge of available help. Reporters who had this 
knowledge found it easier to reach out to whomever (i.e. authorities) they had heard 
about. EJR1 explained that, because the school principal knew of an officer who worked at 
the Info-House, as they had met at a conference, she felt it was better to reach out to that 
officer for help and guidance in dealing with the vulnerable individual. Similarly, because 
EJR2 had previously seen others being prevented from going to conflict zones like Syria, 
she strongly believed that she will be reunited with her sister if she followed the same 
course of action. When asked if she was aware of any information that helped her to make 
the decision to report, the reporter explained: 
“Before I reported my sister I knew of two people. One of my great-cousins 
who went there [Syria] too. [...] I knew there was support and I knew that 
they had a relationship with the officers at the Info-House because they 
mentioned them a lot. [...] His family were supported while he was gone. 
Knowing that they got support gave me motivation as well because both his 
mother and father reported their own son, and they have a good relationship 
and say a lot of good things about it [Info-House]. Before my sister went, I 
thought yeah, whatever, this is the police; I don’t care as long, as it does not 
affect me.” (EJR2) 
The reporter notes that having the knowledge that a family member had experienced 
similar case and were supported by the Info-House encouraged her to report. The fact that 
the reporter highlights how she was not really buying into the support from the police 
until the time had come is very revealing in how the information is used to change the 
state of internal dissonance.  
The reporter further explained that knowing that the support was available to her sister 
gave her comfort:  
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“I was feeling like I was making her a criminal or something, and I asked the 
officer at the Info-House ‘now that I have reported her will you convict her?’ 
He said ‘no, we will help her to be part of the community again. If she hasn’t 
shot anyone or committed a crime we won’t convict her’.” (EJR2) 
The confirmation and the new information provided by the officer assisted the reporter to 
further cooperate with the police in order to save her sister, because such information 
reduced the level of uncertainty and internal conflict. Knowing that there is support 
available for the vulnerable individual is essential, but this was balanced with the reality 
that there could be possible legal actions. The action of the officer indicates transparency 
and honesty, which in turn influenced how the reporter decided to further cooperate. 
6.2.5 Dialogue and Informal Reporting 
Dialogue and informal reporting also assisted in shaping the reasoning to report. Dialogue 
and informal reporting can overlap. Through dialogue reporters were able to discuss 
concerns and seek guidance, as well as confirmation: 
“Because, as a pair, we were not sure what to do; or what was the right thing 
to do [...] in the given situation [...] we decided to seek help from the officer at 
the Info-House that the school principal was in contact with. [...] We were 
told by officer to do an anonymous report. This was helpful that a 
professional helped us to do this [make that decision].”(EJR1) 
Here informal dialogue took pressure off the reporters, as the responsibility of decision-
making was shared with the Info-House officer. In this way, uncertainties were addressed 
through professional insight. Access to such informal processes can work as a heuristic 
(mental shortcut) since it takes the pressure away from the decision-maker. In addition, 
the new information provided through this process of dialogue can be used to justify the 
report. It is evident that this reporter felt more comfortable with making an anonymous 
report, given his concerns about not involving the family (a strong personal value) and the 
sense of betrayal he felt towards the student. The report was clear that the right decision 
was made, especially after talking to the officer; this illustrates how new information can 
assist in reducing dissonance or inner conflict that can ease the decision-making process.  
The interviews made it clear that, for reporters, it was important to obtain some clarity, 
confirmation, and guidance. For example, one reporter, who was part of the Prevent 
Bronze committee, explained that although a formal report had been made, the reporter 
needed guidance to confirm that it was the right decision to report: 
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“Whilst I did a formal Channel referral, I did follow it up with a call to say ‘I’m 
concerned about this particular call, would you be happy to spend some time 
with me and we will play the call back for you’?” (WYR2)  
This particular comment is indicative in that even for a person who is involved in 
prevention of radicalisation and extremism from the level of implementation, this person 
still needed confirmation of what was being experienced due to the intricacies of such 
situations. Given the complexity of radicalisation and extremism, situations in this context 
are not black or white. Reporters face grey areas of uncertainty and need to have access to 
dialogue and informal courses of action that allows them to express their thought, even if 
they are professionals who have experience of such cases. It was also reported that there 
are misconceptions about what prevention means and there is usually a fear of 
prosecution or punishment (see Section 6.2.1): 
“They need to know that we are not punishing them [the vulnerable 
individuals], so we need to talk about it. That is very important because that 
way you feel safe and not scared when discussing your own child. It is 
important to discuss what your worries are. We talk about solutions and not 
punishment.” (MU1) 
Instead of focusing on possible negative elements, the practitioners are able to make the 
reporter feel more secure by discussion the solutions and the support available. This is 
very important in shaping threat perception. Not having access to such resources can add 
to uncertainty and cost-benefit analysis of reporting. Informal conversations about 
concerns can reassure people that they are making the right decision, as issues related to 
radicalisation and extremism can cause panic due the cost of making the wrong decision: 
“I have to say that 90% of the people I speak to feel so much more reassured 
and put at ease because they've had a conversation with me or my Prevent 
colleagues. Because they know that actually what they’re putting on the form 
is relevant [...]. I think it is the not knowing; they have been a teacher for 20 
years and haven’t come across this before. [...] With the current situation of 
radicalisation and extremism they think ‘I can’t get this wrong’ and people 
panic.” (CH1) 
Clearly, informal dialogue allows for the reporter to reduce the levels of uncertainty and 
risk associated with the situation. Informal reporting and dialogue reassures the reporters 
and provides a sense of stability and control over the situation. As discussed in Section 
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6.2.1 when discussing consequences, the costs associated with radicalisation and 
extremism are high, especially if the threat evaluation is misguided. Therefore, access to 
practitioners can enable the reporters to have a better understanding of threat and risks 
that they are facing. Practitioners were able to reduce the risk of reporting by being 
comforting and providing advice. This is vital for ensuring that the information is handled 
appropriately: 
“When the phone is rings I need to be very aware of what is going on because 
most of them [reporters] want advice, or counselling about the problem that 
they have. I mean they are insecure and unsure. For example, I get a call from 
a teacher who says ‘I know this guy, he is a good pupil in my class but there is 
something I am concerned about and actually I don’t know if I should report 
him or not’. Then we discuss what she sees and what she doesn’t see because 
they don’t always necessarily see the same things. So we try to guide and 
advise them.”(IHP2) 
The above comment, like that of CH1, highlights that insecurity is accompanied by 
uncertainty. The Info-House Officer explains the importance of injecting some security and 
control into the situation. This is vital for reducing risk and enabling the reporter to have a 
clearer vision of what is being experienced. Thus, it is about trying to reduce the fear of 
what might be and bring forth reality and control — crucial elements for healthy decision-
making. Another practitioner similarly explained that they encourage reporters to discuss 
their concerns before they submit their referral formally. This way concerns could be 
addressed but also relevant information gained: 
“We do that [informal reporting]; most of the time, through the telephone 
conversation because what we ask of people is that, before they send in a 
referral, to run things by us. Pick up the phone and have a conversation with 
us. Not always does that happen. [...] I contact the referrer to say ‘is there any 
information you felt uncomfortable with putting in your referral form?’ 
Because by putting that information in, it would be more relevant to us 
offering support down the line.” (CH1) 
The practitioners also explained that in such cases they encourage the reporter to seek 
more information in order to understand the full picture, as they would have done 
naturally in other situations. As the comment above illustrates, practitioners need to have 
access to the full picture, as the reporter’s threat perception may not always be accurate. 
However, the reporter will not be alone in gathering more information: practitioners 
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explained that further support was available to reporters if need be. Thus, having that 
guidance and support to induce sense of control over the situation is vital for threat 
perception and management. It was also noted by practitioners that although there was 
no official informal reporting in place, practitioners believed that people still reported 
their concerns informally. A Prevent referral was not made every time a concern was 
raised. The practitioner who received the information would make the judgement on 
whether there should be a formal report: 
 “There is no official process for informal reporting but there is a lot of 
informal reporting initially and that will come under the close long-standing 
relationships. One of my officers gets calls regularly in evenings, when he is 
not working, by people who say ‘this is the situation, what do you think I 
should do?’ So that is an informal conversation, which invariably ends up 
with the advice being given from that officer and ultimately you must submit 
a Prevent referral. It could be [...] the officer will triage from what has been 
said to him that there is no need for referral, he might stop it then and there. 
There are a lot of informal conversations that might instigate a formal 
referral further down the line.” (SP3) 
It is evident that there is a need for such informal discussions and reporters actively try to 
seek them, even outside working hours. The comments from practitioners highlight that 
although not all discussions might lead to formal reports, nevertheless it creates a 
platform where the reporter can discuss concerns and gain certainty. Another aspect of 
informal reporting was anonymity. Practitioners explained that it was important for the 
public to know that they can be anonymous when making a report. It was thought that by 
being able to make an anonymous report, reduced the fear of some of the consequences 
and gained trust (see Section 6.2.6): 
“I think it [Info-House] has convinced people that it is a secure system, and 
the risk of reporting is not so big, as they can actually do it without telling the 
police who they are and get the police to respect that.” (SYS1) 
6.2.6 Trust 
One of the factors (see Chapters 2 and 3) was the notion of trust and how that may 
influence people cooperating with the authorities. Trust was also seen as a contributing 
factor that shaped the reasoning for reporting concerns. The Info-House had managed to 
gain this trust by addressing the involvement of intelligence services with the reporters: 
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“Definitely trust is a big issue and that is why there is limited reporting from 
us to the Intelligence Service. The Intelligence Service wants us to pass 
everything we know to them but we put in a plug in that, and say in order for 
us to maintain trust in the communities we can’t report everything. [...] If we 
have an accumulation of risk factors where we see that these people are 
dangerous or might have something going on then we will report it to them. 
We can’t as police or municipality sit on something like that. If something 
happened [...] we wouldn’t be able to live that down.”(IHM1) 
The comment above illustrates that there is a need for balance when trying to gain trust 
from the public — especially in a CT context. The Info-House practitioner explains that 
although they have a duty to share information with the intelligence service, this is only 
done on a need-to-know-basis because not all cases reported will need the attention of the 
Intelligence Services. Also, and more importantly, the public may have concerns about the 
Intelligence Services being involved, which might prevent them from coming forward in 
the first place (this is in line with warmth-competency theory in Chapter 3). As such, it is 
vital for the public to be able to trust the practitioners and the system in place, and know 
that the information they share will not be passed on to the Intelligence Services unless it 
is necessary. This again, influences the risk-benefit analysis of reporting. From the 
reporter’s perspective trust can also be based on existing knowledge. For example, one 
reporter explained that she trusted the police because she knew how they had helped 
others in the same situation: 
“I was the only one in my family that trusted the police [...] I actually forced 
my family to contact the police, because I sincerely thought the police would 
help us to stop them in time. A lot of people were saying when you inform the 
police everything will go downhill. I asked why and they said, ‘because you 
are a Muslim, they won’t help you’. I said that I trusted the police more than 
other people here because I grew up in Denmark and I know how the system 
works. I knew what the police were doing. I said I know that they have 
stopped people from leaving and have helped them. I know two of them. [...] 
So I was like ‘oh my God, how can you refuse the police!?’” (EJR2) 
The reporter mentions she was aware that others in similar situation had support from 
the police previously. This piece of information is vital for balancing the internal 
dissonance. Information, which can outweigh the inconsistencies in beliefs, may assist 
with changing the context in which the person views the situation. Therefore, for the 
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reporter, knowing the police could help and provide her with what she needed — i.e. to 
bring her sister back — outweighed the mistrust her community had towards the police, 
and confirmed her trust in the system. Also, this is in line with theories of attitude and 
belief shaping behaviour, as well as warmth-competency since the reporters believe the 
police can be trusted if they are not in a position of harm (see Chapter 3). 
6.2.7 Training 
For professional reporters, it became clear that one of the factors in influencing their 
decision to report was the training they had received on prevention of radicalisation and 
extremism: 
“I am Home Office trained. In the WRAP training [...] they are very clear [...] 
that one of the factors that you need to be aware of sometimes is when 
someone states what they are going to do. That there is, normally, an 
intention to do what they say they’re going to do that. And it was such a 
definite that ‘I'm going to do this’ that it seemed, with that training in the 
back of our minds, there was an intent there.” (WYR1) 
The reporter explains that the training guided their way of reasoning. Such information 
provided through training can be used as heuristics (mental shortcuts) when making 
decisions, as the answer for a problem is provided and thus there is no need to figure the 
solution out by oneself. Another professional reporter similarly espoused:  
“As a Prevent Bronze member I thought it was sufficiently serious, alarming, 
and certainly concerning for me to refer it to the CTU and the Prevent Officer 
through a Channel referral.” (WYR2) 
The above comment again suggests that having access to information about radicalisation 
and extremism through Prevent Bronze membership means the reporter is capable of 
recognising the seriousness of the situation and appropriate action. Again, access to such 
insight provides a mental shortcut to what is required to be done in such risky events and 
how to manage the risk.  
6.2.8 Policy 
Policy was another factor that shaped the decision to report. As mentioned earlier when 
discussing fear of consequences and accountability, the Prevent Duty in the UK has 
influenced professional reporters’ decisions to report through enforcing safeguarding and 
holding professionals accountable. In Denmark, during the interviews it was mentioned 
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that laws put in place meant that both the vulnerable individual and the reporter could 
feel at ease knowing that the conversation between them and the authorities would not be 
used to prosecute: 
“The Danish law §115 make is easy for them to have this conversation 
because other units in the police (investigating and criminalising) can do 
their own work. If they [police] find something then they can arrest him, but 
the prevention is about helping them.” (MT1) 
§115, as mentioned in Chapter 5, enables authorities to share information for prevention 
purposes only, without exposing the individual (see Appendix N). The information gained 
for prevention purposes cannot be used in a criminal court, as evidence for the 
prosecution. Hence, this reduces the risk of reporting and cooperating with the 
authorities. This is novel, as it shows how governments can assist with reducing fear of 
approaching authorities for help through legislations. 
6.3 Barriers to Reporting 
The data from the interviews revealed there were barriers to deciding to report. Similar to 
the previous section, several themes were identified that contributed to the reluctance of 
reporters and how the cost and benefit of reporting were viewed.  
6.3.1 Threat, Uncertainty, and Fear of Consequences 
Practitioners believed that many were reluctant to report their concerns due to fear of 
consequences, especially in cases of police involvement:  
“We have a problem with people reporting crime because they are afraid of 
what would happen if they report it [concern] to the police. And that is 
actually one of the big topics in some area where we try to educate people.” 
(SYS1) 
It was also suggested that some of the fear around reporting was based on what people 
had heard from others i.e. misconceptions and misinformation: 
“Of course, people fear that something might happen [...] to them or their 
family because of what others shout and threaten; [...] but from my 
experience such fears are not reality.” (SMU2) 
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Again, similar to Section 6.2.1, uncertainty influenced how the cost and benefit of 
reporting was perceived. It was also highlighted by practitioners that people with such 
concerns were uncertain about whether their concern was legitimate: 
“Some of them think ‘is this the right thing I am doing? Is he a radicalised 
person, or is it my way of thinking that is the problem? Am I allowed to do 
this?” (SP4) 
The above comment highlights the uncertainty and lack of knowledge around 
radicalisation and extremism, and how this can work as a barrier to people to coming 
forward. Similarly, it was highlighted that fear of consequences was also an inhibitor in 
deciding to report “Many are concerned about that they are calling the police and they 
think along the lines of I don’t want him arrested.” (IHM1) Another practitioner espoused 
that professionals were reluctant to report because they feared the CTU’s involvement in 
the process of prevention, since the connotations attached to CTU were that this was more 
serious, and therefore the consequences it might have for the vulnerable individual might 
also be more serious.28  
This worry over sharing of information with police stems from how the police are seen as 
a punitive arm of the law, and therefore, the assumption is that the authorities will 
respond in way that is punitive and in support of prosecution. This suggests that people 
do not want to be responsible for making the wrong decision, or they fear that their 
actions could result in something dramatic. The uncertainty results in fear and feeling 
unsafe: 
“The concerns that people have before reporting someone is that [they want 
to know] what is wrong with the individual? Second, how can I avoid any 
dangers or threats that could happen? Basically, how can we feel safe again 
because when you have a concern you don’t feel safe, you are worried. Of 
course, they fear that there is a risk that the person might be put in gaol and 
get convicted but what I have seen and heard from the parents who call and 
                                                          
28
 “People believe Channel is linked to [the] police. [...] I don’t know whether we would see an increase 
in referrals if the police withdrew completely from the whole process. [...] It does make me wonder 
sometimes, whether or not people are reluctant to refer to Prevent/Channel because of the 
connotations attached to CTU. Because when we mention CTU within training to frontline communities, 
everybody sits up and pays attention. [...] I think there is [a] reluctance maybe not from the public but 
from the professional point of view. [...] So ultimately their concern would be ‘this person hasn’t 
committed an offence, I’m really concerned about the vulnerability but if I send this in, it is likely that 
the CTU is going to see this individual who has been referred’.” (CH1) 
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say ‘oh my boy just got back home from wherever’, they know the risks,” 
(MT1) 
The above comment highlights that there is a need to protect and find answers, which 
highlights personal impulse and responsibility. Although, this sense of personal 
responsibility can be a reason to report (see Section 6.2.2), it can also work as an inhibitor 
or a mechanism that delays the reporting process, since the individual feels they need 
time to figure out what to do. This comment also highlights that although parents might 
fear prosecution, they eventually do report their concerns. Another factor that influenced 
the cost of reporting was negative reactions from the people around the reporter. For 
example, as discussed in section 6.2.3, EJR2 stated that she had much to lose once she 
reported her sister i.e. negative reactions from family and community members. Other 
risk associated with reporting was the fear of surveillance or involvement of police in 
daily life: 
“The day after my sister left my mum said she wouldn’t go back to the police. 
[...] She said ‘they will take your telephone number, they will contact you, and 
I don’t want anything to do with the police. I don’t want be contacted by 
them.”(EJR2) 
Another reporter explained that it is difficult for families to report because of the 
instability in their emotions, and such confusion and fear can be a barrier to reporting 
concerns: 
“I think parents are in a chaotic state [...] their thinking and emotions are all 
over the place. I remember myself as well, you can’t think straight [...] and I 
can understand why some families don’t want to engage with Prevent 
because of the link to the police.” (UKR1) 
6.3.2 Internal Conflict 
One of the factors that shaped the reasoning for reporting concerns was reporters’ 
internal conflict. Some reporters had conflicting emotions and thoughts when considering 
reporting:  
“For me the risk of reporting my sister was that I would criminalise her, [...] 
and that I would lose some of my family, as I knew I wouldn’t have my mum’s 
support if the police got involved. [...] She thought I had given up on my 
sister. [...] So there was a lot to lose. Except, I felt like I had lost everything 
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anyway. [...] But the benefit, no, the diamond of reporting her was that I 
would have my sister back. [...] I took the decision to report on my own, but 
I’m glad. The only person that supported me was my partner at the time. 
Even without him I was already on my way, but I needed the support, you 
know. I felt alone and responsible. I told my mum, ‘I hope you support me 
one day.’ [...] I knew if I reported her, I would hurt my sister’s feelings, and 
she would think I am a bad person. But I was trying to be a good person.” 
(EJR2) 
The reporter highlights her mother’s point of view. For the reporter and her mother, 
reporting had a different meaning. For the reporter it was a must, and the only remaining 
option, whilst for her mother it meant abandonment and not allowing nature to take its 
course. The comments above show the mother felt the reporter had given up on her sister 
because she was reporting her. This indicated the mother felt the vulnerable individual 
still had the power of reason and would be able to return home without police 
interference. This internal conflict, to some extent, echoes the practitioners’ viewpoint on 
why relatives tend to hold back for a longer period before they decide to come forward 
(see Section 6.4). The risk of betraying the person you are protecting can sometimes feel 
too high. The reporter expressed how reporting her sister meant a great deal to her, as she 
thought through reporting her sister would come back. This presents an example of 
reasoned action/planned behaviour. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the theory of reasoned 
action and planned behaviour suggest that an individual’s behaviour is guided by their 
intention. In turn, intention is steered by attitude (how the individual feels about 
something and its outcomes), subjective norms (how the individual regards the 
importance of others’ approval about that particular thing), and perceived behavioural 
control (how much control does the individual believe they have over the matter).  
For the current reporter, her attitude was ‘I need to bring my sister back, otherwise I will 
lose her to harm’. Therefore, there was a need for action — a purpose. The reporter 
recognised that her views on reporting was not in line with those of her family (most 
importantly her mother), yet for her this was outweighed by her motivation to bring her 
sister back. As for her perceived behavioural control, as discussed earlier the reporter felt 
a sense of accountability married with sense of powerless, and the need for urgency. The 
accumulation of all three reasoning has guided her intent to report. It is also evident that, 
for the reporter, having her sister back heavily outweighed the reporter’s fear of 
criminalising her sister. This cost-benefit analysis highlights the process of coming to the 
decision to report. Chapter 3 presented information on how people’s decision to 
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cooperate is linked to the risks and benefits of a given scenario. This is in line with rational 
choice theory, which suggested that the decision to report a crime by a victim is 
dependent on the benefit of the reporting being greater than the associated costs. Clearly 
for our reporter, this was the case, as in her previous comments she states that ‘diamond’ 
of reporting her sister was the possibility of having her sister back. 
Moreover, the reporter suggests that there was a change in the relationship, as the 
reporter felt her sister was no longer who she used to be and they had lost her already. 
This raises the paradox of duality in the relationship, which is married with internal 
conflict and dissonance i.e. ‘you are no longer who you were but I still feel the need to 
protect you’. The comment indicates that the trust between the sisters has been broken, 
changing the dynamic of their close relationship. As such, there is dissonance in viewing 
her relationship with her sister; there is no longer a sense of ‘us’. The sister now takes a 
position of an outsider who could cause harm. This internal conflict is obviously very hard 
for the reporter, as she also wants to protect the person that she fears. 
The inner conflicts are very evident in this comment. The reporter feels a sense of duty 
not only to her sister, but possibly to others too. This can be concluded from the phrase 
‘trying to be a good person’. The reporter does not say she is trying to be a ‘good sister’, 
but a ‘good person’, which indicates obligation to a wider group. This dissonance between 
‘betraying’ her sister by reporting her and simultaneously trying to protect her — and 
possibly protecting a wider population — made the decision difficult for the reporter.  
Similarly, a professional reporter expressed internal conflicts when about reporting a 
vulnerable student:  
“When you ask me how I felt when we reported the student, I actually felt 
that we chose to report him without involving him or his parents. But I 
actually think I could’ve reported him and been able to tell the pupil and his 
parents that I have reported. [...] I know now that we have done the right 
thing. But when you ask me how it affected me, I would have liked to have 
invited the pupil and his parents, and present them with our concerns. Not 
doing that did affect me.”(EJR1) 
The reporter clearly highlights the struggle he felt at the time. It is clear that the reporter 
felt a sense of obligation and responsibility to both the pupil, and his colleagues. Although 
the reporter recognised that reporting the vulnerable individual was appropriate, he 
expresses dissonance about the manner in which it was done. The reporter explained that 
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it is a norm to involve the students and parents in discussions about the problems the 
student is facing in order to collectively and inclusively solutions can be sought. Given the 
sensitivity of the situation and the past experience of the school principal, the reporter felt 
that it was appropriate not to involve the student or his parents.  
6.3.3 Trust  
A further barrier to reporting was lack of trust. Practitioners believed that there is a 
general distrust towards CT, primarily due to fear of punishment or totalitarian actions 
(this is in line with theories related to attitudes and beliefs, as well as warmth-competence 
presented in Chapter 3): 
“It is trust and the whole CT thing. It’s been badged with CT that puts people 
off because they think they will get locked away, and they will have their 
doors kicked in early hours of the morning. It is a perception issue in relation 
to CT.” (P3) 
Others also agreed that trust and confidence in authority figures influenced reporting 
behaviour. It was argued the perception of authority figures are shaped mainly by the 
media: 
“I think, a lot of time, the reasons why people don’t report is the mistrust of 
the authority. For example, we know that hate-crime is under reported 
because people don’t trust the authorities, whether it is the council, the 
police, or whoever. A lot of time the media plays a big part in this, in that you 
only have to look at the young boy who said he lived in a ‘terrorist house’, 
which wasn’t what had happened, but because that is how it was portrayed 
that goes in the media and straightaway the schools are at fault, the councils 
are at fault, the police are at fault. You start putting these bodies in the bad 
category, then people will straightaway say ‘I’m not going to them’.” (LA2) 
The comment above highlights how big a role media can play in influencing how 
authorities are viewed, especially when the information is not reported factually. The key 
here is how stereotypes and biases are shaped through such information, and at a later 
stage can influence the decision-making process. Disloyalty or a sense of betrayal was also 
seen as a consequence of reporting, and although it was not necessarily a dominant factor 
that inhibited reporters coming forward, it did play on their conscience. For example, both 
EJR1 and EJR2 expressed throughout the interviews that although they knew they would 
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hurt the individual by reporting (i.e. the individual would feel betrayed), they still decided 
to report but were uncomfortable doing so without the vulnerable individual’s awareness: 
“I knew her and I didn’t want to hurt her feelings. [...] If I reported her to the 
police, it would have hurt her because she wanted to be there [in Syria] and I 
didn’t want her to be there.” (EJR2) 
Similarly, WYR2 espoused that there had been cases of referral where some students had 
felt betrayed by the teacher that had reported them. This obviously shows the impact of 
reporting on student-teacher relationships. Likewise, for EJR1 this sense of betrayal can 
be seen in the internal conflict presented in the previous section. 
6.3.4 Training 
The next two subsections are not necessarily barriers to reporting, but rather inhibitor of 
appropriate reporting or good quality reporting (in terms of timeliness, appropriateness, 
reliability, accuracy, and comprehensiveness of the information provided — see Figure 
15). As such, the focus is primarily on professional reporters, since this was an issue that 
was highlighted in the interviews in relation to them. 
Figure 15: The Components of a Good Quality Report 
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As part of the training frontline practitioners are told to spot the signs, check them, and 
then report their concerns, if through checking they have obtained evidence to suggest 
there is a risk. However, the interviews revealed unfortunately this is not the case in 
practice. What tends to happen in most cases is that the signs are spotted, but the 
checking process is either skipped or misunderstood. This leads to poor quality reports. 
As the Channel representative explained29 reporting a concern can be very subjective, and 
this is why evidence to support concerns is vital for escalation of concern. Without 
sufficient and appropriate evidence, the reports will not meet the threshold for 
intervention. Similarly, another practitioner espoused concerns about poor-quality 
reports and explained that education services tend to treat concerns of radicalisations and 
extremism like a ‘hot potato’, causing havoc: 
“A lot of referrals come from schools and it could be something quite minor.  
The school has panicked, hit that button, and made a referral. [...] For 
example they might see a boy who is interested in school shootings; they 
panicked and thought ‘school shootings! That is terrorism! This is a Prevent 
referral!’ They’ve done nothing in the middle — what we call the checking 
stage. So now we try to re-educate some of the schools - what you need to do 
now is to look at the individual and see if he has said anything like that 
before, who are his friends, have you spoke to him? Have you asked him 
why? Have you had his parents in? All those things.” (P2) 
One of the reporters similarly explained that colleagues failed to check what they have 
noticed, which had led to controversial reports because there was a gap in knowledge: 
“We were hearing all these stories about all these schools, who were 
reporting anything that moved. You know, a person with a cereal box that 
looked like it might be a bomb, a terrorist house when it’s a terraced house. 
So we were really conscious of not over-referring. We really used the mantra: 
notice, check, and share. So what have you noticed? Check it out, check it 
                                                          
29
 “I would say that 80% of the referrals are what is called 3 Ms: malicious, misguided, or misinformed. 
Now often they are misinformed because what they are saying is that there is not enough evidence to 
state that this person is vulnerable to radicalisation/extremism. [...] VAF, for me, needs to be as detailed 
as possible. So whether there is a grievance, have they developed ideologies, has there been a 
transition period for that person. This is why the information-gathering needs to be so detailed and 
needs to be key, and this is the difficulty that I’ve got. Because I don’t get to see that individual prior to 
VAF being written. [...] the more factual information that I can offer the Channel panel then that leads 
to a more informative discussions, decisions, and interventions that need to be offered. [...] So for us to 
be able to provide the right level of support, we need to be provided the right level of facts in the first 
place.” (CH1) 
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thoroughly, and then make the decision as to sharing that information. [...] 
We took the checking really seriously. That really worked for us. [...] The 
stories that I was reading about and heard about in the media did the 
noticing and sharing. There was no checking, and that is the real gap.” 
(WYR1) 
Other factors leading to poor reporting, in particular with education services, includes the 
need to pass along a concern in order to encourage the involvement of another partner in 
solving the problem. This in turn results in Prevent being a dumping ground for concerns 
that were rejected by other organisations, such as child services: 
“[The] majority of the referrals come in from education, and what we do find 
sometimes is that they report their concern to Child Protection or Social 
Care, for example. However, they were told the concern did not meet the 
threshold, and the concern is bounced back to the school. I’m not saying this 
happens all the time but it does happen in some cases. So they think ‘where 
else can we get that support from? Ah, there is a tenuous link to Prevent. 
We'll send the referral to Prevent’. Now ultimately down the line that’s not 
going to go anywhere.” (CH1) 
6.3.5 Policy 
Policy can be a double edged sward. As mentioned in section 6.2.8, policy can encourage 
reporting. However, it can also work as a barrier. It is evident from the previous section on 
training and fear of consequences (Section 6.2.1) that policy can have a negative impact, as 
it can induce a level of fear due to the punitive element of the policy. In case of the Prevent 
Duty, the professionals who work within the LA, education services, the health sector, 
prisons and the probation services, and the police can face penalties for failing to 
safeguard vulnerable individuals. Some practitioners recognised the impact of Prevent 
Duty on reporting: “Definitely, the Prevent Duty is why we’re getting referrals in.” (CH1) 
This fear, as illustrated can cause panic and result in the processes not being followed 
appropriately.  
6.4 Professional vs. Family Reporters 
One of the questions explored during the interviews with practitioners was whether there 
was a difference in risk of reporting for professionals over parents/family members. 
There was a general consensus that there was a difference. It was explained that there was 
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a tendency for professionals to report much faster, whilst relatives took longer to make 
the decision to report: 
“There is a difference. Professionals tend to report these things more, [...] and 
they also report much smaller things. [...] For relatives it is much more 
difficult to pass that tipping point and to make that report. [...] They need to 
fear that perhaps something terrible could happen. [...] Sometimes in cases 
where they fear someone might go to Syria, I think, sometimes they [family 
members] close their eyes and think it might not happen. That is what we 
have seen. [...] Maybe it’s because they don’t know what to look for; for 
example, some of the signs they see, they just brush it off as the person being 
religious.” (IHP1) 
The above comment highlights that some relatives might not report concern due to lack of 
knowledge of what to look for, or simply avoiding the problem. On the other hand the 
professionals tend to report smaller issues (as explored in Section 6.3.4). Another 
practitioner explained there was a difference in concerns between professionals and 
relatives. Although the professionals have a legal obligation to report individuals at risk of 
radicalisation/ extremism, they were believed to be fearful of what would happen to their 
relationship with the child or relatives. However, they also fear what could happen to 
themselves: 
“For professionals, their concern is about the relationship with the child and 
the parent — ‘what will happen if I make this report now?’ [...] Also they 
think about the security risks of ‘what will happen to me if I don’t report?’ In 
Denmark, most professionals by law have to do it [report]. End of story. [...] I 
think for a teacher it is easier in comparison to a parent but still somewhat 
difficult because they are so scared of losing the child’s trust, but it is not 
their child. It’s their work.” (CW1) 
This brings to attention that professionals need to safeguard individuals from risks; hence 
they need to think within that spectrum. As such, they are aware of the punitive element 
that is attached to the legal requirement — this is evident in the above comment (“they 
think about the risks of what will happen to them”). Moreover, the comment highlights 
that although there may be emotional connection between the vulnerable individual and 
the educator, it is not on the same level as the emotional bond between a parent and a 
child. Also, the practitioners explained that the professional reporters reported early, and 
at times out of fear that they have a professional and legal duty to do so. This resulted to 
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professionals being over-cautious and ‘trigger happy’ when it came to reporting, even if 
they believed it was not a Prevent related issue (as discussed in Section 6.3.4.): 
“The risk they talk about is their own accountability, should they have not 
acted on their concern. We have so many inspection frame works that people 
are subjected to across education, across different infrastructures of support. 
But if we are honest, they think if this is not Prevent-related but something 
does happen then I have not covered my back by not sending that referral in 
to the appropriate agencies. So they err on the side of caution.” (CH1) 
Similarly, another practitioner espoused that professional reporters were seen as less 
certain when they had to report a situation that they believed was CT-related because 
they did not want to experience any backlash should they misjudge the situation: 
“There is an element, from a professional perspective, of ‘if I haven’t said this 
and it ends up going bad, I haven’t shared this with anybody and I have to 
share it’. But in the training we tell people to notice, check, and share.” (LA1) 
For relatives, reporting is more personal; people might feel they are being disloyal. This 
highlights the emotional conflict that parents might feel when reporting their child: 
“For a parent it’s much harder because it’s their own child. No matter what, 
you must feel, somewhere deep in your heart, like a traitor because you are 
reporting your child.” (CW1) 
Other practitioners expressed that relatives need to feel they have no other option, or are 
powerless, married with a sense of urgency, in order for them to take action in reporting 
their concerns: 
“It is challenging, it is very challenging for them [relatives] to report. [...] 
What we have seen is that if they can see no other option, and they believe 
that there is some help to get, then they'll do it [report]. But I think it is 
challenging in general.” (IHM1) 
This sense of urgency for immediate action and feelings of being powerless, as well as not 
having any other option was also highlighted by other practitioners: 
“I think that they feel that they are powerless, [...] they don’t know what to 
do. They just want to stop the child now! [...] They think ‘what can we do? 
The police are our only option to stop our child.’ I think when parents report 
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their child to the police, it is because they have been pushed to their limit and 
they don’t see any other option but calling the police. [...] Even if they are 
from a background that doesn’t approve of approaching the police. This is 
the last step they can take. [...]They have no control over the situation, that’s 
why they need our help. [...] With radicalisation, parents might be more 
willing to do something radical to prevent their child from being harmed.” 
(CW1) 
The idea that the police hold higher power and ability to stop the situation from escalating 
can shape the decision to report and seek help from authorities (see Section 6.2.3). This 
sense of urgency married to a lack of options and feelings of powerlessness influences 
how a person tries to reduce the level of dissonance, and ultimately may lead to the 
individual making a report. As such, reporting might be a last effort to gain control over 
the situation. 
It was also asked if the practitioners had experienced that relatives were more likely to 
report if the vulnerable individual was a convert. It was explained that, although parents 
tend to have similar concerns when reporting their child, parents of converts might not be 
under the pressure from their cultural communities in comparison to someone from a 
particular ethnic or religious background: 
“If the child is a convert and the parents are not, it is sometimes easier for the 
parents to report because they are not part of a religious community, and 
they don’t have any strings attached or have to be careful. Of course, when 
you report someone from a specific community it is difficult. If you are not 
from that community then it maybe be easier to report because they think ‘it 
is not my community, it is sort of a bad community that damaged my child’. 
That is easier to report — sort of.” (CW1) 
As the above comment shows, it is still challenging for a parent to report their child even if 
the vulnerable individual is a convert to a religion that the parents do not follow. 
However, it is also evident that the sense of identity through social categorisation and 
social identity creates an in-group and out groups — i.e. us vs. them — that can influence 
the decision to report. The comment also suggests that external pressures could increase 
the dissonance and prevent individuals from coming forth. 
In West Yorkshire, most of the reports in relation to radicalisation and extremism came 
from the education services, with fewer reports from relatives. The practitioners believed 
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that there was a difference in the risk of reporting for professionals over relatives. It was 
believed that for relatives the risk was mainly to do with criminalisation of the vulnerable 
individual or being under surveillance, and they usually made their reports late: 
“We’ve had some families who [...] had concerns when their children might 
have asked for their passports, for instance. So they had concerns but don’t 
report it because they don’t want to get their child in trouble. Then they will 
report it two days after they have gone missing. [...] They ask if their child 
will get into trouble. [...] What I say to them then is that they will be 
investigated but you’ve probably saved their lives. What is more important? 
It is a tricky one, really. Sometimes they are reluctant to share that 
information. [...] The earlier you do it the safer it is for that individual. So 
their fear is the criminalisation of the individual.” (P2) 
Another theme that became apparent was the need to protect. The practitioners 
highlighted that the relatives’ decision to report their child was a lengthy process and one 
that was a balancing act. The practitioners felt that the relatives, most of time, feared 
either losing their child forever (e.g. being killed after travelling to conflict zones): 
“I think the main concern is that they are afraid that they are going to travel 
off to Syria and fight and die. It takes a long time before they decide to report; 
[...] they have many thoughts about it. [...] And, as parent you would do 
anything to protect your child even if it means that they have to go to prison.” 
(SYS1) 
The same view was echoed by other practitioners: 
“Most parents who approach us have already thought it through. They say 
that ‘I would rather have him in gaol than in Syria’. And many parents are 
actually very reflective about that, [...] their main concern is that at least this 
way my child has a better chance of surviving in prison. Their second thought 
is that the rest of the world is protected but their first thought is that he will 
survive! And you can’t fault anyone there.” (IHM1) 
“They know the risks can be higher so they balance the risk and think ‘well, I 
[would] rather this than have him die in Syria.” (MT1) 
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As the comments above suggest, in order to protect their child, parents who reported tend 
to take on the risk of having their child in prison rather than in Syria or dead. As such, 
reporting is seen as a form of protection. 
6.5 Reporters' Experience of Reporting 
In order to understand the user experience of reporting, it was vital to explore what their 
experience of reporting was, and whether they had received support from practitioners. 
This is because a positive experience is more likely to result in positive word of mouth, 
which subsequently may possibly lead to cooperative behaviour. Also, by exploring such 
experiences, bottlenecks in service can be identified, which can inform improvements in 
the service. 
6.5.1 Dialogue and Informal Reporting 
One of the main themes from the interview was informal reporting. For the reporters, this 
consisted of accessing to practitioners who could provide them with guidance. As such, 
reporters felt more at ease when they were able to talk through their reasoning with a CT 
specialist. This gave them confidence that they were making the right decision, and as a 
result felt empowered: 
“It was an informal reporting initially, then it was made formal [...] I felt 
empowered. [...]I think that was supportive, being able to talk it through, 
being able to make decisions jointly, being informed at every step on what 
was happening. I guess just being in touch with people, you get that 
reassurance from people that you’re doing the right thing. [...] They were able 
to listen to my ideas, views, and comment appropriately on them — whether 
I was doing the right or wrong thing, rather than just go and put a referral in 
straight away. You can use them as a sounding board.” (WYR3) 
Being able to share the burden or responsibility of making the decision with others, 
especially those involved in CT, helped the reporters feel more at ease and confident in 
what they were doing. Similarly, another reporter explained that prior to making an 
anonymous report they had held several discussions with the Info-House practitioners, 
which had helped them to understand their concerns better and to collectively make the 
decision to report — an opportunity that would not have been there if they had reported 
directly to the police: 
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“Reporting this way was different from calling the police, [...] we had several 
talks with the Info-House officer. [This] let him help us to see if we are 
making a big thing out of nothing, or if there was actually something vital. He 
helped us make up our own mind. Info-House wasn’t like a hotline; we were 
able to have a discussion and get advice. So it was really helpful.  If Info-
House wasn’t there, we would have had to make the decision ourselves. But 
[discussing the situation] with them they made us aware that some of the 
information we had about the case wasn’t a cause for concern, but others 
suggested a need for reporting. They helped us a lot to make a decision as a 
school. [...] If we reported it directly to the police there wouldn’t be a 
dialogue.” (EJR1) 
However, in West Yorkshire it was recognised that access to such informal discussions 
was a luxury, as not everyone had this opportunity. In order to have such informal 
discussions, there was a need for an established relationship or contact (see Chapter 7).  
6.5.2 Support 
As evident in previous sections, knowing about available support can shape the decision 
to report. Therefore, the reporters were asked what kind of support they had received 
when reporting. An East Jutland reporter explained that the support she received was 
empathetic and had motivated her to continue seeking help. The reporter explained that 
she had direct access to everyone at the Info-House, and she was also offered counselling: 
“I didn’t have any support before I made my report. [...] During the report 
they told me ‘not to feel bad about anything: ‘we are here for you, anything 
you need; don’t break down; you are bright’. They gave motivation, you 
know. They motivated me to come and see what we can do, to meet other 
people. They said ‘if you are having a hard time, come talk to us’. They even 
offered me [the chance] to speak to a psychiatrist. I told them ‘no, I don’t 
need them. I can manage. I will just call you if I need something. I have 
everyone’s [at the Info-House] contact on my phone’. Anything I need, I just 
call them.” (EJR2) 
The same reporter, explained that she also had access to Parent Network, a group 
counselling and support mechanism discussed in Chapter 5, which she had found very 
helpful and comforting because there were other people with similar experiences: 
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“I went to the Parent Network that the Info-House had setup, and saw a lot of 
faces, a lot of different histories. And I thought, ‘oh my God! You guys have 
the same history but different.’ [...] It was very helpful.” (EJR2) 
It was also important to understand if the reporter felt pressured at any time during her 
report. This would suggest an issue of power, which may have influenced cooperative 
behaviour. The reporter explained that she did not experience pressure from the police or 
social workers: “No, they were very supportive. If I didn’t want to talk about something, 
they would give me time and say, ‘let us stop here’. They were understanding.” (EJR2) This 
comment once again, suggests that the reporter felt respected for her decisions by giving 
her the space she needed. She again uses the word ‘understanding ‘to illustrate this. The 
interviews from the UK were not fruitful in highlighting support provided to the reporters, 
or at least there seemed to be inconsistency. One reporter explained that although she was 
aware that some families were supported, she was not one of them.30 The reporter felt 
there was a lack of communication about the type of support available to her — i.e. FLOs 
— and decisions about such support were made on her behalf without informing her. This, 
the reporter felt, lacked transparency. 
6.5.3 Feedback 
Both East Jutland and West Yorkshire struggled to provide feedback once the report was 
made. Some reporters were happy that they received some feedback about the case they 
reported: “The Prevent Coordinator phoned me to let me know the outcome and what had 
happened.” (WYR3) Others expressed that although some of them were able to have an 
informal discussion before reporting, there was a lack of follow-up afterwards.31  
Moreover, some had managed to get insight into how a report had progressed only 
because they were on the Prevent Committee: 
“I didn’t get any follow up contact but now I’m thinking, nor did I expect 
really [...] I do know that it went into the intelligence profile, and [...] no 
                                                          
30
 “The families that I am in contact with do acknowledge they had some support. [...] Apart from 
Prevent there isn’t an awful lot for families to support them. [...] In my case I wasn’t provided any 
support, not in that time – it was 2015. Unfortunately I wasn’t offered a liaison officer. The detective 
leading the case stepped into the role because of the relationship we had. There was no other person 
that was in the middle to support me, and I did ask at the time and I didn’t get much back to be honest. 
[...] And I told her ‘that’s not you role because how can you be my liaison officer and then be leading the 
case?’ I felt there was no transparency about that; I felt they should have said that. For me she was 
leading the case but behind the scenes they were saying ‘oh yeah you could be her family liaison’ but 
they didn’t communicate that with me in any form.” (UKR1) 
31
 “We had dialogue and discussion before reporting, but we didn’t have a follow-up after the 
reporting.” (EJR2) 
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significant action was taken afterwards. I know this because of my Prevent 
Bronze membership, [...] I found out more about the case purely from the 
professional setting; [...] so an officer didn’t directly ring me to say this is 
what’s happened. But [...] through my membership I learnt about the 
progress, and reassured that it was in the system,  and that other people 
were looking at it over and above myself.” (WYR2) 
It was also reported that feedback was more of a privilege, as not everyone had access to 
such feedback because they were not in the ‘circle’: 
“I recognise that professionally I am in a privileged position, [...] I think if I or 
my organisation weren’t within the CONTEST arena, as a standing partner at 
various levels of [the] Prevent agenda then yes I think we would lack that 
communication. I don’t think the police would be deliberately reaching out to 
us to talk about this issue if we weren’t already part of that audience.”  
(WYR2) 
Another reporter explained that feedback was not available to them because of lack 
of intelligence and the fact the practitioners were swapped with other cases: 
“I remember that the detective saying that ‘I’m asking you all these questions 
but you are getting little back from us’ because they had nothing to give [...] 
and they were inundated with requests at that point [...]. But I thought at 
least they were being honest about that.” (UKR1) 
6.5.4 Being Judged 
One of the concerns highlighted in the interview with the UK reporter was the sense of 
being judged. The reporter explained that families are looked at as though they are naïve 
or as if they are the criminals, leaving them to feel the need to justify themselves as a 
family: 
“Sometimes there is a sense of judgement. [...] Because it’s your child, 
sometimes you get the impression that they think you’re being naïve about 
things, and that makes you think that you can’t make choices on how to do 
things. [...] One thing that comes up when I talk to other families is that they 
were made slightly to feel like they were the criminals. I’m not saying that is 
done on purpose, [...] but those comments land with the families and they feel 
like they need to justify themselves all the time.” (UKR1) 
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6.5.5 Other Negative Experiences 
The reporter from the UK explained that there was a lack of consistency and continuity in 
practitioners that were in contact with the families. This in turn had resulted in families 
retelling their story of events, which caused them stress: 
“I was speaking to some families recently and they mentioned how many 
times they had to repeat the story, and all within a short time. So for example 
they might get a social worker and they have to tell them the story, but later 
they are assigned another social worker, which means they have to go 
through it again. [...] The problem with that is you are re-traumatising the 
person.” (UKR1) 
It was also expressed that there was lack of empathy; that the practitioners were more 
interested in collecting intelligence, which meant they did not pay attention to the fact the 
person they were dealing with was going through a difficult time: 
“It’s almost like an observation, and them always wanting something from 
you. I think sometimes it’s just a simple case of listening to somebody, being 
with them. Because some get caught up in their role and [are] constantly risk 
assessing, so they forget the individual that is actually going through a really 
difficult time. [...] You can be bombarded with too many officials, and asking 
you questions, and you don’t get an awful lot back — and I’m not just talking 
about information, it’s the support as well. [...] It was all about intelligence 
and the detectives were really honest about that. They constantly call me to 
see if I had spoken him.” (UKR1) 
6.6 Discussion 
This chapter sought to illustrate why people report concerns of radicalisation and 
extremism. This is important in prevention because what gets measured gets managed. If 
the concern is to prevent cases of radicalisation and extremism, one way of doing so is 
through encouraging reports of such cases. Knowing how to encourage this requires 
insight (measurement) into the behaviour (reporting) and why people take such actions, 
which can inform better practice to promote the desired behaviour (manage).  
This chapter provided insights into this behaviour, some of which were in support of 
Thomas et al.’s (2017) and their findings, whilst others expanded on their findings or 
found contrary evidence by going deeper into how the reasoning to report is shaped. 
Findings in support of Thomas et al. included internal conflict (e.g. emotions vs. sense of 
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responsibility); the need to safeguard and to protect; the need to seek out information to 
ascertain whether their concerns were warranted; and the threat needs to be perceived as 
high in order to report — i.e. the cost of not reporting. However, this thesis departs from 
Thomas et al. by highlighting that people do seek and approach CT specialists for help, 
something Thomas et al. argued people did not want to do (see Chapter 1). Additionally, 
Thomas et al. argued that people are motivated to report because they care and are 
concerned about the vulnerable individual — i.e. emotional attachment. This thesis 
illustrated that the decision to report is complex and multi-layered, with caring for the 
vulnerable individual being both a motivation and a barrier to reporting. 
For both types of reporters there were pull and push factors that shaped their reasoning 
to report. It was evident from the interviews presented in this chapter that radicalisation 
and extremism were alien concepts, which resulted in uncertainty. When the world is so 
radically alien, so in excess of uncertainty, there is fear; and more importantly there is a 
need for support and additional information that can create a safer environment. This is 
because uncertainty is the recognition that one’s beliefs and representations of the world 
do not accurately predict the future events (including those related to one’s actions) 
(Mushtaq et al. 2011). Uncertainty is a key factor that shapes threat perception. This 
chapter illustrated how threat perception is layered with various factors, with each layer 
adding to the interpretation of reality. Threat perception is not a single event but an 
accumulation of factors, such as fear of consequences, with a trigger point that causes a 
sufficient sense of urgency to act. Those who tend to report much later — which usually 
happens to be families/relatives — have a different threat perception and trigger point. 
For this group, there is misleading or misguiding information that causes them to think 
that the threat has subsided and the trigger point is when they have realised this is not the 
case — i.e. lack of control. For others, the trigger point is a new set of information/action 
that confirms the set of beliefs that they had held previously about a situation — e.g. being 
worried about a risky behaviour and then witnessing a specific action that confirms such 
concerns. 
In moments of uncertainty, heuristics and biases are used to identify the likelihood of 
possible outcomes in order to make the best decision possible. Heuristics are a problem-
solving shortcut that use readily available information (usually from one’s experiences) to 
reach a quick and efficient judgement (Lewis 2008). Although heuristics can work well in 
some circumstances, they can also lead to errors as a result of biases and lack of 
information. These errors are believed to result from people confusing representativeness 
with probability (Kahneman & Tversky 1974). This is evident in cases of relatives who 
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report their concerns too late — i.e. thinking that they can manage the vulnerable 
individual on their own. In such situations the prototypes associated with the social 
identity (e.g. lack of trust or fear of punishment associated with the police or surveillance 
and CT, as discussed in Section 3.2.8) or context tend to be misused as the probability of a 
specific event to take place. Therefore, when making decisions in uncertainty people tend 
to look for patterns or evidence to confirm what they already believe, rather than looking 
for evidence that could contradict their beliefs — this is called confirmation bias (Passer & 
Smith 2007).  
Moreover, uncertainty can also be a by-product of cognitive dissonance or internal 
conflict. In its simplest form, cognitive dissonance is when one’s ideas, beliefs, or 
behaviour contradict and conflict with one another (Festinger, 1957, p.3). This 
inconsistency results in psychological discomfort, which motivates the person to try to 
reduce the dissonance (inconsistency) and achieve consonance (consistency) (Festinger 
1957, p.3). According to the theory, there is an inner drive to hold all our behaviour in line 
with our beliefs and attitudes and avoid inconsistencies. In the presence of dissonance, the 
person will actively try to avoid situations or information that is likely to increase the 
dissonance. For example, people tend to use memory selectively, remembering only good 
outcomes and disregard the bad ones. Therefore, there is a need for change due to 
inconsistencies between attitudes and behaviours. This change can be achieved in three 
possible ways: acquire new information that outweighs the inconsistencies in beliefs (e.g. 
learning about similar cases and available help); reduce the importance of cognition (e.g. it 
is better to report my child to police and have him alive than never see him again); or 
change one or more behaviour or belief in order to harmonise the relationship (e.g. the 
police are bad but they can’t be that bad if they provide support). The last is harder to 
achieve, as well-learned behaviour or deep rooted beliefs will take longer to transform. As 
such, reporting becomes a balancing act for the reporter due to cognitive dissonance.  
This research found evidence of all three responses. For example when EJR2 discovered 
the support available to her, she was more open to seeking help. Thus, knowing about 
similar cases assisted with the decision to report. This thesis suggests that there is 
another factor, which can assist in reducing dissonance: the feeling of being powerless or 
helpless. As such, this thesis contributes to the theory of cognitive dissonance by 
expanding on other factors that may be at play. This thesis highlighted that 
parents/families who reported their concern did so partly because they felt powerless and 
believed they had no other alternative that to have the authorities involved. This also 
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supports the threat perception theory of the late reporters presented in this chapter (see 
Figure 14), which suggests that lack of control is a trigger point that demands action.   
It became evident that reporters sought dialogue and informal reporting in order to a) 
seek advice and guidance from a professional; b) confirm or disconfirm their concerns; c) 
have a free dialogue without worrying about consequences; and d) in some cases share 
the burden of responsibility. This illustrates the importance of dialogue in reducing the 
cognitive dissonance and cost of reporting, which both practitioners and reporters agreed 
to be very beneficial, as it also allowed to them eliminate inappropriate reporting.   
Another factor that influenced reporting behaviour was the sense of responsibility and 
accountability. As discussed in Chapter 3, a sense of responsibility is a predictor of 
behaviour (Kaiser & Shimoda 1999), especially in a case of emergency married with a 
sense of commitment or special bond towards the vulnerable individual (Geer & Jarmecky 
1973; Moriarty 1975), or when the vulnerable individual is dependent on the reporter 
(Berkowitz 1978). This was also present in the case of the relative reporter EJR2, who not 
only felt responsible as a sister but also in a mothering role since she was a guardian to 
her sister. This is also in line with research that suggests a sense of identity is a predictor 
of intention (Viki et al. 2006). A sense of accountability and responsibility encourages 
cooperative behaviour, something that Mistry (2007) argues affects crime-prevention at a 
community level. 
One barrier to reporting was lack of trust. The police were thought to be untrustworthy by 
some and not helpful towards ‘Muslims’. This is in line with Chapter 3, where police 
legitimacy is discussed in the context of suspect community. If people feel they are under 
threat, whether such grievances are real or perceived, as Briggs (2010, p.973) argues, they 
need be addressed in order for CE to be effective. Consequently, this may have an 
influence on reporting behaviour. Moreover, issues of trust were not only associated with 
authorities: some reporters illustrated a sense of betrayal, which suggests breach of trust. 
Although betrayal did not directly inhibit reporters from coming forward, the data 
revealed that it did add to their internal conflict and cognitive dissonance. For example, 
EJR1 illustrated a sense of betrayal because he made the report without involving the 
student or his parents. Such a sense of betrayal can add to the cost of reporting and 
possibly delay the individual coming forward quicker. It is important to note here that 
behaviour is motivated by emotion, as presented here and in Chapter 3, rather than 
reason (Baumeister et al. 2007). The data provided in this chapter shows that positive 
emotions trump negative emotions. Although there were fears of consequences, most 
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reporters sought redemption by knowing they had done something about the situation. 
Attitudes of ‘better safe than sorry’ or ‘at least I know I did everything I could’ all create 
this positive justification that enables the person to feel good about what they are about to 
do.  
Reporters start out with an emotional commitment to a certain idea and then they will use 
their confirmation biases and experiences to confirm what it is they want to believe. For 
example, for professional reporters or foster parents there was a pre-conception that was 
emotionally driven, i.e. how they already felt about the vulnerable individual. They then 
used previous context or radicalisation signs to confirm what they believed. For relatives 
and close associates, their close emotional stance guides them to seek information that 
supports their beliefs — i.e. he/she is only being religious or trying to figure out life.  
Therefore, when they are provided with misinformation, they are more likely to accept it 
as reality. Thus, the partisan affiliation comes first, and then follows the reasoning process 
by which one justifies one’s beliefs. As such, reality is cherry-picked to support one’s 
version of the world, and it takes a big external shock to prove one wrong. This is evident 
in the relative reporters who expressed their shock when they discovered their loved one 
had left; it somehow felt unexpected.   
Another interesting observation was the difference between professional reporters and 
close relatives/associates. The professionals had a tendency to report more quickly, and 
sometimes were hypersensitive to threat perception, resulting in reports of irrelevant 
cases. This was due to several factors, the most influential of which was the fear of 
consequences, especially those in relation to punitive action. This nervousness leads to 
missing the steps in the process of reporting. In the training, the professionals are taught if 
they notice something, they need to check it and make sure that there is sufficient 
evidence supporting that concern. Additionally, as mentioned earlier there is a sense of 
uncertainty around what radicalisation and extremism is and this is perhaps an issue of 
training because it is clear that those who had access to CT specialists or were more 
experienced were more confident in what they should report. In contrast, close relatives 
and associates were more likely to report later if they were not already in a position to be 
alert about safeguarding the vulnerable individual i.e. knowing that they cannot safeguard 
the individual on their own due to other factors such as mental health. This lateness was a 
result of fear of consequences, emotional attachment, and internal conflict. The data 
revealed that in some cases the families were more likely to accept having their loved one 
in prison rather at risk of harm (e.g. dead in Syria); consequently this caused them to 
cooperate and report the vulnerable individual. Those who knew there was additional 
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help for the vulnerable individual were believed to seek active role in prevention. This is 
evident in Chapter 5 in the discussion of a Jihadi reporting her sons to the Info-House, or 
other relatives coming forward to report their children. This illustrates that there is a 
sense of hope that the vulnerable individual will be able to live a ‘normal’ life after 
rehabilitation. This was only evident in East Jutland. In fact, when the experiences of 
reporters were explored, it became evident that close relatives/ associates in East Jutland 
received more help and felt more included and respected in the process. This recognition 
that these families needed support, like victims of crime, encouraged a positive outlook 
from these reporters. This can be seen in EJR2.  
In the UK, the reporter explained that families were thought of as naïve, part of the 
problem, or criminal. This induced the sense of being judged and not being part of a team 
to ensure prevention. The reporter explained that the relationships with specialists were 
more intelligence-related rather than supportive, and at times very clinical without 
empathy. This is very important as it can influence how word of mouth can shape the 
cooperation of others. For example, EJR2 explained how she had heard from others about 
the support they had received and how happy they were. Such experiences influence the 
relation between the authorities and those with concerns — especially families. The 
warmth-competency scale discussed in Chapter 3 illustrates how stereotypes and biases 
from such experiences can shape behaviour  
Another issue that was evident in the experience of reporters in both East Jutland and 
West Yorkshire was the lack of feedback from practitioners once a report was made. It 
became evident that those who were in the circle or in contact with relevant people were 
more likely to get feedback on the report. What is evident thus far is that there is a need 
for it. Feedback is crucial as it can highlight what the reporters need to look for, and 
reassure them that their concern is being dealt with (see Chapter7). 
This chapter illustrated the reasons for and barriers to reporting radicalisation and 
extremism. The thought process is multi-layered and there are needs that ought to be 
addressed to remove some of these barriers and encourage people to report their 
concerns both quickly and appropriately. The next chapter will discuss how reporting can 
be improved and encouraged through CTCE considering the reasoning presented in this 
chapter and literature review in Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 7 
 
The Golden Thread: Improving and Encouraging 
Reporting 
7.1 Introduction 
The last two chapters presented this study’s empirical findings on how CTCE is practiced 
in East Jutland and West Yorkshire (Chapter 5), as well as illustrating the reasoning 
behind reporting and its formation (Chapter6). This chapter is the final empirical chapter. 
This chapter is complementary to Chapters 5 and 6. Improving and encouraging reporting 
behaviour is about the relationship between reasons for, and barriers to reporting, as well 
as the interaction with CTCE. Therefore, it is the marriage and the interface between these 
factors that this chapter explores in order to answer research Question Two on the 
effectiveness of CTCE on reporting of radicalisation and extremism, as well as research 
Questions Four (reasons for the existence of this relationship) and Five (lessons learnt to 
shape CTCE practice that encourages and improves reporting).  
The findings thus far suggest that CTCE is multi-layered, multi-agency, focused on building 
relationships and trust, intended to solve problems, and proactive in prevention. 
Moreover, engagement is considered to be tailored to the audience, and can be targeted. 
Like CTCE, reporting behaviour is multi-layered and multifaceted. Previous chapters have 
asserted that identity is at the heart of it, as it guides perceptions and relationships. The 
purpose of this chapter is to develop models of reporting behaviour and CTCE for the 
purpose of encouragement and improvement of reporting of radicalisation and 
extremism. It argues that reporting behaviour can be encouraged if CTCE is delivered in a 
way that addresses the psychological needs and underpinnings that have been discussed 
thus far.  
Through introduction of these models, the current chapter contributes to existing models 
of behaviour through merging several theories and models in order to provide insight into 
how reporting behaviour is shaped. A further contribution is the proposed CTCE model, 
which is informed through behavioural insight. This chapter also examines the barriers 
and problems in the service — factors that are believed to hinder efficiency of CTCE in the 
context of reporting of radicalisation and extremism — and argues reporting can be 
improved once these issues have been addressed. Consequently, this chapter examines 
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three ideas: the impact of CTCE on reporting of radicalisation and extremism, encouraging 
reporting, and improving the quality of reporting. 
7.2 Impact of CTCE on Reporting 
A part of this thesis explored if CTCE has any influence on reporting behaviour. This is 
because CTCE is about prevention and in order for prevention to be effective it needs the 
cooperation of the public, thus encouraging reporting is important. Practitioners were 
asked if CTCE had any influence on reporting behaviour. The current section attempts to 
explore this notion through qualitative data from interviews, married with some 
secondary statistical data obtained from each force as supporting evidence. 
Overwhelmingly, both East Jutland and West Yorkshire practitioners strongly believed 
that CTCE did have a positive influence on reporting behaviour for various reasons. 
Practitioners stated that CTCE enabled building trust with communities by being honest. 
Therefore, CTCE was believed to have helped increase reports through raising awareness 
and improving relationships: 
“Yes, we have seen an increase since the outreach. There is an improvement 
from the first years to now. There is definitely an increase. When we spread 
awareness in the communities — even with limited outreach — we have 
seen a rise in reports.  [...] It [community engagement] has definitely helped 
people reporting concerns of radicalisation and this is because we were so 
open, and had such a concentrated effort on spreading awareness in the 
communities that we actually got [an] increase in reports of such concerns. 
[...] Because we had this communication with people and actors and players 
in the community [...] they trusted us and that is a big part of it. We were so 
transparent, this is what we do.” (IHM1) 
“Undoubtedly community engagement has had an impact on reporting. I can 
only quantify it through the volume of calls we get. They are increasing year 
on year. [...] The relationships that we’ve got, and the engagement we do is 
generating information from people. [...] We’ve had more referrals in the first 
6 months of this year than we’ve had in the whole of last 12 months. (SP2) 
“If you had 1,600 referrals over a 21-month period you can read something 
into the figures there, so yeah obviously there is an impact. There are at least 
1,500 people in less than 2 years that have trusted the system and done that 
[report]. [...] For example, in one case the officer had worked in that locality 
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for 8-9 years working on the Prevent agenda and there were lots of 
interaction with a particular mental health hospital. Because of that local 
relationship [...] the rapport and trust are already there [...] so there has to be 
some value to it. ” (SP3) 
“Absolutely, community engagement has had an impact on reporting. [...] 
We’ve seen that our reporting has become far better and far more informed 
the more we engage with people.  We have seen a real increase over the last 
sort of 18 months.” (LA1) 
“From the Prevent perspective we have received a lot more calls, referrals. 
Most are from education, and the work that I did on going out and raising 
awareness had helped.  There is obviously a spike.” (P3) 
More importantly, the practitioners stated that CTCE had improved and encouraged 
reports from relatives and close associates, and this change was visible once engagement 
took place: 
“The proportions of the reports are really changing, the vast majority come 
from the schools but we’ve seen increase in number of referrals from 
communities, and families because of engagement.”(SP2) 
“We can see from the small number of figures that we’ve had from family and 
friends that it [community engagement] has helped. I wouldn’t say it has not 
helped. Clearly there are people in the communities that are still willing to 
contact the authorities.” (SP3) 
“I think we had 15 referrals last year and we have 44 in quarter 3 this year 
[...] Out of the 44, we probably had 7 reports from community members. This 
is not exact numbers.  We didn’t use to have community members coming 
forward before the engagement. So, yes there has been a real positive shift. 
[...] We are seeing more people feeling okay to come and talk about it. Feeling 
that they can trust the system, and they can get something back from that.” 
(LA1) 
It was also argued that people reported more because CTCE illustrated the benefits of 
reporting, and induce confidence about the process that permitted the individual to access 
support and guidance without fear of punishment: 
186 
 
“Yes, community engagement helps people report cases of radicalisation and 
extremism because they can see it is good to share that information. It is not 
about punishing but a way to understand how to handle the vulnerable 
individual.” (MU1) 
“I think community outreach does have an impact on people reporting 
because more people call in when they know the police and how stuff like 
prevention works, you know what is the main goal? Because a normal 
civilian will think ‘what is in it for me? Why the hell should I [pick up] the 
phone? You just want to arrest my son and all that’. So it is important for 
people in the community to understand the difference between prevention 
and conviction, especially for minority group because [for them] any contact 
with the police means you are in trouble, and outreach helps with that.” 
(MT1) 
It was noted that other factors, such as recent terrorist events, could also influence the 
increase in numbers of reports: 
“Reports come in waves. When something happens in Denmark related to 
violent extremism, or terrorist attacks worldwide, we receive a wave of 
reports. So what happens globally effects how people approach us or at least 
the volume of people approaching us locally.” (IHM1) 
“Some of the reports are on the back of the attacks we’ve had this year, but 
this is only a personal view. That has clearly motivated people to raise 
concerns at early stage. “(SP2) 
However, it was agreed that CTCE, overall, had a positive impact on reporting behaviour 
but also prevention, because, as mentioned earlier, CTCE created trust and confidence, 
which result in ‘actionable intelligence’. More importantly, unlike the some conventional 
belief, people trusted the police through such practices: 
“Absolutely because community engagement creates trust and confidence, 
and trust and confidence creates what is called actionable intelligence. So 
people in our communities come up to me and say ‘you need to be aware of 
so and so’, or ‘we are aware of that a certain someone has had an argument 
with somebody else around the mosque issues.’ So there are a lot of benefits 
surrounding community engagement: getting actionable intelligence, 
preventing crime and disorder, and so on.” (SP1) 
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“Certain people will say ‘nobody trusts the police, they won’t report 
concerns’ but we’ve had a 100% increase in referrals for the last year.” (SP2) 
7.2.1 What Do The Statistics Show? 
The CTUs from both regions were asked to provide statistical data that they had held on 
reports of radicalisation and extremism. This was more successful with East Jutland, as 
they had collected this data for several years. Unfortunately, this practice was not 
historically supported in West Yorkshire, and the data was limited at the time of this 
research collection. Consequently, other available secondary data was obtained from the 
Home Office’s public annual publications. The East Jutland data supported the claim that 
there had been a rise in reports (See Table 5). As evident, the numbers have increased 
since inception of the Info-House and their CTCE efforts. Although the majority of the 
reports are from professionals, nonetheless, there is an increase in reports from 
family/friends and the general public. In 2014-2015 reports from family/friends were just 
as high as professionals. In 2014 42% of the reports were from family/friends and 50% 
from the professionals, while in 2015 47% of the reports were from professionals and 
43% from family/friends. There is a decline in reports in recent years due to what Info-
House believes to be the result of effective prevention work through their CTCE.  
The data revealed an average annual increase in reports from relatives and close 
associates between 2011-2017, after the implementation of CTCE, of 63%, with 
professionals at 26% and the general public increasing by 49%. This illustrates that CTCE 
has had a very positive effect on reporting behaviour, especially those of relatives and 
close associates. 
Year Yearly 
Totals 
Professionals Family/Friends General 
Public 
2011 25 20 5 0 
2012 30 25 5 0 
2013 50 30 15 5 
2014 120 60 50 10 
2015 150 70 65 15 
2016 105 50 30 25 
2017 100 60 20 20 
Total 580 315 190 75 
Table 5: Number of reports per year made to Info-House in relation to radicalisation and extremism 
As for West Yorkshire the table shows an increase in reports, specifically from 
professionals (see Table 6). The increase in the professional cohort is believed to be due to 
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a) the introduction of Prevent Duty in mid-2016; b) the engagement with professionals to 
ensure they understood Prevent is a safeguarding issue; and c) in 2017 there was a real 
recognition from professionals that they had to commit to the process. There was a small 
drop in reports from the general public. The drop in the family/friends cohort stems from 
a couple of cases involving several individuals from two families, hence the larger 
numbers for 2016. 
Table 6: Number of referrals per year made to CTU in relation to radicalisation and extremism 
One of the reasons for the drop in referrals from the family/friends cohort may be due to 
the cuts and the change of Prevent Officer/Prevent Engagement Officer roles that were 
introduced approximately 18 months prior to the interviews. Due to the cuts and changes 
in the role, less engagement was carried out (see Section 7.3.2). In order to uphold this 
argument more comparative years are needed. However, since the data has only been 
collected by authorities in more detail in recent years, similar effect should be seen 
nationally if the removal of Prevent Engagement Officer role is a factor. The secondary 
data made publicly available by the Home Office from 2015-2018 illustrates a drop in 
family reports at a national level too (see Appendix M). 
7.3 The Actual and The Ideal 
Thus far there is evidence to illustrate that CTCE has been more successful in East Jutland 
than West Yorkshire. Nevertheless, both entities believe CTCE has positively impacted 
reporting behaviour. However, this thesis has found some barriers and problems in the 
service at both sites, which can have negative influence on reporting behaviour. As such, 
this section focuses on marrying the literature review in Chapters 2 and 3 with the data 
obtained to provide insight into how CTCE can be enhanced in order to encouraged and 
improve reporting. 
7.3.1 Encouraging Reporting 
Understanding Psychological Factors Involved When Reporting Radicalisation and 
Extremism 
One of the questions this thesis aimed to answer was to inform CTCE practice. This was 
also a need that was identified in the interviews: “I just think maybe we need a rethink on 
Year Yearly 
Totals 
Professionals Family/Friends General 
Public 
2016 234 182 45 7 
2017 471 457 10 4 
Total 705 639 55 11 
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how we actually deliver that [CTCE] to get people supporting what we are trying to do 
even more.” (SP3) In order to encourage reporting, it is vital to understand the behaviour. 
As explained in Chapters 1, 3, and 6, perception shapes not only behaviour but also the 
sense of self. It is based on who one perceives oneself to be, alongside an interaction with 
how one perceives others and the context in which one is situated, that gives rise to how 
one reacts to a given situation. Fascinatingly, perception fills the void in knowledge by 
creating stories from what is known. These stories help one to understand the world; one 
experiences day-to-day life in story mode, using biases and stereotypes that confirm what 
one wants to believe. These stories can turn reality into a hopeful tale or one of chaos and 
bleakness; and at the centre of each story sits the star of the show: the precious self. 
Consequently, the notion of one’s identity plays a major role, as through this medium one 
experiences life. It is through one’s identity that one’s sense of responsibility, attitudes, 
values, respect, perceived control and power, relationships, and perception of others are 
formed. In turn, the cost-benefit of reporting, in a given situation, is shaped by these 
factors. This was very evident in Chapter 6.  
What the data from this thesis has revealed is that the decision to report is guided by one’s 
identity, which then uses feelings, beliefs, stereotypes, relationships, accountability, 
responsibility personal agency over behaviour and the situation, as well as how others are 
perceived in relation to oneself (warmth-competence) in order to set the foundation for 
the behaviour and contributes to the cost-benefit analysis of reporting (see Figure 16).
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Figure 16: The Integrated Reporting Behaviour Change Model 
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Other factors that influence the cost-benefit analysis of reporting are whether the 
individual has access to the required skills or knowledge to deal with the problem at hand. 
This can at times be overestimated, especially in cases of families — similar to their sense 
of control over the situation. Once the cost-benefit of reporting is analysed, the intention is 
formed, which leads to the decision to report and the behaviour itself. Figure 17, 
illustrates a simplified cluster of psychological factors that shape the cost and benefit of 
reporting radicalisation and extremism, which supports the findings in Chapter 6. 
Therefore, the Integrated Reporting Behaviour Change model is, based on the collected 
data, a marriage of several different theories and models that were presented in Chapter 3 
in order to advance and contribute to a behavioural model that is suited for reporting 
behaviour. These include IDT, SIT, SCT, SDT, theories of reasoned action and planned cost-
benefit calculus, BIAS, multi-component model, dual pathway model of respect, and the 
IBM. Each of these, as explained in Chapter 3 and earlier, helps better understand 
behaviour and reasoning. 
This behavioural insight can be used in shaping CTCE practice that is effective in 
encouraging reporting behaviour. As such, this thesis introduces the CTCE Logic Model 
(see Figure 18), which is an evidence-based approach to CTCE with the aim to increase 
reporting and assist with prevention by addressing the psychological factors highlighted 
above, as well as building a stronger public relationship with the authorities. The model 
has taken on the elements of how CTCE is delivered in East Jutland and West Yorkshire, 
which were presented in Chapter 5, as well as aspects that reporters needed or liked 
(presented in Chapter 6) in order to encourage reporting.  
Figure 17: Psychological factors involved in reporting behaviour. 
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Figure 18: Counterterrorism Community Engagement (CTCE) Logic Model 
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Inadequate Policies 
As explained in Chapter 6, there are both positive and negative implications of policies, 
despite their good intentions. As discovered in Chapters 6 and 7, the introduction of 
Prevent Duty increased the number of reports from professionals, but these reports are 
not necessarily of good quality. In Chapter 1, Figure 1 illustrated that only a small number 
of these reports get discussed at a Channel panel and an even smaller number received 
Channel intervention (although it is important to note that the latter is a voluntary 
programme, thus the former has a stronger ground for argument).  
Chapter 6 showed that there were cases of professionals within the education reporting 
their concern due to fear of running afoul of Ofsted compliance standards or facing 
punishment. Subsequent effects were a) the reports did not meet Channel threshold; and 
b) reporters missed crucial step that is covered in training — i.e. obtaining evidence to 
support their concern.  
In contrast, section 115 of the Danish Administrative Justice Act has helped to encourage 
individuals (including those that are vulnerable) to openly talk to authorities about their 
concerns without fear of prosecution. This is due to the fact the article enables sharing of 
information between partner agencies for prevention purposes but also prohibits its use 
by practitioners in a criminal court for prosecution. Therefore, through removing the fear 
of punishment a cooperative behaviour is encouraged. This supports findings in Chapter 6 
in addition to figures 13, 14, and 16 which illustrate threat perception and the impact of 
threat on behaviour. Moreover, as presented in Section 1.3.1, by removing the fear of 
punishment the British police, in a two-week campaign, managed to recover over 6,000 
unwanted or illegal weapons as they encouraged people to anonymously surrender them 
at designated police stations across the UK without prosecution (BBC 2017). Therefore, it 
is important to understand how policies can impact behaviour in order to reach desirable 
outcome. 
Lack of Knowledge, Reporting Processes, and Access to Specialists 
This thesis identified a need for informal reporting, that encourages open dialogue and 
access to specialists who can provide guidance and support. As explained earlier, 
radicalisation and extremism are grey areas that need clarification and confirmation for 
the salvation of the individual with concerns. Therefore, there the informal reporting of 
concerns and access to specialists allows such dialogue to take place, which is crucial to 
the decision to report. Reporters explained time and time again that the decision to report 
without that dialogue would have been very hard for them. For example, EJR1 explained: 
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“I don’t know how to make it easier a part from it is really important to have 
a dialogue before the formal report; and it has to be a true dialogue between 
two parties who equally have concerns about the person being radicalised. 
Without that dialogue it would have been really hard for us to find out 
whether or not we should report him. The dialogue between us as a school 
and Info-House was vital for us to make a report, and afterwards feeling that 
we did the correct thing.” (EJR1) 
Additionally, in Chapter 6, the thesis presented data and explored how perceptions of 
threat can influence judgement, and that almost all reporters that were interviewed found 
comfort in having had the opportunity to discuss concerns before formal steps were 
taken. Although these discussions can escalate to formal reports at the officer’s discretion, 
nevertheless access to such informal dialogues alleviates threat perception and 
uncertainty. As such, access to such processes and individuals provide the reporter with 
confidence that there is support to help them deal with the situation. A Channel 
representative explained that informal reporting can assist with transparency and using 
that opportunity to provide necessary and support to people:  
“I love the idea of informal reporting because in order for Channel to be 
successful we've got to be more transparent with the public. [...] We've got to 
build that trust with the public, and be less risk adverse. Be clear on what 
we're aiming to achieve. [...] I believe my expertise can be used in this 
informal way to educate people on vulnerabilities, and show them the 
resources available to them.” (CH1)  
When the concept of the Info-House was explained to UK reporters and the reporters 
were asked if such organisation and process would help reporters, they responded 
positively. For example, one reporter explained: “I think Info-House is a fabulous idea. I 
think a lot of people would approach it.” (WYR3) Another reporter explained that there 
was a real need for support and free dialogue that provides choice: 
“We need someone who can support us, someone that can listen so we can 
make sense of stuff. [...] that way we can feel we have choices. [...] The 
families I’ve spoken to say that they always feel like they have to justify [...] 
everything they think, everything they feel. [...] Because you do [feel you need 
to justify], you almost always need to tell people that I didn’t know, that we 
were a good family, I was a good mum. [...] So having that safe space where 
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you feel like you can just be yourself and open up, and without having to be 
questioned about it. ” (UKR1) 
The above comment highlights the importance of a free dialogue, especially for relatives 
and close associates since they have the burden of explaining what has led to the event. 
This call for help and the need for support stems from seeking choices, as these 
individuals are uncertain about what route to take or if they have hit a dead end. 
Lack of Support and Inclusion of Relatives and Close Associates 
The Info-House managed to provide support to relatives and close associates of the 
vulnerable individual. However, this was not seen in West Yorkshire — at least as a 
standard procedure, in like East Jutland. The work that is carried out with families and 
relatives is mainly centred around intelligence-gathering.  
“We work very closely with families because usually they can answer a lot of 
questions that needs answering around the original referral. [...] So the 
relationship with close family members is crucial to get that background 
information from those families.” (SP3) 
This is not to say that there was not a need for it or it was not practiced by all. One officer 
(P1) dealing with Prevent cases advocated working with parents and suggested that once 
they are on board then 50% of the hard work is done. However, the officer also recognised 
that there were also cases of troubled families and parents who supported or were the 
cause of negative behaviours. In this case it was argued that it was very difficult to involve 
such families. In response, a reporter explained that the lack of collaboration with families 
and support for them stems from the mentality that families are to blame: 
“That comes from a framework that you are almost blaming the families. [...] 
They are putting those numbers of small families who have been radicalised 
in the same boat as the rest of us who have been left completely in shock. [...] 
These officers still need educating. [...] Sometimes I think they think families 
are naïve or that they don’t really know best [...] but actually we do [...] and 
have a lot to contribute.” (UKR1) 
The above comment illustrated the frustrations families go through and the need to be 
involved. In East Jutland, the data illustrates that the Info-House has responded to this 
need. From the interviews it was clear that working directly with families had the benefits 
of not removing the responsibility or accountability from the parents. It was mentioned 
time and time again by the East Jutland practitioners that they were not there to be 
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‘second parents’. It was the responsibility of the parents to care for their children; 
however, it was recognised that when it came to prevention, this was not a job for just 
parents. Prevention was recognised as everyone’s responsibility. The delivery of aftercare 
illustrated by Info-House was in the form of the Parent Network and working closely with 
families. Unfortunately, the Parent Network has been dissolved due to lack of resources, 
and as of March 2017 no new family networks have been started, but a new network for 
the relatives of people that die in the Syria/Iraq conflict is being considered (Strong Cities 
Network 2017, p.6). 
When asked how practitioners at the Info-House could make the service better, the 
relative reporter explained: 
“They are doing a good job. I just want the Parent Network [to be reinstated], 
it has now shut down and I have seen some people like myself who need it. I 
have asked Info-House if they can start it again because I know people who 
are dying to come and talk to other people who experienced losing their 
loved ones. The people from the Info-House are there too, and peoples story 
stays there, it doesn’t come out. You can empty your heart. I asked why they 
stopped it but they were so busy with the conference that the Info-House 
was helping to organise. I asked him again later and was told they will do it 
again but not sure when. I told him to do it soon because a lot of people need 
that. I need to hear other people’s stories to comfort myself.”(EJR2) 
The comment above highlights a few things: the urgent need for this service, and the lack 
of resources that has led to its demise. The reporter highlights that people at Info-House 
were busy with administrative work. The conference the reporter is referring to is one of 
two conferences organised by Info-House and the Municipality of Aarhus. The aim of these 
conferences was to promote the anti-radicalisation work that was being done by Info-
House but also to raise awareness about radicalisation and extremism. These conferences 
were very large international events lasting 2-3 days. It is needless to say that the level of 
organisation and resources this kind of conference needs. Given the small number of 
practitioners at the Info-House, the comment above supports the practitioners concerns 
about lack of resources and how it is affecting delivery of service (see Section 7.3.2).  
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These views were also shared by practitioners. It was explained how the Parent Network 
had provided support to relatives, not just from practitioners but other relatives too. This 
in turn had created an environment where Parent Network worked as a promotional 
mechanism for Info-House through word of mouth, as well as having reports made 
through the Parent Network.  
“I think the Parents Network has been really useful. There isn’t any group 
right now but we can activate it if we have parents that need it. Right now it 
is not going on but I think when it was, it was really effective and that was 
the only thing I heard from the people who were in it. It was really important 
to them. The relatives also found it really supportive, for both the ongoing 
cases and some of the cases that have been closed. They [relatives] said that 
all the teamwork and support had been really helpful. I have parents who 
still call me a year or two years after just to say hey or ask questions in 
general. They said that having a key worker to ask questions about so and so 
was really essential for them. [...] I think that they are a good help 
ambassador [for each other] because for them it [Parents Network] is just 
one big bowl of people who work together and for the same thing.  […] If they 
had a good experience with the Parents Network they would connect it to the 
Info-House, so that way it gave us good credit. The parents, who had been in 
the network, would go back to their community and spread the word. [...] We 
also have had people reported through the Parents Network.” (CW1) 
Thus, the Parent Network worked as a go-to system where relatives have access to 
emotional support and information from professionals. The Network seems to have 
worked as a place where people could seek answers from a key worker. This need for 
interaction with one key person was vital to other reporters, as they explained it was very 
emotionally taxing to explain the same thing to several different people several times: “We 
need one central person to speak to, that’s what is really important.” (UKR1) When asked 
the same reporter if they would want a mechanism in place, like the Parent Network, to 
encourage reporting, the reporter responded that it would help.  
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“There needs to be some sort of middle organisation where people can go to. 
[...] Something like the Parent Network would help, definitely. [...] Siblings go 
through stuff as well, and I think having a young person’s group, like a sibling 
group, can help as well. [...] Things need to change before families can feel 
comfortable to speak about it, they are scared. Things have changed slightly 
recently, and they see that families are also victims of this [extremism]; [...] I 
think they have started to offer therapists. [...] I spoke to a sibling recently 
and she said that she had a telephone session with a therapist the other day 
but she still held back a bit because she didn’t know what the therapist was 
going to think. But when she spoke to me there was no filter because of what 
I had gone through. She thought she could just be herself and just speak. So 
counselling is offered, it has worked for some of them but it hasn’t been the 
right time for others. And with therapy you can’t force it on somebody they 
have to be ready to take it up. Sometimes they throw the counselling in 
straight away, and it has only been few day [since the incident] and that is 
actually the worst time to do that because people are still in shock. 
Sometimes the families might reject the counselling but take it on at some 
other time because it wasn’t the right time for them.” (UKR1) 
The reporter explained that there was a need for “some sort of middle organisation” 
where the reporters, especially relatives and close associates, could feel comfortable. The 
Info-House and the Parent Network, although operated in collaboration between the 
Aarhus municipality and the East Jutland police, was not viewed as directly police or 
directly municipality: somehow it was separate.  
Moreover, the reporter highlights that the need is not to just have counselling. It is also the 
timing that matters, since it can be crucial to whether or not the individual will take part. 
The reporter goes on to explain that there is also a need for siblings to have their own 
support group, not just parents, although siblings had to be over the age of 18 to come 
along to the Parent Network. It was explained that lack of support provided to the 
relatives and close associates can be costly, as less unhealthy options (e.g. CAGE)32 might 
be lurking, creating separation between the authorities and reporters of radicalisation and 
extremism through scaremongering: 
                                                          
32
 CAGE is a controversial organisation, which promotes itself as an advocacy aimed to empower 
communities impacted by the War on Terror. They have been criticised for being a front for extremist 
groups like Al-Qaeda, as well as being linked to well known Terrorists such as Mohamed Emwazi or 
Jihadi John.  
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“If you don’t support these families, like myself, [...] then they are left 
vulnerable with their emotions not knowing what to do; [...] and they are left 
vulnerable to other groups to lap that up. [...] Because if they don’t engage 
with Prevent then they are vulnerable to other organisations that are not 
fully equipped and that can be problematic [...] as they don’t really have 
solutions to offer [...] and grow that fear of Prevent through scaremongering 
[...]. That is very easy to do because when you’ve gone through this and 
you’ve had so many people asking you questions it is very difficult to know 
who to trust, and the paranoia is increased [...] and it is natural thing.” 
(UKR1) 
Moreover, it was suggested by one of the professional reporters that inclusion of the 
families and the vulnerable individual in the process of discussing concerns prior to 
formal reporting created an opportunity to explain why such concerns existed: “I would 
have loved to include or involve the pupil and his parents, and explained to them why we 
made our decision of making this report. “(EJR1) The data presented in this section 
illustrates the importance of supporting and including relatives and associates in 
prevention — especially providing the aftercare support that, as illustrated, can have a 
major impact on cooperation and relationships.  
7.3.2  Improving Reporting 
Right person 
It was believed that one of the factors that influenced the effectiveness of engagement is 
having access to the ‘right person’. This notion of ‘right person’ was a mix of personality, 
profile, and interpersonal skills. It was argued that engagement was not a job for just 
anyone, the right person needed to acquire the knowledge and skills, as well as experience 
of dealing with issues such as radicalisations. As such there was an indication that CTCE is 
a specialist role; one requiring specialist set of skills: 
“You have to have the right person, not everyone can take this role. You have 
to know the science of radicalisation and you have to have the experience for 
it.” (SP4) 
 “No, not everyone can do the job. I think you've got to have an open mind, 
[...] multifaceted, multi-skilled. [...] You've got to have a safeguarding 
understanding but ultimately you’ve got to have the ability to speak to 
people and the ability to network with people on all levels.”(CH1)  
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Communication skills were also reported to be a must for engagement practitioners. It is 
through this set of skills that the practitioner can hold dialogue and deliver the message 
coherently: 
“You’ve really got to have excellent communication skills, you’ve got to 
understand your audience, and you’ve got to be positive and proactive. 
You’ve got to be helpful, and you’ve got to have time and resources to give, 
and you have to have a level of professional expertise. You can’t be a poor 
communicator or passive because nothing is going to get done”. (WYR1) 
The above comment highlights the needs from a reporter and partnership perspective. It 
is important that the practitioner is able to share resources and show support. The 
reporter expressed that the practitioner needs to show control, not only of the situation 
but also in how communication is flowing — meaning they actively seek communication 
channels rather than wait for people to approach them. The reporter further explained 
this point: 
“There are lots Prevent coordinators, leads, and Prevent people appearing 
but they’ve got to be the right people. The predecessor of a senior Prevent 
staff member in this area was really poor, and nothing ever happened. Once 
this new person came into place everything changed for better, he 
completely transformed everything we were doing.” (WYR1) 
Moreover, it was noted that engagement practitioners need to be able to take control of 
the situation and manage the emotions of reporters. An East Jutland practitioner 
explained: 
“My colleague is good at his work because he is very good at calming people 
and talking to them, and says that ‘this is not a report’. He says ‘tell me what 
it is and then we can see what we can do about’.” (IHM1) 
The comment above highlights how a practitioner was able to notice the initial fear, which 
in this case related to the consequences of reporting, and had managed to empathically 
address that. In fact, practitioners agreed that being empathic and sympathetic is a must 
in CTCE. One officer in West Yorkshire explained that it was important to understand the 
stories behind the people being engaged, allowing staff to connect with them on individual 
level through their notion of identity: 
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“You need to have somebody who’s got an understanding with the group that 
they’re trying to engage with and have some sympathy for them. For 
example, with the Kurdish community, understanding that they want the 
country that was promised to them at the end of World War I. That’s what 
they’ve been fighting for nearly 100 years. [...] Recognise if they come to the 
UK, they are going to be targeted as terrorists. It’s about being sympathetic 
and empathic to that.” (P1) 
The above example clearly shows that the practitioner, through empathy and sympathy, 
has recognised the individual grievances associated with being Kurdish for this particular 
person. By doing so the practitioner was able to build strong relationship with this 
community. This is in line with the warmth-competency theory discussed in Chapter 3.  
The reporters also expressed the need for empathy and how it had affected their 
relationship with their contacts. The reporter in East Jutland explained that although she 
had a good relationship and access to other practitioners, she felt most connected one: 
“I got help from both the police and the municipality; everyone at the Info-
House, but my relationship was mainly with one particular officer because I 
felt like I could talk to him. I could also talk to the others, but with him it was 
different. I don’t know, I felt he understands my situation more even though 
the others helped me equally. Maybe he is my favourite; [...] I had support 
from him every time I needed it.” (EJR2) 
Another reporter in the UK explained that there were discrepancies in practitioners when 
it came to being genuine, empathic, or considerate, as well as knowledgeable: 
“Some of the practitioners are really good. I know some really fantastic ones 
that genuinely want the best for the family. But some, it’s not that it is out of 
intention, I just think that they need to be more culturally sensitive — there 
is lack of insight sometimes about the true extent of what us families go 
through. [...] Some of them come in with their professional hat, try to make 
sure there are no risks but I think that is a problem. They forget the human 
level of this; [...] they need to connect on the human level by listening and 
believing them. [...] I think they know that as well, that some of them are like 
that [...] . There is a possible gap in training.” (UKR1) 
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Additionally, the right person will have passion. There needs to be a degree of enthusiasm 
and hunger to wanting to make a difference. This was evident in practitioners who 
delivered engagement. 
“You need to have the right sets of skills and knowledge. You need the right 
response and enthusiasm to do this role. Somebody who is empathic. They 
can relate to people, they can talk; they have an understanding of the 
communities they work within. And wanting to actually make a difference 
within the community, as opposed to just doing a job. It’s not [just] a job.” 
(P3) 
All practitioners delivering engagement presented this sense of passion and ownership — 
that they had the ability to make a difference during the interviews. However, the LA 
representative in West Yorkshire displayed this attribute less often. Another skill set was 
knowing the balance of when to approach for engagement and whom to approach. It was 
reported that the ‘right person’ will have the set of skills that will enable them to be able 
to recognise these social facilitators of engagement: 
“If you don’t know the street then it is very difficult to talk and work there. It 
is important to have skills to know the streets. Some people have the skill to 
find a balance on who is approachable and who isn’t. [...] Sometimes when 
you are meeting a person out there you can talk alone normally, then ten 
minutes he is with his gang so the dialogue is out of question, as that is a 
different scenario. That is a difficult balance. But some people don’t have this 
skill and some can learn it but not everyone. [...] The service depends on 
whether or not you can deliver.” (SP4) 
Profile was also believed to be an influential factor. Profile is expressed by this thesis as 
description of a person. It was argued that there was an importance for the profile of those 
involved in direct engagement to be representation of the communities that the serve: 
“My staff are a picture of how the people are built up here, they represent the 
community. We need to [be like this] because then I can put people into the 
conflicts that I don’t understand.” (MU1) 
For example, a Senior Youth Service representative explained that their team of youth 
workers included people of different background, which helped them solve problems 
more effectively: 
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“I have 14 youth workers; three of them are Arabs, one Somali, and one 
Turkish. They actually educate us all; telling us about their religion, 
traditions and what things we have to recognise or be aware of. If there is a 
problem, I approach them. [...] We use the knowledge of the individual’s 
culture and social understanding as a tool to help the parent understand and 
engage, and how they can help.”(SYS1) 
Furthermore, it was noted that personalities matter. For example, a Senior Police Officer 
in East Jutland explained that specific elements of personality like temperament can 
influence effective delivery of CTCE: 
“Some of the police guys we have they cannot work on streets, as they do not 
have the temperament for it. In order for a person to deal with outreach on a 
daily basis, they need to have specific characteristics. So you have to be an 
open minded person, you have to be able to take all of this culture — 
diversity.”(SP4) 
Similarly another officer explained that personalities and lack of interest in community 
work, as well as awareness about the communities can have a negative impact on CTCE: 
“It’s down to their personality. Some of them were really good. Some of them 
would sit there with their collar up, and hands stuck in their jacket or cross 
their arms and just look at the telly in the corner. They weren’t walking 
around, taking off their jacket, talking to people to make them feel at ease. So 
after a few times this guy told me ‘it’s a waste of time going to the surgery 
because nobody talks to me’. I said, ‘what efforts have you made to talk to 
them?’ Because all people see is that hi-vis jacket with police written all over 
it. Especially a lot of communities, [...] if you walked in there with your hi-vis 
jacket on and baton, they would run out of the back door. They would be 
scared. Its death, because they come from a country where the police are 
corrupt and the police would beat them. They are really, really scared and it 
takes a long time just to be able to talk to them.”(P2) 
A West Yorkshire Police Officer stated that CTCE is different to traditional policing, as in 
some ways it is similar to social work rather than prosecution: 
“Engagement almost sits on the social work level. The ability to interact with 
partner agencies that do the work beyond and above our scale. It’s difficult 
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because people do have a mindset of lock up and it’s not about locking people 
up.” (P3) 
Finally, it was suggested that to ensure the facilitation of accessing the ‘right person’ 
it is also crucial for organisations to take responsibility to provide these individuals 
with the right level of training, knowledge, and experience that they need: 
“As I have mentioned a couple of times you need the right person, and the 
best way [...] is to train them. You can provide them with some courses with 
the police; you can sit together with them, do assignment learning, and show 
them what they need to look after, what they need to be aware of.” (SP4) 
Lack of Resources and Lack of Engagement 
The notion of resources was further explored in order to gain a better understanding how 
it may influence the delivery and quality of engagement, and preventive work. It was 
reported that engagement was limited, targeted, and reactive — especially with CT related 
issues — due to cuts in resources. This has lead to practitioners to just focus on the 
existing relationships that they have within the communities, which was believed to have 
a negative impact as such engagement was at risk of being considered not genuine.  
“We have lost some of that engagement because of the changes and the 
withdrawal of the resources and funding. [...] That front line engagement 
with communities [...] has been particularly difficult with the cuts that we are 
facing. [...] Less of it is being done in reality. [...]. If you’re not being proactive, 
[...] you won’t necessarily be engaging with the community. [...] I think there 
is a massive influence on our relationships. [...] At one stage we had Prevent 
Engagement Officers who worked locally with communities supporting 
projects. [...] We lost about 1/3 of our officers going back three years due to 
lack of resources, so that really hampered our ability to do engagement. [...] 
So we have to be more targeted by focusing on some of the existing 
relationships. But when you’re more targeted it looks like you’re only coming 
to talk to people about the things that are important to you, and that in itself 
creates a barrier because it looks like you don’t genuinely care about the 
matters within the community. That’s a real challenge for us.” (SP2) 
There was an awareness that CTCE was not being delivered sufficiently, which meant that 
the quality of information and engagement was at risk. It was explained that raising 
awareness had suffered because of the lack of resources: 
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“We don’t do enough of that [community engagement]. It sounds as if we do a 
lot of that but we don’t. We try to, but in general we don’t do so much of it. 
We bring people here [Info House] on monthly basis, which is not very much. 
Meeting 20 students a month, talking about what the police do. [...] We don’t 
meet too many people. We said no to meeting with the integration language 
school. They have to tell about the Danish model, so to speak, at these classes 
on their own. The police can’t do it, even though we wanted to do it, because 
of resources.” (IHP1) 
The comment above highlights frustration at missed opportunities to engage with 
communities. Lack of resources also had a negative impact on obtaining intelligence. It 
was argued by practitioners that intelligence had decreased due to lack of resources, 
which inhibits practitioners engaging with the public actively: 
“We are not getting the intelligence. We still know the communities but a 
year on from now we won’t have those communities because those 
communities would have moved on. The people in charge of faith 
establishments, community centres, schools, you know people change and 
unless you are engaging with somebody regularly, they will forget who you 
are.” (P2) 
Others explained that due to lack of resources, which had resulted in a smaller workforce, 
they had to rely on other partners for intelligence: 
“Unfortunately, due to reduced resources, and shrunken workforce, now we 
have to rely on intelligence from other sources, which is the Police or the 
Housing Associations as well as some local community organisations to find 
out where the issues are surfacing. That way, we can deploy Youth Workers 
who are skilled to engage with those young people who are identified as [...] 
causing problems.” (YS1) 
Others raised concerns about practitioners being tied down with bureaucracy rather than 
being hands-on:  
“There aren’t enough people at the Info-House to raise awareness and do the 
outreach. Most of their work is not really hands on; it is more bureaucratic; 
pleasing some politicians, dealing with the media”. (MT1) 
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“As soon as you start pulling officers away to do other things, first of all the 
community are missing out because you are obviously not there. Second, the 
officers get fed up because they are pulled away to do other things; the 
morale drops. ‘I can’t do my job, I can’t do what I’m supposed to do, and I’ve 
got a crime work load that is getting out of hand.’ [...] Engagement, as I said 
before, needs to be a specialist role, be very good at what they do, left alone 
to do it, and have that ability and freedom to engage.” (P3) 
The above comment highlights the frustration the practitioners feel when they are tasked 
to do the work that is not relevant to what they were hired to do — i.e. CTCE. This 
inconsistency and the rollercoaster in the job role stemmed from lack of resources where 
the practitioners were forced to take on other roles in addition to their own, which 
resulted in CTCE not being prioritised. There were real concerns about not being able to 
meet the requests and demands for engagement, and due to this lack of resources they 
had to focus more on targeted engagement. It was stressed that due to lack of resources 
they have too much work to do, which means CE is neglected and there are missed 
opportunities for better engagement: 
“We haven’t been able to honour these responses and requests because of 
the lack of resources. And that is why our main two outreach efforts have 
been with the Somali community and this specific mosque in the area 
because that is where we saw actual problems, as young people were leaving 
for conflict zones in Somalia and Syria. So we reacted to that”. (IHM1) 
“I mean we should have been doing it [engagement] but now we have too 
much to do. Now we have the communities reaching out to us. We have had 
mosques reaching out to us, I did it [engagement] once or twice but that is 
not enough [...] and you see there are a lot of opportunities to reach out. We 
have to, somehow, be part of the community”. (IHP2) 
As a result of lack of resources, Info-House practitioners were not able to reach out to 
vulnerable communities, leaving many communities neglected. It was highlighted that 
CTCE takes time and it is information- and relationship-dependant, and lack of resources 
was inhibiting practitioners in appropriate delivery of CTCE: 
“The lack of resources leaves certain areas suffering from lack of 
engagement. That is why we need more support. Ethnic minorities are not 
easy to reach because there are a lot of them, in a sense that you need to be 
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able to identify them and find out how to approach a specific minority group 
and that is a problem of resources.” (IHP1) 
“Because of this lack of resource, a lot of the communities are definitely 
neglected when it comes to outreach. There are a lot of communities that we 
wanted to talk to in a proactive way; that is simply not possible with the 
resources we have. That is why the community outreach has been more 
reactive rather than proactive. The leg-work is time consuming it involves a 
lot of problem-solving. That is a problem of resource! Trying to bring 
together [Somali] clans was a resource issue, as it was very hard to meet with 
12 different groups. We just wanted to know who could talk together so that 
we didn’t have to have so many meetings. And we had a good contact within 
the Somali community who sort of worked as an octopus or bridge builder 
between the different clans and he could move around everywhere, he 
helped us a lot.” (IHM1) 
It was also added that CTCE is further neglected by the police during the ‘peace times’, 
where there is less conflict and fewer problems to solve. Consequently, other partners are 
left to pick up engagement work or completely left abandoned because there is no 
immediate threat. As such there was a recognition that CTCE needs to be continued: 
“At the peace times, where nothing much is happening, we are not doing 
much engagement. The municipalities are doing more than we are. For 
example, we are doing less with the troubled mosques than what we were 
doing before because we don’t have to react to an immediate problem. The Al 
Shabab problem is solved, it’s over. There are very few [people] going to 
Syria. We don’t really have a problem anymore [in that context] but it would 
be very nice to have an ongoing, proactive, preventive dialogue with these 
communities but we don’t have the resources for it. Because the moment we 
don’t have to use resources for that we use the resources for the individual 
cases instead.” (IHM1) 
It was also explained that when the demands were high during high security times, it was 
difficult to respond to every incident due to lack of resources. In the current times, 
although they are not facing similar security concerns, as before they still struggle to do 
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their ‘basic job’ and need to improvise.33 Another issue that was raised that the targeted 
engagement meant a majority of the available resources were being used on immediate 
concerns, such as Islamist related radicalisation and extremism, whilst other threats like 
right-wing extremism were left neglected: 
“All of our resources are used towards the Islamist radicalisation and 
extremism. I think one of the five mentors we have is a right wing extremist 
but [the] majority are Islamists. These days because of the refugee crisis you 
will probably have the right wing popping up again and as a reaction to that 
you'll have the left wing. We're not worried about that [right-wing 
extremism], we know it is a factor not to be concerned about but to be aware 
of”. (IHM1) 
It was explained that CTCE is a cheap form of resource when it comes to prevention, but 
the lack of resource has meant that CTCE is delivered too cheaply and the reliance on the 
partnership with the municipality is to try to compensate for this shortage: 
“It is not a matter of huge resources. The police resource in our police district 
is 1.5 full time employees. That doesn’t mean that the rest of the police is not 
aware of what we are doing, but in general the police resources in the 
preventive programme are less than 2 full-time employees, and that is too 
little. The community outreach and the municipality collaboration have 
helped us somewhat with this shortage of resources. From what I can see is 
that this [CE] is a cheap strategy but we are, right now, too cheap”. (IHP1) 
This issue of low numbers of staff working on full-time basis on prevention of 
radicalisation and extremism was also raised by others. 34 Lack of resources and financing 
was seen to be symbolic of politicians not supporting the CTCE. It was felt that politicians 
focused on numbers rather than actual results. There was frustration among practitioners 
that measuring the success of preventive work or CTCE was unrealistic given that it is 
impossible to say how many people were aiming to be or were involved in a criminal act 
                                                          
33
 “For now we are not under pressure but in 2015 and 2016 with all the attacks taking place in Europe, 
we were under tremendous pressure. I mean we couldn’t follow every incident. Today, I have to 
improvise. By having resources and having enough people we could really do our basic jobs.” (IHP2) 
34
 “There are 22-23 people in the crime prevention section and a huge chunk of those are actually local 
police men in the local districts, which means that they are rural districts. And then we have six people 
here working on youth crime, and then we have four people working part-time on exit from organised 
crime programmes, two police and one municipality. And then we have two police officers and one 
municipality officer who work part time on anti-radicalisation, none of whom work full-time on anti-
radicalisation and extremism”. (IHM1) 
200 
 
prior to engagement. Alongside the political climate meant CTCE had failed to obtain 
political interest and support:  
“In general, the politicians are not confident that this is a strategy [the Info 
House and their use of CTCE] that works. So this is not a national strategy, 
even though there are discussions on prevention at national level that 
focuses more on safety. The problem is that the people above want to see 
results and written evidence and that is difficult. We can tell our experiences, 
so well. And some politicians say ‘oh, you’re only saying that, we need to see 
hard proof that this works, and that as you know is very difficult to provide”. 
(IHP2) 
A practitioner from West Yorkshire expressed frustration in response to the removal of 
the Prevent Engagement Officer role. It was argued that the people higher in the 
organisational hierarchy and central government were short-sighted and were only 
interested in numbers rather than understanding the process in place to obtain the 
needed outcome: 
“I think the biggest mistake they made 12 months ago was to getting rid of 
the Prevent Engagement Officer role, because it was all short-sighted. They 
were looking for the 10% of the Prevent actual work that was done but not 
the 90% of the work that had to be done to get that 10% and the intelligence. 
Also, the other departments like CTU could have used them [Prevent 
Engagement Officers] to share intelligence.” (P2) 
This comment suggests that when it comes to Prevent and CT prevention there is a vast 
amount of engagement work that is done that is unseen and hard to quantify. It was 
explained that it was difficult to quantify and prove prevention work, something that 
superiors were interested in and that was important to getting funding. Another 
practitioner suggested that action needed to be taken higher up, as lack of resources was 
not only jeopardising national security but also impacting communities on various levels, 
including their expectations of the authorities: 
“I really would like someone higher up within the government to take heed 
of this and say we really need to do something about this. Because the 
consequence is not just of national security but also communities living and 
working harmoniously together, and the relationships we did have, the ones 
we still continue to have. If we continue to have further reductions then it 
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will only have a negative knock on affect, [...] we will take ten steps back. [....] 
Without fruitful engagement and just paying lip service to our communities 
we are going to undo all the good work that has gone on in the previous 
years. [...] I do think the majority of our community have a greater 
understanding of the limited resources that we now face, and expect the 
same service.”(SP1) 
The need for more resources was echoed by the Info-House Advisor, especially in the area 
of anti-radicalisation and extremism in order for the work to be proactive in building 
resilience. There was a need for CTCE to be a proactive approach: 
“Community engagement in prevention of radicalisation and extremism 
needs more resources [...] because we should ideally have more time to go 
proactively into the communities and talk with them, as we do for individual 
cases and we don’t have that because prevention is being reactive. We would 
very much like to be proactive, talk to people, and find out how we can 
support building the resilience against radicalised ideologies and totalitarian 
narrative. How can we build resilience against these in society with lack of 
resources? [...] and the resource is lacking in both the municipality and the 
police; more the police than the municipality, with only 1.5 people working 
full-time”. (IHM1) 
In addition to the police force, lack of resources also negatively had an impact on the LA — 
more specifically in relation to Prevent:  
“Probably there is not so much engagement. We have 5 team members, and 
only two of us work on Prevent. Engagement it is done when we get funding; 
or unless we get a specific topic that we can add Prevent at end of it and 
discuss it. We probably don’t do, as much as we should or that we would like. 
But again it’s down to funding and capacity. Our engagement, I would say is 
less than 10% but I’m sure my colleague would disagree.” (LA2) 
Similarly another LA representative explained: 
“We have a very small team that deals with Prevent related issues, and we do 
everything from the training to Channel to referrals, so we do a bit of 
everything.  Because of the size of the team and because we have shrunk 
considerably, as a senior member of staff I end up doing a bit of 
everything.”(LA1) 
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As explained previously, not all LA receive funding for Prevent, due to the risk associated 
with that area. Some areas are deemed less risky when it comes to CT-related issues. It 
was explained that due to this lack of funding a group of Muslim mothers could not receive 
training that they needed and had requested: 
“We did look to get some training for these ladies on computers and some of 
the language and terminologies around the Prevent related issues. That 
hasn’t happened because of the timing and capacity issues. We are a very 
small team and we are not a funded area. So what we are doing is in and 
around our day job really.” (LA2) 
This issue of not being a funded area also had a negative impact on educational services, 
as one reporter explained that lack of funding meant poor quality of training for students, 
and because the Prevent Duty had made raising awareness compulsory for education 
services, regardless of funding it had to get done: 
“Because they have made it essential to have a good Ofsted around Prevent 
and Safeguarding, you have to do it [engagement around Prevent]. You must 
prioritise it; otherwise you will be shut down. Training providers have been 
closed down because they haven’t prioritised it. Colleges have been very 
clear from the beginning that they’ve got to do it. Now you can do it really 
well, or you can do it at the minimal. [...] So some students might get better 
experience because they have lots of money than students that haven’t got 
the money. But the thing is the students must understand what Prevent is, 
what radicalisation means, and we’ve got to do it. Because if we don’t do it, 
there are serious sanctions. So whether you can afford it or not you have to 
get on with it.”(WYR1) 
Lack of Feedback  
Another factor that was identified during the interviews for improvement was a lack of 
consistency when it came to feedback post-reporting. Feedback was thought to be 
valuable in providing insight and building trust, especially in cases where CT strategies 
are criticised. Thus, from the reporter’s perceptive, lack of feedback is costly, since it 
might discourage reporting:  
“I think it would be valuable for reporters to be updated somehow and in 
some way, without too much detail given. I think if somebody is taking the 
responsibility to make that referral, I would expect that they would receive 
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contact and  feedback [...] because if not, and I do know that the Prevent 
model or way of working can often be criticised from the outside about 
people not being too familiar about Prevent as a concept, as a model of 
working. I suppose it’s like anything, feedback[...] gains trust, it gains further 
insight; and maybe somewhere down the line that person be willing to report 
matters again if they feel that they are taken seriously. The danger is if no 
contact is made they might say ‘well why bother? Why should I report things 
because no action was taken last time’.” (WYR1) 
Another reporter similarly explained that lack of feedback left them feeling uncertain 
about the case but also the future, i.e. not knowing what to report next: 
“Well actually we haven’t been informed a lot, and it is not to say something 
bad about the Info-House but it would have been nice, now and then, to have 
a response from them on our report. Partly because it would be nice to know 
how the pupil is getting along but also to judge better next time, if we need to 
report next time. What sign we should look out for next time. Maybe in other 
cases we won’t have such a relationship with the pupil or know if they are 
attending mosques. In this particular case the pupil had some many obvious 
signs. We knew a lot about the pupil.  But, what about next time this 
happens? So I think having feedback would be helpful in the future, and in 
trying to learn about what we should be aware of and look out for.” (EJR1) 
This lack of feedback was also experienced with practitioners who also dealt with CTU, 
Prevent, and Channel. It was explained that feedback is scarce due to the processes in 
place, and that if feedback was actively provided to practitioners, then it could guide their 
engagement with the public more, knowing what has worked and what has not. There was 
recognition that there was a communication breakdown when it came to feedback.  
“We'll never get an outcome, which can become a bit deflating for myself and 
my colleagues not knowing exactly what is going on — there is a bit of [a] 
communication breakdown. But I understand too, because obviously it’s 
highly sensitive, the intelligence, in terms of national security. I just feel like 
there needs to be a bit of feedback, even if it is a generic outcome or update, 
will suffice. Sometimes we just don’t get anything. But it’s not our Prevent 
Officers fault because they do their utmost to engage and communicate with 
us. I think the process stumbles down a bit. If they did actively provide 
feedback then it would give my ward officer a little bit of bump in terms of 
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‘oh, I’ve got updated. There was an outcome around that engagement. Let me 
see if I can get more information’.” (SP1) 
As a LA representative explained this dam in feedback creates a domino effect that 
disrupts the flow of appropriate and much needed information to maintain relationships 
and encourage further cooperation: 
“One of the things we are seeing at the moment is that when people are 
putting reports through to us, and we pass those to CTU, we don’t actually 
get feedback as to what has happened with it. So it’s the lack of the feedback 
from them that stops us from going back to the referrers to say ‘it’s been 
referred, it’s been reviewed, and they actually think it’s not suitable for 
Channel, there is no ideology behind it or yes we need to follow this up’. [...] 
For me if we are not giving that feedback to them they will say ‘what’s the 
point because we never hear anything from you’. But that’s not our 
blockages, its one further up, which we are trying to work on.” (LA2) 
The blockage that is referred to in the above comment is highlighting one of many 
challenges of working in partnerships. This level of partnership is new to the UK. Whilst in 
East Jutland working in partnership has been going strong for over thirty years. During 
the interviews, it became clear that there was no sense of ownership and accountability in 
regards to providing feedback. Moreover, there was an issue with the volume of referrals 
versus manpower, which suggest that feedback is not a priority, given the lack of 
resources: “No, [we don’t provide feedback because] there are far too many referrals to do 
that. We rely on the fact that the referrer will come back to us.” (SP3) 
The Issue of Training and Incentive Funding 
In Chapter 6, both positive and negative impacts of training on reporting behaviour were 
explored. The aim of this section is to broadly focus on training and how it can be used to 
improve reporting of radicalisation and extremism. It was not the objective of this 
research to explore or examine the training processes in place for professionals and non-
professionals. However, the data revealed there were some concerns around training. 
These discussions were mostly of concern for West Yorkshire practitioners rather than 
East Jutland practitioners, as they discussed them more. This is not to indicate there are 
no issues or as much concerns with training in context of East Jutland and this thesis can 
only explore this notion based on the data collected. 
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First, the interviews highlighted there was a need for training and insight into 
radicalisation and extremism, in line with Chapter 6 discussing issue of poor-quality 
reports. Some reporters thought they did not have adequate knowledge around the topic, 
which resulted in uncertainty, especially around the thresholds for intervention. 
Moreover, there was hunger for wanting to know what to do in the future: 
“When you ask me this question right now [...] I think a short presentation 
about our case would be beneficial. [...] Not to go into detail about the pupil 
but more from a learning perspective for the future, and a reflection so that 
teachers in a similar situation could benefit from. For example, what lead to 
our report of the pupil and how can we make ourselves better at that process 
next time. I am sure if I called Info-House today they would show up next 
week; and I probably will. But [...] it shouldn’t be like this. [...] Maybe three 
months after the referral someone from the Info-House could come out and 
give us a feedback and help us learn.” (EJR1) 
“More training could be more beneficial. We needed to be clear about what 
the thresholds are in order to refer to Channel.” (WYR1) 
The interviews also revealed that not everyone has received Prevent training since the 
inception of Prevent. Due to fear of identification, no interview extract was provided. 
Prevent awareness is compulsory, and it was explained that these cases are usually 
evident in areas where there is no Prevent funding. In one particular case, this concern 
was presented to the Home Office, and the response seemed to illustrate that there was no 
homogenous approach when it came to Prevent. It was one rule for one, and a different 
rule for another.  
Second, in contrast to  East Jutland, it was reported that in the UK the Prevent training was 
no longer delivered by the police Prevent teams, as the new regulation to put LA at the 
forefront of Prevent does not allow it. Therefore, the responsibility for training has been 
placed on the LA to provide guidance to all those ‘specified authorities’ highlighted in the 
Prevent Duty. The interviews revealed that not everyone was in support of such practice 
because they believed LA did not really understand how to deliver WRAP training: 
“In my opinion it is a ridiculous decision for LA to do the training because 
you are giving it to the people who stand up and read the script from start to 
finish. It’s horrendous and I’ve seen people do it; it has no impact other than 
build negativity. If it’s not delivered properly it is a waste of time.” (P3)  
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The above comment highlights the negative impact of poor training but also the inability 
of LA to deliver such training. Similarly, another officer explained the transfer of training 
delivery to LA has resulted in basic and generic training on a very complicated topic, as 
well as creating an environment for incentive funding: 
 “What has happened as a consequence of that is a very blanket approach 
through the WRAP training programme that provides a very generic, very 
basic understanding. The council talks about the number WRAP training they 
have delivered. What they won’t do, unless we challenge them, is to talk 
about the number of referrals or the number of engagement opportunities 
that has emerged, as a result of that training. So I question the value of that 
training. [...] Also the Home Office provided the funding based on the volume 
of the training sessions delivered rather than the actual outcome from that. ” 
(SP2) 
The data also revealed that partnership is encouraged and much needed. There was 
definitely advocacy for it; however, in practice Prevent training is delivered in separately 
by the partners, rather than together. In recent years, LA does the training. In East Jutland, 
the training was delivered by Info-House practitioners, in collaboration between the 
police and the municipality. It was reported by participants that Prevent training should 
be delivered in partnership between the LA and police. If not then specialists in the 
subject should deliver training. In fact, the CTU and the LA were working in collaboration 
to deliver Prevent training to frontline officers. This approach to training was reported to 
be received very well. A Channel representative explained that partnership delivery was 
important because each party comes at the issue from different angles: 
“Because again we look at it from a different angle — LA is safeguarding, 
early intervention, and prevention. Police is criminal pursuit, and prevention. 
So although it is not always criminal pursuit, they're there to protect the 
communities from harm. I think it gives practitioners an understanding of 
their responsibility.” (CH1) 
It was also reported that if training were to be delivered in partnership, then both LA and 
police had to meet prior to training to determine the training programme, and practice the 
presentation. It was agreed that the session could go terribly wrong if the presenters were 
not prepared or knowledgeable enough on the topic or the group they were presenting 
too. Participants reported that training is not sufficient if both Prevent and Channel are 
not covered together. Therefore, to train practitioners on Channel referrals is not 
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beneficial if the basics are not covered. Therefore, there was a sense that Prevent and 
Channel were approached separately instead of recognising their overlap. This view was 
explained as a result of thinking that people already know what Prevent is. It was reported 
by a Channel representative (CH1) that there was a Home Office initiative to roll out 
Channel Awareness trainings. It would be beneficial for future research to explore this 
training strategy and its impact. 
The interviews also revealed that some training was short as 15 minutes. This happened 
in both East Jutland and West Yorkshire, mainly due to lack of resources: 
“Sometimes what we found is because people are so stretched it is difficult to 
get someone in a meeting room for 2 hours. It is easier to say’ can we come 
and give you a 20-minute input?’And that is sometimes enough for us to give 
that information. We’ve been asked today to go and give a 15-minute 
presentation to a school, [to] which we have said yes, we can come and do 
that.” (LA2) 
Another practitioner revealed that it is difficult to fit WRAP training into different 
schedules, as there are organisational time limits that to some extent Home Office have 
failed to recognise fully:  
“WRAP training used to be 8 hours. Then WRAP 2 was about 2-3 hour 
session. Then WRAP 3 which is what we have now is an hour session. [...] 
Training others does not always fit into their working. For example, school 
kids have an hour class, and trying to fit that within an hour is difficult. [...] 
and Home Office says you will deliver this.” (P2) 
Moreover, it became evident during the interviews that some of the East Jutland 
practitioners were able to receive some WRAP training around 2010 in order to learn 
from it. It was reported that they like the idea of a workshop, using video clips, talks, 
questions, and exercises. However, the East Jutland practitioner disliked the content, as it 
was a ‘lecture disguised as a workshop’ and manipulative, as opinions were guided rather 
expressed organically: 
“The presenter from Prevent was waiting until people gave the answers that 
he expected, otherwise he would direct them towards the answers and once 
you reached that point then you could proceed. We thought this won’t play in 
the Danish educational context because in Denmark kids are raised as being 
very critical of the sources, which means if you try to manipulate them in that 
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way they would react negatively and say this is all just government stuff. 
That is not something we would want to achieve with them anyway, if we 
wanted to give them a lecture, we would just give them a presentation. [...] I 
thought the UK's WRAP approach was manipulative. [...] We wanted a true 
workshop and not a lecture because true workshop for us means interaction 
with people; people's own opinion is presented on ideas instead of being 
guided into what you should be thinking about this.” (IHM) 
It is important to note that the comment above is more likely to relate to the first 
generation of WRAP training, rather the most recent one. When the experience of the East 
Jutland practitioner was put to West Yorkshire practitioners, there was some agreement 
with the criticism that the first version of WRAP was awful, and through evolution WRAP 
3 is more balanced, although not necessarily perfect. Another responded: 
“Yes, I agree its patronising. I’ve never used it, I’m a WRAP trainer. It is good 
for certain segments, say if you wanted some nurses to say that they have 
some form of Prevent qualification and training. They can go on WRAP, tick a 
box, they have a good idea: what is prevent, what is a referral, how to do a 
referral — the basics. But I’ve always found that it doesn’t work for 
everybody. So if you’re teaching junior school kids, or the community centre, 
which has been directly affected by terrorism, whatever groups it is you have 
to tailor that package for that individual.” (P2) 
7.4 Discussion 
The aim of this chapter was to illustrate the existence of the relationship between CTCE 
and reporting behaviour, in order to understand how it can be manipulated to encourage 
reporting of radicalisation and extremism. Across both cases a core finding is the belief 
that CTCE has a positive effect on reporting behaviour. The data presented here, illustrate, 
in case of East Jutland, an increase in reports, especially from family/friends and the 
general public once communities were engaged. The practitioners worked closely with 
troubled mosques (those with large number of foreign fighter recruits); engaging with 
specific hard-to-reach communities; and most importantly engaging with families to 
ensure an inclusive approach to prevention. This engagement was enhanced through the 
multi-agency approach, Info-House capitalised on the engagement carried out by other 
services such as youth services. Most importantly, as the result of engagement and their 
experience with Info-House, word of mouth from families and close associates helped 
others in the same situation to come forward. In the case of West Yorkshire the limited 
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data revealed that removal of the Prevent Engagement Officer role had a possible negative 
effect on the number reports, including those from relatives and close associates. When it 
comes to prevention of radicalisation and extremism, what more can one want other than 
people close to the vulnerable individual coming forward? After all, the family/friends are 
those who tend to spot the signs first, and with a little help and guidance they can be 
encouraged to come forward — and hopefully sooner.  
However, what is evident from the data presented here is that the effectiveness of CTCE is 
conditional. This chapter presented the conditions and bottlenecks in the service that 
need to be addressed in order to encourage and improve reporting of radicalisation and 
extremism. Moreover, it used the literature review and the data collected from the 
interviews to present model of reporting behaviour (The Integrated Reporting Behaviour 
Change Model) and an ideal model of CTCE (the CTCE Logic Model) informed by the 
behavioural model in order to encourage reporting. The data highlighted that more 
engagement was needed in both East Jutland and West Yorkshire. It was also shocking to 
discover that although CTCE is meant to be a multi-agency collaboration, in West 
Yorkshire the LA indicated that only 10% of their engagement was around Prevent. This is 
not enough, especially given that the UK government is insisting on LAs leading Prevent 
and being in charge of training.  
In order for CTCE to be effective it needs to be proactive. The current CTCE approach is 
very much targeted and reactive. Some of this was due to lack of resources in both East 
Jutland and West Yorkshire. Targeted engagement could mean that others miss out on 
information and support. It also could mean that there is room for other problems to rise 
due to limited CE. Engagement takes time to, acquire knowledge, and build relationships. 
Furthermore, since CTCE is currently used as a reactive strategy once a problem is 
deemed ‘solved’ the resources are allocated to other cases. As such the burden is dropped 
on other partners, for whom CTCE may or may not be a priority.  
Furthermore, this thesis argues there is a need for an informal reporting process to be 
made available to the public. However, this process needs to be transparent. The Info-
House practitioners and reporters highlighted that there was consistent honesty in what 
they would do and could do. This is not to say the West Yorkshire practitioners were 
dishonest, but rather to highlight the importance of transparency and honesty in the 
reporting process, as this information then enables the reporter to make an informed 
decision and feel at ease with it. Therefore, the decision to report is no longer a gamble, 
but rather a more intentional approach to cooperation. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
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intention is one of casual factors for behaviour. The interviews also highlighted that there 
are informal discussions, not necessarily an informal process, when it came to people 
raising their concerns. Practitioners explained that they did have conversations with 
people before any formal report was raised and in some cases there was no report made. 
However, this vital aspect of reporting — informal reporting — should not be left to the 
discretion of the officer. 
Moreover, there needs to be a clear and concise reporting process in place to encourage 
people to come forward. The informal process that is created by the Info-House makes 
reporting simple —‘You have a concern? Come to us for a chat over a coffee’. In order to 
make a desired behaviour possible, it needs to be made easy. Humans are not logical, 
rational beings, and do not do well with too many choices or in situations of uncertainty. 
Therefore, the path needs to be clear for them in order to help them utilise the 
information and resources at hand to make the decision that is best for them. It is also 
important to note that by sharing the steps involved, the possible outcomes, and the help 
and resources available to the individual, on an identity level, perception is influenced. 
The individual may no longer feel threatened (i.e. the warmth-competency scale of 
behaviour); they may also feel respected because through this inclusion process there is 
no perceived power struggle. This process can harmonise the sense of individual’s agency 
and control over the situation. The individual’s sense of responsibility is not taken away 
from them because the reporter has some sense of responsibility towards the vulnerable 
person. By informing and including the reporter in the reporting process they can still 
hold onto a sense of responsibility to ensure risks are eliminated. The Info-House seems to 
do a better job of inclusion, not just with reporters but also with all those involved with 
the vulnerable individual (see Chapter 5). There was also a belief that the current process 
of reporting was clear and concise. However, through the interviews presented thus far, it 
has been evident that the reporting process is neither clear nor concise. There are 
uncertainties around what should be reported, and what to expect. Although some LA 
might have the name of Prevent and Channel officers available on their website there is no 
information as to what happens once someone raises a concern, and what they should 
expect.  
The data also revealed a need for inclusion and support of relatives and close associates. 
The Info-House had managed to provide such support, which included the Parent 
Network. Unfortunately, it is no longer running. It has been evident from the interviews 
that it was a form of promotion for cooperating with the police, as the relatives and close 
associates had heard about it and were encouraged to come forward. Also, the network 
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clearly highlights that these relatives are the forgotten victims of terrorism and 
extremism. They need support as much as a victim of other crimes such as rape and 
murder. It is a traumatic experience that these victims go through, as a society we need to 
recognise these victims and provide adequate support. Recognition of this fact is vital to 
prevention of radicalisation and extremism, as families are best situated to spot the 
warning signs. Such networks encourage sharing of intelligence, as highlighted by 
practitioners, which is essential for prevention. The Parent Network is clearly a platform 
for networking, engaging, sharing of information, promotion, gaining intelligence, and 
most importantly providing the support that is needed. This is an area that needs to be 
reconsidered; it is far too valuable to be left abandoned. Parent engagement in prevention 
has shown to have important benefits; for example, involvement of parents in their 
children’s schooling has resulted in positive academic achievement and behaviour 
(Sheldon & Epstein 2004). Other research has shown the benefits of involving parents, as 
part of family-based programmes, in dealing with issues such as youth substance use 
(Liddle 2004). Another example is the Youth in Iceland Model, which is based on the 
research of Harvey Milkman regarding addiction and substance use (Milkman & Frosch 
1973). The research (and the model) takes a psychological approach, and has five central 
themes, which involved the inclusion of parents and gaining their pledge in keeping 
children occupied. The evidence from this programme, which involved up to 4,000 
adolescents aged 14 to 16, shows a consistent decrease in usage of alcohol, cigarettes, and 
drugs (Volteface 2019). 
One the reasons that this model works is due to family and parental engagement. The 
model creates a level of personal and social responsibility for children and parents. This 
connects with the individual’s sense of identity, and their association with responsibility. 
Parents are encouraged to spend more family time with their children, to discover them 
and their social life, as well as taking responsibility for their whereabouts. This model has 
also encouraged mobilisation of parents as a collective group. It is believed that through 
this kind of support and connection, problematic and risky behaviour is reduced in 
children.  
In East Jutland, working with families is a one of key factors in crime prevention, 
especially with radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism. As explained in Chapter 5, East 
Jutland takes a 360-degree approach to prevention, which means they work closely with 
relatives and all those individuals in frequent contact with the vulnerable person. This has 
assisted with rehabilitation of vulnerable individuals and prevented of involvement in 
possible criminality or harm. This thesis argues that parental and family engagement is 
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vital for prevention of radicalisation and extremism. In fact, as presented in this chapter, 
by working closely and engaging with the families and parents, the Info-House managed to 
increase referrals from this cohort. Without the involvement of families, prevention of 
radicalisation is challenging, as the experience in the UK has illustrated. Also, through 
inclusion, transparency and respect are promoted. Again influencing the psychological 
underpinnings of cooperative behaviour, and specifically the individual’s interpretation of 
the situation based on how their notion of identity is affected. 
As explained in Chapter 6 and7, the experiences of reporters matter. The reporter from 
the UK (UKR1) explained that she was not given a FLO and in general the relationship 
between her and the investigators were very much one of intelligence-gathering. In 
contrast the reporter EJR2 in East Jutland expressed how satisfied she was with the 
support she had received, and had heard from others about such support being available. 
This word of mouth is key in attracting this cohort to come forward due to how they 
perceive the risks and benefits of reporting (see Chapter 6). This also highlights the 
importance of having a single point of contact (or at least as few staff as possible) involved 
in the contact with the family. It is evident from the data that emphasise on the individual 
relationship can build trust. Having too many people to interact with in a situation where 
the emotional state is already unstable can leave an individual more confused and on 
edge. Therefore, engagement is a specialist role. It is vital to ensure that the practitioners 
that deliver engagement are specialists when it involves radicalisation and extremism. 
Additionally, there needs to be an understanding of balance: how to be professionally 
committed but simultaneously use interpersonal skills to build relationships. This 
suggests that the assumed fixed borders or red line in roles are flexible within reason. To 
be able to provide guidance there needs to be a level of leadership and inclusion. It is 
important to recognise that CTCE is a specialist subject that needs specialist input. 
Practitioners within this realm need to ensure that they are actively sharing such 
knowledge, instead of being passively active — reactive only when approached. CTCE 
practitioners need to be empathetic and sympathetic. In order to respond effectively to 
emotions, there needs to be empathy and shared understanding of the fear. The data 
illustrated when empathy was experienced trusting relationships existed (e.g. EJR1), 
whilst in contrast lack of it presented distrust and distance (e.g. UKR1). This is in line with 
warmth-competency theory discussed in Chapter 3. 
It is important for practitioners to be approachable. Closed or intimidating body language 
can have a negative impact on how practitioners are perceived. For example, a study 
found that when police engaged in behaviours that victims perceived to be caring, 
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compassionate, and personable there was a positive impact on victims’ emotional well-
being and criminal justice system engagement (Greeson et al. 2014). It is important for 
practitioners to be open-minded in order to understand the fluidity, complexity and 
diversity of the communities and situations that they deal with. Therefore, this thesis 
argues that engagement officers need the right personality traits, as presented, in order to 
ensure engagement is effective. The’ right person’ also requires the ‘right profile’ for the 
area that they are servicing. This is because the people from similar backgrounds may be 
able to associate and identify with them. Also, people from similar background are likely 
to be aware of cultural nuances, and use that insight to solve problems.  
This chapter uncovered some serious concerns in relation to training provided by the LAs. 
It is also concerning that Home Office funding creates a situation of incentives to acquire 
further funding through the volume of training provided. Therefore, delivery is no longer 
about quality of training provided, but quantity. This obviously impacts the quality of 
reports, as well as the service provided to practitioners. Moreover, there was a lack of 
consistency in approach from Home Office when it came to training and funding. The 
thesis found not everyone received Prevent training, in particular those who did not 
receive funding. This is concerning, as crime and terrorism are forever changing. To only 
focus on what are primarily geographical locations based on previous intelligence will 
create a vacuum where other extremist activities will manifest. Not providing training for 
all can result in signs of new crimes/threats being missed. Also, as discussed previously 
the Prevent priority area style of funding that consists of no funding areas can only 
support the ideology that Prevent is biased towards specific communities. This thesis 
argues that bias is not from Prevent itself, as the real life practice illustrates all kinds of 
extremism is dealt with. However, the bias does exist and whether that is at government 
level, this thesis cannot tell.  
The duration of training is also a cause for concern. Training that is set for approximately 
two hours is concentrated to fit a smaller time scale — some as short as 15 minutes — in 
order to address issues of resources, but also make the training short enough to fit within 
the schedule of trainees. It is also concerning that such short exposure to Prevent training 
is given to schools, a place entity where most referrals come from and has experienced 
some controversies in the past. This indicates that such training sessions lack quality and 
are not sufficient to provide frontline practitioners with the information that they need, 
especially on topics as complicated as radicalisation and extremism. This is also a concern 
for East Jutland. This suggests that although Home Office has made Prevent awareness 
compulsory without taking into consideration its application in reality. It is evident that 
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the time scale for WRAP training has changed over the years. That could possibly be a 
response to scheduling a training slot. Nevertheless, not all WRAP training is delivered 
based on the recommended time. 
This chapter also illustrated that, although Prevent Duty has good intentions, by putting 
pressure on partners and organisations, the entire process of Prevent has somewhat 
turned into a tick-box practice. Instead of actually ensuring that the aim of such training is 
met, the process transforms into ‘we must have this done’. This thesis is not against 
compulsory training. In fact it is important to ensure that practitioners are getting the 
adequate training they need. However, this thesis argues that in order to differentiate 
between poor and good policy, the government needs to ensure that training is audited. 
This thesis argues that training is a must, and it needs better examination and investment. 
Finally, lack of information and knowledge can influence reporting behaviour. For 
example, this chapter presented the importance of feedback, as not only it will inform the 
reporter of the outcome but it can gain trust of the people, as well as making sure that 
their voices are heard. People share information not just for the sake of sharing it, but 
because they expect to see it acted upon (Sharot 2017, p.6). However, feedback was not 
just an issue for reporters but also for practitioners. The data revealed a bottleneck in 
communication channels and processes in West Yorkshire, which inhibits information 
trickling down to relevant people. This finding supports the criticisms reported by the ISC, 
which released an analysis of the UK’s experience of terrorist attacks in 2017 and what 
needed to change. The report highlighted fundamental failings in practice, as well as 
information-sharing within the Home Office, Prevent and their partner agencies, including 
the police and LA. These resulted in mismanagement and misevaluation of the risks 
associated with the attackers, especially in the case of the Parsons Green attacker and the 
Manchester Arena attacker (Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament 2018, p.3). 
This lack of feedback between partners was not evident in East Jutland. Feedback is 
important in order for people to be more confident in what they are doing and reporting, 
but also, as mentioned earlier, to know action has been taken on the information they 
have shared and that their voices are heard. As illustrated, the domino effect of not 
providing feedback not only has a primary impact on the reporter but also a secondary 
impact when there is an organisational hierarchy, i.e. a manager is not able to feedback to 
other staff or the organisation cannot report back to a member of the public.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
There have been shifts in policy context since the start of this research. When work began 
on this thesis in 2015, foreign fighters joining groups like Daesh were a national security 
issue for governments. At the conclusion of the research, foreign fighters remain an issue, 
but from a different perspective. With a military pressure on Daesh in Syria and Iraq, more 
and more foreign fighters want to return home, leaving their home country in a dilemma, 
as they potentially pose security risks. While many of the home countries are reluctant to 
take back these foreign fighters, their family members are desperate to have them back, as 
seen in recent cases in which families have travelled to conflict zones (Embedded 2019)or 
sent money to bring back their loved ones — through which creating possible security 
risks (BBC 2019). Each side has valid concerns and arguments.  
However, this is not a new situation, as explained in this thesis; the Info-House has been 
rehabilitating returnees and preventing extremism by working closely with families since 
2011. This is not to say that those returning do not pose risks, but rather that those risks 
can be managed and the individuals safeguarded if the authorities work in partnership 
with families. As Info-House exemplifies, prevention does not discontinue at stopping the 
individual from becoming radicalised and being exposed to extremism, but active 
involvement continues with those surrounding the individual (i.e. family, school, friends, 
mentors etc.) to ensure that the individual is on the path to or a “good life”, the 
psychological philosophy that their approach is based on. Moreover, at the beginning of 
this thesis, concerns surrounding radicalisation and extremism were dominated by 
extreme Islamist ideologies, as the threats were coming from groups like Al-Qaeda and 
Daesh. At the time, the threats from far right-wing extremism were not as prominent, 
although the CT specialists did deal with such cases. However, by the end of this research, 
far right-wing extremism was no longer a simmering issue, but one that needed urgent 
attention, as extreme right-wing terrorist attacks started to emerge across the globe 
urging others to do the same (e.g. the Christchurch terrorist attacks).  
This snapshot is revealing and relevant to the thesis in two ways. First, it is emblematic of 
the fluctuating nature of prevention, radicalisation, extremism, terrorism, and perceptions 
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of security risks. Security risks set the agenda for prevention, which in turn influences 
policy and practice, indicating that prevention needs to be proactive by highlighting what 
needs to be reported and managed. Second, it highlights the puzzle that this thesis has 
sought to address (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3) — how can authorities, through CTCE, 
encourage people to report their concerns of radicalisation and extremism to official 
organisations (especially reports on their relatives and close associates), while ensuring 
relevance and quality of the information that is being shared? (The key findings of this 
research were used to produce a Policy Brief providing policy and practice 
recommendations to encourage and improve reporting of radicalisation, see Chapter 7 
and Appendix O). In tackling this issue, the thesis has an unusual genesis — psychology of 
reporting. It analysed empirically how CTCE is understood and delivered within East 
Jutland and West Yorkshire. It asked whether CTCE had an impact on reporting behaviour, 
what were the reasons for and barriers to reporting, and sought to identify ways to 
improve and encourage reporting of radicalisation/extremism based on reporters’ needs. 
The study acknowledges that there may be a range of wider factors that influence the 
reporting of radicalisation and extremism, and that there are challenges with comparing 
two international practices when such strategies are not homogeneously exercised 
nationally. However, the study confirms the original hypothesis that CTCE does influence 
reporting behaviour, especially positively when CTCE is implemented in a way that 
connects with the individual at a personal level by addressing the individual’s 
psychological needs. This concluding chapter draws together and reflects upon the key 
findings from the previous chapters and draws out the salient themes to explore make 
recommendations for policy, practice and future research. The following sections will 
demonstrate by drawing on key findings how well the data fit the hypothesis by 
presenting a synthesised answer to each research question.  
8.2 Reflection on Findings 
8.2.1 Research Question One: Understanding CTCE, its use, and delivery in East Jutland 
and West Yorkshire 
One of the aims of the thesis was to compare the practices in East Jutland and West 
Yorkshire to help the research develop from an exploratory phase to a more advanced 
theoretical model, through the identification of similarities and differences. This question 
aimed to explore whether the style of engagement delivered by Info-House in East Jutland 
differed to that of West Yorkshire, and how these strategies could collectively inform 
understanding of CTCE and its practice.  
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For purpose of clarity, the differences in CTCE practice between West Yorkshire and East 
Jutland are summarised below: 
 Especially in case of engagement, the Danish initiative is fundamentally 
municipality based, whereas the UK scheme is more grounded in policing. The 
municipality partners such as youth services were active in general CE, whereas 
the Info-House (a municipality and police partnership) were more focused on 
targeted and specific CTCE. In contrast, in West Yorkshire the police were more 
active in CE in general, whilst the LA delivered Prevent related training. Other than 
these trainings, LA was not very active in delivery of CTCE.  
 The East Jutland practice is more ‘psychologically literate’, whereas the West 
Yorkshire is more pragmatic in the sense that the former took initiatives to involve 
evidence based psychology in order to inform their practice. Whereas the UKs 
Prevent, as far as this research could tell, had not taken into account such research 
and their practice was based more on practical rather than theoretical. 
 The Aarhus methodology focuses more on individuals and families, whereas the 
West Yorkshire approach has a more community base. A key difference was that 
the Info-House approach was very inclusive of families and worked closely with 
them for prevention. These families were empowered through the support and 
recognition that Info-House had provided them to ensure the safeguarding of the 
vulnerable individual. As a result of this inclusion, the sense of responsibility from 
parents was enforced. In the UK the families were mainly viewed as a source of 
intelligence rather partners in prevention. 
In both regions, CTCE was understood as a ‘soft’, proactive strategy that allowed 
authorities to build relationships with the public and encourage the sharing of 
information. Practitioners recognised that CTCE operated in a pre-criminal space and was 
a vital tool (see Chapter 5). Additionally, CTCE strategies in both locations reflected 
priorities set by the EU, as well as national and international pressures. However, unlike 
West Yorkshire, the East Jutland approach (i.e. the Aarhus Model) started off as a pilot 
study and has not been adopted across the country. The West Yorkshire practices reflect 
the Prevent strategy, which is a nationwide approach, and consequently practices do vary 
across the country. Nevertheless, there were similarities. Both locations showed that CTCE 
consisted of multi-layered targeted engagements with the general public, institutions and 
organisations, individuals at risk, and those who have already encountered extremism. As 
such, the intensity and the target audience varied at each level. Both cases focused on 
empowerment, building relationships, and raising awareness through training and 
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workshops. More importantly, dialogue was found to be a vital strategy for building 
trusting relationships, problem-solving, and sharing information.  
One of the key factors revealed by the current data was that there are psychological 
elements to CTCE. The practitioners revealed that when engaging in dialogue and building 
relationships, it was important that they connected on a personal level (i.e. identity) with 
those being engaged, which resulted in a new definition for CE. There was also a 
recognition that CTCE practitioners needed to demographically represent the 
communities that they were engaging with, in order to have insight into cultural 
differences that could shape problem-solving. Moreover, CTCE was a multi-agency, which 
required the partners to meet regularly to discuss new and ongoing cases and concerns. 
However, West Yorkshire failed to meet frequently, and some meetings with partners 
were postponed. This finding supports an investigation of Prevent, after the Parson Green 
attack, as they too found that these partnership meetings were inconsistent and 
infrequent (Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament 2018, p.96). In West 
Yorkshire, CTCE was primarily delivered by the police. Although LA did carry out 
engagement, it was not as frequent as it was for the police. In contrast, in East Jutland, 
Info-House had initially started aggressively carrying out engagement to raise awareness. 
However, CTCE had slowed down by the time of this research, and the municipality was 
more active in general engagement and building relationships, while Info-House focused 
on targeted engagement. Thus, in both cases, there was an unspoken reliance on partners 
for engagement. The data revealed that although CTCE was viewed positively, it was not 
being delivered proactively or frequently, as both entities had adopted a reactive 
approach to engagement. There was a need for more CTCE to be delivered; this was a call 
from both reporters and practitioners. It was also revealed that, due to this reactive 
approach, opportunities for further and more cohesive engagement were missed.  
 
8.2.2 Research Question Two: The Effect of CTCE on Reporting of Radicalisation and 
Extremism 
Although comparative data were limited (unlike East Jutland, West Yorkshire did not 
collect historical data on number of reports, as a result there were only two years worth of 
data to compare with East Jutland’s seven years) the results indicated that CTCE could 
positively impact reporting of radicalisation and extremism, especially from families and 
relatives once they were engaged with and supported (see Chapter 7). This was very clear 
from the result provided by Info-House, which showed an average annual increase of 63% 
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in reports from relatives and close associates. In fact, at one point there were 
approximately as many reports from families, as there were from professionals. 
Therefore, this thesis argues that working closely with families influences prevention. 
There were not enough data from West Yorkshire for a like-for-like comparison; however, 
further national information was sought from Home Office public data, which illustrated a 
decline in reports. This thesis argues that this decline coincides with the removal of the 
Prevent Engagement Officer. Finally, this thesis identified that for CTCE to be effective, it 
was important to connect on a personal level with those being engaged. Info-House 
illustrates that the close relationships built through connecting on a personal level and 
empathy were most fruitful. This is in line with the theories discussed in Chapter 3 
including the warmth-competency theory. 
8.2.3 Research Question Three: Reasons and Barriers to Reporting, and How CTCE Can 
Address Them 
Analysis of the data has identified several factors (e.g. fear, sense of responsibility, 
personal agency, relationships, skills, knowledge etc.) that influenced the reporter’s 
decision to report, which supported some of the findings of Thomas et al. (2017); 
however, this thesis delved deeper and departed from Thomas et al. by exploring 
psychology of reporting. First, Thomas et al. (2017) argue that threat needs to be 
perceived as high in order for an individual to report their concern. Although this thesis 
agrees, it argues threat perception varies across different types of reporters. Thus, it 
illustrates threat perception to be multi-layered rather than a single event; and at its heart 
sits uncertainty. Moreover, this thesis argues that threat perception moulds the cost and 
benefit of reporting, as the data revealed (see Chapters 6 and 7). Secondly, the thesis 
demonstrates that those who tend to report later — which usually happens to be 
families/relatives — have a slightly different threat perception and trigger point. For this 
group, the trigger is the realisation of lack of control, but for others, it is a new set of 
information that confirms their previously held beliefs. This suggests that reporters start 
with an emotional commitment to a certain idea and then they will use confirmation bias 
and experience to confirm what they believe (see Chapter 6). Therefore, knowing about 
these threat perception and trigger points, the thesis provides an insight into reporting 
behaviour and its psychology. For example, although this thesis agrees with Thomas et al. 
(2017) that internal conflicts influence reporting, it has gone further by explaining why 
and how (see Chapter 6 and 7).  
The analysis highlighted that people took action because they wanted to feel they have 
done something about the situation at hand, and sometimes this overlapped with a sense 
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of control or power over the situation (see Chapter 6). Reporters reached a point where 
they all recognised that they were no longer in position to deal with the situation 
themselves and thus there was a need for ‘power of powers’ (i.e. the authorities), as one 
reporter put it, to take over. The sense of responsibility guided reporting behaviour, not 
only in a the sense that they felt obliged to protect others but also a sense of responsibility 
felt towards the vulnerable individual. This worked as a doubled-edged sword that both 
encouraged and discouraged reporting.  
The data also identified that in contrast to relatives and close associates, professional 
reporters were much quicker to report their concerns. This was not necessarily positive, 
as such reports did not always meet the threshold for interventions, as reporters did not 
follow what their training. This eagerness to report quickly in West Yorkshire was 
primarily the result of fear at failing to meet the Prevent Duty requirements, which in turn 
would have a domino effect on other punitive actions. This illustrates the fragile nature of 
policies in practice and how they can have a negative impact. Although the Prevent Duty 
had helped increase reports from professionals, it did not necessarily succeed in ensuring 
high-quality reports. 
One barrier to reporting was a lack of trust in authorities; there was a sense that 
authorities were not going to help and that they were a source of trouble. This particularly 
was an issue for relatives and close associate reporters. More importantly, the thesis 
revealed that people do report to CT specialists — a choice that Thomas et al. (2017) (see 
Section 1.3) suggested was not a preferred — and it is possible to encourage such 
behaviour. In fact, the data revealed that reporters wanted to be in contact with such 
specialists in order to discuss their concerns. Info-House illustrates informal dialogue 
helps reducing the risk of reporting for reporters. Thus, this thesis argues that by creating 
an informal process for reporting, dialogue is made possible, and there is a single point of 
contact, reducing the fear of reporting.  
Finally, the relative and close associate reporters expressed that they wanted someone 
empathetic and human to alleviate their concerns, as they were already in a difficult 
situation. There was a real need for support, and once again Info-House illustrated that by 
giving families support (e.g. the Parent Network) reporting of radicalisation and 
extremism can be increased.  
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8.2.4 Research Question Four: How can the relationship between CTCE and reporting 
behaviour be explained? 
This discussion draws from the literature and data from this research. In the simplest 
terms, the relationship between CTCE and reporting behaviour is that of psychology. This 
thesis has explained that reporting behaviour is multi-faceted, threat perception is multi-
layered, and that CTCE strategy is a psychological process. When CTCE is delivered in a 
way that connects on an individual level, it breaks down the barriers of ‘Us vs. Them’. The 
‘Us/Them’ dichotomy is created by the perception of whether the ‘other’ is capable of 
harming or helping us (see Chapter 3). This was present in the data when both the 
practitioners and reporters suggested there was an element of trust at stake between the 
public and the police. For example, EJR2 and UKR1 explained how some people were 
reluctant to come forward because there was a lack of trust — i.e. preventive strategies 
were going to do harm rather than good, e.g. criminalisation (see Chapter 6). By becoming 
an in-group member, the reporters reaching out to practitioners no longer see them as 
police or the face of authority, or at least these perceptions are lessened. They become 
personable and relatable. The practitioner is no longer an outsider, but someone that can 
be trusted. This again was evident in the data when practitioners and reporters like EJR2 
explained how they would discuss non-CT related matters such as marital problems and 
ask for guidance (see Chapters 5 and 6). This in in-group transformation builds trust. In 
fact, being relatable and personable does not just stop at personality: sometimes it is 
important for demographics to match, as an ‘Us/Them’ bifurcation is deeply-rooted in the 
human psyche (Sapolsky 2018). This thesis also presented that practitioners believed 
some communities were more open to interacting with people of the same background 
(see Chapter 5).  
Emotions are big drivers in behaviour (see Chapters 3 and 6). Having an emotional 
connection can help to break down barriers. This study found empathy to be yearned for 
and appreciated (see Chapters 5-7), resulting in empathy creating trusting relationships. 
This is in line with the warmth-competency theory discussed in Chapter 3.  In contrast, 
fear can become an inhibitor in building relationships or reporting (see Chapter 6), and 
thus knowing how the perception of fear is shaped can assist in addressing those issues. 
Moreover, through the support provided by CTCE, reporters learnt to see authorities as 
those that can assist and guide, as well as being trustworthy. This transformation from 
negative to positive view can help shape the stories one tells oneself about those one 
interacts with, which influence how one behaves. There is also an issue of respect: where 
there is disrespect, a person can be viewed as an outsider (see Chapters 5-7). This thesis 
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found that by recognising differences in culture, communities, and so on, practitioners 
were more mindful and respectful towards identities. This, in turn, again, breaks down 
barriers that are preventing trusting relationships. For example, when practitioners in 
West Yorkshire worked the Kurdish community there was recognition of their identity 
and the historical meaning attached to it. This helped to build a strong relationship. Or 
when East Jutland reporters were given space to make their own decision and were not 
pressured, the reporters expressed they felt respected. Also, through inclusion and 
recognition, practitioners were communicating to that ‘you matter; we see you’. Similarly, 
this creates a sense of respect. Additionally, through inclusion, practitioners are not 
removing the sense of responsibility from those that they engage with (see Chapter 5). 
Responsibility is essential to creating the desired behaviour and this thesis found 
responsibility was also a motive for reporting (see Chapter 6), but also it reinstates a 
sense of respect, as well as a sense of control. Once responsibility is removed, the message 
that is being communicated is that ‘you are incapable’, which can create a sense of being 
judged, reinforcing feelings of ‘Us vs. Them’ (as presented by UKR1 see Chapter 6). 
By behaving in this way, practitioners are changing attitudes and perceptions of those that 
they engage with, resulting in the re-evaluation of the cost and benefit of reporting. 
Therefore, CTCE is about closing that gap, which creates division and the ‘Us/Them’ 
bifurcation. When practitioners are aware of what they can do through CTCE and how 
they should connect with those that they engage with, engagement can be effective. In East 
Jutland practitioners really understood the value of connecting on a personal level. In 
West Yorkshire, police practitioners had a better idea than the LA practitioners. Moreover, 
to encourage reporting, there is a need to understand why people report — the 
psychological underpinnings that shape the decision-making process. From a reporter’s 
perspective, there are needs that should be met to encourage reporting. There are also 
barriers that interfere with reporting behaviour. One cannot simply ask people to report 
and expect the reports to  flow in. There needs to be an understanding of this transaction 
that happens when engagement takes place and its value.  
8.2.5 Research Question Five: Lessons Learnt From East Jutland and West Yorkshire in 
Shaping CTCE Practices  
The comparative analysis in Chapter 5 revealed that CTCE needs to be a multiagency 
proactive approach, this means that the issue of radicalisation and extremism cannot be 
solved by one party (e.g. police). It needs to be addressed holistically as other agencies 
such as mental health, employment, etc will be more appropriate to providing support 
which is in pre-criminal space. Also CTCE needs to be multi-layered, i.e. different intensity 
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of engagement with different target audience. As presented in Chapter 5 each target 
audience (e.g. vulnerable individual, public, family members) have different needs; thus, 
CTCE ought to have the flexibility in its intensity to address such needs. Therefore, CTCE 
needs to be tailored. Moreover CTCE has to be problem-oriented, as it allows for targeted 
interventions and engagement. This approach as presented in Chapter 5 can be helpful 
when there is shortage of resources, as it encourages investing in areas that are deemed 
more effective (e.g. working with families or a troubled mosque). Additionally, the 
practitioners revealed that by engaging with communities they were able to deal with 
issues that mattered to the community. Although not all these were CT related, it did help 
with building relationships.  
The data also revealed that CTCE can benefit from being dialogue-centric, as it allows for 
difficult conversations to take place — preferably informal from reporters’ perspective as 
it reduces the fear of consequences. It was evident from the data there was a need for 
informal dialogue, as it helped to clear uncertainly about signs of radicalisation and 
extremism. Also, through dialogue CTCE was more inclusive, which had a positive effect. 
Thus, CTCE needs to be inclusive but especially inclusive of parents/families. This thesis 
found that East Jutland had managed to prevent vulnerable individuals leaving for conflict 
zones by working closely with their families and relatives.  
It is also important for CTCE to be relationship focused. The practitioners in this study 
expressed how important these relationships were in prevention. Relationships are 
psychologically rooted, and practitioners illustrated how they tried to connect with 
personalities by mirroring the identities of those being engaged in order to build long, 
trusting relationships. These approaches allow one to connect on a personal level in order 
to identify problems, concerns, and get access to intelligence, as well as positively 
influence relationship and attitudes. The data also revealed that CTCE needs to be 
supportive and empowering in order to build strong relationships. This way the 
responsibility of prevention was not removed from individuals and a sense of respect was 
induced. The reporters showed that there was a need to act on their concerns, but they 
were not equipped with the right information or resources to do so. Thus, the support 
from the practitioners was welcomed. Additionally, CTCE needs to be delivered by the’ 
right person’, with specific set of skills that can deal with important aspects or practical 
details of a situation (see Chapters 5-7). 
This thesis found that CTCE needs to be frequent and transparent. There was a real 
hunger from both practitioners and reporters to have more engagement. Also reporters 
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wanted transparency; they wanted to know the exact processes and to be kept informed. 
Consequently, this thesis believes that through application of CTCE Logic Model (see 
Figure 18 in Chapter 7), which is informed by the data collected, the cost and benefit of 
reporting are influenced and people can access relevant knowledge and skills. This is 
believed to encourage reporting, which in turn enables early detection, intervention, 
rehabilitation, and hopefully, an increase in the quality of life for the vulnerable individual. 
Subsequently, the distal effects will decrease in incidence, ultimately resulting in 
prevention.  
8.2.6 Recommendations For Policy and Practice 
The central focus of these recommendations is to ensure the need of reporters are met 
(i.e. social justice), as well as the need for prevention (e.g. better quality and more timely 
intelligence). Based on the current findings, the following recommendations are proposed, 
divided into short-term and long-term recommendations, based on the urgency of the 
reporters’ need and the ease in application. In essence these recommendations also 
summarise the evidence that they were derived form. Many of these recommendations are 
for central governments, and thus policy-focused. Some guideline recommendations are 
for LA, police, and practitioners with the intention to influence practice. These 
recommendations were elaborated and disseminated through a Policy Brief, which the 
Prevent team at the Home Office showed interest, and later resulted in a meeting with the 
Prevent campaign team at New Scotland Yard to inform their 2020 communication 
campaign — a website aimed to encourage reporting of radicalisation and extremism — a 
first step into series of campaigns.  
Short-Term Recommendations 
To improve and encourage reporting the data revealed that having a single point of 
contact from which information could be sought was vital to reporters. Therefore, it is 
recommended that a multi-agency information hub be created, where it is possible for 
members of the public, practitioners, and vulnerable individuals to seek guidance and 
support from CT professionals. The location of the hub is crucial, given that it needs to be 
easily accessible. Policing districts can be used as guidance. For example, in Aarhus, 
Denmark, this hub is on the police premises, operated by multi-agency staff. The 
environment of the hub needs to be welcoming and informal; this is to detach association 
with authorities, as reporters fear punitive actions from authority figures and need 
informal dialogue. The Info-House in Aarhus imitates a living room within a home, which 
takes away the formality and promotes a relaxed atmosphere where the individual can 
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discuss issues openly; their needs are signposted and provided the support required by 
the appropriate agency.  This also creates transparency from the start and who is involved 
in the process. 
It is recommended that the central government conduct audits of training to ensure the 
prioritisation of training quality. The current auditing process in place in the UK is 
insufficient, as it only seeks to identify if the organisation has received training, and the 
trainers have been certified. There is a need for a more thorough audit that seeks 
continuity in practice and service. There needs to be quality control assessment, especially 
since the ‘specific authorities’ mentioned in the Prevent Duty are not provided with a 
training package that the trainers could share with the people and organisations that they 
train. If any local training package was devised, it was the organisation delivering the 
training that would have put it together. It is also recommended that both central 
governments audit reporting processes for a better understanding of barriers and 
problems that reporters face, as they can identify areas of concern that are not picked up 
at when evaluating training and workshop sessions, as well as complementing those 
audits. The thesis accepts that this auditing will be costly; however, to merely make 
something compulsory for the purpose of accountability without sufficient funding, 
auditing, and checking it creates nothing but a thin veil, which can also be very costly in 
the long run, as well as putting national security at risk. 
It is equally important for the central government to remove funding incentives that 
encourage increases in the quantity of training rather than quality. Furthermore, training 
programmes like WRAP are delivered differently across the country and organisations. 
Although this is acceptable and encouraged to some extent, this thesis argues that there 
needs to be some level of the audit to ensure that there are no gaps in training and 
delivery, as well as minimising difference in practices whilst considering the regional 
factors. There is a need for central governments to understand the organisational context 
better and recommend more suitable training scheme. For example, with students, 
prevention of radicalisation and extremism could be covered in citizenship-based 
modules, and be part of education assessment.  
It is recommended that practitioners delivering CTCE adopt the CTCE Logic Model to 
engage with the psychological underpinnings of reporting and build closer relationships 
with relatives/close associates. Increase active CTCE and dialogue. It is through dialogue 
that concerns are addressed and through CTCE that opportunities are identified. It is 
important to understand that dialogue is not about changing opinions, but listening in 
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order to identify a common ground that parties can utilise to work together, which 
ultimately will aid prevention. Working with relatives/close associates is vital to an all-
around approach to prevention. This thesis, as well as previous research, has illustrated 
that working with families can be highly beneficial, and that families request this. 
Long-Term Recommendations 
It is recommended that the practitioners and the central government improve the quality 
of training and awareness workshops through an evidence-based approach, which aims to 
inform better practice and be more effective. This research found that the workshops 
delivered by Info-House were to some extent based on research; however, it would be 
highly beneficial if research could identify the impact of such training and make 
improvements if need be.  
Central governments need to invest more in youth services, as they can engage with young 
people and their families to raise awareness in addition to safeguard. In Denmark, youth 
services are very active in the prevention of radicalisation and extremism and work very 
closely with the Info-House and the police to ensure prevention. It is advised that the 
funding for CE and CTCE be more abundant and more targeted. For example, identifying 
which part of CTCE needs more funding, why, and by whom. Such targeted funding can be 
identified through a review of funding policies that negatively impact practice. 
Finally, those involved in communicating the message and intention of CT and prevention 
can invest in advertising that connects with individuals’ core social identity (e.g. being a 
parent) and any sense of responsibility associated with that role, with focus on facts about 
services and the support available to them. Publicity can be used as a form of engagement 
and sharing of information, as direct face-to-face engagement is not possible at all times. 
Advertisement promotes not only the services, support, and resources available to people 
but also creates an opportunity to address misinformation. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
during the Troubles in the late 1980s and 1990s to the Good Friday Agreement, the UK 
government, in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the public and to stop the 
violence, invested £3million into commercials. What was supposed to have been aired on 
the BBC as a documentary was instead presented as 25 public service commercials. The 
Northern Ireland Office began to commission these public ads to influence public opinion 
by delivering the government’s message directly into their homes. Advertising producers 
David Lyle and Julie-Anne Bailie created psychological adverts (highly emotionally 
charged) designed to encourage people to call the Confidential Telephone Line and report 
suspicious activity by paramilitaries (BBC 2018). Their first advert, entitled “A Future”, 
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was aired in January 1988 and resulted in 729% increase in genuine and useful calls to the 
hotline. The narrative of the ad was based on a young man, fed up with how the violence 
in Northern Ireland had hindered his life, who decided to provide information. The film is 
graphic and powerful; it used the aftermath footage of the Enniskillen bombings. The 
commercial places responsibility on the viewer’s hands. The commissioned researchers 
identified their core target audiences and made sure that each of those target audiences 
was in the frame.  They found that as well as appealing to innocent members of the public, 
they also needed to reach the terrorists and their families to encourage them to cooperate, 
which required a different approach, as Bailie explained during a BBC documentary: 
“There was absolutely no point in us just capturing the moral high ground, that was never 
going to be enough. Popularising, the security forces were never going to be enough. 
Demonising terrorists wasn’t going to work.” (BBC 2018) They started to work with the 
psychological theory of cognitive dissonance (a topic this thesis has addressed and 
included in the models, see Chapters 6 and 7), to present to the paramilitaries that their 
love for violence will destroy the other things they love most in their life, their family. In 
the adverts targeting families, they presented families (mothers and children) queuing 
outside prison, highlighting the painful reality of what happens after extremists are 
arrested. They gave profound insight into what terrorism was doing to the families. Other 
adverts were aimed at fiancés, wives, or girlfriends of extremists and illustrated cases 
where two newlywed women on opposing political sides were suffering from the same 
pain — losing their partner to either an attack or to prison. Similarly, adverts targeted at 
fathers focused on their role in shaping their children’s future. All were highly emotional 
and identity oriented, with the aim of creating a sense of personal responsibility. All 
factors, which this thesis has covered in relation reporting behaviour.  
This thesis suggests that by investing in such commercials that focus on sharing the facts 
about reporting someone they are concerned about, connecting with the individual’s 
sense of identity, and responsibility, the government has a better chance of reaching a 
wider audience (although this do not take away from the importance of the CTCE in 
general).  
8.3 Research Importance, Contribution, and Implications 
Not disregarding the limitations, which are discussed in the coming section, this thesis has 
sought to provide a different viewpoint when considering CTCE, and the prevention of 
radicalisation and extremism, especially from a research point of view. The thesis adds to 
the existing corpus by looking at prevention through the lens of reporting behaviour. 
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Thus, instead of focusing on the vulnerable individual, the thesis is focusing on the people 
around the individual. By understanding how people operate when they start having 
concerns, steps can be taken through CTCE to encourage reporting behaviour to ensure 
early intervention and prevention. Consequently, prevention efforts no longer discontinue 
at the vulnerable individual but extend further to provide a 360-degrees approach to 
prevention.  
This thesis has identified the needs of service users (reporters) and how these needs can 
be met through CTCE. More importantly, this research has shone a light on a forgotten 
cohort — families and close associates of the vulnerable individuals — who are also are 
victims of radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism that need support.  As this research 
has illustrated, these families are not always regarded positively or involved in 
prevention, particularly in the UK. Thus, it is by investing in this cohort that CTCE and 
prevention can be more effective. Hence, the findings from this thesis can encourage 
policies and practices that are end-user focused.  
From a research perspective, this thesis has tried to change the conversation around CT 
and methods used. Thus far, CT research has been dominated by critical studies of 
strategies and policies, and although they provide valued arguments, which this thesis has 
used as building blocks, it is time to move the discussion on with innovative and 
constructive solutions that not only benefit the vulnerable people but also ensure national 
security and civil liberties. Similarly, other CT studies have focused on communications 
from different campaigns and how effective they have been for intervention and 
mitigation. However, focus on the families of those vulnerable individuals is still lacking, 
and although this group was not necessarily the primary focus of this research, it has 
provided some insight into the importance of this group. This thesis hopes to have opened 
up avenues for future research to access these groups and work in collaboration with 
CTUs in order to explore CT, radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. Additionally, this 
thesis has introduced a new definition for CE, informed by other definitions of CE, 
inclusive of behavioural insight and recognising the psychological element of this 
interaction. This, again, brings to the table new conversations about CE and CTCE, how 
they should be viewed, and what should be considered. As a result, through the use of this 
definition, interdisciplinarity and multidisciplinarity are encouraged in future research, as 
CE or CTCE no longer stays a criminological and political science topic, but rather one that 
is connected deeply with psychology and other behavioural sciences.  
229 
 
This research also contributed to criminology through the introduction of the CTCE Logic 
Model, as it presented an evidence-based approach to engagement and prevention. The 
model breaks down the valuable characteristics of CTCE and how the process works 
towards prevention. This model can be used by future researchers to test the processes 
proposed, as a guideline that is informed by the marriage of different existing corpuses of 
research. Moreover, through the introduction of the Integrated Reporting Behaviour 
Change Model, the thesis has merged the current data with several behavioural science 
theories: the multi-component model of attitudes, BIAS, collective efficacy theory, cost-
benefit analysis, theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour, SDT, IBM, SIT,  SCT, 
identity theory, and the dual-pathway model of respect. Each of these models and theories 
individually addresses different behavioural and personal characteristics. However, 
through this marriage, these theories and models can be used collectively to understand 
the decision-making process and the reporting behaviour. 
This thesis also contributed to understanding threat perception by introducing the threat 
perception models (see Chapter 6), which were informed by the data collected. The 
models illustrate the multi-layered experience and trigger points for reporting. This is of 
value in policy and practice when trying to encourage people to come forward, especially 
family members. This can be used in the advertisements to illustrate what one goes 
through when one is unsure about concerns that they have about radicalisation and 
extremism.  
This research has also contributed to the methodological approach in terrorism research. 
As stated by other scholars, research on terrorism has long suffered from methodological 
issues whether it is over-reliance on secondary data, associated literature reviews, the 
sacristy of statistical data, or lack of collaborative work (Horgan 2017; Silke 2001; Merari 
1991; Schuurman 2018). This thesis that was informed by merging together comparative 
case studies and TRD, adapting these methodologies in a way that accounts for some of 
the limitations faced doing CT research. Though this research has limitations, nevertheless 
it has taken a new approach to studying terrorism-related topics in the hope of 
encouraging a social justice approach to CT research and ensure delivery of axiology. 
Finally, this thesis hopes to have encouraged the use of behavioural insight as a tool to 
further policy, practice, research, and impact. More importantly, it has demonstrated that 
by staying true to its epistemology, ontology, and axiology, it has contributed to 
knowledge. 
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8.4 Reflection on Research Limitations 
The primary limitation of the current findings is generalisability, as a common concern of 
case studies is that their findings are not sufficient for scientific generalisation (Thomas 
2011). However, generalisation has two forms: statistical and analytical. To generalise 
statistically, claims are made based on statistical probabilities of a population sample. It is 
argued that this type of generalisation is commonly recognised because researchers “have 
ready access to quantitative formulas for determining the confidence with which 
generalisations can be made” (Yin 2009, p.38). On the other hand, in analytical 
generalisation, research uses an in-depth analytical investigation to generalise a particular 
set of results to some broader theory (Yin 2009, p.43). Analytical generalisation is defined 
as a two-step process: a) conceptual claim that is informed by the findings of the case 
study; and b) the application of the theory to connect to a context in which similar 
experiences might occur (Yin 2010). The former applies to this thesis. Through multiple 
case studies, analytic generalisation is made possible and increases accuracy (Bulmer 
1988), as replication through cases is used to confirm or challenge the theory (Yin 2009, 
p.38). Therefore, claims made by case studies may not be ‘proof’ in statistical terms; 
rather, they form theoretical premises that can be utilised to make assertions about the 
studied phenomenon. Further cases that replicate outcomes can support and strengthen 
the construction of the theory (Lincoln & Guba 2002; Yin 2009, pp.38–44).  It is also 
argued that the empirical findings of a case study can be strengthened when replication 
supports the same theory but do not support an equally plausible, rival theory (Yin 2009, 
p.39). 
However, another element of generalisation could be that the readers interpret the 
practices of East Jutland and West Yorkshire to be representative of CTCE practice across 
each nation. This is not the purpose here. First, although both the UK and Denmark 
practice CP, they differ in practice and philosophy. The UK practice aspires to take the 
Peelian approach, of policing by consent (Harris 2004), while the Danish proximity 
policing is focused on building a close relationship with the community by ensuring the 
same officer serves the area for several years (Holmberg 2002). Both strategies in 
simplest term focus on the public, but the practice differs partly due to resources and 
political agendas. In West Yorkshire not many officers serve the same area for a long term, 
as they get promoted or move on — in fact, some practitioners were frustrated for this 
reason. Whilst in East Jutland having the same person serving the same area was vital and 
valued. It presented service continuity. Second, East Jutland and West Yorkshire are not 
necessarily representative of all forces or LA across each country. This is because 
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demographics will vary across the countries, shaping organisational cultures, relationship 
with communities, crimes, and priorities that direct the purpose of each agency in the 
region (Carrington et al. 2003); not to mention the impact of funding and austerity (HMIC 
2012; Home Office 2018b). Yet there were similarities as the Police and the LA have to fill 
the same fundamental role, guided by the same national legal controls and policies (Reiner 
2010). Moreover, there were similarities in CT strategies since both countries are within 
the EU, an institution that has since 9/11 tried to harmonise CT strategies across the 
member states. Consequently, in this homogenous view caution is needed in the 
application of the current study, which can be partially transferable and inform practices 
of an equivalent organisation (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Flyvbjerg 2006), and especially 
policies (Jones & Newburn 2007).  
It should be noted that one limitation of the comparative international study was that the 
case studies presented were not like-for-like comparisons due to social, economic, 
political, and demographical structure, as well as the practices in place. Additionally, both 
the UK and Denmark have various police forces and LAs across the country who operate 
differently based on their geographical needs. Therefore, caution is needed when 
considering the practices in place, as they do not represent how other regions operate. For 
example, West Yorkshire was not able to provide full comparative reporting data, unlike 
East Jutland; they only provided two years’ worth of data. However, that does not mean 
lessons cannot be learnt from such comparisons, as they can illustrate different methods 
of practice. 
Another limitation was that of language. Since the UK and Denmark do not share the same 
language, and I relied upon English language, there were some constraints in accessing 
and interpreting CE and policing in East Jutland. Information on the Aarhus Model was 
much more accessible in English. Therefore, this research predominately obtained 
knowledge of CE through the practitioners, and when possible, Google translate was used 
to translate policing information into English. Freedom of expression for the participants 
was also a by-product of the language barrier. Although the participants spoke English, 
fluency varied, which meant some participants found it challenging to communicate their 
thoughts freely. Thus, they used words that they thought were close to what they were 
intending to express, limiting their freedom of expression. This is crucial for qualitative 
data, as it is through the thematic analysis that themes and meanings are identified. 
Therefore, during the interviews, the participants were encouraged to use Google 
translate when there was a perceived difficulty in expression. 
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A methodological challenge, which is also an ontological limitation, is access to reporters, 
primarily relatives and close associate reporters. This is because, as explained in Section 
4.2, such reporters were reluctant to participate in the study, as they wanted to leave the 
traumatic event behind them and feared identification. It would have been unethical to 
pursue them further. Although the research managed to gain access to two relative 
reporters, reporting behaviour cannot be understood fully without input from relative 
reporters. This thesis addressed this limitation in three parts. First, reporting reasoning 
was explored from the experience of practitioners who dealt with reporters, asking why 
relatives report do or do not report? Examples and insight were gained about reasoning 
and fears that were involved. Second, in cases where relative reporters refused to take 
part, the CTU was asked to provide case studies and talk through the cases in detail, 
without exposing the identity or any information that could lead to the identification of 
the reporter or the vulnerable individual reported. This way, the thesis was still able to 
explore who made the report, and make some inferences about possible reasons for 
reporting. Third, the research accepted participants who approached me for participation 
through social media and the like. This mainly happened at the later stage of the thesis, 
after the introduction of a Policy Brief based on this thesis. This, too, had some limitations, 
as those wanting to participate were not necessarily from the sampled regions (i.e. West 
Yorkshire and East Jutland). However, this thesis deemed their input to be of value, given 
that they were relatives and close associate reporters.  
The data collected about the first-hand experience of two relative reporters still provided 
valuable insights. Such a small sample is a limitation of this thesis; however, without 
having this first-hand experience this thesis would not able to understand the 
psychological underpinnings of reporting behaviour in the context of CT. Therefore, even 
such small samples have a similar value to individual case-studies for research. In fact, 
single case studies can be used to inform decision-making theories (Carroll & Johnson 
1990). Moreover, the two relative reporters are at the very least representative of the 
female family members. The three case studies used including the ones discussed with 
practitioners were also predominantly cases that were reported by female family 
members. Not to mention, the study is also representative of the professional reporters. 
Additionally, this thesis, as explained, has attempted to balance this limitation by 
obtaining parallel data about the reporter’s reasoning by exploring three case studies 
where relatives made a report. This thesis hopes that the outcome of this research will 
encourage future participation of relative reporters.  
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It is also important to note that when exploring why people did not report, that it is 
impossible to explore this notion in detail. First, one needs to identify those individuals 
who were aware of the risk but did not raise their concerns. Without reports, there is no 
trail to the source. Second, the thesis could have carried out a survey that focused on this 
group, but this was not within the immediate scope of this thesis, as well as not being 
feasible due to workload. This is a factor that could benefit from further meta-ontological 
analysis.  
Although the application of TRD is very valuable to social research, it did present some 
challenges for this thesis. Since TRD takes the end-user’s platform and approaches them to 
guide the research, this thesis was not able to approach the reporters of 
radicalisation/extremism before designing the study. This was mainly due to issues of 
access. The research had to know who these people were in the first place; however, given 
the nature of CT, such data are not publicly available. Therefore, the research was highly 
dependent on the access provided by the CTU. Once access was obtained, during the 
interviews with the reporters (and practitioners), they were asked what they needed from 
CE, and how they believed the reporting process could be improved to meet these needs 
and encourage reporting. Through this action, the research managed to reel in their world 
view and what was important to them when it came to reporting 
radicalisation/extremism. Hence, the research uses data to inform better practice and 
policy. This thesis illustrates that TRD is flexible in application and that researchers can 
adjust the margins as long as the foundations of the methodology are intact — i.e. creating 
social justice and considering the end-user’s perspective. As a result, the research 
contribution is the application of TRD method and how it can be adjusted to address 
research limitations. 
Additionally, this thesis did not explore the notion of ‘community’ directly, meaning it did 
not ask the CE practitioners to define community. This is because, as explained in Chapter 
1, the notion of community is complex and has a different meaning in a different context. 
The community has overlapping geographical and identity dimension. Given that there is 
no fixed definition for ‘community’, it was of little value to ask practitioners to define it. 
The aim of this research was not to explore what the notion of the community meant in 
the context of CE. Thus, instead of questioning practitioners on how they defined 
community, they were asked to explain how they learnt about the communities they 
served, and how they tried to apply that knowledge in their practice? In this way, the 
participant was given a platform to freely express their understanding of whom were they 
serving, which also highlighted geographical and identity factors.  
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A possible ontological limitation of this thesis could be that it has not directly explored the 
relationship between political views and reporting reasoning, which could be a 
confounding factor. This is because political views, in the context of CT, are associated 
with strategies in places such as Prevent or the Aarhus Model. Although this thesis agrees 
that political views are a by-product of our attitudes and beliefs, which could feed into the 
behavioural processes, it concluded that such views could be explored in the risks 
associated with reporting. Therefore, through the ontological processes, the thesis 
identified political views of reporters as part of the risk of reporting category, and 
possibly quite low in the hierarchy of importance. Reporters were given the opportunity 
to express their thought process about reporting, and within that, they have the freedom 
to express thoughts about Prevent or the Aarhus Model. Subsequently, if such concerns 
were raised, these could have been explored further, as the interviews were semi-
structured. However, this is an area where future research could expand. 
Due to the nature of the study and CT, direct access was not available to subjects for 
recruitment purposes. Consequently, a limitation was that the CTUs in West Yorkshire and 
East Jutland were in charge of providing participants, without any input from the author 
other than the numbers of participants required and the type (i.e. practitioners that 
deliver CTCE from all partner agencies and reporters of radicalisation/extremism). 
However, it was stressed how vital it was to have access to relative reporters for a better 
understanding of reporting reasoning, as professional reporters have a professional legal 
duty of care. Thus, it can be argued that since the CTU had the power of choice, they could 
have been selective in terms of who they wanted to be involved in the study, to indirectly 
create a more favourable outcome for CT strategies or agencies involved. This is a 
concern; however, some comfort could be taken from the fact that the data from these 
participants did not illustrate a skewed view of the systems. In fact, there were both 
positive and negative world views, which identified barriers and problems in the service. 
8.5 Future Research 
This thesis gave rise to several avenues for future research. One of the areas that could be 
further explored is reports from education services. The Department of Education in 2015 
released departmental advice for schools and childcare providers, as part of Prevent Duty. 
The document notes that professionals can follow three routes when raising a concern 
(Department for Education 2015, p.10). First, if a member of staff in a school has a concern 
about a particular pupil, they should follow the school’s normal safeguarding procedures. 
This includes discussing the matter with the school’s designated safeguarding lead, and 
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where deemed necessary, with the child’s guardians. If the school is within a Prevent 
priority area, then the staff can also contact the Prevent Lead. Second, the member of staff 
could report their concern directly to local police or dial 101 (the non-emergency 
number), where they can discuss the issue in confidence, and access support and 
guidance. Third, the Department for Education has a dedicated telephone helpline to 
enable staff and governors to raise concerns relating to extremism directly. Concerns can 
also be raised by email.  
The interviews mainly suggested the first approach for reporting concerns was the most 
common. However, it would be highly beneficial for future research to investigate more 
fully which route is commonly taken by educational professionals and why. This could 
provide a better insight into the reporting of radicalisation and extremism in education 
services, and how it can be further improved. Not much is known about the available 
information in Denmark that guides professionals in reporting. There is a hotline, but the 
Info-House in Aarhus is the central hub for information. Researchers should further 
investigate this to inform future efforts and maximise the effectiveness of the processes in 
place. 
Another issue that was identified in this thesis was the quality of the reports since if there 
is not enough evidence the investigators will waste their time in investigating people who 
are not vulnerable in a CT context; or if the evidence is irrelevant, the investigators may 
dismiss people who are at risk. Concern can be very subjective; this is why evidence to 
support concerns is vital for the escalation of a concern because, without sufficient and 
appropriate evidence, the reports will not meet the threshold for intervention. In the UK, 
the VAF is used to assess whether individuals need support and safeguarding. As 
explained in Section 5.3.2, the framework covers 22 factors that may indicate whether an 
individual is vulnerable. The framework was introduced in 2012 by the government, and 
it is four pages in length, with only two pages of information and bullet-pointed 
characteristics. The document is vague in terms of guidance that is designed to assist 
practitioners to identify characteristics associated with the three core dimensions. Due to 
this lack of information, it is likely that risk assessment will be subjective rather than 
objective. The quality of information is not based on opinions but as many facts as 
possible.   
The aim of this thesis was not to explore the implementation of VAF and how it functions 
in reality. However, this would be a great opportunity for future research to explore. It 
would be beneficial to explore whether VAF is covered in detail during the WRAP training, 
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for example. Given the hours allocated to WRAP, this thesis believes an in-depth coverage 
of VAF may be lacking from the WRAP training. 
In relation to referrals, this thesis found that at times, Prevent can be a dumping ground 
for a variety of concerns that are not CT-related. There were concerns that reporters, such 
professionals, would report cases that might be in need of safeguarding, but they were not 
CT-related; or that they would report concerns without supporting evidence, just so that 
they had passed on the issue. There was a sense of ‘it is better to report than not to’. 
Researchers may also wish to explore such referrals further, as it would be beneficial to 
explore how many of the Prevent referrals were previously referred to other services. 
Future research can explore the relationship between such reporting and the institution 
that the report was generated by (e.g. schools, mental health, etc.). Furthermore, it would 
be beneficial to see how many of those Prevent referrals that did not meet the threshold 
but were signposted to other services were also previously reported to these services and 
whether they received the support needed. The results of such research can inform 
barriers and problems in other services and their domino effect on services like Prevent 
and Channel. As mentioned earlier, this thesis did not explore the procedures of reporting. 
However, to better understand reporting, it is vital for future research to focus on the 
procedures of reporting and identify areas for improvement. 
When looking at the data presented in this thesis, it is hard not to think about the issue of 
resources and what it could mean for a healthy partnership. It would seem that the 
municipality/LA can deal with social elements, while the police deal with the criminal 
justice aspects. However, due to a lack of resources, the Info-House seems to be dependent 
on general CE carried out by the municipality or the old contacts established within the 
community. In contrast, the LA in West Yorkshire were not very active in CTCE or they 
were done in conjunction with other forms of engagement such as FGM. It would be 
interesting to explore further what such dependency could mean for the partners. Future 
research might want to focus on the pressures, accountability, and ownership when 
delivering CTCE, a strategy that this thesis found to be vital to be carried out by both the 
municipality and the police. Additionally, it would be beneficial for future research to 
audit and explore the type of engagement carried out by different partners to comprehend 
what is being done, how much is being done and by whom, to measure the impact of such 
engagement, and identify areas for improvement.  
This thesis also highlighted how the issue of resources is affecting CTCE. It would be 
beneficial to understand how different viewpoints at different levels can affect resourcing 
237 
 
CTCE. Additionally, researchers should explore if people in positions of power are aware 
of the amount of labour, resources, and time involved in building relationships and 
engaging with communities? Have they tried to measure the time allocated to such 
activities? How do they value CTCE? Moreover, the issue of resources highlighted the lack 
of support from politicians. This is vital and needs further exploration. Future research 
might explore politicians’ views on CTCE and how they may influence funding. Is there an 
alternative way of measuring the effects of CTCE on prevention (such as looking at 
reporting behaviour) that could assist politicians with their need for quantifying results? 
Likewise, it would be beneficial for future research to explore funding from central 
government. Researchers could explore how the Home Office allocates funding to each 
region for CT purposes, especially CTCE, and whether the Home Office takes into 
consideration local differences when rolling out agendas for the police, LA, education 
service, and the like. There may be biased when it comes to funding. 
The thesis also discovered some differences in how training programmes like WRAP and 
the Info-House Workshop had developed. Future research might explore and identify the 
impact of such evolutions and formations. It would be highly beneficial to understand if, 
and how much of, these training programmes were based on evidence; and whether they 
meet the needs of practitioners and prevention. Finally, researchers of behaviour and 
decision-making are welcomed to assess and evaluate the models presented in this thesis 
in a lab environment to further improve them through the identification of 
confounding/other factors. Although the current models were based on already examined 
concepts, it would be highly beneficial to have experiments that test the concept as a 
whole.  
8.6 Three Final Thoughts 
If this thesis had to be encapsulated in a single phrase, it would be “CTCE is an effective 
strategy to encourage reporting behaviour, especially when working with families.” At the 
inception of this thesis, the quote from Hussen Abase, the father of Amira Abase (one of 
the Bethnal Green trio), illustrated the hunger of families to work in partnerships with 
government to prevent radicalisation and extremism, and this thesis asked if such 
preventive collaboration is possible. The answer is yes! At the beginning of Chapter 1, this 
thesis queried what was happening when Info-House had managed to stop vulnerable 
individuals from travelling to conflict zone, and what were the practitioners doing to 
encourage reporting by parents. This thesis revealed that practitioners believed this was 
the result of working closely and honestly with families, and providing them with the 
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support that they needed. It was the inclusion of families that advanced prevention. 
Engagement on its own is not enough to encourage cooperation, as illustrated in this 
thesis. There are needs to be met. Engaging with the general public can be positive overall, 
but if the idea is to prevent radicalisation and extremism, then families are best situated to 
spot the signs early and intervene. Therefore, engaging and working with families can be a 
beneficial, targeted engagement, which Info-House has illustrated to be an effective 
preventive strategy. It is surprising that in the UK not much work has been done with 
these families. 
Second, CTCE needs to adopt a psychological approach to engagement. This thesis has an 
unusual genesis in that it is based on the storytelling of the mind in the context of 
reporting radicalisation and/or extremism. As presented, the decision to report is a multi-
layered and interconnected psychological process. This might sound complicated, but the 
reality is humans interact with one another on a psychological level every day. Successful 
interaction is achievable when it is done mindfully. The practitioners at the Info-House 
mindfully sought to connect with individual’s identity to understand their concerns and 
needs for effective prevention. Therefore, a psychological approach to CTCE is about 
training the staff to be aware of such cues during engagement. 
Finally, empathy is essential! It is important for CTCE to be human and empathetic, 
especially when dealing with families. It is that sense of warmth that creates trust and 
draws the relationship closer. The thesis found that some practitioners struggled with the 
balancing act of when to put on their professional ‘hat’ and when to be an empathic 
human that is not restricted by red tape. The truth is they do not have to choose: they can 
be both. The Info-House practitioners (and some in the West Yorkshire) had managed to 
strike balance, and such empathic responses had resulted in strong relationships. 
 
 
  
239 
 
References 
Aarhus.dk, 2016. About Radicalisation: Anti-radicalization in Aarhus Municipality. 
Available at: 
https://www.aarhus.dk/sitecore/content/Subsites/Antiradikaliseringsindsats/Hom
e/Om-radikalisering.aspx?sc_lang=en [Accessed April 4, 2018]. 
Aarhus Kommune, 2016. Dialogbaseret workshop om Radikalisering og Diskrimination. 
Available at: http://filer.aarhuskommune.dk/filer/mbu/filer/2016/uge39/LU-
NyhedsbrevfraSSP-Aarhus-Flyeromdialogbaseretworkshop.pdf [Accessed March 8, 
2019]. 
Abase, H., 2019. Father of IS bride Amira Abase says girls should be allowed to return to 
Britain. Sky News. Available at: https://news.sky.com/story/father-of-is-bride-amira-
abase-girls-should-be-forgiven-11637331 [Accessed April 24, 2019]. 
Abrams, D. & Hogg, M., 1990. An introduction to the social identity approach. In Social 
identity theory: Constructive and critical advances. Hertfordshire, UK: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, pp. 1–9. 
Airhihenbuwa, C.O. & Obregon, R., 2000. A critical assessment of theories/models used in 
health communication for hiv/aids. Journal of Health Communication, 5(sup1), pp.5–
15. Available at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11010357 [Accessed April 6, 
2019]. 
Ajzen, I. & Fishbein, M., 2005. The influence of attitudes on behavior. In The Handbook of 
attitudes. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Allen, J. et al., 2006. Policing and the criminal justice system – public confidence and 
perceptions : findings from the 2004/05 British Crime Survey. Home Office, p.49. 
Allison, G.T. & Zelikow, P., 1999. Essence of Decision : Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 
2nd ed., Pearson. 
Aly, A. & Green, L., 2010. Fear, Anxiety and the State of Terror. Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 33(3), pp.268–281. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100903555796 [Accessed 
December 16, 2016]. 
Anderson, E., 2000. Code of the street: Decency, violence, and the moral life of the inner 
city. The New York Times on the Web, pp.1–22. Available at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Code_of_the_Street_Decency_Violence_and.
html?id=GlK6sXGrWtsC [Accessed August 24, 2017]. 
Armstrong, T.A., Katz, C.M. & Schnebly, S.M., 2015. The Relationship Between Citizen 
Perceptions of Collective Efficacy and Neighborhood Violent Crime. Crime & 
Delinquency, 61(1), pp.121–142. Available at: 
http://cad.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0011128710386202 [Accessed 
November 16, 2016]. 
Asbrock, F., 2010. Stereotypes of social groups in Germany in terms of warmth and 
competence. Social Psychology, 41(2), pp.76–81. Available at: 
http://econtent.hogrefe.com/doi/abs/10.1027/1864-9335/a000011 [Accessed 
November 16, 2016]. 
240 
 
Ashworth, A. & Zedner, L., 2014. Preventive Justice, OUP Oxford. Available at: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/socialPolicy/Researchcentresandgroups/mannheim/pdf/Man
heimPreventiveJusticeIntroduction.pdf [Accessed September 24, 2019]. 
Aviram, R.. & Rosenfeld, S., 2002. Application of social identity theory in group therapy 
with stigmatized adults. International Journal of Group Psychotherapy, 52(1), pp.121–
130. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1521/ijgp.52.1.121.45468?journalCode=uj
gp20. 
Awan, I. & Blakemore, B., 2013. Extremism, counter-terrorism and policing, Ashgate Pub. 
Limited. 
Baker, S.E. & Edwards, R., 2012. How Many Interviews Are Enough? Expert voices and 
early career reflections on sampling and cases in qualitative research. National 
Centre for Research Methods Review Paper, pp.1–42. Available at: 
http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/2273/4/how_many_interviews.pdf [Accessed February 
15, 2019]. 
Bamberg, S., Ajzen, I. & Schmidt, P., 2003. Choice of Travel Mode in the Theory of Planned 
Behavior: The Roles of Past Behavior, Habit, and Reasoned Action. Basic and Applied 
Social Psychology, 25(3), pp.175–187. Available at: 
http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article&doi=10.1207/S15324834BA
SP2503_01&magic=crossref%7C%7CD404A21C5BB053405B1A640AFFD44AE3 
[Accessed November 16, 2016]. 
Baron, R.M. & Kenny, D.A., 1986. The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social 
Psychological Research. Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6), pp.1173–1182. Available at: 
http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/0022-3514.51.6.1173 [Accessed 
September 20, 2019]. 
Barrett, D., 2016. Tackling Radicalisation: The Limitations of the Anti-Radicalisation 
Prevent Duty. Available at: 
https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/33960/Tackling 
radicalisation - the limitations of the anti-radicalisation Prevent 
duty.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y [Accessed February 19, 2020]. 
Baumeister, R.F. et al., 2007. How Emotion Shapes Behavior: Feedback, Anticipation, and 
Reflection, Rather Than Direct Causation. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 
11(2), pp.167–203. Available at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1088868307301033 [Accessed May 31, 
2019]. 
Baur, V., 2010. Book Review: Transformative Research and Evaluation. Evaluation and 
Program Planning, 33, pp.276–277. Available at: https://0-ac-els--cdn-
com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/S014971890900086X/1-s2.0-S014971890900086X-
main.pdf?_tid=c486f2c4-da9d-11e7-b6c0-
00000aacb35e&acdnat=1512575860_af60b27c4f98cca5b1bfc18d004549e7 
[Accessed December 7, 2017]. 
Bavel, R. van et al., 2013. Applying behavioural sciences to EU policy-making. Joint 
Research Centre Scientific and Policy Reports, p.13. Available at: http://europa.eu/. 
[Accessed September 4, 2019]. 
Bazeley, P., 2009. Analysing Qualitative Data: More than Indentifying Themes. Malaysian 
241 
 
Journal of Qualitative Research,, 2(9), pp.6–22. Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Pat_Bazeley/publication/237458922_Analysi
ng_qualitative_data_More_than_’identifying_themes’/links/581881f608ae50812f5d9
f71.pdf [Accessed January 10, 2018]. 
BBC, 2019. “Jihadi Jack” parents guilty of funding terrorism - BBC News. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-oxfordshire-48676894 [Accessed 
September 25, 2019]. 
 BBC, 2018. Ads on the frontline: Changing hearts and minds. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-44156360 [Accessed June 19, 
2018]. 
BBC, 2017. Police launch two-week weapons surrender in England and Wales -. Available 
at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-41964031 [Accessed February 4, 2019]. 
Becker, M., 1974. The Health Belief Model and Personal Health Behavior. Health Education 
Monographs, 2, pp.324–473. 
Beetham, D., 2013. Revisiting Legitimacy, Twenty Years On. In Legitimacy and Criminal 
Justice: An International Exploration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Beetham, D., 1991. The Legitimation of Power. Issues in political theory, p.viii, 267. 
Available at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8Ju7BgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&
dq=The+Legitimation+of+Power&ots=pwVlr-
9txn&sig=5ZqLSN2UyUJSW_5f11Odcm4fNOY#v=onepage&q=The Legitimation of 
Power&f=true [Accessed July 7, 2017]. 
Bellasio, J. et al., 2018. Counterterrorism evaluation: Taking stock and looking ahead, 
Available at: file:///C:/Users/Ada/Downloads/RAND_RR2628.pdf [Accessed 
February 12, 2020]. 
Bennet, T., 1998. Crime Prevention. In The Handbook of Crime and Punishment. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Berg, B., 2009. Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, Boston: Pearson. 
Berkowitz, L., 1978. Decreased helpfulness with increased group size through lessening 
the effects of the needy individual’s dependency. Journal of Personality, 46(2), 
pp.299–310. Available at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1467-
6494.1978.tb00181.x [Accessed August 25, 2017]. 
Bermingham, A. et al., 2009. Combining social network analysis and sentiment analysis to 
explore the potential for online radicalisation. In International Conference on 
Advances in Social Network Analysis and Mining. pp. 231–236. Available at: 
http://www.youtube.com [Accessed March 14, 2019]. 
Berns, G., 2010. Iconoclast : A Neuroscientist Reveals How to Think Differently, Harvard 
Business Press. 
Bertelsen, P., 2015. Danish Preventive Measures and De-radicalization Strategies: The 
Aarhus Model. Panorama Insights into Asian and European Affairs, 1, pp.241–253. 
Available at: 
http://psy.au.dk/fileadmin/Psykologi/Forskning/Preben_Bertelsen/Avisartikler_ra
dikalisering/Panorama.pdf [Accessed January 25, 2019]. 
242 
 
Beyers, J. et al., 2014. Let’s talk! On the practice and method of interviewing policy experts. 
Interest Groups & Advocacy, pp.174–187. 
Biddle, B.J., Bank, B.J. & Slavings, R.L., 1987. Norms, Preferences, Identities and Retention 
Decisions. Social Psychology Quarterly, 50(4), p.322. Available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2786817?origin=crossref [Accessed November 16, 
2016]. 
Billig, M. & Tajfel, H., 1973. Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behaviour. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 3(1), pp.27–52. Available at: 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/ejsp.2420030103 [Accessed November 14, 2016]. 
Bjørgo, T., 2015. Preventing crime : a holistic approach, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan. Available at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=NT_eCgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&
dq=Preventing+Crime:+A+Holistic+Approach&ots=yJ-
n04H0B2&sig=VnBlcl7ek0diiXSddlE9rAEGCRQ#v=onepage&q=Preventing 
Crime%3A A Holistic Approach&f=false [Accessed February 18, 2020]. 
Blackbourn, J. & Walker, C., 2016. Interdiction and indoctrination: The counter-terrorism 
and security act 2015. Modern Law Review, 79(5), pp.840–870. Available at: 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/1468-2230.12217 
[Accessed February 19, 2020]. 
Blackwood, L., Hopkins, N. & Reicher, S., 2016. From Theorizing Radicalization to 
Surveillance Practices: Muslims in the Cross Hairs of Scrutiny. Political Psychology, 
37(5), pp.597–612. Available at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/pops.12284 
[Accessed February 28, 2019]. 
Blaug, R. & Schwarzmantel, J., 2000. Democracy: A Reader, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
Blick, A., Choudhury, T. & Weir, S., 2006. The Rules of the Game Terrorism, Community 
and Human Rights. Available at: 
http://www.jrrt.org.uk/sites/jrrt.org.uk/files/documents/Terrorism_final.pdf 
[Accessed July 26, 2017]. 
Blumstein, A., Cohen, J. & Nagin, D.S., 1978. Deterrence and Incapacitation, Washington, 
DC: National Academy Press. 
Boateng, F.D., 2016. Crime Reporting Behavior: Do Attitudes Toward the Police Matter? 
Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 1, pp.1–26. Available at: http://0-
journals.sagepub.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/doi/pdf/10.1177/0886260516632356 
[Accessed August 24, 2017]. 
Boeckmann, R.J. & Tyler, T.R., 2002. Trust, respect, and the psychology of political 
engagement. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 32(10), pp.2067–2088. Available 
at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2002.tb02064.x [Accessed August 25, 
2017]. 
Bottoms, A., 2006. Incivilities, offence and social order in residential communities. In 
Incivilities: regulating offensive behaviour. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 239–280. 
Bowles, R., Reyes, M.G. & Garoupa, N., 2009. Crime reporting decisions and the costs of 
crime. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 15(4), pp.365–377. 
Available at: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10610-009-9109-8 [Accessed 
243 
 
August 24, 2017]. 
Boyatzis, R.E., 1998. Transforming qualitative information : thematic analysis and code 
development, Sage Publications. Available at: https://uk.sagepub.com/en-
gb/eur/transforming-qualitative-information/book7714 [Accessed January 10, 
2018]. 
Bradford, B., 2014. Policing and social identity: procedural justice, inclusion and 
cooperation between police and public. Policing and Society, 9463(May 2015), pp.1–
22. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2012.724068 [Accessed 
September 6, 2016]. 
Bradford, B., Jackson, J. & Stanko, E.A., 2009. Contact and confidence: revisiting the impact 
of public encounters with the police. Policing and Society, 19(1), pp.20–46. Available 
at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10439460802457594 [Accessed 
November 9, 2016]. 
Braun, V. & Clarke, V., 2013. Successful qualitative research: A practical guide for 
beginners. , (August), p.382. 
Braun, V. & Clarke, V., 2006. Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in 
Psychology, 3(2), pp.77–101. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa [Accessed 
January 10, 2018]. 
Brie re, C. & Weyembergh, A., 2018. Foreign Terrorist Fighters: De-Radicalisation and 
Inclusion vs Law Enforcement and Corrections in Denmark. In Needed Balances in Eu 
Criminal Law. Hart Publishing, pp. 257–285. Available at: 
https://www.forskningsdatabasen.dk/en/catalog/2395994970 [Accessed February 
12, 2020]. 
Briggs, R., 2010. Community engagement for counterterrorism: lessons from the United 
Kingdom. International Affairs, 86(4), pp.971–981. Available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40865006 [Accessed November 8, 2016]. 
Briggs, R., Fieschi, C. & Lownsbrough, H., 2006. All our experience of tackling terrorism 
tells us that the ‘ hardware ’ is useless without the ‘ software. Genome Research, 14, 
pp.1669–1675. Available at: 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=509277&tool=pmcentr
ez&rendertype=abstract [Accessed September 6, 2016]. 
Brown, E., 2007. Snitch: Informants, Cooperators, and the Corruption of Justice, 
PublicAffairs. 
Bullock, K., 2014. Citizens, Community and Crime Control, Palgrave Macmillan UK. Available 
at: https://www.dawsonera.com/readonline/9781137269331 [Accessed April 1, 
2019]. 
Bullock, K. & Sindall, K., 2014. Examining the nature and extent of public participation in 
neighbourhood policing. Policing and Society, 24(4), pp.385–404. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10439463.2013.844130 [Accessed 
April 2, 2019]. 
Bulmer, M., 1988. Some Reflections Upon Research in Organizations. In Doing Research in 
Organizations. London: Routledge, pp. 151–161. 
Butt, R. & Tuck, H., 2014. European Counter-Radicalisation and De-radicalisation: A 
244 
 
Comparative Evaluation of Approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and 
Germany. , p.42. Available at: http://www.eukn.eu/fileadmin/Files/News/De-
radicalisation_final.pdf [Accessed January 8, 2018]. 
Callero, P.L., 1985. Role-Identity Salience. Social Psychology Quarterly, 48(3), pp.203–215. 
Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3033681?origin=crossref [Accessed 
November 16, 2016]. 
Carrington, P.J. et al., 2003. Police Discretion with Young Offenders, Available at: 
https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/yj-jj/discre/pdf/rep-rap.pdf [Accessed 
February 14, 2019]. 
Carroll, J.S. & Johnson, E.J., 1990. Decision research : a field guide, Sage Publications. 
Carson, E.A. & Sabol, W.J., 2013. Prisoners in 2011. In Inmate Populations in Federal 
Prisons: Buildup Issues and Policy Options. pp. 101–150. Available at: 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf [Accessed February 13, 2020]. 
Casey, L., 2008. Engaging communities in fighting crime. London: Cabinet Office. Available 
at: http://www.safercommunitiesscotland.org/Documents/Engaging Communities 
in Fighting Crime (2008).pdf [Accessed October 28, 2016]. 
Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2012. Women and Preventing Violent 
Extremism: The U.S. and U.K. Experiences [White Paper]. , (July), pp.1–20. Available 
at: https://chrgj.org/document-center/women-and-preventing-violent-extremism-
the-u-s-and-u-k-experiences/ [Accessed February 6, 2020]. 
Chadwick, E., 1829. A Preventive Police. The London Review, i, pp.271–272. 
Charng, H.-W., Piliavin, J.A. & Callero, P.L., 1988. Role Identity and Reasoned Action in the 
Prediction of Repeated Behavior. Social Psychology Quarterly, 51(4), pp.303–317. 
Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2786758?origin=crossref [Accessed 
November 16, 2016]. 
Cherney,  a. & Murphy, K., 2013. Policing terrorism with procedural justice: The role of 
police legitimacy and law legitimacy. Australian & New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology, 46(3), pp.403–421. Available at: http://0-
journals.sagepub.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/doi/pdf/10.1177/0004865813485072 
[Accessed September 1, 2017]. 
Cherney, A. & Hartley, J., 2016. Policing and Society Community engagement to tackle 
terrorism and violent extremism: challenges, tensions and pitfalls Community 
engagement to tackle terrorism and violent extremism: challenges, tensions and 
pitfalls. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=gpas20 
[Accessed December 7, 2016]. 
Christmann, K., 2012. Preventing religious radicalisation and violent extremism: A 
systematic review of the research evidence. Youth Justice Board, pp.1–77. Available 
at: 
http://www.safecampuscommunities.ac.uk/uploads/files/2016/08/yjb_preventing_
violent_extremism_systematic_review_requires_uploading.pdf [Accessed June 29, 
2017]. 
Clampet-Lundquist, S., Carr, P.J. & Kefalas, M.J., 2015. The Sliding Scale of Snitching: A 
Qualitative Examination of Snitching in Three Philadelphia Communities. Sociological 
245 
 
Forum, 30(2), pp.265–285. Available at: 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/socf.12162 [Accessed 
February 13, 2020]. 
Clancy, A. et al., 2001. Crime, Policing and Justice: the Experience of Ethnic Minorities. 
Findings from the 2000 British Crime Survey, Available at: 
http://www.lemosandcrane.co.uk/dev/resources/HO - Crime, policing and 
justice.pdf [Accessed July 26, 2017]. 
Clarke, R. V. & Bowers, K., 2017. Seven misconceptions of situational crime prevention. In 
Handbook of Crime Prevention and Community Safety. pp. 109–142. Available at: 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=235583 [Accessed 
September 19, 2019]. 
Clarke, R. V. & Cornish, D.B., 1985. Modeling offenders’ decisions: A framework for 
research and policy. Crime and Justice, 6, pp.147–185. Available at: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1147498?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents [Accessed 
May 31, 2017]. 
Clarke, R. V, 1998. Defining Police Strategies: Problem Solving, Problem-Oriented Policing 
and Community-Oriented Policing. In Problem-Oriented Policing: Crime-Specific 
Problems, Criti-cal Issues and Making POP Work. Washington, D.C: Police 
ExecutiveResearch Forum. 
Clarke, R.V.G. & Felson, M., 2004. Routine activity and rational choice, Available at: 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=159999 [Accessed May 
31, 2017]. 
Cohen, L. & Manion, L., 1989. Research Methods in Education, London: Routledge. Available 
at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=mLh0Oza3V1IC&oi=fnd&pg=PR3&
dq=Action+Research:+Methods+of+Education&ots=SOCPHqwapo&sig=F0wWhYs7A
HhFpIzzNY8z3xlVkiU#v=onepage&q=Action Research%3A Methods of 
Education&f=false [Accessed January 9, 2018]. 
Cohen, L.E. & Felson, M., 1979. Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity 
Approach. American Sociological Review, 44(4), p.588. Available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2094589?origin=crossref [Accessed May 31, 2017]. 
Cohen, P., 1997. Policing the Working-class City. In Rethinking the Youth Question. London: 
Macmillan Education UK, pp. 110–138. Available at: 
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-1-349-25390-6_6 [Accessed February 13, 
2020]. 
Coicaud, J., 2013. Crime, Justice, and Legitimacy: A Brief Theoratical Inquiry. In Legitimacy 
and Criminal Justice: An International Exploration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
College of Policing, 2013. Command Structures. College of Policing. Available at: 
https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/operations/command-and-
control/command-structures/ [Accessed October 1, 2018]. 
Collier, P.M., 2001. Police performance measurement and human rights. Public Money and 
Management, 21(3), pp.35–40. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9302.00272 [Accessed 
February 10, 2019]. 
246 
 
Cornish, D.B. & Clarke, R. V., 2003. Opportunities, Precipitators and Criminal Decisions: A 
Reply to Wortley’s Critique of Situational Crime Prevention. In Theory for Practice in 
Situational Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press. 
Cornish, D.B. & Clarke, R. V., 1986. The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on 
offending, Springer-Verlag. Available at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=MPmmAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP
1&dq=ron+clarke+rational+choice+theory&ots=FBwbTrVqJK&sig=CwDqD8OZ4Iupf
nbe1PfjWz-zACs#v=onepage&q=ron clarke rational choice theory&f=false [Accessed 
September 4, 2019]. 
Cottrell, C.A. & Neuberg, S.L., 2005. Different emotional reactions to different groups: a 
sociofunctional threat-based approach to “prejudice”. Journal of personality and 
social psychology, 88(5), pp.770–89. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15898874 [Accessed November 8, 2016]. 
Council of the European Union, 2002. Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on 
combating terrorism, Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002F0475 [Accessed February 20, 2020]. 
Council of the European Union, 2005. EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and 
Recruitment to Terrorism, Available at: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST 14781 2005 REV 1 
[Accessed September 20, 2017]. 
Council of the European Union, 2008. Council Framework Decision of 28 November 2008 
amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, Available at: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32008F0919 [Accessed 
February 20, 2020]. 
Council of the European Union, 2014. Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation 
and Recruitment to Terrorism, Available at: 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9956-2014-INIT/en/pdf 
[Accessed September 20, 2017]. 
Crawford, A., 1998. Crime prevention and community safety : politics, policies, and practices, 
Longman. 
Crawford, A., 1999. The local governance of crime : appeals to community and partnerships, 
Oxford University Press. 
Crawford, A. & Evans, K., 2017. Crime Prevention and Community Safety. In Oxford 
Handbook of Criminology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 797–824. 
De Cremer, D., 2002. Respect and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: The Importance of 
Feeling Included. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28(10), pp.1335–1341. 
Available at: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/014616702236830 
[Accessed August 25, 2017]. 
De Cremer, D. & Tyler, T.R., 2005. Am I respected or not?: Inclusion and reputation as 
issues in group membership. Social Justice Research, 18(2), pp.121–153. Available at: 
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11211-005-7366-3 [Accessed August 25, 2017].. 
Crenshaw, M., 2001. Counterterrorism Policy and the Political Process. Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 24(5), pp.329–337. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/105761001750434204 [Accessed 
247 
 
January 30, 2020]. 
Cresswell, J., 2007. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five 
Approaches, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Creswell, J.W., 2003. Research design : qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods 
approaches, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Creswell, J.W., 2014. The Selection of a Research Approach. In Research Design. Available 
at: https://in.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-
binaries/55588_Chapter_1_Sample_Creswell_Research_Design_4e.pdf [Accessed 
September 4, 2019]. 
Crocker, J., Major, B. & Steele, C., 1998. Social stigma. In Handbook of social psychology. 
Boston: McGraw Hill, pp. 504–553. 
Crompton, R. & Jones, G., 1988. Researching White Collar Organisations: Why Sociologists 
Should Not Stop Doing Case Studies. In Doing Research in Organisations. London: 
Routledge, pp. 68–81. 
Cuddy, A.J.C., Fiske, S.T. & Glick, P., 2007. The BIAS map: behaviors from intergroup affect 
and stereotypes. Journal of personality and social psychology, 92(4), pp.631–648. 
Cuddy, A.J.C., Fiske, S.T. & Glick, P., 2008. Warmth and competence as universal 
dimensions of social perception: The Stereotype Content Model and the BIAS Map. In 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. New York: Academic Press, p. vol 40, 61–
149. 
Daly, J., Kellehear, A. & Gliksman, M., 1997. The public health researcher : a methodological 
guide, Melbourne: Oxford University Press. 
Deci, E. & Ryan, R., 2000. The “What” and “Why” of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the 
Self-Determination of Behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11(4), pp.227–268. Available 
at: 
https://selfdeterminationtheory.org/SDT/documents/2000_DeciRyan_PIWhatWhy.
pdf [Accessed April 5, 2019]. 
Deci, E.L. & Ryan, R.M., 1985. Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human 
Behavior, New York: Plenum Press. 
Deflem, M., 2010. The policing of terrorism : organizational and global perspectives, New 
York: Routledge. 
Demos, 2007. The Activist Police Force. 
Department for Education, 2015. The Prevent duty: Departmental advice for schools and 
childcare providers. , (June), p.11. Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta
chment_data/file/439598/prevent-duty-departmental-advice-v6.pdf [Accessed 
January 22, 2019]. 
Dion, D., 1998. Evidence and inference in the comparative case study. Comparative Politics, 
30(2), pp.127–145. 
Dixon, D., 1997. Law in policing : legal regulation and police practices, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. Available at: 
https://ezp.lib.unimelb.edu.au/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?
248 
 
direct=true&db=cat00006a&AN=melb.b2291545&scope=site [Accessed February 
10, 2019]. 
Docobo, J., 2005. Community policing as the primary prevention strategy for homeland 
security at the local law enforcement level. Homeland Security Affairs, 1(1), pp.1–12. 
Available at: file:///C:/Users/Ada/Downloads/1.1.4 (1).pdf [Accessed July 3, 2017]. 
Dolowitz, D.P. & Marsh, D., 2012. The Future of Policy Transfer Research. Political Studies 
Review, 10(3), pp.339–345. Available at: 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1478-9302.2012.00274.x 
[Accessed February 4, 2020]. 
Duffy, B. et al., 2008. Closing the gaps – crime and public perceptions. International Review 
of Law, Computers & Technology, 22(1–2), pp.17–44. Available at: 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1451723.1451726. 
Dumitriu, E., 2002. The E.U.’s Definition of Terrorism: The Council Frame- work Decision 
on Combating Terrorism. The German Law Journal, 5(585). Available at: 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56330ad3e4b0733dcc0c8495/t/56b92436a
b48def04c000e97/1454974006321/GLJ_Vol_05_No_05_Dumitriu.pdf [Accessed 
September 12, 2017]. 
Dunn, K.M. et al., 2016. Can you use community policing for counter terrorism? Evidence 
from. Police Practice and Research, 17(3), pp.196–211. Available at: 
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=gppr20 
[Accessed February 28, 2019]. 
Durkheim, E., 1961. Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology 
of Education, Available at: https://www.amazon.com/Moral-Education-Theory-
Application-Sociology/dp/B000U2BN7W. 
Durkheim, E., 1984. The Division of Labor in Society. 2012, p.xxiv, 439 p. 
Eagly, A.H. & Chaiken, S., 1993. The psychology of attitudes, Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich College Publishers. 
Easby, A., 2016. Indigenous Research Methodologies, Available at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=VER1AwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1
&dq=social+research+colonial+view+axiology&ots=zvvfmRJOuT&sig=u5-
MivQgw4yNvBtrd-p864rZolA#v=snippet&q=axiology&f=false [Accessed February 
12, 2019]. 
Eck, J.E., 2000. Problem-oriented policing and its problems: The means over ends 
syndrome strikes back and the return of the problem-solver. 
Edwards, C., 2005. Changing Police Theories for 21st Century Societies, Federation Press. 
Ekblom, P., 1988. Getting the best out of crime analysis, Available at: 
http://library.npia.police.uk/docs/hopolicers/fcpu10.pdf [Accessed November 2, 
2016]. 
Ellemers, N., Doosje, B. & Spears, R., 2004. Sources of respect: The effects of being liked by 
ingroups and outgroups. European Journal of Social Psychology, 34(2), pp.155–172. 
Available at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/ejsp.196 [Accessed August 25, 2017]. 
Embedded, 2019. One Sister’s Journey To Find Her Brother Who May Have Joined ISIS : 
NPR. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/04/05/710489192/how-it-ends-
249 
 
part-1-the-brother [Accessed September 25, 2019]. 
Emmel, N., 2013. Sampling and choosing cases in qualitative research : a realist approach, 
London: SAGE. 
Esser, F. & Vliegenthart, R., 2017. Comparative Research Methods. In The International 
Encyclopedia of Communication Research Methods. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., pp. 1–22. Available at: 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/9781118901731.iecrm0035 [Accessed January 30, 
2020]. 
Esses, V.M. et al., 2001. The Immigration Dilemma: The Role of Perceived Group 
Competition, Ethnic Prejudice, and National Identity. Journal of Social Issues, 57(3), 
pp.389–412. Available at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/0022-4537.00220 
[Accessed November 8, 2016]. 
Farrington, D.P., 2000. Explaining and preventing crime: The globalization of knowledge. 
Criminology, 38(1), pp.1–24. Available at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1745-
9125.2000.tb00881.x [Accessed September 20, 2019]. 
Farrington, D.P. & Welsh, B.C., 2007. Saving Children from a Life of Crime: Early Risk Factors 
and Effective Interventions, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Felson, M., 1994. Crime and everyday life: Insight and implications for society. … Protect 
Themselves Against Crime." Lusk Review for …, p.169. Available at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Crime_and_Everyday_Life.html?id=OC9aA
AAAYAAJ&redir_esc=y [Accessed May 31, 2017]. 
Felson, M., Clarke, R. V & Webb, B., 1998. Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical theory for 
crime prevention, Available at: 
http://www.popcenter.org/library/reading/pdfs/thief.pdf [Accessed May 31, 2017]. 
Felson, R.B. et al., 2002. Reasons for Reporting and Not Reporting Domestic Violence To 
the Police. Criminology, 40(3), pp.617–648. Available at: 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2002.tb00968.x [Accessed August 24, 
2017]. 
Festinger, L., 1957. A theory of cognitive dissonance, California: Stanford University Press. 
Available at: https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=voeQ-
8CASacC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=A+Theory+of+Cognitive+Dissonance&ots=9y59Tuvd
tB&sig=PufsFwo4YKI_S1LE4gKFtiJ548o#v=onepage&q=A Theory of Cognitive 
Dissonance&f=false [Accessed June 1, 2018]. 
Fielding, N., 2006a. Fieldwork and Policing. In The SAGE Handbook of Fieldwork. London: 
Fielding, N, pp. 227–292. 
Fielding, N., 2006b. Fieldwork and Policing. In The SAGE Handbook of Fieldwork. London: 
SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 277–292. 
Finucane, M.L. et al., 2000. The affect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits. Journal 
of Behavioral Decision Making, 13(1), p.1. Available at: 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/a720/f4dcde0901c191dae016ee379638dd6b0bcf.
pdf [Accessed July 20, 2017]. 
Fishbein, M. & Ajzen, I., 1975. Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An introduction to 
theory and research, Available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237022?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. 
250 
 
Fiske, S.T., 1998. Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination. In Handbook of Social 
Psychology. John Wiley & Sons, pp. 357–411. 
FitzGerald, M., Hough, M. & Joseph, I., 2002. Policing for London : report of an independent 
study funded by the Nuf ield  oundation, the Esm e  airbairn  oundation and the Paul 
Hamlyn Foundation, Willan. 
Flyvbjerg, B., 2006. Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research. Qualitative 
Inquiry, 12(2), pp.219–245. Available at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1077800405284363 [Accessed February 
14, 2019]. 
Foddy, W., 2001. Constructing Questions for Interviews and Questionnaires: Theory and 
Practice in Social Research, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Foley, F., 2013. Countering terrorism in Britain and  rance : institutions, norms, and the 
shadow of the past, Cambridge University Press. 
Frank, J. et al., 1996. Citizen involvement in the coproduction of police outputs. Journal of 
Crime and Justice, 19(2), pp.1–30. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0735648X.1996.9721544 [Accessed 
April 2, 2019]. 
Frei, J.R. & Shaver, P.R., 2002. Respect in close relationships: Prototype definition, self-
report assessment, and initial correlates. Personal Relationships, 9(2), pp.121–139. 
Available at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/1475-6811.00008 [Accessed August 25, 
2017]. 
Froschauer, U. & Lueger, M., 2009. Expert Interviews in Interpretive Organizational 
Research. In Interviewing Experts. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 217–234. 
Fugard, A.J.B. & Potts, H.W.W., 2015. Supporting thinking on sample sizes for thematic 
analyses: a quantitative tool. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 
18(6), pp.669–684. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13645579.2015.1005453 [Accessed 
January 10, 2018]. 
Garland, D., 2001. The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society, 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Garland, D., 2000. The Culture of High Crime Societies. British Journal of Criminology, 
40(3), pp.347–375. Available at: 
https://watermark.silverchair.com/400347.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkh
W_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAmswggJnBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggJYMIICVAIBA
DCCAk0GCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQMBgBpaF4GUaTS8icEAgEQg
IICHjLDSL329Fload0bD-yEATo0HvGeAL9AY-DLFojV5wfV0zQT [Accessed 
September 19, 2019]. 
Garland, D., 1996. The limits of the sovereign state: Strategies of crime control in 
contemporary society. The British journal of Criminology, 36(4), pp.445–471. 
Available at: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/23638075?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents [Accessed 
May 31, 2017]. 
Geer, J.H. & Jarmecky, L., 1973. The effect of being responsible for reducing another’s pain 
on subjects’ response and arousal. Journal of personality and social psychology, 26(2), 
251 
 
pp.232–237. Available at: file:///C:/Users/Ada/Downloads/00005205-197305000-
00010.pdf [Accessed August 25, 2017]. 
Giddens, A., 1984. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Gilchrist, A., Bowles, M. & Wetherell, M., 2010. Identities and Social Action: Connecting 
Communities for a Change. Economic & Social Research Council, (September), pp.1–
49. Available at: http://www.cdf.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Identities-
and-social-action-Connecting-communities-for-a-change-A-Gilchrist-M-Wetherell-
and-M-Bowles-08.09.10-for-web.pdf [Accessed September 6, 2016]. 
Goffman, A., 2014. On the run: fugitive life in an American city, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Goffman, A., 2009. On the run: Wanted men in a Philadelphia Ghetto. American Sociological 
Review, 74(3), pp.339–357. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/27736067 
[Accessed February 13, 2020]. 
Goffman, E., 1963. Stigma. Notes on the management of spoiled identity. A Spectrum book, 
10, p.147. 
Goldberg, D., Jadhav, S. & Younis, T., 2017. Prevent: What is pre-criminal space? 
Psychiatrist, 41(4), pp.208–211. Available at: 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-
core/content/view/2E6C639BB6B6FB738B683C4B93ED67C4/S205646940000363
6a.pdf/prevent_what_is_precriminal_space.pdf [Accessed September 12, 2019]. 
Goldstein, H., 1979. Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach. Crime & 
Delinquency, 25(2), pp.236–258. Available at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/001112877902500207 [Accessed July 6, 
2017]. 
Goldstein, H., 1990. Problem-oriented policing, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Goudriaan, H., 2006. Reporting crime: Effects of social context on the decision of victims to 
notify the police. Available at: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Reporting-Crime-Effects-
Context-Decision/dp/B00E8L6QHI [Accessed December 20, 2016]. 
Goudriaan, H., Wittebrood, K. & Nieuwbeerta, P., 2006. Neighbourhood characteristics and 
reporting crime: Effects of social cohesion, confidence in police effectiveness and 
socio-economic disadvantage. British Journal of Criminology, 46(4), pp.719–742. 
Available at: http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/bjc/azi096 [Accessed 
November 16, 2016]. 
Granberg, D. & Holmberg, S., 1990. The intention-behavior relationship among U.S. ans 
Swedish voters. Social psychology quarterly, 53(1), pp.44–54. Available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2786868?origin=crossref [Accessed November 16, 
2016]. 
Greenberg, M.S. & Ruback, R.B., 1992. After the crime: Victim decision making, Springer US. 
Greer, S., 2010. Anti-terrorist laws and the United Kingdom’s suspect muslim community: 
A reply to pantazis and pemberton. British Journal of Criminology, 50(6), pp.1171–
1190. Available at: http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/bjc/azq047 
[Accessed November 8, 2016]. 
252 
 
Greeson, M.R., Campbell, R. & Fehler-Cabral, G., 2014. Cold or Caring? Adolescent Sexual 
Assault Victims’ Perceptions of Their Interactions With the Police. Violence and 
Victims, 29(4), pp.636–651. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/0886-6708.VV-
D-13-00039 [Accessed January 24, 2019]. 
Guest, G., Bunce, A. & Johnson, L., 2006. How Many Interviews Are Enough?: An 
Experiment with Data Saturation and Variability. Field Methods, 18(1), pp.59–82. 
Available at: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1525822X05279903 
[Accessed January 10, 2018]. 
Guest, G., MacQueen, K. & Namey, E., 2012. Applied Thematic Analysis, Thousand Oaks: 
Sage Publications. Available at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=VuWrexznC7sC&oi=fnd&pg=PR13
&dq=Applied+Thematic+Analysis&ots=YcC3L3DkaT&sig=gV6ONXsUr7hkipwKcwrZ
ndAkRlk#v=onepage&q=Applied Thematic Analysis&f=false [Accessed February 10, 
2019]. 
Hagger, M.S. & Chatzisarantis, N.L.D., 2014. An integrated behavior change model for 
physical activity. Exercise and Sport Sciences Reviews, 42(2), pp.62–69. Available at: 
https://insights.ovid.com/crossref?an=00003677-201404000-00004 [Accessed 
February 5, 2019]. 
Hagger, M.S. & Chatzisarantis, N.L.D., 2009. Integrating the theory of planned behaviour 
and self-determination theory in health behaviour: A meta-analysis. British Journal of 
Health Psychology, 14(2), pp.275–302. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18926008 [Accessed April 5, 2019]. 
Halpern, D., 2015. Inside the Nudge Unit: How Small Changes Can Make a Big Difference, 
Available at: 
https://books.google.com.au/books?id=BR98DAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=
Halpern,+Inside+the+Nudge+Unit&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjutYqc3aDdAhWQFo
gKHSXwCXIQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=Halpern%2C Inside the Nudge Unit&f=false 
[Accessed February 4, 2019]. 
Halpern, D. et al., 2004. Personal Responsibility and Changing Behaviour : the state of 
knowledge and its implications for public policy, Available at: 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/med
ia/cabinetoffice/strategy/assets/pr2.pdf [Accessed February 7, 2019]. 
Hannerz, U., 1969. Soulside : inquiries into ghetto culture and community, New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Hantrais, L., 1999. Contextualization in cross-national comparative research. International 
Journal of Social Research Methodology, 2(2), pp.93–108. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/136455799295078 [Accessed 
January 8, 2018]. 
Harris, A.T., 2004. Policing the city: crime and legal authority in London, 1780-1840, 
Available at: 
https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/search?index=books&linkCode=qs&keywords=9780
814209660 [Accessed May 25, 2017]. 
Heath-Kelly, C., 2017. The geography of pre-criminal space: epidemiological imaginations 
of radicalisation risk in the UK Prevent Strategy, 2007–2017. Critical Studies on 
Terrorism, 10(2), pp.297–319. Available at: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/88388/9/WRAP-Geography-pre-criminal-space-Heath-
253 
 
Kelly-2017.pdf [Accessed September 12, 2019]. 
Hedinger, T., 2000. To learn respect: Four adults share their stories of respectfulness. 
Doctoral dissertation Southern Illinois University, Carbondale. Dissertation Abstracts 
International Section A: Humanities and Social Sciences, 61(3068), p.UMI No. 
9982073. 
Hemmingsen, A.-S., 2015. An introduction to the Danish approach to countering and 
preventing extremism and radicalization, Available at: 
http://www.ft.dk/samling/20151/almdel/reu/bilag/248/1617692.pdf [Accessed 
September 22, 2017]. 
Herriott, R. & Firestone, W., 1983. Multisite Qualitative Policy Research: Optimizing 
Description and Generalizability. Educational Researcher, 12(2), pp.14–19. Available 
at: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.3102/0013189X012002014 [Accessed 
February 14, 2019]. 
Heuer, L. et al., 1999. A Deservingness Approach to Respect as a Relationally Based 
Fairness Judgment. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(10), pp.1279–1292. 
Available at: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0146167299258009 
[Accessed August 25, 2017]. 
Hickman, M.J. et al., 2011. ‘Suspect Communities’? Counter-terrorism policy, the press, and 
the impact on Irish and Muslim communities in Britain. London Metropolitan 
University, (July). 
Hillyard, P., 2004. Beyond criminology : taking harm seriously, Pluto Press. 
Hillyard, P., 1993. Suspect community : people’s experience of the Prevention of Terrorism 
Acts in Britain, Pluto Press in association with Liberty. 
Hinshaw, S.P., 2009. The mark of shame : stigma of mental illness and an agenda for change, 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
HMIC, 2012. Policing in Austerity: One Year on, Available at: 
https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/publications/policing-in-
austerity-one-year-on/ [Accessed February 14, 2019]. 
Hoffman, C. & Hurst, N., 1990. Gender stereotypes: perception or rationalization? Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 58(2), pp.197–208. Available at: 
http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=buy.optionToBuy&id=1990-14585-001. 
Hogg, M., 2006. Social identity theory. In Contemporary social psychological theories. Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 111–136. 
Hogg, M., Terry, D. & White, K., 1995. A tale of two theories: A critical comparison of 
identity theory with social identity theory. Social psychology quarterly, 58(4), 
pp.255–269. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2787127?origin=crossref 
[Accessed November 14, 2016]. 
Holmberg, L., 2002. Personalized policing Results from a series of experiments with 
proximity policing in Denmark. PIJPSM An International Journal of Police Strategies & 
Management, 251(1), pp.32–47. Available at: 
file:///C:/Users/Ada/Downloads/LarsHolmbergPersonalizedP.pdf [Accessed 
November 8, 2017]. 
Home Office, 1993. A Practical Guide to Crime Prevention for Local Partnerships, London. 
254 
 
Available at: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Practical-Guide-Crime-Prevention-
Partnerships/dp/B001A4BRAC [Accessed September 19, 2019]. 
Home Office, 1977. A review of criminal justice policy, 1976., London: Home Office. 
Home Office, 2017. Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent 
Programme, April 2016 to March 2017. Statistical Bulletin 23/17. Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta
chment_data/file/677646/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-
apr2015-mar2016.pdf [Accessed October 16, 2018]. 
Home Office, 2018a. CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism. 
HM Government, (June). CM 9680. Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta
chment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-
1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf [Accessed September 25, 2018]. 
Home Office, 2018b. Financial sustainability of police forces in England and Wales 2018, HC 
1501 Available at: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/Financial-sustainability-of-police-forces-in-England-and-
Wales-2018-Summary.pdf [Accessed February 14, 2019]. 
Home Office, 2018c. Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, 
April 2017 to March 2018, Statistical bulletin 31/18, London. Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta
chment_data/file/763254/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-
apr2017-mar2018-hosb3118.pdf [Accessed January 10, 2019]. 
Hope, T., 1995. Community Crime Prevention. In Building a Safer Society: Strategic 
Approaches to Crime Prevention. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hope, T., 1988. Support for Neighbourhood Watch: A British Crime Survey Analysis. In 
Communities and Crime Reduction. H.M. Stationery Office. 
Horgan, J., 2017. Issues in Terrorism Research. The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and 
Principles, 70(3), pp.193–202. Available at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0032258X9707000302 [Accessed June 
24, 2019]. 
Hough, M. et al., 2010. Procedural Justice, Trust, and Institutional Legitimacy. Policing, 
4(3), pp.203–210. Available at: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/methodology/pdf/JonJackson/Policing_pj.pdf [Accessed July 7, 
2017]. 
Hough, M., Clarke, R. V & Mayhew, P., 1980. Introduction. In Designing out Crime. London: 
HMSO. 
Hourihan, K., 1987. Local Community Involvement and Participation in Neighbourhood 
Watch: A Case Study in Cork, Ireland. Urban Studies, 24, pp.129–36. 
Huang, P.H. & Wu, H.-M., 1994. More Order without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms 
and Organizational Cultures. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organisation, 10(2), 
pp.390–406. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/764973 [Accessed July 20, 
2017]. 
Hughes, G., McLaughlin, E. & Muncie, J., 2002. Crime Prevention & Community Safety, 
London: SAGE. Available at: 
255 
 
http://www.springer.com/social+sciences/journal/41300. 
Hui, S.K., Bradlow, E.T. & Fader, P.S., 2009. Testing Behavioral Hypotheses Using an 
Integrated Model of Grocery Store Shopping Path and Purchase Behavior. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 36(3), pp.478–493. Available at: 
https://academic.oup.com/jcr/article-lookup/doi/10.1086/599046 [Accessed April 
24, 2019]. 
Huo, Y.J., 2006. Is pluralism a viable model of diversity? The benefits and limits of 
subgroup respect. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 9(3), pp.359–376. 
Available at: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1368430206064639 
[Accessed August 25, 2017]. 
Huo, Y.J., 2003. Procedural justice and social regulation across group boundaries: does 
subgroup identity undermine relationship-based governance? Personality and social 
psychology bulletin, 29(3), pp.336–348. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15273011 [Accessed September 1, 2017]. 
Huo, Y.J. et al., 2010. Subgroup respect, social engagement, and well-being: A field study of 
an ethnically diverse high school. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 
16(3), pp.427–436. Available at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20658887 
[Accessed August 25, 2017]. 
Huo, Y.J. & Binning, K.R., 2008. Why the Psychological Experience of Respect Matters in 
Group Life: An Integrative Account. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 
24(10), pp.1570–1585. Available at: http://kbinning.bol.ucla.edu/huo_binning.pdf 
[Accessed August 25, 2017]. 
Huq, A.Z., Tyler, T.R. & Schulhofer, S.J., 2011. Why does the public cooperate with law 
enforcement? The influence of the purposes and targets of policing. Psychology, 
Public Policy, and Law, 17(3), pp.419–450. Available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1757263 [Accessed 
September 1, 2017]. 
Husain, S., 1988. Neighbourhood Watch in England and Wales: A Locational Analysis, 
Huskinson, T.L.H. & Haddock, G., 2004. Individual differences in attitude structure: 
Variance in the chronic reliance on affective and cognitive information. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 40(1), pp.82–90. Available at: 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S002210310300060X [Accessed August 
24, 2017]. 
Ingersoll-Dayton, B. & Saengtienchai, C., 1999. Respect for the elderly in Asia: stability and 
change. International journal of aging & human development, 48(2), pp.113–130. 
Available at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10376957 [Accessed August 25, 
2017]. 
Inglis, G. & Shepherd, S., 2007. Confidence in the police complaints system: a second 
survey of the general population in 2007. Available at: 
https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Documents/research_stats/public_conf
idence_survey_2007.pdf [Accessed July 28, 2017]. 
Innes, M. et al., 2011. Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing, Available at: 
https://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/TAM/2011/PREVENT Innes 0311 Final 
send 2.pdf [Accessed September 20, 2019]. 
256 
 
Innes, M. et al., 2007. Hearts and Minds and Eyes and Ears: reducing radicalisation risks 
through reassurance-oriented policing. 
Innes, M., 2006. Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror through Community Intelligence 
and Democratic Policing. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 605(1), pp.222–241. Available at: 
http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/605/1/222%5Cnhttp://orca.cf.ac.uk
/3138/ [Accessed December 16, 2016]. 
Innes, M., 2005. Why “Soft” policing is hard: On the curious development of reassurance 
policing, how it became neighbourhood policing and what this signifies about the 
politics of police reform. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 15(3), 
pp.156–169. Available at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/casp.818 [Accessed 
December 16, 2016]. 
Innes, M., Roberts, C. & Lowe, T., 2017. A Disruptive Influence? “Prevent-ing” Problems 
and Countering Violent Extremism Policy in Practice. Law and Society Review, 51(2), 
pp.252–281. Available at: 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/lasr.12267 [Accessed 
February 18, 2020]. 
Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016. Highlights: Measuring and understanding the 
impact of terrorism. Global Terrorism Index, pp.1–4. Available at: 
http://45.55.217.203/app/uploads/2017/03/GTI16_Four-Pager_WEB.pdf [Accessed 
November 1, 2017]. 
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2018. The 2017 Attacks: What Needs To 
Change, Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-
DemBSSMo_tb2JDcFhORnZ1d0NrbUhzT1Q5QzU5dS1McGU0/view [Accessed 
January 25, 2019]. 
International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2014. Using Community Policing to Counter 
Violent Extremism: 5 Key Principles for Law Enforcement, Available at: 
http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/Final Key Principles Guide.pdf 
[Accessed November 7, 2016]. 
Ipsos Mori, 2016. Public Confidence in the Police Complaints System 2016 report 
prepared for the Independent Police. Available at: 
https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Documents/guidelines_reports/IPCC_P
ublic_Confidence_Survey_2016.pdf [Accessed July 28, 2017]. 
Jackson, J. et al., 2009. Does the Fear of Crime Erode Public Confidence in Policing? 
Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 3(1), pp.100–
111. Available at: https://academic.oup.com/policing/article-
lookup/doi/10.1093/police/pan079 [Accessed December 16, 2016]. 
Jackson, R., 2008. Counter-terrorism and communities: an interview with Robert Lambert. 
Critical Studies on Terrorism, 1(2), pp.293–308. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17539150802184678#aHR0cDovL
3d3dy50YW5kZm9ubGluZS5jb20vZG9pL3BkZi8xMC4xMDgwLzE3NTM5MTUwODA
yMTg0Njc4QEBAMA== [Accessed November 3, 2015]. 
James, P., 2006. Globalism, Nationalism, Tribalism: Bringing Theory Back In – Volume 2 of 
Towards a Theory of Abstract Community, lon: Sage Publications. Available at: 
https://www.academia.edu/1642214/Globalism_Nationalism_Tribalism_Bringing_T
heory_Back_In_2006_ [Accessed April 25, 2019]. 
257 
 
Jones, H.M.F., 2002. Respecting Respect: Exploring a great deal. Educational Studies, 28(4), 
pp.341–352. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0305569022000042381 [Accessed 
August 25, 2017]. 
Jones, T. & Newburn, T., 2007. Policy transfer and criminal justice, Maidenhead: Open 
University Press. 
Joshi, A. & Moore, M., 2004. Institutionalised Co-production: Unorthodox Public Service 
Delivery in Challenging Environments. Journal of Development Studies, 40(4), pp.31–
49. 
Jost, J. & Banaji, M., 2004. The Role of Stereotiping in System-Justification and the 
Production of False Consciusness. In Political Psychology: Key Readings (Key Readings 
in Social Psychology). Kelley Schlenker Tversky & Kahneman Tajfel Tajfel & Turner, 
pp. 292–308. 
Kahneman, D., 2000. Experienced Utility and Objective Happiness: A Moment-Based 
Approach. In Choices, Values and Frames. pp. 673–692. Available at: 
https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/podzim2013/PSY268/um/43421299/kahneman_experi
enced_utility_and_objective_happiness.pdf [Accessed July 20, 2017]. 
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A., 1974. Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases, 
Available at: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0036-
8075%2819740927%293%3A185%3A4157%3C1124%3AJUUHAB%3E2.0.CO%3B
2-M [Accessed December 20, 2016]. 
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A., 1979. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. 
Econometrica, 47(2), p.263. Available at: 
https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/9789814417358_0006 
[Accessed September 4, 2019]. 
Kaiser, F.G. & Shimoda, T. a., 1999. Responsibility as a predictor of ecological behaviour. 
Journal of Environmental Psychology, 19(3), pp.243–253. Available at: 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S027249449899123X [Accessed August 
25, 2017]. 
Kasarda, J.D. & Janowitz, M., 1974. Community Attachment in Mass Society. American 
Sociological Review, 39(3), pp.328–339. Available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2094293?origin=crossref [Accessed November 16, 
2016]. 
Katz, D., 1960. The functional approach to the study of attitudes. Public Opinion Quarterly, 
24(2, Special Issue: Attitude Change), pp.163–204. Available at: 
https://academic.oup.com/poq/article-lookup/doi/10.1086/266945 [Accessed 
August 24, 2017]. 
Katz, D., Sarnoff, I. & McClintock, C., 1956. Ego-defense and attitude change. Human 
Relations, 9(1), pp.27–54. Available at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/001872675600900102 [Accessed August 
24, 2017]. 
Katzenstein, P.J., 2003. Same War: Different Views: Germany, Japan, and Counterterrorism. 
International Organization, 57, pp.731–760. Available at: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3594845 [Accessed January 30, 2020]. 
258 
 
Kaukinen, C., 2002. The help-seeking decisions of violent crime victims: An examination of 
the direct and conditional effects of gender and the victim-offender relationship. 
Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 17(4), pp.432–456. Available at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0886260502017004006 [Accessed 
August 24, 2017]. 
Kazdin, A.E. et al., 1997. Contributions of risk-factor research to developmental 
psychopathology. Clinical psychology review, 17(4), pp.375–406. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9199858 [Accessed September 20, 2019]. 
Kelling, G.L. & Wilson, J.Q., 1982. Broken windows. The Atlantic, (March), pp.1–18. 
Kelman, H.C., 1958. Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of 
Attitude Change. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2, pp.51–60. Available at: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/172844 [Accessed August 24, 2017]. 
Kelman, H.C., 1961. Processes of Opinion Change. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 25(1), 
pp.57–78. Available at: https://academic.oup.com/poq/article-
lookup/doi/10.1086/266996 [Accessed August 24, 2017]. 
Kitchen, S., Michaelson, J. & Wood, N., 2006. 2005 Citizenship Survey: Race and faith topic 
report, West Yorkshire. Available at: www.communities.gov.uk. 
Kivunja, C. & Kuyini, A.B., 2017. Understanding and Applying Research Paradigms in 
Educational Contexts. International Journal of Higher Education, 6(5), p.26. Available 
at: file:///C:/Users/Ada/Downloads/12169-43505-1-PB.pdf [Accessed February 12, 
2019]. 
Koshrokhavar, F., 2005. Suicide bombers: The new martyrs of Allah., Pluto Press. 
Kramer, R.. & Jost, J., 2002. Close encounters of the suspicious kind: Out-group paranoia in 
hierarchical trust dilemmas. In From prejudice to intergroup emotions: Differentiated 
reactions to social groups. New York: Psychology Press, pp. 153–189. 
Kunda, Z. & Oleson, K.C., 1995. Maintaining stereotypes in the face of disconfirmation: 
Constructing grounds for subtyping deviants. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 68(4), pp.565–579. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7738766 [Accessed November 16, 2016]. 
Kundnani, A., 2009. Spooked. Available at: http://www.irr.org.uk/pdf2/spooked.pdf 
[Accessed October 29, 2015]. 
LaFree, G. & Dugan, L., 2004. How Does Studying Terrorism Compare to Studying Crime? 
In Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Criminological Perspectives. pp. 53–74. Available 
at: http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/10.1108/S1521-
6136%282004%290000005006 [Accessed November 7, 2016]. 
Lakhani, S., 2012. Preventing Violent Extremism: Perceptions of Policy from Grassroots 
and Communities. Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 51(2), pp.190–206. Available 
at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/j.1468-
2311.2011.00685.x [Accessed February 5, 2020]. 
Langdon, S.W., 2007. Conceptualizations of respect: Qualitative and quantitative evidence 
of four (five) themes. The Journal of Psychology, 141(5), pp.469–484. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17933402 [Accessed August 25, 2017]. 
Langdon, S.W. & Preble, W., 2003. Qualitative and quantitative definitions and experiences 
259 
 
of respect in adolescents. Poster session presented at Society for Research in Child 
Development conference, Tampa, FL. 
Lapinski, M. & Mastro, D.E., 2000. A Social Identity Approach to Understanding the Jury 
Decision ­ Making Process : Race as a Social Indicator. In The Journal of Intergroup 
Relations. 
Lavrakas, P.. & Herz, E.., 1982. Citizen Participation in Neighborhood Crime Prevention. 
Criminology, 20(3–4), pp.479–498. Available at: 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1745-9125.1982.tb00473.x [Accessed April 2, 
2019]. 
Lawrence-Lightfoot, S., 2000. Respect : an exploration, Perseus Books. 
Laycock, G. & Tilley, N., 1995. Policing and Neighbourhood Watch: Strategic Issues. Police 
Research Group. Available at: 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.437.4882&rep=rep1&ty
pe=pdf [Accessed April 2, 2019]. 
Leary, J.D., Brennan, E.M. & Briggs, H.E., 2005. The African American Adolescent Respect 
Scale: A Measure of a Prosocial Attitude. Research on Social Work Practice, 15(6), 
pp.462–469. Available at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1049731505277717 [Accessed August 
25, 2017]. 
Leonard-Barton, D., 1990. A dual methodology for case studies: Synergistic use of a 
longitudinal single site with replicated multiple sites. Organizational Science, 3(1), 
pp.248–266. 
Lewis, A., 2008. The Cambridge Handbook of Psychology and Economic Behaviour 
Psychologists, Cambridge University Press. 
Liamputtong, P., 2009. Qualitative data analysis: Conceptual and practical considerations. 
Health Promotion Journal of Australia, 20(2), pp.133–139. 
Liddle, H.A., 2004. Family-based therapies for adolescent alcohol and drug use: research 
contributions and future research needs. Addiction, 99, pp.76–92. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15488107 [Accessed January 23, 2019]. 
Lincoln, Y. & Guba, E., 2002. The only generalization is: There is no generalization. In Case 
study method. London: SAGE, pp. 27–44. 
Lincoln, Y.S. & Guba, E.G., 1985. Naturalistic inquiry, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Available at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=2oA9aWlNeooC&oi=fnd&pg=PA5&
sig=GoKaBo0eIoPy4qeqRyuozZo1CqM&dq=naturalistic+inquiry&prev=http://schola
r.google.com/scholar%3Fq%3Dnaturalistic%2Binquiry%26num%3D100%26hl%3
Den%26lr%3D&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=natu [Accessed February 14, 2019]. 
Lind, E.A. & Tyler, T.R., 1988. The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice, Boston, MA: 
Springer US. Available at: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-1-4899-2115-4 
[Accessed August 25, 2017]. 
Lindekilde, L., 2012. Neo-liberal governing of “radicals”: Danish radicalization prevention 
policies and potential iatrogenic effects. International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 
6(1), pp.109–125. Available at: 
https://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/view/2933 [Accessed February 12, 
260 
 
2020]. 
Lloyd, K. & Foster, J., 2009. Citizen Focus and Community Engagement: A Review of the 
Literature. Available at: http://www.police-
foundation.org.uk/uploads/catalogerfiles/citizen-focus-and-community-
engagement-a-review-of-the-literature/citizen_focus.pdf [Accessed November 1, 
2016]. 
Loader, I. & Mulcahy, A., 2003. Policing and the Conditin of England: Memory,Politics and 
Culture, Oxford University Press. 
Lofland, J. et al., 2006. Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observation and 
Analysis, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company. Available at: 
http://library.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/toc/z2007_865.pdf [Accessed January 9, 2018]. 
Lowe, D., 2015. Policing terrorism : research studies into police counterterrorism 
investigations, CRC Press. 
Lowe, D., 2017. Prevent strategies: The problems associated in defining extremism: The 
case of the United Kingdom. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 40(11), pp.917–933. 
Available at: 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1253941?needAcc
ess=true [Accessed February 19, 2020]. 
Lowe, T. & Innes, M., 2008. Countering terror: Violent radicalisation and situational 
intelligence. Prison Service Journal, 179, pp.3–10. 
Luthar, S.S., 2003. Resilience and Vulnerability: Adaptation in the Context of Childhood 
Adversities. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 162(8), pp.1553–1554. Available at: 
www.cambridge.org [Accessed June 28, 2017]. 
Lynn, N. & Lea, S., 2012. Civil disputes and crime recording: Refusals, disinterest and 
powers in police witchcraft. British Journal of Criminology, 52(2), pp.361–380. 
MacCormick, N., 2007. Institutions of Law, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Mackenzie, S. & Henry, A., 2009. Community policing: A review of the evidence. 
Maio, G.R. et al., 2004. The function-structure model of attitudes: Incorporating the need 
for affect. In Contemporary perspectives on the psychology of attitudes. London: 
Psychology Press. 
Maio, G.R. & Haddock, G., 2014. The psychology of attitudes and attitude change, SAGE. 
Available at: http://www.uk.sagepub.com/books/Book230403 [Accessed August 24, 
2017]. 
Maio, G.R. & Olson, J.M., 1998. Values as truisms: Evidence and implications. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 74(2), pp.294–311. Available at: 
http://psych.cf.ac.uk/home2/maio/Maio & Olson JPSP 1998.pdf [Accessed August 
24, 2017]. 
Major, B. & Eccleston, C., 2004. Stigma and social exclusion. In Social Psychology of 
Inclusion and Exclusion. New York: Psychology Press, pp. 63–87. 
Major, B. & O’Brien, L.T., 2005. The Social Psychology of Stigma. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 56(1), pp.393–421. Available at: 
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070137 
261 
 
[Accessed November 16, 2016]. 
Mancini, P. & Hallin, D., 2012. Some caveats about comparative research in media studies. 
In The SAGE handbook of political communication. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, pp. 509–
517. 
Marin, R.J., 1981. The Living Law. In The Police Function in Canada. Toronto: Methuen, pp. 
18–19. 
Mason, M., 2009. Findings from the second year of the national Neighbourhood Policing 
Programme evaluation, London. Available at: 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4f74/00b81dc43faf4d12454faa2d68fbaec196cb.p
df [Accessed April 1, 2019]. 
Masten, J., 2009. “Ain’t No Snitches Ridin’’ Wit’ Us": How Deception in the Fourth 
Amendment Triggered the Stop Snitching Movement.” Ohio State Law Journal, 70(3), 
pp.701–753. Available at: http://stopsnitching.com/flash/index.htm [Accessed 
February 13, 2020]. 
Mauer, M., 2006. Race to incarcerate, New Press. 
McAfee, C.A. et al., 2019. Predicting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Advance Care Planning 
Using the Integrated Behavioral Model. Omega (United States), 78(4), pp.369–389. 
Available at: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0030222817691286 
[Accessed April 24, 2019]. 
Mccabe, A., Keast, R. & Brown, K., 2006. Community engagement : towards community as 
governance. In Governments and Communities in Partnership Conference. Available at: 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/10878014.pdf [Accessed September 2, 2019]. 
McCluskey, J.D. (John D., 2003. Police requests for compliance : coercive and procedurally 
just tactics, LFB Scholarly Pub. 
McConville, M. et al., 1991. Routledge Revivals: Case for the Prosecution, London: Routledge. 
Available at: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781351245388. 
McCulloch, J. & Wilson, D., 2015. Pre-crime: Pre-emption, precaution and the future, 
McMillan, D.W. & Chavis, D.M., 1986. Sense of community: A definition and theory. Journal 
of Community Psychology, 14(1), pp.6–23. Available at: 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/1520-
6629%28198601%2914%3A1%3C6%3A%3AAID-
JCOP2290140103%3E3.0.CO%3B2-I [Accessed April 25, 2019]. 
Medin, D.L., 1989. Concepts and Conceptual Structure. American Psychologist, 44(12), 
pp.1469–1481. Available at: http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/0003-
066X.44.12.1469 [Accessed April 17, 2019]. 
Merari, A., 1991. Academic Research and Government Policy on Terrorism. Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 3(1), pp.88–102. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546559108427094 [Accessed 
June 24, 2019]. 
Mertens, D., 2014. Transformative Paradigm: Mixed Methods and Social Justice. Journal of 
Mixed Methods Research, 1(3). Available at: http://0-
journals.sagepub.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/doi/pdf/10.1177/1558689807302811 
[Accessed December 7, 2017]. 
262 
 
Mertens, D.M., 2005. Research methods in education and psychology: Integrating diversity 
with quantitative and qualitative approaches 2nd ed., Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications. 
Mertens, D.M., 2012. Transformative Mixed Methods. American Behavioral Scientist, 56(6), 
pp.802–813. Available at: 
http://abs.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/02/01/0002764211433797 
[Accessed December 7, 2017]. 
Milkman, H. & Frosch, W.A., 1973. On the preferential abuse of heroin and amphetamine. 
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 156(4), pp.242–248. Available at: 
https://insights.ovid.com/crossref?an=00005053-197304000-00004 [Accessed 
January 23, 2019]. 
Miller, L., 2006. Practical police psychology : stress management and crisis intervention for 
law enforcement, Charles C Thomas. 
Miller, T. & Boulton, M., 2007. Changing constructions of informed consent: Qualitative 
research and complex social worlds. Social Science & Medicine, 65(11), pp.2199–
2211. 
Mills, C.W. (Charles W., 2000. The sociological imagination, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Mills, M., Van De Bunt, G.G. & De Bruijn, J., 2006. Comparative research: Persistent 
problems and promising solutions. International Sociology, 21(5), pp.619–631. 
Available at: http://euroac.ffri.hr/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Comparative-
Research_Problems-and-Solution.pdf [Accessed January 8, 2018]. 
Mistry, D., 2007. Community Engagement: Practical Lessons From a Pilot Project. , p.10. 
Available at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pubsintro1.html [Accessed 
November 10, 2016]. 
Montano, D.E. & Kasprzyk, D., 2015. The Theory of Reasoned Action, Theory of Planned 
Behavior and The Integrated Behavioral Model. In Health Behavior and Health 
Education: Theory, Research, and Practice. John Wiley & Sons, pp. 67–96. Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Danuta_Kasprzyk/publication/288927435_H
ealth_Behavior_and_Health_Education_Theory_Research_and_Practice/links/56eabb
1008ae95fa33c851df.pdf [Accessed April 5, 2019]. 
Moriarty, T., 1975. Crime, commitment, and the responsive bystander: Two field 
experiments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31(2), pp.370–376. 
Available at: http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED076923.pdf [Accessed August 25, 
2017]. 
Murphy, C., 2012. EU counter-terrorism : pre-emption and the rule of law, Hart. 
Murphy, K., Hinds, L. & Fleming, J., 2008. Encouraging public cooperation and support for 
police. Policing & Society, 18(2), pp.136–155. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10439460802008660 [Accessed 
November 16, 2016]. 
Murray, J., 2005. Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in 
Priorities? Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, 6(4), pp.347–361. 
Available at: http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/15614260500293986 
[Accessed November 7, 2016]. 
263 
 
Mushtaq, F., Bland, A.R. & Schaefer, A., 2011. Uncertainty and cognitive control. Frontiers 
in Psychology, 2(SEP), p.249. Available at: 
http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00249/abstract 
[Accessed May 23, 2019]. 
Myhill, A., 2012. Community engagement in policing Lessons from the literature. National 
Policing Improvement Agency. 
Myhill, A. & Bradford, B., 2012. Can police enhance public confidence by improving quality 
of service? Results from two surveys in England and Wales. Policing and Society, 
22(4), pp.397–425. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10439463.2011.641551 [Accessed 
November 16, 2016]. 
Myhill, A. & Quinton, P., 2011. It ’ s a fair cop? Police legitimacy, public cooperation, and 
crime reduction An interpretative evidence commentary. Available at: 
http://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Documents/Fair_cop_Full_Report.pdf 
[Accessed August 23, 2016]. 
Nagin, D.S., 1998. Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century. 
Crime and Justice, 23, pp.1–42. 
Natapoff, A., 2009. Snitching: Criminal informants and the erosion of American justice, 
Natapoff, A., 2004. Snitching: The institutional and communal consequences. University of 
Cincinnati Law Review, 73(2), pp.645–703. Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228168437_Snitching_The_Institutional_
and_Communal_Consequences [Accessed February 13, 2020]. 
Nelken, D., 2009. Comparative Criminal Justice. European Journal of Criminology, 6(4), 
pp.291–311. Available at: 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1477370809104684 [Accessed 
February 4, 2020]. 
Newburn, T. & Jones, T., 2007. Policy transfer and criminal justice : exploring US influence 
over British crime control policy. , p.190. 
Newton, J.-A., 2001. A Boredom Theory of Youth Criminality. Available at: 
http://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses_hons/335 [Accessed April 5, 2018]. 
O’toole, T. et al., 2016. Governing through Prevent? Regulation and Contested Practice in 
State–Muslim Engagement. Sociology, 50(1), pp.160–177. Available at: 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0038038514564437 [Accessed 
February 28, 2019]. 
Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, 2017. Channel: Dovetail pilot evaluation 
findings, Available at: http://www.hampshirepreventboard.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/Dovetail-evaluation-high-level-findings-and-next-
steps.pdf [Accessed September 27, 2018]. 
Onwuegbuzie, A.J. & Leech, N.L., 2007. A call for qualitative power analyses. Quality and 
Quantity, 41(1), pp.105–121. Available at: 
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11135-005-1098-1 [Accessed January 10, 2018]. 
Ostrom, E., 1996. Crossing the Great Divide : Synergy , and Development. World 
Development, 24(6), pp.1073–1087. 
264 
 
Pantazis, C. & Pemberton, S., 2009. From the “old” to the “new” suspect community. British 
Journal of Criminology, 49(5), pp.646–666. Available at: 
http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/bjc/azp031 [Accessed November 8, 
2016]. 
Pantazis, C. & Pemberton, S., 2011. Restating the case for the “suspect community”: A reply 
to Greer. British Journal of Criminology, 51(6), pp.1054–1062. Available at: 
http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/bjc/azr071 [Accessed November 8, 
2016]. 
Parker, D., Pearce, J. & Rogers, B., 2017. Prevent, Interdicting and Mitigating Extremims: 
Communication Requirements Report, Available at: http://www.fp7-
prime.eu/deliverables/PRIME_Communications_Requirements_Report.pdf [Accessed 
February 8, 2019]. 
Parks, R.B. et al., 1999. How officers spend their time with the community. Justice 
Quarterly, 16(3), pp.483–518. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07418829900094241 [Accessed 
April 3, 2019]. 
Passer, M.W. & Smith, R.E., 2007. Psychology : the science of mind and behavior, McGraw-
Hill Higher Education. 
Paternoster, R. et al., 1997. Do fair procedures matter? The effect of procedural justice on 
spouse assault. Law & Society Review, 31(2), pp.163–204. Available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3054098?origin=crossref [Accessed November 9, 
2016]. 
Pattavina, A., Byrne, J.M. & Garcia, L., 2006. An Examination of Citizen Involvement in 
Crime Prevention in High-Risk Versus Low- to Moderate-Risk Neighborhoods. Crime 
& Delinquency, 52(2), pp.203–231. Available at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0011128705284155 [Accessed April 2, 
2019]. 
Patton, M.Q., 2015. Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods: Integrating Theory and 
Practice. Qualitative research and evaluation methods, p.832. Available at: 
https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/eur/qualitative-research-evaluation-
methods/book232962 [Accessed January 9, 2018]. 
Pearce, J.M. et al., 2019. Encouraging public reporting of suspicious behaviour on rail 
networks. Policing and Society, pp.1–19. Available at: 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10439463.2019.1607340 
[Accessed April 24, 2019]. 
Petteruti, A. & Walsh, N., 2008. Jailing communities: The impact of jail expansion & 
effective public safety strategies. Available at: 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08-
04_REP_JailingCommunities_AC.pdf [Accessed February 13, 2020]. 
Piaget, J., 1932. The Moral Judgment of the. Available at: 
https://archive.org/details/moraljudgmentoft005613mbp [Accessed August 25, 
2017]. 
Pickering, S., McCulloch, J. & Wright-Neville, D., 2008. Counter-terrorism policing: 
Community, cohesion and security, Springer. Available at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=JRYu0wKYlskC&pg=PA26&lpg=PA26&dq=com
265 
 
munity+engagement+irish+terrorism&source=bl&ots=8IgPgGkEqA&sig=6QOdrPgc6
rzlEDKtobCynHzhAmw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi9l8qArqfVAhVhIMAKHXHnD4
8Q6AEIWDAJ#v=onepage&q=community engagement ir [Accessed July 26, 2017]. 
Police and Crime Committee, 2015. Preventing extremism in London Police and Crime 
Committee Members, London. Available at: 
https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/preventing_extremism_in_london_re
port.pdf [Accessed October 1, 2018]. 
Powell, K.A., 2011. Framing Islam: An Analysis of U.S. Media Coverage of Terrorism Since 
9/11. Communication Studies, 62(1), pp.90–112. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10510974.2011.533599 [Accessed 
November 16, 2016]. 
Putnam, R.D., 1995. Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital. Journal of 
Democracy, 6(1), pp.65–78. Available at: http://www.directory-
online.com/Rotary/Accounts/6970/Downloads/4381/Bowling Alone Article.pdf 
[Accessed April 2, 2019]. 
Putnam, R.D., 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, New 
York: Simon & Schuster. 
Quinton, P. & Morris, J., 2008. Neighbourhood policing : the impact of piloting and early 
national implementation. Home Office. Available at: 
https://openeyecommunications.typepad.com/Uploads/NHPImpactReport.pdf 
[Accessed April 1, 2019]. 
Rabasa, A. et al., 2010. Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, Available at: 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1053.html [Accessed February 2, 
2017]. 
Radicalization Awareness Network, 2018. Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and 
Violent Extremism to Terrorism: Collection of Approaches and Practices, Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-
practices/docs/community_engagement_and_empowerment_en.pdf [Accessed 
February 28, 2019]. 
Rangel, U. & Keller, J., 2011. Essentialism goes social: Belief in social determinism as a 
component of psychological essentialism. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 100(6), pp.1056–1078. Available at: 
http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/a0022401 [Accessed November 14, 
2016]. 
Reiner, R., 2010. The Politics of the Police, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Riezen, B. Van & Roex, K., 2009. Counter-terrorism in the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom : a comparative literature review study. Social Cosmos, 3(1), pp.97–110. 
Available at: file:///C:/Users/Ada/Downloads/52-190-1-PB.pdf [Accessed January 8, 
2018]. 
Riley, B.D. & Mayhew, P., 1980. Crime Prevention Publicity : an assessment. Home Office. 
Available at: 
https://popcenter.asu.edu/sites/default/files/Responses/crime_prevention/PDFs/R
iley&Mayhew_1980.pdf [Accessed September 19, 2019]. 
266 
 
Rios, V.M., 2011. Punished: Policing the lives of black and latino boys, New York University 
Press. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt16f99dh [Accessed February 
13, 2020]. 
Ritchie, J. & Spencer, L., 2002. Qualitative Data Analysis for Applied Policy Research. In The 
Qualitative Researcher’s Companion. Thousand Oaks: SAGE, pp. 305–330. 
Ritzer, G. ed., 2007. The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology Vol. 1479., New York, NY, USA: 
Blackwell Publishing. Available at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/9781405165518 
[Accessed April 25, 2019]. 
Roach, K., 2011. The 9/11 effect: Comparative counter-terrorism, Available at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=meZDxEpBAjsC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&
dq=cross+national+comparative+counter+terrorism+strategy&ots=rj3Vf8oEo2&sig=
r0qB6xA5PsAdQwR7fh2G0gX19Gc#v=onepage&q&f=false [Accessed January 8, 
2018]. 
Robson, C., 1993. Real world research. A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner 
Researchers, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc. 
Rogers, C., 2016. Plural policing., Policy Press. 
Rose, R., 2005. Learning from comparative public policy : a practical guide, Routledge. 
Rosenbaum, D., 1987. The Theory and Research Behind Neighbouhood Watch: Is It a 
Sound Fear and Crime Reduction Strategy. Crime and Delinquency, 35, pp.105–34. 
Rosenbaum, D.P., 2005. Attitudes toward the police: The effects of direct and vicarious 
experience. Police Quarterly, 8(3), pp.343–365. Available at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1098611104271085 [Accessed August 
24, 2017]. 
Rosenbaum, D.P. & Lurigio, A.J., 1994. An Inside Look at Community Policing Reform: 
Definitions, Organizational Change, and Evaluation Findings. Crime & Delinquency, 
40, pp.299–314. 
Rosenberg, M.J. & Hovland, C.I., 1960. Cognitive, affective, and behavioral components of 
attidudes. In Attitude Organization and Change: An Analysis of Consistency among 
Attitude Components. pp. 1–14. Available at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Attitude_organization_and_change.html?id
=mVp9AAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y [Accessed August 24, 2017]. 
Rosin, H., 2016. How Flipping The Script Helped Keep Young Muslims From Joining ISIS. 
Invisibilia. Available at: https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2016/07/15/485900076/how-a-danish-town-helped-young-muslims-turn-
away-from-isis [Accessed April 24, 2019]. 
Rowe, M., 2004. Policing, Race and Racism, Willan. Available at: 
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=GmiEUN49pGYC&pgis=1 [Accessed 
December 14, 2016]. 
Ruback, R.B. et al., 1999. Normative Advice to Campus Crime Victims: Effects of Gender, 
Age, and Alcohol. Violence and Victims, 14(4), pp.381–396. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10751046 [Accessed November 16, 2016]. 
Ryan, R. & Deci, E., 2000a. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic Definitions and New 
Directions. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 25(1), pp.54–67. Available at: 
267 
 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0361476X99910202 
[Accessed April 5, 2019]. 
Ryan, R. & Deci, E., 2000b. Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic 
motivation. American Psychologist all pages, 55(1), p.Whole Journal. Available at: 
https://selfdeterminationtheory.org/SDT/documents/2000_RyanDeci_SDT.pdf 
[Accessed April 5, 2019]. 
Sacks, H., 1992a. Lectures on Conversation, Vol. 1., Oxford: Blackwell. 
Sacks, H., 1992b. Lectures on Conversation, Vol. 2, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Safer and Stronger Communities Board, 2018. Operation Dovetail update, Available at: 
http://lga.moderngov.co.uk/documents/s16757/Operation Dovetail update.pdf 
[Accessed September 27, 2018]. 
Saldaña, J., 2013. The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers, 
Sampson, R.J., 2012. Great American city : Chicago and the enduring neighborhood effect, 
The University of Chicago Press. 
Sampson, R.J. & Groves, W.B., 1989. Structure and Crime: Testing Community Social-
Disorganization Theoryl. American Journal of Sociology, 94(4), pp.774–802. 
Sampson, R.J., Raudenbush, S.W. & Earls, F., 1997. Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A 
Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy. Science, 277(5328), pp.918–924. Available at: 
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/277/5328/918%5Cnpapers3://
publication/uuid/642BC5EA-C33B-499D-B031-47365798E6FD [Accessed 
November 16, 2016]. 
Sapolsky, R.M., 2018. Behave : The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst 8th ed., 
Vintage. 
Sapsford, R., 2007. Survey Research, London: Sage Publications. 
Sargeant, E., 2015. Policing and collective efficacy: the relative importance of police 
effectiveness, procedural justice and the obligation to obey police. Policing and 
Society. Available at: http://0-
www.tandfonline.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/doi/abs/10.1080/10439463.2015.1122008
#aHR0cDovLzAtd3d3LnRhbmRmb25saW5lLmNvbS53YW0ubGVlZHMuYWMudWsv
ZG9pL3BkZi8xMC4xMDgwLzEwNDM5NDYzLjIwMTUuMTEyMjAwOEBAQDA= 
[Accessed May 12, 2016]. 
Sarre, R., 1996. The state of community policing in Australia: Some emerging themes. In 
Australian policing: Contemporary issues. North Ryde: Butterworths, pp. 26–41. 
Schafer, J.A., 2013. The role of trust and transparency in the pursuit of procedural and 
organisational justice. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 8(2), 
pp.132–143. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/18335330.2013.821738 [Accessed 
September 17, 2019]. 
Schaufeli, W., 2013. What is Engagement? Employee Engagement in Theory and Practice, 
pp.1–37. 
Schnebly, S.M., 2008. The Influence of Community­Oriented Policing on Crime­Reporting 
Behavior∗. Justice Quarterly, 25(2), pp.223–251. Available at: 
268 
 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07418820802025009 [Accessed 
November 16, 2016]. 
Schuurman, B., 2018. Research on Terrorism, 2007–2016: A Review of Data, Methods, and 
Authorship. Terrorism and Political Violence, pp.1–16. Available at: 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2018.1439023 
[Accessed June 24, 2019]. 
Scott, M.S., 2010. Evaluating the effectiveness of problem-oriented policing. Criminology & 
Public Policy, 9(1), pp.135–137. Available at: 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f3fa/6f9b8057470384a33845b2cca2d56653734b.
pdf [Accessed September 19, 2019]. 
Sennett, R., 2004. Respect : the formation of character in an age of inequality, Penguin. 
Sentas, V., 2016. Policing the diaspora: Kurdish Londoners, MI5 and the proscription of 
terrorist organizations in the United Kingdom. British Journal of Criminology, 56(5), 
pp.898–918. Available at: https://academic.oup.com/bjc/article-
lookup/doi/10.1093/bjc/azv094 [Accessed February 5, 2020]. 
Service, O. et al., 2014. EAST Four simple ways to apply behavioural insights, Available at: 
https://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/BIT-
Publication-EAST_FA_WEB.pdf [Accessed February 7, 2019]. 
Shanaah, S., 2019. Alienation or Cooperation? British Muslims’ Attitudes to and 
Engagement in Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Extremism. Terrorism and Political 
Violence, pp.1–22. Available at: 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2019.1663829 
[Accessed September 26, 2019]. 
Sharot, T., 2017. The influential mind : what the brain reveals about our power to change 
others, Available at: 
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=VHo2DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA1
&dq=The+Influential+Mind:+What+the+Brain+Reveals+About+Our+Power+to+Chan
ge+Others&ots=mp8Gv7Sb2X&sig=2nH0ZuuC7EUNoO-
2WnjAHMY3kzo#v=onepage&q=The Influential Mind%3A What the Brain Revea 
[Accessed January 11, 2019]. 
Shavitt, S. & Nelson, M.R., 2002. The Role of Attitude Functions in Persuasion and Social 
Judgment. The Persuasion Handbook: Developments in Theory and Practice, pp.137–
154. Available at: 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=BF73461D1781682AD3
35C53ADA6702C0?doi=10.1.1.718.1207&rep=rep1&type=pdf [Accessed August 24, 
2017]. 
Sheldon, S.B. & Epstein, J., 2004. Getting Students to School: Using Family and Community 
Involvement to Reduce Chronic Absenteeism. School Community Journal, 14, pp.39–
56. Available at: https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ794822 [Accessed January 23, 2019]. 
Sherman, L.W., 2006. Evidence-based crime prevention, Routledge. 
Sherman, L.W., Bursik, R.J. & Grasmick, H.G., 1994. Neighborhoods and Crime: The 
Dimensions of Effective Community Control. Contemporary Sociology, 23, p.112. 
Shernock, S., 1986. A Profile of the Citizen Crime Prevention Activist. Journal of Criminal 
Justice, 14, pp.211–28. 
269 
 
Silke, A., 2001. The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism. 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 13(4), pp.1–14. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546550109609697 [Accessed 
June 24, 2019]. 
Silver, E. & Miller, L.L., 2004. Sources of Informal Social Control in {Chicago} 
Neighborhoods. Criminology, 42(3), pp.551–584. Available at: 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2004.tb00529.x [Accessed November 16, 
2016]. 
Silverman, T., 2017. U.K. Foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq: The need for a real community 
engagment approach. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 40(12), pp.1091–1107. 
Available at: 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1253991?needAcc
ess=true& [Accessed February 5, 2020]. 
Simon, B. & Stürmer, S., 2003. Respect for group members: intragroup determinants of 
collective identification and group-serving behavior. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 29(2), pp.183–193. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15272946 [Accessed August 25, 2017]. 
Singer, S.I., 1988. The fear of reprisal and the failure of victims to report a personal crime. 
Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 4(3), pp.289–302. Available at: 
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF01072455 [Accessed April 1, 2019]. 
Skogan, W.. et al., 2000. Public Involvement: Community Policing in Chicago, Washington, 
DC. Available at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/179557.pdf. 
Skogan, W.G., 2006a. Asymmetry in the Impact of Encounters with Police. Policing and 
Society, 16(2), pp.99–126. 
Skogan, W.G., 2005. Citizen Satisfaction with Police Encounters. Police Quarterly, 8(3), 
pp.298–321. Available at: 
http://pqx.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/1098611104271086 [Accessed 
November 9, 2016]. 
Skogan, W.G., 1989. Communities, Crime, and Neighborhood Organization. Crime & 
Delinquency, 35(3), pp.437–457. Available at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0011128789035003008 [Accessed April 
2, 2019]. 
Skogan, W.G., 2004. Community Policing Can It Work?, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning. 
Skogan, W.G., 1995. Crime and the Racial Fears of White Americans. The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 539(1), pp.59–71. Available at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0002716295539001005 [Accessed April 
2, 2019]. 
Skogan, W.G., 2006b. The promise of community policing. In Police innovation: Contrasting 
perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 27–43. 
Skogan, W.G. & Frydll, K., 2004. Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence, 
Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press. Available at: 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10419 [Accessed November 9, 2016]. 
Skogan, W.G. & Steiner, L., 2004. Community Policing In Chicago, Year Ten. An Evaluation of 
Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy, Chicago. Available at: 
270 
 
http://www.skogan.org/files/Community_Policing_in_Chicago_Year_Ten.pdf 
[Accessed April 1, 2019]. 
Smith, M.B., Bruner, J.S. & White, R.W., 1956. Opinions and personality, New York: John 
Wiley. Available at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Opinions_and_personality.html?id=xR4NA
AAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y [Accessed August 24, 2017]. 
Somekh, B. & Lewin, C., 2005. Research methods in the social sciences, Thousand Oaks: 
SAGE Publications. 
Spalek, B., 2012. Counter-terrorism : community-based approaches to preventing terror 
crime, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Spalek, B. & Lambert, B., 2007. Muslim communities under surveillance. Criminal Justice 
Matters, 68(1), pp.12–13. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09627250708553274 [Accessed 
November 16, 2016]. 
Spalek, B., Muḥammad ʻAwwā, S. & McDonald, L.., 2008. Police-Muslim Engagement and 
Partnerships for the Purposes of Counter-Terrorism: An Examination. 
Sparks, P. & Shepherd, R., 1992. Sparks and Shepherd Self-identity and the theory of 
planned behavior: Assesing the role of identification with Green Consumerism. 
Source: Social Psychology Quarterly, 55(4), pp.388–399. Available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2786955?origin=crossref [Accessed November 16, 
2016]. 
Spears, R., Ellemers, N. & Doosje, B., 2005. Let me count the ways in which I respect thee: 
Does competence compensate or compromise lack of liking from the group? 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 35(2), pp.263–279. Available at: 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/ejsp.248 [Accessed August 25, 2017]. 
Stake, R., 2005. Qualitative case studie. In The Sage handbook of qualitative research. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, pp. 443–466. 
Staniforth, A., 2014. Preventing terrorism and violent extremism. 
Staniforth, A., Walker, C. & Osborne, S., 2010. Blackstone’s counter-terrorism handbook, 
Oxford University Press. 
Stern, J., 2010. Mind over martyr: How to deradicalize islamist extremists. Foreign Affairs, 
89(1), pp.95–108. Available at: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/20699786?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents [Accessed 
December 16, 2016]. 
Stevens, D., 2001. Case studies in community policing, Prentice Hall. Available at: 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/app/abstractdb/AbstractDBDetails.aspx?id=190345 
[Accessed July 3, 2017]. 
Stewart, C., 2017. Countering Violent Extremism Policy in the United Stated. Available at: 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/56816/17Dec_Stewart_Craig.pdf
?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [Accessed February 7, 2020]. 
Story Maps, 2017. No Title. 2017 Terrorist Attacks. Available at: 
https://storymaps.esri.com/stories/terrorist-attacks/?year=2017 [Accessed 
November 1, 2017]. 
271 
 
Strauss, A.L. & Corbin, J.M., 1990. Basics of qualitative research : grounded theory 
procedures and techniques, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Strong Cities Network, 2017. Open House Event The Aarhus Model: Prevention of 
Radicalization and Discrimination in Aarhus, Available at: 
http://strongcitiesnetwork.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/Status_Prevention_of_Radikalization_English-1.pdf 
[Accessed January 14, 2019]. 
Stryker, S., 1968. Identity Salience and Role Performance : The Relevance of Symbolic 
Interaction Theory for Family Research Author. Journal of Marriage and Family, 
30(4), pp.558–564. Available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/349494?origin=crossref [Accessed November 16, 
2016]. 
Stryker, S., 1987. Identity theory: Developments and extensions. In Self and identity,. New 
York: Wiley, pp. 89–104. 
Stuart, H., 2015. Community Policing and Preventing Extremism : Lessons from Bradford. , 
4(4). Available at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/Community-Policing-and-Preventing-Extremism.pdf 
[Accessed July 25, 2017]. 
Sung, K.T., 2004. Elder respect among young adults: A cross-cultural study of Americans 
and Koreans. Journal of Aging Studies, 18(2), pp.215–230. Available at: 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0890406504000039 [Accessed August 
25, 2017]. 
Sunshine, J. & Tyler, T.R., 2003. The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping 
Public Support for Policing. Law and Society Review, 37(3), p.513–548+512. Available 
at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/1540-5893.3703002 [Accessed November 9, 
2016]. 
Szanton, P., 1981. Not Well Advised, Russell Sage Foundation : Ford Foundation. Available 
at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Not_well_advised.html?id=D6GNAAAAMA
AJ&redir_esc=y [Accessed February 14, 2019]. 
Tahiri, H. & Grossman, M., 2013. Community and radicalisation: An examination of 
perceptions, ideas, beliefs and solutions throughout Australia. , (September). 
Tajfel, H., 1978. Differentiation between social groups: studies in the social psychology of 
intergroup relations, Published in cooperation with European Association of 
Experimental Social Psychology by Academic Press. 
Tajfel, H., 2010. Social identity and intergroup relations, Available at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=q0wFY3Dcu1MC&oi=fnd&pg=PR1
1&dq=related:ZrMXulOFW9B4XM:scholar.google.com/&ots=qutju54vOp&sig=yPlCk
PNoeA1o7z5ckPA61bPXiWE [Accessed April 18, 2016]. 
Tajfel, H., 1969. Social and cultural factors in perception. In Handbook of social psychology. 
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Tajfel, H. & Turner, J., 1979. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In The social 
psychology of intergroup relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole., pp. 33–47. 
Tajfel, H. & Turner, J.C., 1986. The social identity of intergroup relations. In Psychology of 
272 
 
intergroup relations. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, pp. 7–24. 
Tamanaha, B., 2001. A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society, Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
Tarling, R. & Morris, K., 2010. Reporting crime to the police. British Journal of Criminology, 
50(3), pp.474–490. Available at: https://academic.oup.com/bjc/article-
lookup/doi/10.1093/bjc/azq011 [Accessed August 24, 2017]. 
Taub, R.P., Taylor, D.G. & Dunham, J.D., 1984. Paths of neighborhood change: race and crime 
in urban America, Available at: 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/abstractdb/AbstractDBDetails.aspx?id=95444 
[Accessed June 2, 2017]. 
Terry, D.J., Gallois, C. & McCamish, M., 1993. The theory of reasoned action: Its application 
to AID-preventive behavoiur, Pergamon Press. 
Terry, D.J., Hogg, M.A. & White, K.M., 1999. The theory of planned behaviour: self-identity, 
social identity and group norms. The British journal of social psychology / the British 
Psychological Society, 38 ( Pt 3)(3), pp.225–244. Available at: 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1348/014466699164149 [Accessed November 16, 2016]. 
The Cordoba Foundation, 2012. Terrorism and counter-terrorism: Spotlight on Strategies 
and Approaches. Arches Quarterly, 5(9), p.179. Available at: 
http://thecordobafoundation.com/attach/ARCHES_Vol5_Edition9.PDF#page=20 
[Accessed January 8, 2018]. 
Thiel, D., 2009. A Review of the Evidence. Available at: www.police-foundation.org.uk 
[Accessed July 24, 2017]. 
Thomas, G., 2011. How to do Your Case Study: A Guide for Students and Researchers, 
London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Thomas, P. et al., 2017. Community Reporting Thresholds: Sharing information with 
authorities concerning violent extremist activity and involvement in foreign conflict 
A UK Replication Study. Available at: 
https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/community-reporting-thresholds-full-report 
[Accessed January 20, 2019]. 
Thomas, P., 2014. Prevent and community cohesion in Britain: The worst of all possible 
worlds? In Counter-Radicalisation: Critical Perspectives. pp. 36–53. Available at: 
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/21522/3/ThomasPrevent.pdf [Accessed 
February 28, 2019]. 
Tilley, N., 2010. Whither problem-oriented policing. Criminology & Public Policy, 9(1), 
pp.183–195. Available at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2010.00619.x 
[Accessed September 19, 2019]. 
Tonry, M. & Farrington, D.P., 1995. Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention. In Building 
a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Topping, J.R., 2008. Community policing in Northern Ireland: a resistance narrative. 
Policing and Society, 18(4), pp.377–396. Available at: http://0-
www.tandfonline.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/doi/pdf/10.1080/10439460802094660?nee
dAccess=true [Accessed July 26, 2017]. 
273 
 
Travis, A., 2008. MI5 report challenges views on terrorism in Britain | UK news | The 
Guardian. The Guardian. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism1 [Accessed 
February 12, 2019]. 
Triandis, H.C., 1980. Values, Attitudes, and Interpersonal Behavior. In Nebraska 
Symposium on Motivation. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
Trojanowicz, R.C. & Carter, D., 1988. The philosophy and role of community policing, 
Available at: http://cj.msu.edu/assets/Outreach-NCCP-GB14.pdf [Accessed 
September 4, 2017]. 
Tuffin, R. et al., 2006. An evaluation of the impact of the National Reassurance Policing 
Programme, London. Available at: 
http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/police/pam024 [Accessed 
November 8, 2016]. 
Turner, J.C., 2010. Towards a cognitive redefinition of the social group. In Social identity 
and intergroup relations. Cambridge University Press. 
Tyler, T., Degoey, P. & Smith, H., 1996. Understanding why the justice of group procedures 
matters: A test of the psychological dynamics of the group-value model. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 70(5), pp.913–930. Available at: 
http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/0022-3514.70.5.913 [Accessed August 
25, 2017]. 
Tyler, T.R., 2004. Enhancing Police Legitimacy. Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, 593(1), pp.84–99. Available at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0002716203262627 [Accessed April 3, 
2019]. 
Tyler, T.R., 1997. Procedural Fairness and Compliance with the Law. Swiss Journal of 
Economics and Statistics, 133(2), pp.219–240. 
Tyler, T.R., 2001. Public trust and confidence in legal authorities: What do majority and 
minority group members want from the law and legal institutions? Behavioral 
Sciences and the Law, 19(2), pp.215–235. Available at: 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/bsl.438 [Accessed November 9, 2016]. 
Tyler, T.R., 1990. Why People Obey the Law Yale University Press New Haven. , p.299. 
Tyler, T.R. & Blader, S.L., 2000. Cooperation in groups: Procedural justice, social identity, 
and behavioral engagement, Psychology Press. 
Tyler, T.R. & Darley, J.M., 2000. Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views about 
Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating 
Substantive Law. Hofstra Law Review, 28, pp.707–739. Available at: 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers [Accessed November 10, 2016]. 
Tyler, T.R. & Fagan, J., 2009. Legitimacy and cooperation: Why do people help the police 
fight crime in their communities? Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 6, p.231-. 
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/3037 [Accessed 
November 16, 2016]. 
Tyler, T.R. & Huo, Y.J., 2002. Trust in the law: Encouraging public cooperation with the 
police and courts. Russell Sage Foundation series on trust., (December), p.xvi, 248. 
Available at: 
274 
 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/619994944?accountid=26262%5Cnhttp://gq
2ly2tu2b.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-
8&rfr_id=info:sid/PsycINFO&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:book&rft.genre=book
&rft.jtitle=&rft.ati [Accessed November 9, 2016]. 
Tyler, T.R. & Lind, E.A., 1992. A Relational Model of Authority in Groups. Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology, 25(C), pp.115–191. Available at: 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S006526010860283X [Accessed August 
25, 2017]. 
Tyler, T.R., Schulhofer, S. & Huq, A.Z., 2010. Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in 
Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans. Law and Society Review, 
44(2), pp.365–402. Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/ [Accessed 
November 8, 2016]. 
Tyler, T.R. & Smith, H., 1998. Social Justice and Social Movements. In The handbook of 
social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 2). pp. 595–629. 
Tyler, T.R. & Weber, R., 1982. Support for the Death Penalty: Instumental Response to 
Crime or Symbolic Attitude? Law & Society Review, 17(1), pp.21–45. Available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3053531?origin=crossref [Accessed August 24, 2017]. 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010. Making them work: Handbook on the 
crime prevention guidlines, Available at: 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_Crime_Prevention_Guid
elines_-_Making_them_work.pdf [Accessed June 28, 2017]. 
Van Dijk, J.J.M. & De Waard, J., 1991. A two-dimensional typology of crime prevention 
projects. Criminal Justice Abstracts, pp.483–503. Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jaap_De_Waard/publication/287994211_A_t
wo-
dimensional_typology_of_crime_prevention_projects_With_a_bibliography/links/567
bbab808ae1e63f1dff065.pdf [Accessed September 20, 2019]. 
Varki, S. & Colgate, M., 2001. The Role of Price Perceptions in an Integrated Model of 
Behavioral Intentions. Journal of Service Research, 3(3), pp.232–240. Available at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/109467050133004 [Accessed April 24, 
2019]. 
Vermeulen, F. & Bovenkerk, F., 2012. Engaging with violent Islamic extremism : local 
policies in Western European cities, Available at: 
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Engaging-Violent-Islamic-Extremism-
Policies/dp/9490947571 [Accessed February 6, 2020]. 
Vidino, L., 2010. The new Muslim Brotherhood in the West, Columbia University Press. 
Viki, G.T. et al., 2006. Race and willingness to cooperate with the police: The roles of 
quality of contact, attitudes towards the behaviour and subjective norms. 
BritishJournal of Social Psychology, 45(2), pp.285–302. Available at: 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1348/014466605X49618 [Accessed November 16, 2016]. 
Volteface, 2019. Icelandic Youth. Available at: http://volteface.me/publications/iceland-
report/3-the-evidence/ [Accessed January 23, 2019]. 
Waddington, P.A.J., 1999. Police (canteen) sub-culture. British Journal of Criminology, 
275 
 
39(2), pp.287–309. Available at: https://academic.oup.com/bjc/article-
lookup/doi/10.1093/bjc/39.2.287 [Accessed February 10, 2019]. 
Walker, C., 2018. Counter-terrorism and counter-extremism: the UK policy spirals. Public 
Law, Oct, pp.725–747. Available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3278296 [Accessed February 
19, 2020]. 
Walker, C., 2012. House of Commons Home Affairs committee: E-Crime. Available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/1446/144
6vw08.htm. 
Walker, C., 2010. Conscripting the public in terrorism policing: Towards safer 
communities or a police state? Criminal Law Review, (6), pp.441–456. Available at: 
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/7/6/7/3/p37
6731_index.html [Accessed February 19, 2020]. 
Walker, C. & Lennon, G., 2015. Routledge handbook of law and terrorism, Routledge. 
Walker, S., 1999. Broken Windows and Fractured History. In Community Policing: Classical 
Readings. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 
Waller, I., 2006. Less law, more order : the truth about reducing crime, Westport, Conn: 
Praeger Publishers. 
Watkins, A.M., 2005. Examining the Disparity between Juvenile and Adult Victims in 
Notifying the Police: A Study of Mediating Variables. Journal of Research in Crime and 
Delinquency, 42(3), pp.333–353. Available at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022427805275186 [Accessed August 
24, 2017]. 
Watson, D., 1992. Correcting for Acquiescent Response Bias in the Absence of a Balanced 
Scale:An Application to Class Consciousness. Sociological Methods & Research, 21(1), 
pp.52–88. Available at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0049124192021001003 [Accessed 
February 15, 2019]. 
Weber, M., 1968. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. In Readings 
in Economic Sociology. pp. 24–37. Available at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=MILOksrhgrYC&oi=fnd&pg=PR1&
dq=economy+and+society+weber+1968&ots=ozEzDk7dnN&sig=KHedvkgfd0KEOW
LOWk3dTjZ9nM0#v=onepage&q=economy and society weber 1968&f=false. 
Weisburd, D. et al., 2010. Is problem-oriented policing effective in reducing crime and 
disorder? Criminology & Public Policy, 9(1), pp.139–172. Available at: 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2010.00617.x [Accessed September 19, 
2019]. 
Weitzer, R., 1987. Policing Northern Ireland Today. The Political Quarterly, 58(1), pp.88–
96. Available at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1467-923X.1987.tb02578.x 
[Accessed July 26, 2017]. 
Welsh, B.C. & Farrington, D.P., 2010. The Future of Crime Prevention: Developmental and 
Situational Strategies, Available at: 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/237329.pdf [Accessed September 20, 
2019]. 
276 
 
Welsh, B.C. & Hoshi, A., 2006. Communities and Crime Prevention. In Evidence-Based 
Crime Prevention. New York: Routledge, pp. 165–197. 
White, M., Cox, T. & Basehart, J., 1994. Theoretical considerations of officer profanity and 
obscenity in formal contacts with citizens. In Police Deviance (3rd Edition). pp. 223–
244. Available at: 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=144551. 
White, S. & McEvoy, K., 2012. Countering Violent Extremism : Community Engagement 
Programmes In Europe. QAISS, pp.1–81. Available at: 
file:///C:/Users/Ada/Downloads/Countering_Violent_Extremism-_QIASS-_2012 
(2).pdf [Accessed July 26, 2017]. 
Wicker, A.W., 1969. Attitudes versus Actions: The Relationship of Verbal and Overt 
Behavioral Responses to Attitude Objects. Journal of Social Issues, 25(4), pp.41–78. 
Available at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1969.tb00619.x [Accessed 
August 24, 2017]. 
Wilson, J., 2000. Volunteering. Annual Review of Sociology, 26(1), pp.215–240. Available at: 
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.215 [Accessed April 
2, 2019]. 
Workman-Stark, A.L., 2017. Inclusive Policing from the Inside Out, Cham: Springer 
International Publishing. Available at: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-
53309-4 [Accessed February 10, 2019]. 
Wortley, R., 2010. Critiques of situational crime prevention. In Encyclopedia of Victimology 
and Crime Prevention. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. Available at: 
http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1301877/1/Wortley_2010_SCP_criticisms.pdf [Accessed 
September 19, 2019]. 
Wright, S., 2015. Police and Crime Commissioner involved in ground-breaking study to 
tackle violent extremism. Bradford Telegraph and Argus. Available at: 
https://www.thetelegraphandargus.co.uk/news/14116356.police-and-crime-
commissioner-involved-in-ground-breaking-study-to-tackle-violent-extremism/ 
[Accessed February 14, 2019]. 
Yankelovich, D., 2001. The magic of dialogue : transforming conflict into cooperation, Simon 
& Schuster. 
Yarwood, R. & Edwards, B., 1995. Voluntary Action in Rural Areas: The Case of 
Neighbourhood Watch. Journal of Rural Studies, 11, pp.447–59. 
Yin, R., 2010. Analytic Generalization. In Encyclopedia of Case Study Research. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, pp. 21–23. 
Yin, R.K., 2009. Case study research : design and methods (applied social research methods), 
London and Singapore: SAGE. 
Yin, R.K., 2003. Case study research: Design and methods 3rd ed., Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. 
Yin, R.K., 2014. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Zajonc, R.B., 1980. Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. American 
Psychologist, 35, pp.151–175. Available at: 
http://longevity.stanford.edu/blog/2011/02/04/feeling-and-thinking-preferences-
need-no-inferences/ [Accessed July 20, 2017]. 
277 
 
Zedner, L., 2007. Pre-crime and post-criminology? Theoretical Criminology, 11(2), pp.261–
281. Available at: http://tcr.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/1362480607075851 
[Accessed December 19, 2016]. 
Zhao, J.S., Scheider, M.C. & Quint, T., 2002. Funding community policing to reduce crime: 
Have COPS grants made a difference? Criminology & Public Policy, 2(1), pp.7–50. 
Available at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2002.tb00104.x [Accessed 
November 2, 2016]. 
Zimmermann, D. & Wenger, A., 2007. How states fight terrorism : policy dynamics in the 
West, Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
  
278 
 
Appendix A: Semi-Structured Interview Questions for Practitioners 
Questions for Frontline Practitioners 
1. Can you please describe your day at work – from the moment that you 
start work until you finish. 
2. How much of your daily work is actual foot patrol? 
3. How do you show your availability to members of the public? 
4. What is your understanding of community engagement? 
5. What do you think your superiors in the police hierarchy see community 
engagement as? 
6. Do you practice engagement in your daily work? How? 
7. How do you build a relationship with members of the community? 
8. How do you think the local people perceive the police? 
9. How do you think the local people perceive you, as a police officer? 
10. Do you think there is a difference between how the local people, in general, 
perceive you and those living in the community who you have daily contact with? Please 
explain. 
11. In the context of counterterrorism, how do you use engagement? 
12. How do you think the ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood perceive 
you? 
13. How do you, as part of community engagement, differentiate between 
identities and communities within a neighbourhood? 
14. How do you think the young members of the community perceive you?  
15. How do you approach younger people in the community? Can you give me 
an example? 
16. Is there a difference in how you approach younger members of the 
community in comparison to the rest of the community? Can you give me an example? 
17. What about the ethnic minorities? Do you approach them differently? 
How? 
18. How do you engage with other agencies in the community e.g. schools, 
health providers, religious institutes etc.?  
19. For you what is the most important aspect of engagement? Why? 
20. Can you give me an example of when community engagement has worked 
for you? 
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21. Do you think community engagement has any impact on crime-reporting 
behaviour? What about in the case of reporting individuals at risk of 
radicalisation/extremism? 
22. How do you try to make cooperation with police more appealing through 
community engagement? 
23. What do you think community engagement should be about? 
24. What do you think the community needs from engagement so that it can be 
effective in preventing crime? 
25. From your experience, how do you think the public perceives the risks of 
reporting to the police? 
26. From your experience, which part of the community is MORE likely to 
cooperate and engage with the police? Explain. 
27. From your experience, which part of the community is LESS likely to 
cooperate and engage with the police? Explain. 
28. Is there anything relevant that you wish to add or believe to be of 
importance? 
Questions with more senior police 
1. Could you please explain what your understanding of community 
engagement is? 
2. Is rapport building with residents important for community engagement? 
Explain. 
3. How should this rapport be built? 
4. What is your understanding of prevention? 
5. How is community engagement relevant to the prevention of terrorism, 
extremism and radicalisation? 
6. Do you believe community engagement is having an impact on public 
cooperation? 
7. What do you think community engagement should be about? 
8. Do you believe community engagement has had any impact on prevention 
of terrorism, extremism, and radicalisation? How? 
9. How does community engagement take into consideration the complexity 
of community? 
10. How does community engagement recognise the different identities and 
communities within a neighbourhood? 
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11. Is there anything relevant that you wish to add or believe to be of 
importance? 
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Appendix B: Semi-Structured Interview Questions for Reporters  
 
1. Without exposing the individual reported (e.g. name), can you tell me: 
a) About the case you had reported? 
b) How are you related to this person? 
c) How would describe your relationship with this person? 
d) To Whom did you report? 
e) Why did you report to them? 
f) What specifically led you to report the individual? 
2. As a .... (Muslim, teacher, parent etc) what did the reporting of this 
individual meant to: 
a) You 
b) The individual and your relationship with the individual 
c) The community and your relationship with the community 
d) The neighbourhood and your relationship with the neighbours 
e) The family and your relationship with the family 
f) Anyone else that was involved  
3. How did you feel about reporting this person? Specifically your emotions. 
4. What did you think at the time of reporting/decision to report? Specifically 
your thought process. 
5. Did you experience (whether perceived or actual) stigma and prejudice 
(judgement) for wanting to/making the report? 
a) How did that make you feel? 
b) Did it have an impact on your reporting? 
6. Was any support available to you before, during and after making the 
report? 
a) What kind of support and from whom? 
7. Were you aware of the support available to you before you made the 
report? 
8. Did having/lacking support have any effect on your decision to report this 
individual? Please explain 
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9. Was there a sense of obligation for reporting this person? If so, where or 
who this sense of obligation came from? 
10. If you hadn’t have this sense of obligation, would you still have made your 
report? Please explain 
11. What is your general attitude towards the police? 
12. In what scenarios would you approach the police for help? 
13. In the scenarios you’ve explained will the relationship (e.g. friend, 
neighbour, parent, sibling, children, distant relatives etc) you have with the offender make 
you more reluctant to report? Could you explain why? 
14. Can you give a brief example of when you’ve had either direct or indirect 
experience with the police? 
a) How do you judge your experience with the police on the basis of how you 
were treated? 
b) Would you say your previous experience with the police had an influence 
on your decision to report the individual? If so please explain. 
15. What were the risks of reporting this individual? (e.g. to yourself, the 
individual, the family) 
16. What were the benefits of reporting this individual? (e.g. to yourself, the 
individual, the family) 
17. Did any of these risks or benefits specifically influence your decision to 
report? If so, which risk or benefit was specifically the driving force behind your report?  
18.  In general, how much contact did you have with the police in your daily 
life before making the report? 
19. Before making the report, did you have any form of contact or relationship 
with the community engagement officers in your area? 
20.  How good are the police at getting to know the community? 
21. Do the police meet with schools and community groups? 
a) Would you want to be in those meetings? 
22. Are here any police on the beat/patrols on foot in your neighbourhood? 
Does that matter to you? Why? 
23. Do you think that, if you talked to most of the people in your 
neighbourhood, you would find you agreed on many everyday issues?   
24. Do you think you are respected in your neighbourhood or are you 
targeted? Please explain. 
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25. Do you feel strong ties to your neighbourhood? Explain. 
26. Do you agree with this statement: 
"I agree with many of the values that define what the people in my community 
stand for in their lives"  
27. Do you feel strong ties to your community? Explain 
28. Do you feel your community is welcomed in your neighbourhood? Explain   
29. Community engagement is a policing strategy that is based on building 
relationships with the community, which enables a two-way information flow. This, in 
turn, allows the community to be more engaged in policing itself.  
a) Have you experienced this? 
b) What would you like engagement to involve? 
c) Do you think if engagement with the community was carried out the way 
you have described it, would it have any impact on your decision to report or how you 
made the report? 
30. A dialogue is a balanced two-way and cooperative communication method. 
Its purpose is to exchange information and build relationships. Is this what you 
experienced before, during and after making the report? 
a) Did this dialogue have an impact on your decision to report the individual?  
b) How would you describe the quality of dialogue between yourself and the 
police/the agency the report was made to?    
31. Is there anything relevant that you wish to add or believe to be of 
importance when it comes to reporting someone at risk of radicalisation or extremism? 
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Appendix C: Information Sheet and Consent Form 
Information 
This research project is being conducted by Neda Nobari Nazari, a doctoral researcher 
based at School of Law, University of Leeds, UK. The project examines how radicalisation 
and extremism is policed West Yorkshire (UK) and Aarhus (Denmark). The interviews are 
aimed at learning more about why people report vulnerable individuals at risk of 
radicalization/extremism and explore how they feel about community engagement; 
hence, these interviews will be recorded through audio and general notes. By 
understanding why people report and what they think about community engagement, we 
can give citizens the opportunity to get heard about this policing strategy, which may 
potentially inform policies and practices. The data may have to be shared with the 
regulatory authorities. 
This project has been ethically approved by the University of Leeds (Ethics Reference: 
AREA 16-046). Any confidential questions or concerns about the research can also be 
directed to Neda’s supervision team: Professor Adam Crawford (a.crawford@leeds.ac.uk) 
or Professor Edward Newman (e.newman@leeds.ac.uk). 
Participant Consent 
          
 Please tick 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the above 
information about the research and have had the 
chance to ask any questions 
 
2. I voluntarily agree to participate in the research on 
policing of radicalisation and extremism in UK and 
Denmark 
 
3. I agree that my anonymised interview with Neda 
will be recorded, transcribed, and archived 
 
4. I agree that my interview responses and/ or 
shadowing observation may be used in Neda’s 
doctoral thesis and research publications or reports 
and future research which are related to the project  
 
5. I understand that my participation in the research is 
voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
point before 01/12/17 
 
6. I understand that should I not wish to answer any 
particular question or questions, I am free to decline 
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7. I am aware that my identity is kept anonymous at all 
time, unless I ask otherwise.  
 
Signature of participant: …………………………….. Print name: …………….…………….….. 
Email: ………………………………………  Date (dd/mm/yyyy): …………………….. 
Signature of researcher: ……………………………...Print name: NEDA NOBARI NAZARI 
Email: n.nobari1@leeds.ac.uk     Date: (dd/mm/yyyy): ………………………….. 
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Appendix D: WYR1 Incident 
A teenage male student at college, from an Asian background was reported by the college 
due to having posted concerning material on Facebook. It was reported by other students 
who followed the individual on Facebook that he had stated he “can’t wait to go Jihad, and 
leave this land of Kafars”. The college worked closely with the Counter Terrorism Unit and 
Prevent Officer, and had arranged had arranged a meeting with them and the student to 
discuss what had happened. They also met with the parents, who were supportive.  
To begin with, the student denied he had written the statement, and that his account was 
hacked. He later said that he had in fact written those comments. The college 
representative and the officer questioned the student about his understanding of what 
was happening in Syria. His answers revealed that he did not know much factual 
information. He did not know who Assad was. He did not understand certain factions of 
Muslims were killing other Muslims. He was saying that he did not believe that Muslims 
should kill but in the next breath would say he was going to Syria to kill. He believed that 
the British army were responsible for the whole thing, even though, at the time, the British 
army were not present in Syria. He was clearly very surprised at the gap in his knowledge. 
The college holds an online profile of its students, and the staff had reported the subject 
had a good attendance, had good relationships with teachers, was very popular in the 
class, and had a good friendship group. However, this had dropped away a little It was 
decided at the time that he did not need a referral, and the subject did not go through 
Channel. The reason for this was that both the college staff and the officer met with the 
subject, who had accepted that his version of the truth might not be right and that there 
may be alternatives. The college met with him a few times and he was assigned a progress 
coach. The student seemed almost relieved that he was being mentored and guided.  
Subsequently, the college found out that two of his close friends (who were not students at 
the college) had gone to Syria, and that the subject had previously planned to go with 
them, but the intervention had helped him change his course. However, after this incident 
he was taken into Channel as his friends had kept in touch with the student, and passed 
their goodbye notes to him. In addition one of his friends died in Syria, and they were like 
brothers, which led to the subject struggling with guilt that he had not gone with his 
friends to Syria.  
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Appendix E: WYR2 Incident 
A charitable housing organisation received a call from one of their tenants through their 
call centre. The subject provided his name and address to the call-handler, and reported 
concerns about what he described as “suspicious and funny goings” at a property across 
the road. He described 6 or 7 Asian men frequenting a local takeaway shop and coming 
out several hours later. The caller had concerns about what these men were doing there. 
He felt that the premises were being used as an illegal place of worship. He did not have 
enough information to say which particular religion, but often described it as a mosque. 
This was an unusual call for the organisation, as they usually received calls relating to 
housing issues. The organisation would have usually passed the recoding from the call to 
the police for intelligence. However, the call started to take a different turn as the subject’s 
attitude changed completely. He moved from reporting his concern, to using volatile 
language. His views became more far right and racist in nature. He made assumptions as 
to why these Asian men were there and that they had taken residence. He became short-
tempered, hostile, intimidating, and his use of language made the call hander 
uncomfortable.  
The incident quickly moved from reporting a concern, which the subject did not feel was a 
police matter but wanted to make the organisation aware of, to language that was 
inflammatory and extremely opinionated. This caused concerns for the call-handler, who 
gave several warnings to the subject that the call would be terminated if he continued his 
manner. The subject failed to cooperate, and the call was ended. 
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Appendix F: WYR3 Incident 
A teenage male student had been referred to Prevent on two separate occasions. The 
subject was considered to be both a troubled individual and to be vulnerable. 
The student was a member of the Youth Parliament; however, there were some incidents 
that required investigation, which both the council and the college felt the individual was 
not the kind of voice that was representative of the students in West Yorkshire. He was 
also involved in setting up fictitious businesses from his parent’s address and creating 
debt. He had lots of issues with his parents; they tried to support him as much as possible, 
but the student rebelled against that. 
The first report was made by the college because it was believed he had participated in 
creating a website with another student that promoted anti-Muslim ideologies. Through 
the website, the students at the school were sent emails trying to encourage the students 
to sign up to their site and campaign against Muslims. It was also believed that he had 
hacked the college IT network and was being monitored closely. The IT specialists were 
brought in to investigate which students were involved, but they could not do so due to 
creators of the website having advanced knowledge. The second referral was due to the 
Youth Parliament council being contacted by the student under several different names, 
and the council was worried, given the history of the student and his ideologies. 
Both the council and the college believed the student to be vulnerable and needed to be 
referred to Channel. The second referral was made just after the student had left for 
university; as such, the university was kept informed. 
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Appendix G: Family Reporter Case Study 1 
The foster carers of a teenage Afghan boy reported concerns to the manager of the foster 
carers at the LA who passed it to the Prevent coordinators and the Counter Terrorism Unit 
were subsequently contacted. 
The individual had been living with his Pakistani foster parents for the last couple of 
years. One night, during dinner, the subject stated to his foster parents that he was 
planning to become a suicide bomber and wanted to blow up the house. He also said that 
he did not like people from Pakistan because they were racist. 
The subject was debriefed by couple of Prevent Officers; he explained he was attempting 
to be humorous. His foster parents agreed that they had not seen anything of a CT nature. 
They felt that ordinarily he can be problematic and that they dealt with majority of issues 
but due to the current climate they thought they needed a professional to take a closer 
look. Based on the balance of probabilities and the evidence, the CTU accepted the subject 
was attempting to be humorous. They provided the foster carers with guidance and 
support, as well as noting they should contact them if they had further concerns.  
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Appendix H: Family Reporter Case Study 2 
The mother of a male mental health patient reported concerns to the therapist who had 
been working with him. The vulnerable individual had posted material on Facebook that 
demonstrated extreme right wing views and conflicting Islamist ideologies. The subject 
seemed to be showing interest in the extreme right wing but he had also done a lot of 
research on Islamic State. Once these concerned were raised with the mental health 
partner, it was forwarded to Counter Terrorism Unit. 
As a result, the subject’s medication was changed, this made a vast improvement and the 
individual seemed more calm and relaxed. This then enabled the Prevent Officer to hold a 
conversation with the subject. He explained that he was really interested in world affairs 
and saw himself more as an online political activist. He clarified he was generally troubled 
around a whole host of different problems, including ethnic cleansing that was taking 
place in Myanmar. He expressed that only in the last few weeks since his medication had 
been changed his outlook on life had changed considerably. He had realised that at the 
time his medication was not working but he seemed to be unaware of the rhetoric that he 
was expressing. As a result of the debrief we the Prevent Officer found there were no 
serious terrorism or extremism related concerns at that point and did not see a need for 
Channel intervention, although initially the concerns were there. 
The individual is now out of the mental health accommodation and is being supported by 
the mental health partners. He is intending to seek a college placement to further his 
academic studies. 
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Appendix I: Family Reporter Case Study 3 
This case involved an Asian Muslim male, within a secure mental health organisation. He 
came from a single parent family. He had been detained under the Mental Health Act.   
The subject had been making comments that were seen as extreme by his family members 
who were visiting him. The mother stated that he was viewing and listening to sermons 
online of a known hard-line Islamist extremist. This concern was reported by the mother 
to the mental health profession, who then contacted the Counter Terrorism Unit.  
The individual was undergoing treatment and was not in a fit state for officers to interact 
with him. Once he was deemed fit, the officers spoke to him and his mother. As a result the 
threat was assessed and he entered the Channel programme. He has now exited the 
process with a successful conclusion. He is now in full-time employment, leading a more 
stable lifestyle, living at home with his mother. 
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Appendix J: UKR1 Incident 
A mother reported her teenage son after realising he had left for Syria. She described her 
son’s radicalisation as something that occurred over a course of a year. As he grew older 
he became interested in religion and politics. His parents saw a shift in his approach to the 
world, which they put down to teenage transition and expression. He started going to a 
different place of worship, and withdrawing from the family life. He was not sharing his 
feelings any longer but was more confrontational. He seemed ignited and wanted to do 
something about situation in Syria, which his parents said he could do plenty from the UK.  
However, just months before he left for Syria, all his passion seemed to have evaporated 
and he no longer had an opinion on anything. His mood had lifted and was close to the 
family again. The parents thought that he had come out of the phase he was going through, 
and they felt relieved. One morning he left the house and was not expected back until late. 
It was until they could not reach him that the parents started to panic and think something 
might have happened to him. They contacted various hospitals and reported him missing.  
It was a few days later when the mother received a text from her son in Syria. The parents 
directly went to headquarters this time and reported the incident to the CTU.  
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Appendix K: EJR1 Incident 
A senior teacher was involved in the reporting of a teenage pupil, whom he had a close 
relationship with and mentored. The reporter was part of a group of teaching staff that 
had discussed the reporting of this individual. The reporter was not the actual person who 
reported this incident. It was the school principal. This is because there is a process in 
place and also the school principal was already in contact with the Senior Prevention 
Officer from a previous meeting. However, the reporter was involved in the reporting 
process. 
The schoolboy was from a troubled background, with divorced parents. The reporter 
started to notice changes in him. He started hanging out with drug gangs and was no 
longer with his usual friends. Then he started attending mosque prayers. He converted to 
Islam and was spending a lot of time at the mosque, and his new-found friends from 
minority backgrounds. He would cite Arabic prayers at school and watched beheading 
videos. 
The school were concerned and so were his parents. The school had several meetings 
amongst themselves, as well with the Info-House practitioner. The school principal had 
previously taught a student who travelled to a conflict zone. This experience made the 
school principal uneasy. The team collectively made the decision to report the boy without 
informing the student or his parents, an unusual practice as in Demark they almost always 
include students and parents in the decision-making process.  
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Appendix L: EJR2 Incident 
The sister reported her teenage sister who had travelled to Syria without telling her 
relatives. They used to live together, and the reporter was her guardian. A year or two, 
prior to her leaving, she lost her father. From then she became more religious, but the 
family did not see anything that caused concern. She started having views about what was 
happening in Syria and her sister (the reporter) challenged her on those views. She 
regularly attended mosque. She started learning Arabic, becoming fluent within a year and 
was concerned about learning the right dialect. 
Meanwhile, there were cases of people who had left for Syria, including her friend and 
cousin. This had caused some concern. However, just before she left for Syria, she was 
back to ‘normal’. The night before she left, there was a gathering with her friends. She was 
very affectionate towards her sister and they stayed up until early hours in the morning 
watching YouTube videos and having a great time. 
The next morning she had left the house very early without waking anyone. There was an 
assumption that she had gone to an event at the mosque. However, she was not answering 
her phone and that caused concerns. The reporter found her sister’s set of keys in the 
post-box and immediately recognised that her sister had left for Syria. She called her 
sister’s friend and realised she was missing too. She called their mother but her mother 
did not want to go to the police. By the time she had convinced the family that making a 
report was the right thing to do it was already midnight. Unfortunately by the time the 
report was made, it was too late to prevent the vulnerable individual from travelling to a 
conflict zone. 
The officer at the police station was very blunt about what could have happened to the 
vulnerable individual, and told the family she was likely to be a sex slave. This was very 
hard for the reporter to hear and caused emotional distress. The officer said there was 
nothing they could, as the Info-House was closed until 9am the next day. They were 
advised to come back in the morning. The next day she went to the Info-House by herself 
and reported the case. 
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Appendix M: Publicly Available Home Office Data on Prevent referrals from 2016-2018 
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Appendix N: Danish Legal Materials – Citation of Key Measures with Google 
English Translation 
Relevant to p.105 and elsewhere, Bekendtgørelse af lov om social service (eg as 
consolidated by No. 1096 of 2010) (Social Services Act): 
s. 153. Socialministeren kan i en bekendtgørelse fastsætte regler, hvorefter personer, 
der udøver offentlig tjeneste eller offentligt hverv, skal underrette kommunen, hvis de 
under udøvelsen af tjenesten eller hvervet får kendskab til forhold, der giver 
formodning om, at et barn eller en ung under 18 år har behov for særlig støtte. 
Stk. 2. Socialministeren kan i en bekendtgørelse fastsætte regler om underretningspligt 
for andre grupper af personer, der under udøvelse af deres erhverv får kendskab til 
forhold, som bevirker, at der kan være anledning til foranstaltninger efter denne lov. 
Stk. 3. Socialministeren kan i en bekendtgørelse fastsætte regler, hvorefter personer, 
der udøver offentlig tjeneste eller offentligt hverv, skal underrette kommunen, hvis de 
under udøvelsen af deres tjeneste eller hverv får kendskab til en gravid kvinde med 
alvorlige misbrugsproblemer, der giver formodning om, at der er behov for støtte. 
Socialministeren kan i en bekendtgørelse fastsætte tilsvarende regler for andre 
grupper, der under udøvelsen af deres erhverv får kendskab til sådanne forhold. 
Stk. 4. Socialministeren kan i en bekendtgørelse fastsætte regler, hvorefter 
1) praktiserende læger, speciallæger og andre, der virker inden for social- og 
sundhedsvæsenet, kan videregive oplysninger om børn og unge under 18 år med 
nedsat synsfunktion til John F. Kennedy Instituttet – Statens Øjenklinik, for at klinikken 
kan varetage sine behandlingsmæssige og administrative aktiviteter, og 
2) John F. Kennedy Instituttet – Statens Øjenklinik kan videregive de oplysninger, der 
er nævnt i nr. 1, til social-, sundheds- og undervisningsmyndigheder for at sikre, at 
nødvendige foranstaltninger til afhjælpning af nedsat synsfunktion kan iværksættes. 
s. 154. Den, der får kendskab til, at et barn eller en ung under 18 år fra forældres eller 
andre opdrageres side udsættes for vanrøgt eller nedværdigende behandling eller 
lever under forhold, der bringer dets sundhed eller udvikling i fare, har pligt til at 
underrette kommunen. 
English Translation 
s. 153. The Minister of Social Affairs may, in an executive order, lay down rules 
according to which persons who perform public service or public office must notify the 
municipality if, during the performance of the service or profession, they obtain 
information that presupposes that a child or young person under 18 needs special 
support. 
PCS. 2. The Minister of Social Affairs may, in an executive order, lay down rules on the 
obligation to provide information for other groups of persons who, in the course of 
their profession, become aware of circumstances which may give rise to measures 
under this Act. 
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PCS. 3. The Minister of Social Affairs may, in an executive order, lay down rules under 
which persons performing public service or public office must notify the municipality 
if, during the performance of their service or duties, they become aware of a pregnant 
woman with serious abuse problems who presumes that support is needed. The 
Minister of Social Affairs may, in an executive order, lay down similar rules for other 
groups who, in the course of their occupation, gain knowledge of such matters. 
PCS. 4. The Minister of Social Affairs may, in an executive order, lay down rules 
according to which 
1) GPs, specialty physicians and others working in the social and health care system 
may disclose information on children and adolescents under the age of 18 with visual 
impairment to the John F. Kennedy Institute - State Eye Clinic so that the clinic can 
handle its treatment and administrative activities, and 
2) The John F. Kennedy Institute - State Eye Clinic may disclose the information 
referred to in paragraph 1 to social, health and education authorities to ensure that 
necessary measures to remedy vision impairment can be implemented. 
s. 154. Anyone who becomes aware that a child or young person under the age of 18 is 
being subjected to neglect or degrading treatment by parents or other caregivers or is 
living in conditions that jeopardize its health or development are required to notify the 
municipality. 
 
 Relevant to p.107 and elsewhere, the Danish Bekendtgørelse af lov om rettens 
pleje (consolidated 1139 of 2013) (Administration of Justice Act)  
    s.115 Politiet kan videregive oplysninger om enkeltpersoners rent private forhold til 
andre myndigheder, hvis videregivelsen må anses for nødvendig af hensyn til 
        1) det kriminalitetsforebyggende samarbejde (SSP-samarbejdet), 
        2) politiets samarbejde med de sociale myndigheder og social- og 
behandlingspsykiatrien som led i indsatsen over for socialt udsatte personer (PSP-
samarbejdet) eller 
        3) samarbejdet mellem kriminalforsorgen, de sociale myndigheder og politiet 
(KSP-samarbejdet) som led i indsatsen over for 
            a) dømte, der løslades fra institutioner under kriminalforsorgen, 
            b) dømte under 18 år, der løslades fra institutioner m.v. uden for 
kriminalforsorgen, hvor de er anbragt i henhold til § 78, stk. 2, i lov om fuldbyrdelse af 
straf m.v., og 
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            c) personer, der løslades fra varetægtsfængsling eller anden frihedsberøvende 
foranstaltning efter kapitel 70, hvis de skønnes at være radikaliserede eller i risiko for 
at blive det. 
    Stk. 2. I samme omfang som nævnt i stk. 1 kan en myndighed videregive oplysninger 
om enkeltpersoner til politiet og andre myndigheder, der indgår i de former for 
samarbejde, som er nævnt i stk. 1. Oplysningerne må i forbindelse med de nævnte 
former for samarbejde ikke videregives med henblik på efterforskning af straffesager. 
    Stk. 3. Inddrages selvejende institutioner, der løser opgaver for det offentlige inden 
for social-, undervisnings- og beskæftigelsesområdet eller social- og 
behandlingspsykiatrien, i de former for samarbejde, som er nævnt i stk. 1, kan der i 
samme omfang som nævnt i stk. 1 og 2 udveksles oplysninger mellem myndighederne 
og institutionerne. 
    Stk. 4. De myndigheder og institutioner, der indgår i de former for samarbejde, som 
er nævnt i stk. 1, er ikke forpligtet til at videregive oplysninger efter stk. 1-3. 
    s.115a Politiet kan videregive fortrolige oplysninger vedrørende personer, der er 
fyldt 18 år, til forældre eller andre, herunder familiemedlemmer, der har lignende 
tætte relationer til den pågældende person, hvis videregivelsen må anses for 
nødvendig som led i en kriminalitetsforebyggende indsats over for personen. 
English Translation 
    s.115 The police may disclose information about individuals' purely private matters 
to other authorities if the disclosure is deemed necessary for the sake of 
        1) crime prevention cooperation (SSP cooperation); 
        2) police cooperation with the social authorities and the social and treatment 
psychiatry as part of the action against socially vulnerable persons (PSP cooperation) 
or 
        3) cooperation between the Prison and Probation Service, the social authorities 
and the police (KSP cooperation) as part of the action against 
            (a) convicted persons released from institutions under the Prison and Probation 
Service; 
            (b) convicted persons under the age of 18 who are released from institutions, etc. 
outside the prison, where they are placed in accordance with section 78 (2). 2 of the 
Act on the Enforcement of Punishment, etc., and 
            (c) persons released from custody or other custodial measure under Chapter 70 
if they are deemed to be radicalized or at risk of becoming so.  
    PCS. 2nd To the same extent as mentioned in paragraph 1.2. In accordance with 
paragraph 1, an authority may disclose information about individuals to the police and 
other authorities involved in the forms of cooperation referred to in paragraph 1.1. In 
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connection with the aforementioned forms of cooperation, the information must not be 
disclosed for the purpose of investigating criminal cases. 
    PCS. 3rd The self-governing institutions that solve tasks for the public in the social, 
educational and employment or social and treatment psychiatry are included in the 
forms of cooperation referred to in paragraph 1.1, to the same extent as mentioned in 
paragraph 1. Paragraphs 1 and 2 exchange information between the authorities and 
the institutions. 
    PCS. 4th The authorities and institutions involved in the forms of cooperation 
referred to in para. 1 is not required to disclose information pursuant to subsection (1). 
1-3.  
    s.115a The police may disclose confidential information regarding persons over the 
age of 18 to parents or others, including family members who have similar close 
relationships with the person concerned, if the disclosure is deemed necessary as part 
of a crime prevention action against the person.  
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Appendix O: Policy Brief 
 
By Neda Richards 
Better Reporting To Prevent 
Radicalisation, Extremism, 
and Terrorism 
New empirical research findings recommend changes 
to policy and practice, in relation to counterterrorism 
community engagement, to encourage and improve 
the reporting of radicalisation and extremism. 
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Context and Importance 
of the Problem 
Prevention of radicalisation, extremism, 
and terrorism relies upon good quality 
intelligence. One source of intelligence is 
through formal reporting of concerns. 
Research shows most reports come from 
professionals, and very few from the 
relatives and close associates. Moreover, 
only a small fraction of these reports make 
it to Channel or meet Channel thresholds. 
Practitioners argue that this is because the 
majority of referrals are “malicious, 
misguided or misinformed”.  
Currently, the problem is that professionals 
report too quickly, without having the 
appropriate supporting evidence, fearing 
Policy Brief 
Key Findings & Recommendations 
1. Poor quality reports of radicalisation and extremism, including those lacking 
supportive evidence, persist despite policy changes intended to encourage 
reporting from professionals, and despite the training available to this group. 
2. Most reports about radicalisation and extremism are made by professionals, 
notably education and mental health services, and very few relatives or close 
associates report concerns. 
3. Community engagement has proved to be effective in encouraging reports 
from relatives and close associates. 
4. To help with prevention, the Counterterrorism Community Engagement 
(CTCE) Logic Model provides a framework to encourage and improve 
reporting behaviour through community engagement, with a focus on 
relatives and close associates. 
5. Those seeking to encourage reporting must be aware that (a) reporting needs 
to be made easy and feasible by reducing the cost of reporting and making the 
reporter knowledgeable – for example better training; (b) the psychological 
underpinnings of reporting behaviour needs to be addressed in order to 
encourage people to come forward. 
6. It is recommended that the policy and practice related to counterterrorism 
community engagement - including radicalisation and extremism awareness 
trainings – to reflect the need of reporters. 
Source 1 
302 
 
repercussions, which leads to poor quality 
reports that do not meet the Channel 
threshold. While relatives and close 
associates are too slow to report. This 
poses a serious question for the prevention 
of radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism: 
how can authorities encourage people 
reporting their concerns, whilst 
ensuring good quality reports, in 
addition to increasing reports from 
relatives or close associates? The latter 
group is more likely to first notice the signs 
in a vulnerable individual, and time is often 
vital to the prevention of an act of 
criminality.  
 
Understanding reporting 
behaviours and the reasons for reporting 
are important for creating and 
strengthening appropriate processes, 
practices, and policies which encourage and 
improve reporting in the counterterrorism 
context.  
The comparative study of East Jutland 
(Denmark) and West Yorkshire (UK) found 
that although other confounding factors 
may be involved, the Info-House - a 
multiagency prevention approach - in East 
Jutland has managed to increase reports of 
radicalisation and extremism through 
community engagement and working 
closely with relatives.  
There is evidence that the application of 
psychological interventions in the delivery 
of community engagement may be helpful 
in addressing fears of reporting – a major 
factor in influencing the decision to report. 
Encouraging Reporting 
Contrary to some belief, those worried 
about radicalisation or extremism do want 
to be able to raise and discuss their 
concerns. However, there are various 
barriers that make it challenging for 
reporters - especially relatives and close 
associates - to come forward. These 
include: 
1. Lack of understanding of 
psychological factors involved when 
reporting radicalisation and extremism – 
Psychological factors that influence this 
behaviour have mainly surrounded the 
notion of one’s identity, as through this 
medium one manoeuvres in life. Identity 
influences responsibilities, attitudes, 
values, respect, perceived control and 
power, relationships, and how people 
perceive others (e.g. are they going to harm 
or help us?). In turn, these factors shape the 
cost-benefit of reporting in a given 
situation.  
Source 2  
Source 2 
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UK government in the early 1990s 
managed to increase legitimate reports of 
Irish related terrorism by 700% by 
releasing advertisements that 
addressed psychological 
underpinnings associated with identity. 
The CTCE Logic Model (Figure 1) is an 
evidence-based approach to community 
engagement with the intention to increase 
reporting and assist with prevention by 
addressing these psychological factors, as 
well as building a stronger public 
relationship with the authorities. 
2. Inadequate policies – There are 
both positive and negative implications that 
result from policies, despite their good 
intention. For example, although the 
Prevent Duty has increased reports from 
statutory authorities (e.g. education 
services), these reports are not necessarily 
good in terms of quality.  
Professionals within the education services 
sometimes report for the fear of running 
foul of Ofsted compliance standards or 
facing punishment. As such, this hastiness 
results in the reporter failing to obtain 
evidence to support their concern - a 
crucial step that is covered in training. 
Policies that have helped with reporting are 
Figure 1: Counterterrorism Community Engagement (CTCE) Logic Model, source 2. 
Neda Richards, Preventative Counterterrorism Policing: The Impact of Community Engagement on Public 
Cooperation, under consideration at University of Leeds. 
 
Source 2  
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also S. 115 of the Danish Administrative 
Justice Act, as it allows sharing of 
information between partner agencies for 
prevention purposes but also inhibits the 
use of information obtained for purpose of 
prevention in a criminal court for 
prosecution. This, in turn, has enabled 
concerned individuals, as well as at-risk 
individuals to talk openly about their 
situation. 
3. Reporting processes & access to 
specialists - there is a need for informal 
reporting processes that encourage open 
dialogue and access to a specialist who can 
provide guidance and support in relation to 
radicalisation and extremism. Fear of 
consequences has a major impact on 
reporting behaviour. Reporters do not want 
to make a mistake of reporting apparent 
‘ghosts’ or not reporting.  
Being able to spot the signs of 
radicalisation and extremism is very 
difficult - especially for a lay person. 
Therefore, access to such processes and 
individuals provide the reporter with 
confidence that they are free to raise their 
apprehension without having to fear that 
formal action will take place. Most reports 
show that concerns are not necessarily 
counterterrorism-related. Therefore, user-
friendly reporting processes are vital. The 
Info-House in East Jutland is open to 
everyone who is in need of help and 
guidance. It is an information hub, as well 
as a place where reporters can access 
support and advice more informally.  
4. Lack of public knowledge and 
awareness – there is uncertainty around 
counterterrorism strategies and the 
practices. There is a lack of knowledge in 
what kind of support is available to those in 
need, and where it can be sought from. 
Access to user-friendly and appropriate 
information is vital to shaping a better 
understanding of the investigation and 
rehabilitation process in the pre-criminal 
stage. This induces transparency, as well, as 
assists with gaining trust and confidence in 
the system. 
5. Lack of support and inclusion of 
relatives of the vulnerable – Parents 
Network set up by Info-House and close 
working relationship with this group raised 
awareness about support available to them 
through word of mouth. This led to an 
increase in reporting from this cohort, 
where parents informed the agency directly 
of the return of their child from conflict 
zones. By treating relatives and close 
associates in this way, relevant authorities 
are able to identify their needs better and 
provide them with the support needed. 
Knowledge and access to such support 
decrease the fear and cost of reporting. 
6. Resource - Lack of resources has 
resulted in a reactive engagement, short 
exposure to raising awareness, and support 
for reporters. Without sufficient funding or 
inadequate staff the quality of service 
declines with negative implications for 
reporting. For example, some areas, which 
are not deemed priority to Prevent funding 
but are still required to raise awareness, 
fail to do so comprehensively. 
As a preventative strategy, Community 
engagement may help address these 
barriers to reporting. Currently, 
counterterrorism community engagement 
is reactive rather than proactive, 
inconsistent, and is not evidence-based.  
Improving Reporting 
Inhibitors to good quality reports include: 
1. Some professional reporters do not 
follow the training provided (for the reasons 
explained earlier). This leads to skipping 
crucial steps prior to reporting. 
Professionals (e.g. teachers, doctors, and 
mental health practitioners) are required to 
spot the signs, check them by gaining 
evidence to support their concern, and then 
report them. However, what happens is 
that checking for evidence is missed. This 
leads to reports not meeting threshold 
required to be recommended for early 
intervention programmes such as Channel, 
as well as excessive reporting. 
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2. Lack of feedback results in 
uncertainties for the reporter. The study 
revealed there is a lack of feedback to 
reporters, which may be due to the volume 
of reporting and lack of resources. For 
example, this includes ‘have they reported 
the right concerns?’, ‘what other 
information could have improved the 
report?’, ‘why the report did not meet the 
threshold?’, and ‘was their view valued?’ 
Feedback provides guidance, support, and 
inclusion that is needed to encourage better 
quality reports. Such lack of inclusion can 
have a negative impact on reporters’ 
morale and self-esteem, with implications 
for whether they might report in the future.  
3. Lack of comprehensive and 
appropriate training for practitioners and 
statutory agency professionals. Not all 
Prevent training is delivered by specialists 
(e.g. Prevent or Channel Officers) who deal 
with radicalisation and extremism, and its 
assessment on daily basis; this may be 
ineffective. The training process currently, 
allows for managers in organisations to be 
trained, and are then required sharing that 
knowledge with their staff within their 
organisation through training. This results 
in Chinese-whisper style of training with 
gaps in knowledge and skills. Training is 
not provided based on guidelines or for an 
appropriate length of time (e.g. a minimum 
of two hours). Local authorities deliver 
training as short as 20 minutes to cover 
counterterrorism awareness, which is not 
sufficient to address complex issues such as 
radicalisation and extremism and results in 
a ticking process. Additionally, these 
individuals do not have the expertise to 
answer any specialist queries, resulting in 
inadequate training. Finally, workshops 
and training that are evidence-based have 
been found to be more effective in Aarhus, 
Denmark.  
4. Stop incentive funding. This is 
linked to the issue of resources and 
training, as well as policy issues. Due to the 
pressure to raise awareness and lack of 
funding, the research has found that some 
Local Authorities deliver short awareness 
training, like a ticking process. Therefore, 
the quality of training drops for the sake of 
receiving funding through the quantity of 
training delivered. As mentioned earlier, 
poor training can result in poor reports, 
and this is not a risk that can be afforded in 
the counterterrorism context. 
What Needs To Be Done? 
Short-Term Recommendations 
 Create a multi-agency information 
hub, where it is possible for the members 
of the public, practitioners, and 
vulnerable individuals to seek guidance 
and support from counterterrorism 
professionals. In Aarhus, Denmark, this 
hub is on the police premises, operated by 
multi-agency staff. The hub imitates a 
living room within a home, which takes 
away the formality and promotes a 
relaxed atmosphere. It is recommended 
for the UK to adopt a similar approach, as 
it enables the individual to discuss issues 
openly in a comfortable environment, 
their needs are signposted and provided 
the support required by the appropriate 
agency. Also, from the start, there is 
transparency in who is involved in the 
process. 
 Conduct audits of training sessions 
for professionals tasked with identifying 
and preventing radicalisation to ensure 
the prioritisation of quality. 
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 Remove funding incentives that 
encourage increases in the quantity of 
training rather than quality. 
 Apply the CTCE Logic Model to 
community engagement practices to 
engage with the psychological 
underpinnings of reporting, and build 
closer relationships with relatives/close 
associates. 
 Increase active community 
engagement and dialogue. The UK needs 
to be less risk-averse when it comes to 
having “difficult conversations”. More 
needs to be done in identifying 
opportunities to have dialogue. It is 
important to understand that dialogue is 
not about changing opinions but to listen 
in order to identify a common ground that 
parties can utilise to work together that 
ultimately will help with prevention.  
 Working with relatives/close 
associates is vital to an all-round 
approach to prevention. For example, in 
Iceland inclusion of parents in the 
prevention of youth anti-social behaviour 
has been positive, as well as the works of 
Info-House with parents of vulnerable 
individuals. 
Long-Term Recommendations 
 Improve the quality of training and 
awareness workshops through an 
evidence-based approach, which aims to 
inform better practice and be more 
effective, as well as useful training. 
 More investment in youth services 
is needed, as they can engage with young 
people and their families to raise 
awareness and safeguard. In Denmark 
youth services are very active in 
prevention of radicalisation and 
extremism. 
 Funding for community 
engagement needs to increase but also 
needs to be more targeted. Review 
funding policies that negatively impact 
practice – these may be identified through 
an audit. 
 Audit training sessions, delivery of 
workshops, and reporting processes for a 
better understanding of bottlenecks. 
 Invest in advertisements that 
connect with individual’s core social 
identity (e.g. being a parent) and sense of 
responsibility associated with that role, 
and focus on delivering facts about the 
services and the support available to 
them. Publicity can be used as a form of 
engagement and sharing of information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source 1: Home Office (2018) ‘Individuals 
referred to and supported through the Prevent 
Programme, April 2016 to March 2017’ 
Source 2: Neda Richards, (forthcoming), 
Preventative Counterterrorism Policing: The Impact 
of Community Engagement on Public Cooperation, 
University of Leeds. 
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